

ITALY AND THE JUGOSLAVS

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HISTORY I

TO THE
AMERICAN

Made in the United States of America

The Gorham Press, Boston, U. S. A.

"The South Slavs have been the fighting slaves and the farming serfs of Central Europe for centuries, and it is their struggle for freedom that has upset the European equilibrium and set in motion the mobilization machines."

YOUNG, GEORGE, Nationalism and War in the Near East, p. xlv.

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PREFACE

The Adriatic problem is to-day the most dangerous part of the Balkan situation and one of the two or three greatest dangers to the peace of Europe and hence to the peace of the whole world. It involves not merely the economic and political freedom of Yugoslavia but also the economic and political stability of Austria, Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia and South Germany. All of these countries must seek avenues of trade with the outside world through the Adriatic ports and they are vitally concerned in the question as to whether one power is to have exclusive control of the whole Adriatic and to levy toll on all commerce through its ports or whether those ports are to be under different national controls and in fair competition for the trade of Central Europe. Shut in upon themselves and strangled by an Adriatic tariff wall, the Central Europeans would find it impossible to reorganize and stabilize their governments and would fall easy prey to Bolshevism and other forms of social unrest.

Other disputes, such as the boundaries between Rumania and Yugoslavia, between Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia and between Bulgaria and Rumania, are in process of settlement, and with seemingly good prospects. But the Italian and the Yugoslav claims are so fundamentally inconsistent, and the two nations seem so determined upon them that there is no possibility of satisfying fully the demands of either nation and slight probability of arriving at a compromise that will not strengthen and keep alive for many years the present antagonism between them. Ever since the armistice there has been the possibility that some clash or other incident, unimportant in itself, might plunge Italy

and Jugoslavia into war, drain still further the resources of these two nations, already distressed by the burdens of the World War, and, at the expense of the masses, give further advantage to the imperialist and militarist elements in both.

The Adriatic question was among the most difficult problems before the Peace Conference, especially difficult because it involved the secret Pact of London. President Wilson and the American delegation stood alone against Italy's demands for what she had been promised by the Treaty, but the British and ultimately the French refused to give Fiume in addition to the promised territory. The course of the negotiations in the Peace Conference and afterwards in the Supreme Council, up to the Italian parliamentary election of November, 1919, has been followed in the chapters of this book. The election showed little but the indifference of the middle classes, the activity of the Roman Catholics and of the Socialists and the almost total lack of political consciousness of the Italian peasants. The Official or anti-war Socialists have 156 members of the 508 already elected and can reasonably expect more from Trieste when the elections are held in the redeemed districts. The Catholics have 101 and will doubtless gain a few more from the Trentino. The acknowledged followers of Giolitti were defeated almost to a man, but "the Boss" himself was elected. Over 300 new men have seats in the Chamber and among these are some workingmen who bring first-hand knowledge of working class conditions in place of the made-in-Germany socialistic theories previously expounded in the Italian Parliament. The Socialists received their increase of votes largely not from adherents to socialistic tenets but from people who are discontented with present conditions and weary of war and intrigue. Nitti, who retains the Premiership, counts upon 259 Constitutional Deputies representing moderate tendencies and upon the Catholics, two of whom are members of his Cabinet. He has continued and strength-

ened the alliance with the Catholics and the Vatican begun by Giolitti in the election of 1904.

The Nitti Ministry inherited many difficulties from the Orlando-Sonnino Ministry. There is no doubt that the latter Ministry had encouraged the demand for Fiume in order to divert the attention of the people from the pressing domestic problems—the old, old political game of trying to make the people forget their sufferings at home by pointing to national glories won or to be won abroad. The Orlando-Sonnino Ministry did not at any time bring before the Italian people the bearing upon Italy's claims of President Wilson's repudiation of all secret treaties. Long before the Peace Conference met at Paris it was known that Wilson did not support the Italian position in its entirety. Tittoni has said quite frankly in the Italian Chamber of Deputies that Europe was dependent upon America and that Wilson was the Arbiter almost as soon as the United States had entered the War and still more certainly at Paris. He has blamed Orlando for not making this fact clear to the Italians.

Tittoni has represented a party of compromise on the Adriatic question. A proposition drawn by him was presented in Washington last October. It suggested the creation of a buffer state consisting of Fiume and the surrounding territory and connected with the Trieste district by Italian possession of Eastern Istria. President Wilson found himself unable to accept this proposition and made a counter proposal. This was announced by Scialoja, who had become Foreign Minister upon the resignation of Tittoni shortly after the election, to be unacceptable to the Italians because it would not fully neutralize Dalmatia and would leave Sebenico and Cattaro to Jugoslavia without sufficient guarantee for the safety of the Italian coast.

Nitti has constantly professed his willingness and eagerness to arrive at a settlement of the Adriatic question but has just as constantly refused to concede any substantial

change beyond the Tittoni proposals. He and Scialoia have led their countrymen to hope that the British and the French would secure from the Americans concessions for Italy though Scialoia admitted in December that sentiment in England and in France was against serious concessions to Italy in the Adriatic without the consent of the United States. This news gave new life to the cry "Italy stands alone," which had been raised when Orlando withdrew from the Conference. This feeling has done much toward uniting Italy in support of Nitti but it has also had the effect of strengthening the influences working for the revival of Italo-German relations.

Italy has accepted a settlement of the Adriatic question as drawn up by Lloyd George and Clemenceau making Fiume an autonomous city under the League. The Italians insisted upon having incorporated in the plan the granting to Italy of territorial connection with the city. Nitti announced this as Italy's last effort at compromise and the only alternative to demanding the enforcement of the Treaty of London, which would give the whole of Dalmatia to Italy. This proposal as amended and accepted by Italy was forwarded to Belgrade. The Jugoslavs have refused to accept it. They object to Italy's having territorial connection with Fiume, and especially by possession of Eastern Istria or Volosca with its almost purely Slavic population. They state that they are willing to accept the proposals of President Wilson but that officially they know nothing of the Treaty of London, mentioned by Italy as the only alternative to the proposal. The question now rests with the French and the British as to whether the Treaty of London shall be carried out immediately or whether efforts at compromise shall be renewed.

Nitti has been playing for time, hoping that meanwhile Italy would become tired of D'Annunzio's play in Fiume and would become more amenable to cooler leadership. In spite of the predictions that his ministry would last but

a short time he has steadily grown stronger with the Italians. His efforts have been directed toward the improvement of internal conditions, the rebuilding of the devastated provinces, the decreasing of unemployment, the handling of strikes and other measures of reconstruction.

The United States had, before its entry into the war, a very grave responsibility in this and in other European questions involving the peace of Europe and of the world. That responsibility for guarding and for advancing the international ideals of justice has grown with the growth of the part taken by our nation in the war. The responsibility of this world leadership has been scarcely recognized by the American people and since the armistice we have been drifting back into the old time spirit of isolation and remoteness. The promised land of world leadership in idealism, in the protection of small nations, in the education and advancement of backward peoples and in the great general task of sustaining the burdens of the world, that promised land pointed out by the President and by his words and deeds preëmpted for the United States, has failed to wean the American people from the hope of enjoying the old traditional isolation and selfish commercialism.

This book has been written with the hope of helping in some small degree to improve the quality of American thinking on international questions and especially on the Adriatic problem. It is intended to present as much as possible of the material available in this country on the historical background of this problem and on its development during and since the war. The American position on the question has been too much treated as if it were the personal position of Mr. Wilson. The problem is still unsolved and it needs the careful thought of Americans. The lack of understanding and of definite opinion in this country has hindered, to our shame, the settlement of this and other international difficulties.

Even in arranging and presenting in a way as impartial

as has been herein attempted the positions and arguments of the two nations most concerned, the writers have been unable to avoid expressing some preference of their own. It is hoped and believed that such inclination or decision is not partisan but the natural and inevitable result of investigation. The making of this study has strengthened the conviction in the minds of the writers that most peoples are poorly served, badly misled, and sadly misrepresented by their governments. Mr. Seton-Watson voiced this feeling when he said recently, "Serbia owes the recovery of her independence and the achievement of Yugoslav unity—next to the Grand Alliance—to the moral endurance of the nation in arms and to the sterling qualities of the Serbian peasant, not to the politicians to whose exploitation he has too long submitted." Italy likewise, through the moral strength and sterling worth of her peasants and workmen, has survived many mistakes and misdeeds at the hands of her politicians. She is still paying for those mistakes and misdeeds and must continue to pay for many a year as the cost is great. But she is now entering upon better days.

In preparing these pages *The New Europe* has been invaluable. It has added to the debt owed by the writers and by other students of Balkan affairs to Mr. Seton-Watson. The *New York Times*, the *New York Times Current History* and the *Christian Science Monitor* have supplied much valuable material.

Mr. Henry Rood, Director of the Italian Bureau of Public Information in New York, very courteously placed the resources of his office at the disposal of the writers and supplied the Italian Memorandum to the Peace Conference and other material. Mr. V. R. Savic has supplied material which has been of great assistance. It is a pleasure to thank these gentlemen for their courtesy. Our thanks are also due to Miss Laura Ley of Smith College for her generous help in the preparation of the manuscript.

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ITALY AND THE JUGOSLAVS



ITALY AND THE JUGOSLAVS

CHAPTER I

ITALY AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

ONE of the greatest proofs of the democratization of the war aims of the Allies is to be found in the attitude with which many people are regarding the controversy between the government of Italy and the people whose national aspirations lead them to claim the eastern coast of the Adriatic. The policies of President Wilson, of the British Labour party and of the early Russian Revolution are transforming the foreign policies of Europe, that is, the Europe of the Allies, and we may hope that the influence will later be felt by the Central Powers.

Italy has had a hard task in this war and perhaps we have not always appreciated her difficulties and given her due credit for what she has accomplished and suffered. In 1914 when the war broke out, her army was in a state of disorganization and public funds were far from plentiful. Foreign policy is, as a rule, a matter of business and not of sentiment. We must remember that Italian unity is a comparatively recent achievement and not firmly cemented. The population is poor and has a larger percentage of illiterates than any other country of Western Europe. The Italian peasants are hard working and frugal but too poor and too conservative to apply scientific methods to farming. Many agricultural cooperative societies established by the Socialists and by the Catholics have endeavoured to remedy conditions by establishing rural banks and by introducing

better methods of tilling and marketing. The North is more industrialized than the South but its prosperity, as we now know, was based largely on German banks and German business, controlled and directed by German managers even though there was relatively little German capital invested in Italy.

The lack of coal and iron hampers the industrial life of Italy, though the lack of coal is being made good by the use of the many streams to generate electric power. The taxes are heavy and the brunt is borne by the poorer classes, as taxes are laid upon necessities such as bread and sugar and salt. Until the reforms in the finances of 1905-06 were made by Luigi Luzzatti, the national treasury showed a yearly deficit. Of course, Italy has had her share of increasing prosperity in the last few years and there are evidences of prosperity in her growing merchant marine. In Tunis, in Egypt, and in Asia Minor there are flourishing Italian colonies and the Italians have established very considerable trading interests in the Egyptian hinterland, and in Abyssinia, in Somaliland and in Tripoli. But the pressure of population is still felt. There has arisen the curious phenomenon of seasonal emigration to South America and practically one-seventh of the Italian people are living under foreign flags. In 1914, Italy had not recovered from the strain of the Turkish war. Lombardy and Romagna were experiencing economic difficulties; industrial unrest was showing itself in revolutionary outbreaks and strikes, and, as we shall see, many felt that peace was the thing that was most needed.

When war broke out in August, 1914, Italy was a member of the Triple Alliance. How did it happen that she was in this position? From 1848 until 1870, Italy was engaged in the task of achieving national unity. On the whole, she was left to accomplish this through her own efforts. England, it is true, lent spasmodic patronage but gave no material aid. Austria was actively opposed to

the movement. Louis Napoleon helped Italy to get Lombardy in 1859 but either discouraged or positively vetoed the acquisition of Venetia, Central Italy and Rome, and gained Savoy for himself. Through aiding Prussia in the war of 1866, Italy gained Venetia but the Trentino and Istria were left within the Austrian Empire. The Franco-Prussian war changed conditions in France, stopped her interfering in favor of the Vatican, and enabled Italy to make Rome her capital. After 1871, France gave her chief attention to internal affairs. Her foreign policy was extremely cautious. It was no secret that, in Austria, in Germany, and also in France, many advocated restoration of the temporal power of the Pope and were willing to use force to gain their end. Italy constantly feared the advent to power of the Clerical party in Paris and was also suspicious of the Mediterranean ambitions of France.

In 1872, an alliance was formed between Germany, Austria and Russia. It had no firm basis for it was against the interests of Russia to allow France to be crushed; and, between Austria and Russia, there was always the question of the Near East. Since the loss of Venetia, Austria had become more interested in the Balkans. The military authorities constantly advised the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. An uprising in these two provinces in 1875 against the Turkish administration was the immediate cause of general Balkan disturbances which culminated in war between Russia and Turkey and led to the Congress of Berlin. Austria obtained from the Congress the right to occupy and administer Bosnia and Herzegovina and also to occupy the district of Novibazar. Russia obtained some few concessions but left the Congress enraged at her treatment. The alliance could not last. Neither Russia nor Germany was ready to grant the other a perfectly free hand against France and Austria respectively. Bismarck knew that Russia would never support him against France, and, in spite of the preference of the old Emperor William for

Russia, the Austro-German Alliance was signed October 7, 1879. It was purely defensive in character but was really a dam against Pan-Slavism and had the effect of isolating France.

Italy also had left the Congress disappointed. She had not dared to oppose the gains of Austria nor to ask any compensation for herself, though she was anxious to secure Tunis. But France also desired Tunis. When her representative, Waddington, on learning of the Cyprus Convention, threatened to leave the Congress, Lord Salisbury told him that England would have no objection to a French occupation of Tunis and Bismarck conveyed the same impression in regard to the attitude of Germany. In 1881, taking advantage of the violation of Algerian territory by an unruly Tunisian tribe, France dispatched a punitive force into Tunis and, on May 12, of that year, the Bey was forced to sign a treaty which made Tunis a French protectorate. Naturally, this did not improve the feeling of Italy towards France, but Italy was not strong enough to protest.

Crispi had toured the European capitals in 1877 and had returned feeling that Bismarck was the only friend upon whom Italy could rely. The English policy was against contracting continental obligations. Austria was an old enemy. There was only Germany as a possible ally. The growing feeling that the Irredenta must be regained was heightened by the Austrian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. But this feeling was rather a literary than a political one. Crispi was eager to see Italy a world power and he had a boundless admiration for Bismarck. In the Chamber he denounced the irredentist agitation as detrimental to the best interests of Italy. When Germany was approached on the subject of an alliance, it was suggested that the way to Berlin lay through Vienna. King Humbert visited Vienna in October, 1881. Negotiations moved slowly. Italy asked for two things, first, a guarantee of the

integrity of her territory which should put an end to all dangers of foreign intervention in behalf of the Papacy, and second, support for her ambitions in the Mediterranean. The latter was refused by both Vienna and Berlin. Austria was hostile to an increase of Italian influence in the Adriatic. All Italy could get was a vague promise that the Allies would support each other within the limits of their own interests and that the status quo would be maintained in the Balkans. The treaty was operative only when one ally was attacked by two foreign powers. It was to run for five years and was to be secret. This was agreed between Austria and Italy. An identical treaty, minus the Balkan clause, was signed between Germany and Italy. Both were signed May 22, 1882, in Vienna.

The treaty was not supported unanimously in Italy when the fact of its existence was disclosed in 1883. For Austria, it meant that the Italian army would be on the French frontier in case of war, and, for Italy, it meant at least benevolent neutrality in her colonial enterprises. The French occupation of Tunis was not the sole determining cause of the entry of Italy into the Alliance. The Roman question also caused Italy the greatest anxiety and made her feel the imperative need for allies.

When the treaty was renewed in 1887, equilibrium in the Mediterranean was guaranteed by an arrangement with Germany as to the status quo in Tripoli and a special convention with Austria guaranteed equilibrium in the Adriatic and in the Balkans. The Alliance was renewed in 1891 for at least six years and, if not renounced by one of the allies, for six more years, and renewed in 1902 and in 1912. Until 1912, there were three separate agreements but, in that year, a single treaty was signed, December 8, by the three allies.

Italy's open acknowledgment of her partnership in the Triple Alliance was one of the chief factors which brought about the formation of the Triple Entente. However,

Italy's relations with the countries of the Triple Entente have been of increasing cordiality. There has been practically no clash of interests between Italy and England in the Mediterranean. Great Britain invited Italy to join her in the occupation of Egypt in 1882 and encouraged Italy to establish a trading post on the Red Sea in 1885. In 1887 the two countries entered into an agreement to maintain the status quo in the Mediterranean and in the Balkans, and, if the latter were impossible, to obtain autonomy for the Balkan peoples. In the early part of 1914, there was some irritation in Italy when Sir Edward Grey endeavoured to induce Italy to evacuate the Dodecanese Islands, but, on the whole, relations between Italy and Great Britain have been friendly.

As has been said above, the attitude of the French Clerical party and the occupation of Tunis had engendered some ill-will between France and Italy. Then there was a commercial dispute which caused considerable economic loss to Italy, but this was closed by the commercial treaty of 1898. In 1896, the two countries came to an agreement in regard to Tunis, and, in 1900, the Italian interests in Tripoli and the French in Morocco were mutually recognized. There is some evidence that a secret convention was concluded in 1904 on the basis of Fez for Tripoli, one clause of which promised France that, in the event of her being attacked by Germany, Italy would not mobilize on the Alpine frontier and would remove her fleet from the western Mediterranean.¹ At the Algeciras Conference, Italy was on the side of France, and it then became plain that Italy would pursue the policy which her best interests should dictate, regardless of the Triple Alliance. However, the relations between France and Italy were disturbed during the Tripoli expedition by regrettable incidents, which helped to arouse public opinion in Italy in favor of a renewal of the Triple Alliance.

¹ Bainville, Jacques, "Italy and the War," pp. 164-165.

As for Russia, the crisis of 1908 had detached her definitely from the Central Empires, and she had a common aim with Italy in keeping Austria from growing more powerful in the Balkans and especially from establishing herself more securely on the Adriatic.

Italy, in entering the Triple Alliance, had sacrificed her interests in the Adriatic in order to safeguard what she believed to be a more vital interest in the Mediterranean. On the Adriatic, the Italian coast is a slow-sloping, sandy beach with few harbors, and none of strategic value, while the opposite coast has many good harbors of great strategic value. The Congress of Berlin entrusted Austria with police duties in Montenegrin waters, and this gave the Austrian commercial fleet a great impetus. It was not to the interest of Italy to allow Austria to get control of the whole Eastern coast. In 1897, there was a verbal agreement between the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Goluchowski, and the Italian Minister, Visconti Venosta, as to Albanian affairs and, from that date, Adriatic affairs have acquired a separate individuality. Both parties agreed to refrain from acquiring any portion of Albania and agreed to favour the establishment of an autonomous Albania in case Turkey should disappear from the Balkans. This agreement was confirmed in 1899 and again in 1905. The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was, of course, a blow to Italy's plans. There was a great popular outburst, but Italy was in no position to fight, and, after prolonged negotiations, was able to obtain only the abolition of the privileges previously granted to Austria of policing Montenegrin waters and the promise of the establishment of an Italian University at Vienna. Italy later acted with Austria to compel the withdrawal of Greece from southern Albania and to compel Montenegro to evacuate Scutari. During the Turkish war, Austria used the Treaty of Alliance to hamper Italy. The appearance of part of the Italian fleet on the Albanian coast provoked a warm protest from Austria. Any action against the coast

of Turkey in Europe was declared to be a breach of the treaty. When an Italian squadron was bombarded by forts at the entrance to the Dardanelles and replied, Count Berchtold announced that the treaty had been violated and stated that, if the Italian government desired its freedom of action, the Austrian government also would resume its freedom of action. Austria had the support of Germany. Salandra, speaking in the Italian Chamber June 3, 1915, said that it would be impossible to estimate how many Italian soldiers were wasted and how much treasure was expended because it was impossible for Italy to take direct action against Turkey and because, further, that country knew it was being protected by Italy's allies.

After the Turko-Italian war, Italy renewed the Alliance because she saw that the whole Albanian coast would soon pass from Turkish rule and she feared it would all fall into Austrian hands. At the Conference of London, Italy obtained the support of her Allies, not only on the question of Epirus, but also on the Dodecanese. At Kiel, in 1913, King Victor and the German Emperor came to an agreement relative to concessions in Adalia which were to open the door for Italian penetration into Asia Minor. But relations with Austria were never really cordial. In 1913 Austria informed the Italian foreign office that she proposed to go to war with Serbia in order to defend herself and would expect the military support of her ally. The Marquis di San Giuliano refused such support. After the failure of this scheme, General Konrad von Hoetzendorf, with the aid of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, tried to persuade the Emperor to sanction a "preventive war" against Italy. But neither the Emperor nor Count Aehrenthal liked the scheme and it fell through.²

² Dillon, "From the Triple to the Quadruple Alliance," pp. 33-50.

CHAPTER II

ITALY'S ENTRANCE INTO THE WAR

IN 1914, Signor Giolitti was the leader of the majority in Parliament as he had been since 1903. He was really the "boss" of Italy. He first entered Parliament in 1882 and Crispi brought him into the Cabinet as Finance Minister in 1889. The court clique helped make him Premier in 1892, but in 1893, on account of the Banca Romana scandal, his unpopularity was so great that he was obliged to retire. He was impeached for abuse of power but the supreme court declared the courts without power over ministerial acts. In 1900, he became Minister of the Interior in the Zanardelli cabinet. During the few years previous, the government had been persecuting the Socialists, the Republicans, and the Radicals and had taken active measures to put down the strikes which had been disturbing the country. Giolitti had been developing a personal policy of encouraging the Socialists and, when he came into power, changed the policy of the government accordingly. He allowed the first strikes which occurred after he took office to run their natural course, and, in certain cases, he even ordered the authorities to assume a benevolent attitude toward the strikers. His influence increased steadily. In 1903, when Zanardelli resigned on the plea of old age and ill health, Giolitti was intrusted with the formation of the new cabinet. In a large number of the electoral districts in Italy, party organization has been so weak that the candidates are chosen and supported by rival cliques quite unable to carry off victory without government support. It is, therefore, possible for the Prime Minister in power at the time of a general election, especially if he be

also the Minister of the Interior, to create a personal party which will return deputies whose only political program is to support him. The three general elections which have taken place during the reign of Victor Emmanuel III have been in Giolitti's terms of office as Premier and Minister of the Interior. His custom has been to resign a few months after a general election, as in the Spring of 1905, at the close of 1909, and in the Spring of 1914. The interim government was invariably weak and fell into general disfavour within a year or so, and then Giolitti's friends would bring about its fall, and he would be recalled, to form a new Cabinet. Two of the five years of the legal life of the Chamber having passed, Giolitti could threaten a general election and, with this weapon, was able to keep the Chamber tractable and to remain in power until after the next general election.¹

There were five prominent parties in the Chamber, the Clerical, the Sonnino group, which may be called Conservative, the Republican, the Radical, and the Socialist. Each was too small to act alone and coalition has proved difficult. Giolitti did his utmost to conciliate everyone. He gave the Socialists the opportunity to turn the railroads into state concerns and to carry out other parts of their program, while at the same time granting the great industries all the privileges and protection they demanded, and guaranteeing the landed proprietors the duty on cereals. The salaries of the clergy were increased and clerical influence was favored in the schools though a Free Mason was chosen as Minister of Public Instruction. The term of military service was reduced to two years; higher taxes were not imposed; and the schemes for colonial expansion were given up to please the masses. To please the upper classes, the army and the navy were increased in size. Giolitti yielded always to public opinion and withdrew the concession the minute public attention was fixed elsewhere.² It was in this way that he was

¹ Ferrero, Guglielmo, "Europe's Fateful Hour," pp. 123-125.

² Ferrero, Guglielmo, "Europe's Fateful Hour," p. 126.

forced into the Tripoli expedition, for he never took any interest in foreign affairs. In the Chamber, his methods were those of the typical boss. He had a compact body of disciplined deputies dependent upon him. Good care was taken of the faithful and office went to the obedient. No cabinet could long survive without his support.

Giolitti retired, as has been said, in the Spring of 1914, leaving Salandra as premier to struggle with all the questions arising out of his administration. The country was faced with a general strike; there was a deficit to be met and Parliament refused to pass the taxes asked for by the government, which had to be content with a royal decree authorizing them for one year. The Chamber was thoroughly disorganized through the long rule of Giolitti. There were no real parties, no real opposition. There were one strong man and his personal followers making up a majority in the Chamber. Such was the condition in Italy when the war broke in August. Luckily, the Foreign Minister was a strong man of great experience, the Marquis di San Giuliano. His attitude towards Austria was one of protest from the beginning of the situation. On July 25, 1914, he telegraphed the Italian Ambassador at Vienna, "Salandra and myself made it quite clear to the Austrian ambassador that Austria could have no right according to the spirit of the treaty of the Triple Alliance, to act as she had done at Belgrade without previous understanding with her Allies." At the same time, he told von Flotow (German Ambassador at Rome) that Italy was under no obligation to come in if Austria went to war with Russia.³

Italian neutrality was proclaimed in the usual manner August 4, 1914. It was approved by the great majority of the nation represented by the Socialists, the Republicans, and the Radical Democrats, and opposed by a small minority who wanted immediate intervention on the side of the Germans and by another minority who wanted Italy to join

³ Carnovale, Luigi, "Why Italy Entered into the Great War," p. 231-32.

the Entente Allies in order to acquire more territory. This neutrality was really in favor of the Entente. The Italian fleet could have hindered the transportation of French troops from Africa and cut British lines to India. Italy, from Eretria, could also have hindered British communications with the East. Italy concentrated her fleet at the entrance to the Adriatic and withdrew her garrisons from the French frontier.

The Triplist tradition had for many decades moulded Italian public opinion. The election of 1913 was the first held after the passage of the universal suffrage law. All the extreme parties had made noticeable gains. There was an increase in the strength of the irreconcilable Catholics and of the Republicans. Two new parties appeared, the Revolutionary Socialists or Syndicalists, and the Nationalists.

The Nationalists thought that Prussia would win a sweeping and rapid victory and favored intervention on that side in order to earn a claim to the Mediterranean possessions of France and England. The Catholics and Conservatives were pro-German and pro-Austrian. Austria, as the great Catholic power, had long led the Papal party to hope for the weakening of the Italian Kingdom and for the restoration of the temporal power of the Pope. The Liberal bloc in control of the government was strictly neutral, as were the Marxian Socialists. The mass of the people followed them in their neutrality. The Republicans, the Radicals and the Syndicalists were strongly pro-Ally, the Radical Republicans raising a Garibaldian Legion for the French front.⁴ Both Berlin and Vienna dropt hints that, should Italy pursue a course of action prejudicial to their interests, the Pope could expect every assistance from them towards the restoration of his temporal power and

⁴ Maugain, Gabriel, "*L'Opinion Italienne et l'Intervention de l'Italie dans la Guerre actuelle*," pp. 9-13.

that the efforts of the Church to maintain Italian neutrality would not go without recompense.⁵

The problem soon resolved itself into the question whether Italy should remain neutral or take up arms on the side of the Allies. Those who had at first favored joining the Central Powers now were silent or joined the Giolittian neutralists, who believed that, under the circumstances, much could be gained without going to war. The neutralists had the sympathy of the Papacy and of the majority of the Socialists. The Papacy approved any policy which would not increase the prestige of the House of Savoy. It mistrusted France and was jealous of Russia.

Another group in favor of neutrality were those who had business ties with Germany. The Banca Commerciale was intimately connected with German financial groups, and, through them, with the German government. It shared in many Italian corporations and businesses and had effectively promoted the interests of Germany. There was an excellent understanding between the Bank and Giolitti. He had little interest in, or knowledge of, foreign affairs and held that the only course for Italy to follow was one of cooperation with Germany. The Bank had connections with many of the financial and commercial leaders and with prominent members of Roman society, many of whom had a pecuniary interest in different businesses under the control of the Bank. Many feared that a break with Germany would result in economic disaster. The North of Italy had been passing through a period of economic revival. Never had the mercantile and propertied classes been so well off. War would destroy this prosperity. The peasantry were more interested in higher taxes and larger markets than they were in foreign policy and the workmen were interested in better wages and in internal reforms.

Thus the interventionists had a difficult task. At first their party consisted of an unimportant minority of young

⁵ Wallace, William Kay, "Greater Italy," p. 244.

men, army officers, professional men, writers and teachers. They believed that Italy could obtain her legitimate ends only by participation in the war on the side of the Entente Allies. They were fighting for purely practical reasons. Austria was the enemy. They wanted a restoration of the irredenta provinces and a rectification of the frontier. They felt that, if Italy remained outside the struggle, her Adriatic aspirations would not be gratified. The outside world has looked upon Italy as a museum of ancient art. This attitude has been resented by a group of young men who believe that, if Italy was to take her place among the great powers, she must break completely with the past. To gain a hearing, they exaggerated the virtues of the present day. Plans were proposed for selling the art treasures of Italy to Americans and for using the proceeds to develop the army and navy. Others suggested filling up the canals of Venice or at least abolishing the gondolas and making Venice purely a commercial port. This group of the Futurists, which had been growing before the war, had no place in their program for arbitration, for pacificism or for internationalism. Theirs was essentially a belligerent doctrine holding war essential for the hygiene of the world. The victory of Austria would be the signal for the downfall of Italy as a great power. For Italy, they regarded the war as the culmination of a hundred years of national endeavor.

Germany and Italy in the nineteenth century had many points in common. Their unity was accomplished under very similar circumstances. Italy had more moderation but felt that her destiny was to be a great military, naval, industrial, and colonial power. As D'Annunzio put it in one of his famous May, 1915, speeches, "We will no longer be a museum of antiquity, a kind of hostelry, a pleasure resort, under a sky painted Prussian blue, for the benefit of international honeymooners."⁶ What they wanted was an

⁶ Quoted by Sidney Low, "Italy in the War," p. 6.

Italy great in territorial power, great in commerce, with a strong national feeling and with all the Italian people under one flag. Italy they pictured as politically young, and under the necessity of expanding. The Nationalists denounced the commercial penetration and methods of Germany, but they admired the preparedness and military organization. This party had made great strides on account of the expedition to Tripoli. Salandra, while not one of the extreme party, declared that Italy must follow her own interests. On December 3, 1914, in the Chamber, he said, "Italy has vital rights to safeguard, just aspirations to assert and maintain; she has her position as a great power to preserve intact; more, she must so continue that this position shall not be diminished by comparison with possible aggrandizement of other states. It follows from this that neutrality can not remain inert and flabby; it must be active and vigilant, not impotent but strongly armed and ready for every eventuality."

During the Fall and Winter of 1914-1915, public opinion came more and more to demand intervention on the side of the Entente Allies. Among the Catholics, we must make a distinction between the Intransigents, the Christian Democrats, and the clerical Catholic party proper. The Intransigents were the most pro-Austrian. The Christian Democrats at the Congress at Bologna, in the Fall of 1914, included in their program the reunion of Trentino and Venetia with Italy, the union of all the Serbo-Croat peoples into an independent state on the limits of the Quarnero, the reconstruction of Poland as an independent state, and a guarantee for the independence of small nations. The majority of the Catholics were, however, in favor of neutrality and the two other divisions represented only a minority.

There were some who believed in intervention even though they were not extreme nationalists. The German action in Belgium and the sinking of the *Lusitania* caused much indignation among this group and led them to see that the strug-

gle was between two civilizations. Other Italians felt that they belonged on the side of Latin France.

The Socialists were not all neutral. In the first weeks of the war, the reformed Socialists demanded intervention on the side of the Entente Allies. Their leaders were Bissolati and Bonomi. Bissolati enlisted in an Alpine regiment to show where his feelings were. The Republicans were even more eager for war with Austria. The more moderate Democrats believed that preparation was necessary before entering the war.

In short, the majority of the Italians were, at first, satisfied with neutrality; but, by the end of August, the feeling was beginning to change and it grew in favour of the Entente Allies until Italy declared war on Austria in May, 1915. But Germany could not, without a struggle, see Italy retreat from the policy of neutrality. The Papacy was strong for neutrality. In September, 1914, Cardinal Della Chiesa was elected Pope as Benedict XV. He was experienced in ecclesiastical diplomacy and owed his election largely to this fact. His first encyclical showed his attitude toward the Italian government. It rehearsed the grudges and grievances of the Vatican, dwelt on the tendencies towards "independence," the "absurdities of socialism," "dissension within the Church," the desire for the cessation of the abnormal condition in which the head of the Church finds himself. The Papacy proclaimed its neutrality. Neither France nor Great Britain had a mission at the Vatican, and the Russian Envoy was a man without much influence there. The Pope expressed no opinion in regard to the violation of Belgium, and even his reply to Cardinal Mercier was a vague expression of generalities. In December, 1914, Great Britain sent an accredited mission to the Vatican, with whom she had not had diplomatic relations for four centuries. In Rome, the Irish Catholics were in direct communication with the Germans, and it was rumoured that it was through their medium that the Easter Revolution of

1916 was carried through. Even after the German and Austrian envoys had left Rome, they were established in Switzerland, and the Pope was free to send them sealed dispatches.

Germany hoped, through the Papacy and Giolitti, to maintain Italian neutrality. Prince Bülow was sent as a special emissary to Rome. He was connected through his wife with a prominent and noble Italian family, had lived for many years in Italy and was an experienced diplomat. He had the full sympathy of the Vatican and was supported by its press. Giolitti felt that Italy could obtain her legitimate ends by bargaining and that there was no need for entering the war. Bülow came prepared to bargain Austrian territory for Italian neutrality. The question turned largely upon the interpretation of the treaty of the Triple Alliance. In the beginning, Germany and Austria had claimed that it was a defensive war and therefore that Italy should, according to the terms of the treaty, come in on their side.⁷

⁷ In 1915 Articles I, III, IV, VII of the treaty were for the first time revealed. Article I was disclosed in a Note transmitted by Baron Sonnino, the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Italian diplomatic representatives abroad on May 24 for communication to the Powers. The remainder were published by the Austro-Hungarian Government during the same month in their "Diplomatische Aktenstücke" (Red Book). They read as follows:

Article I. The High Contracting Parties mutually promise to remain on terms of peace and friendship, and that they will not enter into any alliance or engagement directed against one of their states.

They pledge themselves to undertake an exchange of views regarding all general and political questions which may present themselves, and promise furthermore their mutual assistance, commensurate with their individual interests.

Article III. If one or two of the contracting parties, without provocation on their part, are attacked by two or more Powers which have not signed this treaty, and are implicated in a war with them, this will at the same time raise the *casus foederis* for the other parties.

Article IV. If a great Power which has not signed this treaty menaces the national safety of one of the contracting parties and the nation thus menaced were thus constrained to declare war, the other two would be obliged to observe toward their ally a benevolent neutrality. Each of the three contracting Powers in this case will remain free to participate in the war if it seems wise and to make common cause with her ally.

Although Germany had declared war on France, it was held that certain alleged acts of aggression committed by France constituted an attack on Germany within the meaning of the treaty. The Marquis di San Giuliano said that the acts complained of had unquestionably been done after similar acts on the part of Germany, and the fact remained that it was Germany that declared war. Giolitti even went further and declared that Italy would have been perfectly justified in remaining neutral even had Germany or Austria been attacked.

The *Giornale d'Italia*, the official daily of Rome, for August 4, 1914, gave in detail the manner in which Austria, in its ultimatum of July 23, had violated the treaty of the Triple Alliance to the injury of Italy.⁸ The note to Serbia was communicated to the Italian Government after it had been communicated to the Serbian Government. One of the fundamental provisions of the Triple Alliance is that no one of the allies can undertake an action in the Balkans without the consent of the other allies. The Triple Alliance has a purely defensive character and does not obligate any one of the allies to follow another of them when pursuing an aggressive action such as that undertaken by Austria against Serbia. It was to the interest of Italy that the Adriatic-Balkan equilibrium remain undisturbed and that the Balkans be kept for the Balkan people.

The death of Marquis di San Giuliano left the portfolio of Foreign Minister vacant in September, 1914, and it was filled by Baron Sonnino, who was believed to be in favour of the Triple Alliance. His policy was to look after the interests of Italy, a policy of "sacro egoismo" as Premier Salandra put it. On October 14, 1914, Italy occupied the island of Saseno off the Albanian coast and, on Christmas Day, occupied Valona. The Albanian coast is of great importance to Italy because it holds the eastern side of the narrow

⁸ Carnovale, Luigi, "Why Italy Entered into the Great War," p. 217.

strait of Otranto. Italy announced that this action was taken because she was the only power not occupied with the war and because conditions were such in Albania that there had to be some policing power to maintain order.

In July, 1914, Italy had protested that Austria should have consulted Italy before Austria took steps at Belgrade. During the Summer, there were conversations on the interpretations of Article VII.⁹ Italy declared she could maintain a friendly attitude only if her interpretation of Article VII were accepted. Austria and Germany worked to keep Italy neutral, since they had given up hope of her active intervention on their side. On August 4, Berchtold stated ¹⁰ "were Italy to remain on the side of her allies, an opportunity would be offered for the realization of her far-reaching aspirations such as the acquirement of Tunisia, Savoy and so on; should she detach herself, then she would receive nothing."

In November, 1914, the military invasion of Serbia created a new situation. The question of the violation of the Triple Alliance was actively opened. On December 9, Sonnino telegraphed to the Italian Ambassador at Vienna that the Austro-Hungarian advance into Serbia constituted a fact which could not fail to become the subject of examination by the Italian and Austro-Hungarian Governments on the basis of Article VII of the Triple Alliance. Sonnino

⁹ Article VII. Austria-Hungary and Italy, who have solely in view the maintenance, as far as possible, of the territorial status quo in the East, engage themselves to use their influence to prevent all territorial changes which might be disadvantageous to the one or other of the Powers signatory of the present Treaty. To this end they will give reciprocally all information calculated to enlighten each other concerning their own intentions and those of other Powers. Should, however, the case arise that, in the course of events, the maintenance of the status quo in the territory of the Balkans or the Ottoman coasts and islands in the Adriatic or the Ægean Seas becomes impossible, and that, either in consequence of the action of a third Power or for any other reason, Austria-Hungary or Italy should be obliged to change the status

¹⁰ Austrian Red Book (No. 2), Document No. 30. Scott, "Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Part I, p. 161.

claimed that the Austrian government should have consulted Italy and have entered into an agreement with her before the Austrian army had crossed the Serbian frontier. On the same day, the following message was sent to the Italian Ambassador at Berlin: "The trend in favour of neutrality manifested by a section of public opinion does not imply the renunciation of Italian interests in the Balkans and the Adriatic or of the Italian national aspirations, but rather the persuasion that these interests and these aspirations will be effectively safeguarded if neutrality is maintained."¹¹

Italy claimed that even temporary occupation without previous agreement was a violation of Article VII. Berchtold made a fine distinction between temporary and momentary occupation resulting from military operations, and only after being urged by Berlin did he consent to enter into an exchange of views. After Bülow came to Rome, Sonnino summed up the situation in a telegram to the Italian Ambassadors at Berlin and at Vienna.¹² "I remarked to Prince von Bülow that the situation in Italy could be summed up in a very few words. That the majority of the nation was in favour of the preservation of neutrality and ready to support the government in this, but only upon the presupposition that by means of neutrality it should be possible to obtain the fulfilment of certain national aspirations. This task, the practical difficulties of which I fully recognized, was what the government aimed at accomplishing." By the first week in January, Berlin was convinced that Austria must make some concessions. Vienna

quo for their part by a temporary or permanent occupation, such occupation would only take place after previous agreements between the two Powers, which would have to be based upon the principle of a reciprocal compensation for all territorial or other advantages that either of them might acquire over and above the existing status quo, and would have to satisfy the interests and rightful claims of both parties.

¹¹ "Italian Green Book," Doc. No. 2, Scott, *op. cit.*, Part II, p. 1211.

¹² "Italian Green Book," Doc. No. 8, Scott, *op. cit.*, p. 1218.

suggested that Italy might find compensation in Albania, but Italy claimed only a negative interest there. All she wanted was that other powers should keep out of Albania.

Austria next took the line that there were claims against Italy for the occupation of Valona and of the Dodecanese, but Italy pointed out that the Dodecanese was occupied merely until the Treaty of Lausanne should be fulfilled and that the occupation of Valona was simply to maintain order, she having to do it because all the other powers were busy with the war. It was not until March that Austria, under pressure from Germany, consented to discuss the question on the basis of the cession of Austrian territory. Bülow did not think that immediate performance should be exacted from Austria, but both Austria and Germany agreed that the bargain should be made public immediately. Finally, on March 27, in return for friendly neutrality on the part of Italy and for liberty of action in the Balkans and for the renunciation in advance by Italy of any fresh compensation for the advantages, territorial or other, that might accrue to Austria-Hungary, Austria offered to cede territory in South Tyrol including the city of Trent, Italy to assume a part of the public debt and to pay a lump sum to compensate for investments made by the state in the territory and for ecclesiastical property, pensions to functionaries, etc.¹³

Italy did not consider this sufficient. On April 8, on the invitation of Burian, Sonnino sent in the claims of Italy.¹⁴ They included the cession of the Trentino with the frontiers which were those of the Italian Kingdom of 1811, Italy's eastern frontier to be extended in her favour so as to bring in the cities of Gradisca and Gorizia; the city of Trieste, with its territory extended in the north to include Nabresina and in the south to include the present districts of Capo d'Istria and Pirano, was to be constituted an autonomous

¹³ "Italian Green Book," Document No. 56, Scott, *op. cit.*, p. 1291-1293.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Doc. No. 64, p. 1299-1302.

and independent state in all internal affairs and Austria-Hungary was to renounce all sovereignty over it. It was to remain a free port. Austria was to cede further the Archipelago of Curzola, including Lissa (with the neighbouring islets of St. Andrea and Busi), Lesina (with Spalmadori and Torcola), Curzola, Lagosta (with the neighbouring islets and rocks), Cazza, Meleda and Pelagora. Italy should immediately occupy the ceded territory and Trieste should be evacuated by the Austro-Hungarian authorities and military forces with the immediate discharge of all soldiers and sailors derived from these territories. The sovereignty of Italy over Valona and its bay together with such territory in the hinterland as might be required for its defense was to be recognized. Austria-Hungary was to cease to interest herself at all in Albania. There were to be complete amnesty and release for all political offenders from the ceded and evacuated territories. Italy offered 200 million lire in compensation for a quota of the public debt and other charges. Italy was to maintain perfect neutrality towards Austria and Germany and to renounce any further invocation of Article VII and Austria was to renounce any as to the Dodecanese.

Burian refused to do more than to extend slightly his former offer of the Trentino or to grant immediate occupation to Italy. On May 3, Italy resumed her liberty of action and declared the alliance cancelled. On May 10, Bülow, still hoping for settlement, signed together with Macchio, the Austrian representative at Rome, an offer, which, as amended by Burian, made Italy the following concessions:¹⁵ South Tyrol; territory to the west bank of the Isonzo as far as the population is purely of Italian nationality; the title of Imperial Free City for Trieste, together with an Italian university and new municipal regulations; the recognition of Italy's sovereignty over Valona, its bay and the surround-

¹⁵ "Austrian Red Book," Doc. No. 185, 188 (Scott, *op cit.*, pp. 311-316, 318-321).

ing territory; no political interference by Austria in Albania within the borders drawn by the Convention of London, special safeguards for the rights of Italians who should remain within the Empire; general political and military amnesty and release from military service for all natives of the ceded territory; Italy in return to promise absolute neutrality towards Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey, and to declare her disinterestedness in any territorial or other advantage that might accrue to Austria-Hungary as a result of the military operations or treaties of peace; Austria at the same time to waive any claims based upon the Italian occupation of the Dodecanese. The execution of the agreement was to be guaranteed by Germany. There was to be a mixed commission to settle details and to fix the indemnity to be paid by Italy. The territory should be ceded to Italy as soon as the commission had finished its work. This offer was submitted to the Italian government May 18.

Considering the new boundaries offered by the Austrian Government to Italy, Professor Gino Fani of the Polytechnic School of Turin, observed that "this new and insidious frontier constitutes a conventional line which always leaves to Austria the upper part of our valleys, and therefore the possibility of invasion of territory with no possibility of defense, if such invasion were to come suddenly, and it would be very difficult in any case. . . . Thus the acception, while it meant a definite renunciation, would have continued to keep us at the mercy of our neighbors, and aggravate our subjection."¹⁶

Bülow had been working with Giolitti, who still had a majority in the Chamber. Being sure that the offer would be accepted by the followers of Giolitti, and that, in the face of such an acceptance, no government would dare to break its neutrality, he was anxious to make the question a parliamentary matter. Sonnino and Salandra were well aware of the situation and had no intention of facing Parlia-

¹⁶ Carnovale, "Why Italy Entered into the Great War," p. 237.

ment on such an issue. The last proposal in typewritten form was placed in the hands of deputies and newspaper men several days before it was officially communicated to the Italian government and indeed was published in an English journal before the Italian government was officially aware of its existence. Under the circumstances, Salandra refused to consider it when it was presented by Bülow. The Chamber was to meet May 20. Having fully accepted Bülow's scheme and meaning to overthrow the ministry on an adverse vote, and then to form a new government which would accept the Austrian offer, Giolitti was busy in Rome getting his followers into line. Salandra thought that the risk of a defeat of the ministry should not be taken. On May 13, the ministers collectively tendered their resignations to the King. He offered the Premiership to Signor Marcora, President of the Chamber, to Signor Carcona and to Signor Boselli. All three advised that Salandra's resignation should not be accepted and the King followed their advice.¹⁷

Meanwhile, D'Annunzio had arrived in Rome and made speeches between May 12 and 19. He had only recently come from France and had already aroused great enthusiasm in the North, where he had been speaking in favour of intervention on the side of the Allies. He extolled the glories of Italy and denounced the agents and clients of the German envoys as traitors. He disclosed the fact that the Cabinet had renounced the Triple Alliance and had entered into an agreement with the Entente. He soon had the people with him. Public wrath rose so high against Giolitti and his followers that the police advised them to remain off the streets. When the Chamber opened, Salandra and Sonnino were received with great applause. A vote conferring discretionary power upon the Government in case of war was in reality an authorization for the Government to declare war. On May 23, the Government notified Baron

¹⁷ Dillon, "From the Triple to the Quadruple Alliance," p. 216.

Burian that Italy would consider herself in a state of war with Austria on the following day.

Bülow had relied upon the politicians but had not reckoned on the people. As the war had gone on, their sensibilities had been aroused. Reports from Belgium and from northern France and the sinking of the *Lusitania* had had their effect. Feeling was actively on the side of the Allies. The Nationalists made the most of this. One of the immediate agents was Gabriele D'Annunzio with his remarkable oratorical powers. He had long believed that another war of liberation must come and thought that this was the time. Bülow's attempt to overthrow the Government enraged the public. Italy was a great power. Methods which might be employed in Persia or Morocco could not be allowed in Italy. But Ferrero claims, "The impulse which made her take this step was not, however, as has been often said a mere outburst of national feeling. It was something much more complicated—something far deeper. The necessity of putting an end to an artificial, contradictory and enervating system of government, shame at having for so long submitted meekly to German influence; horror and dread of this monstrous power resting on numbers, steel, the authority of the monarchy, the prestige of the army, the credulity and blind passions of the masses exploited by a strong and unscrupulous oligarchy; the desire for moral independence which could only be hers with a more secure frontier, together with a somewhat vague but very real longing for a nobler, higher and happier life—all these causes impelled Italy to take part in the struggles." ¹⁸

Italy was at war only with Austria. The German Ambassador at Rome demanded and obtained his passports as soon as Italy had declared war against Austria and the Italian Ambassador at Berlin did the same. During the first months Italy seemed to wish it understood that her war with Austria was only indirectly connected with war on the

¹⁸ Ferrero, G., "Europe's Fateful Hour," pp. 166-167.

other fronts. Goods from Italy still reached Germany. Italy was fighting for her own aims. These have been stated by Carnovale¹⁹ as follows: (1) the defense of Italianity as the first and greatest duty, (2) a secure military frontier, (3) a less dangerous strategical position in the Adriatic. The offers to Italy by Austria never quite covered these aims, but, as the "secret" treaty with the Allies shows, the offers of the Allies did. Italy, unsupported, had never been able to attack Austria without too great a risk as that country was superior to her in population, wealth, size of army, natural and artificial frontiers, and was certain to be supported by Germany. This was Italy's chance. "In fact, Italy, had she remained neutral in the great war, would have lost all credit, all prestige in the world. She would not have been considered nor respected by anyone."²⁰

It is quite plain that the entry of Italy into the war was exploited by the Nationalist party in order to persuade the Italian people to accept its imperialistic policy, a negation of every principle for which the Allied nations had been fighting. Their aims were really more like those of Prussia and, in fact, this party had been called *nostri Prussiani* in Italy. Irredentism for some decades had been little more than a tradition. Austrian stupidity and bad faith were the only things that had kept it alive. In Lombardy and Venetia, of course, it had remained smoldering but, in the center and in the South, little thought had been given to it. It was not until the war was well started that Italian public opinion, through the activity of the Nationalistic party and of the Pro-Dalmazia and other kindred societies, was aroused to take a keen interest in Irredentia and the Adriatic. The Nationalists urged their imperialistic aims upon the people and treated the war as purely one between Austria and Italy, a quarrel between partners, with Germany as an angry spectator. Many Italians who were willing to

¹⁹ Carnovale, "Why Italy Entered into the Great War," p. 237.

²⁰ Carnovale, "Why Italy Entered into the Great War," p. 251.

declare war against Austria did not want war with Germany. There was a considerable number of business men who did not want war to interfere with their prosperity. Their trade with Germany was netting them large profits. To quote Ferrero again, "It may safely be stated that in the last ten years all Italy, professors and manufacturers, Socialists and Conservatives, free-thinkers and clericals, philosophers and musicians alike, had been affected with Germanophilia. Germany was regarded as the universal model, because she had realized the quantitative formula of progress better than any other nation and was the land where population, wealth, production, commerce, army and navy were increasing most rapidly. . . . In spite of the affinity of language, race, and culture, France had become a sort of enigma. The educated classes in Italy, who were becoming more and more dominated by the purely quantitative conception of progress, did not understand the tragic position of a country whose demographical conditions, traditions, and historical tendencies alike impelled it to develop in the direction of quality, whilst forced to do so in the direction of quantity by the competition of its neighbours and above all by the preposterous and menacing growth of its foe."²¹ This gives us some clue as to why Italy was not declaring war against Germany.

The Salandra Government was under the necessity of maintaining equilibrium between the Germanophile party and the patriots. Only the official Socialists maintained their neutrality. The Giolittians saw in peace with Germany the only economic and financial salvation of Italy. They did not wish war with Turkey. Their idea was to mass their forces for the conquest of the Adriatic and the Irredentia lands. The clericals backed Giolitti on the question of peace with Germany. Salandra had not the personality of a great leader, but gradually the country came round to the policy of the government. On August 21,

²¹ Ferrero, G., "Europe's Fateful Hour," p. 133.

1915, war was declared against Turkey to protect Italian interests in the *Ægean* and more particularly in Asia Minor. The war was not going well. There was a shortage of munitions; machine guns and heavy artillery were lacking; the shortage of coal was suspending production. The Government offered no explanation. In October, war was declared against Bulgaria. The Giolittians disapproved of this as they felt that Bulgaria should be left alone to act as a foil against a Greater Serbia. In November, at the opening of Parliament, Sonnino announced that Italy had formally adhered to the Pact of London, pledging herself not to sign a separate peace. But the year closed without any clear statement of Italy's aims and there was still some doubt outside as to Italy's intentions.

The Allied situation in the Balkans grew worse. Serbia was crushed. Cetinje was taken. Italy refused to send a force to Salonika. It was not until March 27, 1916, that Salandra, Sonnino, and Cadorna officially met representatives of the Allied governments. In May, came the Austrian invasion of the Trentino. Still war was not declared against Germany, although it was known that German officers were directing the movements of Austrian troops and that German munitions and artillery were being used on the Italian front.

On June 10, Salandra, when demanding a vote of confidence in the Chamber, made a reference to the war which was taken as a criticism of the Italian Higher Command. He lost the vote of confidence and resigned June 12. The immediate cause was merely the occasion. The official Socialists and the Giolittians had been against him since May, 1915, because he had led the country into war, and the Interventionists were dissatisfied because he was not, according to their ideas, pushing the war vigorously enough. The King invited Salandra to remain as the head of a larger and more representative ministry but he wished to resign and the formation of the new Cabinet was entrusted to

Boselli, dean of the Italian deputies. There were nineteen instead of thirteen members in the new Cabinet. For the first time a Catholic and a Republican held portfolios in the same cabinet, and the leader of the Interventionist group of Socialists, Bissolati, was also a member. War was finally declared against Germany, August 28, 1916. The technical charge was that Germany had broken the agreement of May, 1915, which had safeguarded German commercial interests in Italy in return for certain privileges granted to Italians long resident in Germany. Of these, the most important was the German promise to continue the pensions due to Italian workmen who were living or who had lived in Germany.

Since 1915, the Italian cabinets have been constantly under the attack of the official Socialists and of the Giolittians. Their object seems to have been to force one crisis after another until the leaders should be overthrown, when Giolitti would have to be recalled. One of the causes of the disaster at Caporetto was the pacifist propaganda by which the Giolittians, the Clericals, and the official Socialists had poisoned the minds of the soldiers.²² On November 23, 1918, Deputy Centurione charged in the Chamber that Giolitti and his followers had planned and supplied with German money and arms the rebellion in Turin in August, 1917. "Ex-Premier Giolitti, three Senators, several Deputies belonging to the Intransigent Socialist party betrayed their country," shouted Centurione. He asserted he had documents to prove the charges, but a Parliamentary Commission appointed immediately to examine the documents decided the charges were not sufficiently established.²³ This finding may have been a whitewashing such as the Ballinger investigation and others in the United States. The Italian High Command alone is blamed by others for Caporetto.

²² Simons, A. M., Chairman of American Socialist and Labor Commission to Italy, *Christian Science Monitor*, Oct. 25, 1918.

²³ *New York Times*, November 27, 1918.

The opponents of the war made full use of the Papal peace note launched during the German peace offensive of August, 1917. It is believed that the Pope had been promised by both the German and the Austrian Emperors that they would restore his temporal power at the end of the war. The Ultramontane Diet of Bavaria openly announced this as one of the aims of the war. The failure of the Pope to protest against the atrocities seems to justify the assumption that he was against the Allies and the fact that he put forward appeals for peace at a time when the peace he advocated would have meant a substantial victory for the Germans, strengthens the suspicion of his pro-German feelings. Since November, 1918, the Pope has protested against reports that he did not desire Italian success. He pointed out in the *Osservatore Romano* (official Vatican organ) for November 17, that he had repeatedly wished that the territorial questions between Italy and Austria should be solved in a manner conformable to the just aspirations of the peoples affected and that he had instructed the Papal Nuncio at Vienna to establish friendly relations with the different nationalities which are now constituting independent states. At any rate, there is no doubt that many of the clergy took part in the defeatist propaganda and that the Vatican did not discourage this course.

In the Summer of 1917, Italy was passing through a crisis caused by the defeatists. The Socialists deliberately aimed at weakening the solidarity of the army and the national resistance. Propaganda carried on in war establishments resulted in sabotage. The German espionage and trading system was uncovered only during these months. Prominent merchants were found to be engaged in smuggling contraband into Germany through so-called Swiss partners. There was the association of traitors who blew up the Benedetto Brin and imparted intelligence to the enemy. Defeatism was carried on through active organizations. Italy was really paying the price for the lack of education of her

masses. Her trouble should teach the world that an unenlightened proletariat is a danger, especially when combined with a superstitious peasantry. The Government did not deal energetically with this propaganda until September, 1917. The Cabinet then became active. Turin, Genoa and Alessandria were placed under military jurisdiction; changes were made in the chief of police and in certain prefects. Of course, these prefects were Giolitti's appointees. The Giolittians and the Clericals raised the cry of reaction and the rights of Parliament. They were able to gather a number of deputies who were discontented with the ministry, and, late in October, 1917, the Boselli ministry fell. A new cabinet with Orlando as premier was created, Sonnino still retaining the post of Foreign Minister. After the battle of Caporetto, the Premier had invited all former premiers to attend the Chamber and thus set for the country an example of unity. Though Giolitti returned to Parliament for a short time, he was soon back in his country home, but his friends, working in agreement with the official Socialists, have done their best to overthrow the Orlando cabinet in favour of one which would make a compromised peace.

Orlando and his cabinet were by no means in favour of a patched-up peace. They had very definite ideas as to what Italy should gain from the war. In the Chamber, October 21, 1917, the Prime Minister, in speaking of the vagueness of the Papal note, summed up the kind of peace that Italy would accept. "But there are certain essential points in which there can be no bargaining. We cannot throw over the supreme ends for which we entered the war and for which we have asked so many sacrifices from the nation—the liberation of our brothers and security for our independence. . . . Such peace guarantees as may be organized by a league of nations and the introduction of compulsory arbitration will be one more addition to the normal duration of a just and reasonable peace, in so far as they serve to combat the dangers arising from ambitions and desires, from

the turbid passions and unjustified designs and caprices on one side or the other. . . . Italy is fighting for the completion of her national frontiers, for the liberation of her brethren oppressed by the foreigner and to guarantee in the Adriatic the conditions necessary to her existence and legitimate security. The Adriatic question is for Italy one of the essential aims of the war, and is outside all discussion alike for us and our allies. There is nothing imperialistic in our claims. I will not dilate upon our intolerable situation as the result of the artificial Adriatic position before the war. The differences in the conformation of the coasts of that sea produce in practice grave consequences of a strategical nature. From the ethnical point of view, it is now well enough known that our claims are imposed by essentially conciliatory ideas, and fully respect the political and economic needs of the Slav peoples, and that this is only natural since it is a matter of territory whose population is mixed." He gave the claims of Italy in the Near East as merely those of "balance and proportion dependent upon the general situation resulting from the war."²⁴

The claims of Italy were well maintained and the Government never looked with favour upon a compromise peace. In reply to the Austrian peace proposals in September, 1918, the Italian Government pointed out that no practical results could come from negotiations in the face of utterances of the German and Austrian cabinet members which ignored any cession of territory and sanctioned the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest, which did not mention the declarations of aims by the Allies and by the United States and did not recognize Italian aspirations for the deliverance of Italians subject to Austria and for the realization of Italian unity and of conditions essential to the safety of Italy. The Italian press, at the end of October, 1918, was unanimous in exhorting watchfulness against Germany, in urging unconditional surrender and in demanding that the

²⁴ "New Europe," Vol. V, p. 122.

armistice should not be a means to enable the Central Powers to reorganize their forces and accumulate the means eventually to renew the war.

As in other countries, there has been no one set of war aims in Italy. The people who have made the most noise and who have had the ear of the Government have been the imperialists. Their claims may be stated as follows:²⁵ The recovery from Austria of the Irredentia, Tyrol and Trentino; the domination of the Adriatic and the maintenance of equilibrium in the Balkans; consolidation of the results obtained in the Ægean Sea by the occupation of the islands, the forerunner of development in Asia Minor; the affirmation of Italy as a great European power. A "sacred egoism," Salandra's phrase when Italy's course was still uncertain, is expressive of Italy's thought. Italy wanted an Austria vigorous enough to serve her as a buffer state against the Slavs, yet incapable of injuring her. Many sympathized with Germany as a monarchy with a governmental system representing authority in politics, and with Austria as Catholic. The relations with England and France were not very close. It was only in March, 1918, that a single command on the western front was achieved. To lack of unison in the general Allied plans was added the suspicion that the French and English did not sympathize with some of Italy's aims.

²⁵ Bainville, J., "Italy and the War," pp. 235-245.

CHAPTER III

THE SECRET TREATIES

BEFORE discussing the attitude of the various Italian parties towards the question of the territorial gains which Italy might obtain from the war, we should consider the agreement made by the Entente Allies with Italy. In the early part of the war, public opinion was determined much by the necessity of maintaining the balance of power in Europe. There were treaties between Russia and France in regard to the boundaries of Germany and in regard to the Dardanelles and Constantinople. Secret agreements were concluded by Russia, France, and England on the subject of Turkey. The texts ¹ as published by Lenine after the Russian Revolution show that Russia was to have Constantinople, the Sea of Marmora, and the Dardanelles, Southern Thrace to the Enos-Midia line, the shores of Asia Minor between the Bosphorus and the Sakaria River, and a point on the Gulf of Ismid, to be defined later; islands of the Sea of Marmora and the islands of Imbros and Tenedos. Special rights of France and Great Britain in these territories were to remain inviolate. Constantinople was recognized as a free port for the transit of merchandise other than that coming from or going to Russia and the free passage of the Straits for merchant vessels was assured. The rights of France and Britain in Asiatic Turkey were to be exactly determined by a special agreement. There was to be an independent Mohammedan control of Arabia and of the Mohammedan Holy Places. The Persian neutral zone,

¹"New Europe," Vol. V, Supp., December 20, 1917. Full text of Anglo-French agreement of 1916 in *New York Times*, July 6, 1919.

drawn in conformity with the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, was to be included in the British sphere of influence.

In 1915, further agreements as to the East were made. Russia acquired the provinces of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van, and Bitlis and the southern Kurdistan territories following a line beginning at Mircha and running to the Persian frontier. The terminus of Russian acquisitions on the Black Sea was to be west of Trebizond and to be determined later. France was to receive the Syrian coast line, Adana Villayet and territory limited in the South, by the Aintab-Kharput line, up to the Russian frontier, and, in the North, by a line from Akdagh-Kaisarieh ending at Kharput. Great Britain was to have the southern part of Mesopotamia with Bagdad and the ports of Acre and Haifa.

According to the convention between France and Britain, the zone between their regions was to constitute a confederation of Arabian States, zones of influence being assigned to each power. Alexandretta was to be a free port for the commerce of the British Empire, and Haifa a free port for the commerce of France. Palestine and the Holy Places were excluded from Turkish territory and placed under a special regime to be determined by convention between Russia, France, and Britain. The contracting parties promised mutually to recognise, as a general rule, the concessions and prerogatives existing before the war in acquired territory and accepted parts of the Ottoman debt according to the extent of their acquisitions.

When Italy entered the war, these agreements were made known to her and the Italian Government consented to them on condition that, on the victorious conclusion of the war, satisfaction should be given to Italy's demands, particularly in the East, and that she should have the same trade rights as France and Britain in the territory ceded to those countries. With this treaty before us, we have some explanation of Italy's insistence upon having Dalmatia. Sonnino, who was then Foreign Minister, holds strongly the idea of

maintaining the balance of power. If the Tsar was to have Constantinople, Italy claimed that she must have the Eastern coast of the Adriatic in order to keep the ports out of Russian hands and that she must have Valona as a protection against a future Yugoslav state, which she expected to be a mere tool of the Tsar's government. But, once the Russian Revolution was successful and the Russian government had renounced its claims to Constantinople and had declared the principle of no annexations, this claim to Dalmatia was, of course, no longer so reasonable.

The treaty signed by the Allies and Italy on April 26, 1915, made arrangements for the military cooperation of Russia with Italy against Austria and for the naval cooperation of France and England with Italy. In return for entering the war, Italy was to receive the Trentino; the whole of Southern Tyrol, as far as its natural and geographical frontier, the Brenner; the city of Trieste and its surroundings; the county of Gorizia and Gradisca; the whole of Istria as far as the Quarnero, including Volosca and the Istrian Islands and a number of lesser islands. The boundary was gone into in some detail. Italy was to receive also the province of Dalmatia, including Lissarika and Trebinje, and, to the south, all places as far as a line starting from the sea close to Cape Planka and following the watershed eastward in such a way as to place in Italian hands all the valleys whose rivers enter the sea near Sebenico. Italy was to have also all the islands north and west of the Dalmatian coast. The whole coast from Cape Planka, on the north, to the southern point on the peninsula of Sabbioncello, on the south, was to be neutralized, as was also the coast from a point ten kilometers south of Ragusavecchia south to the River Vojussa, including in the neutralized zone the whole Gulf of Cattaro with its ports Antivari, Dulcigno, S. Giovanni di Medua and Durazzo, with the reservation that Montenegro's rights were not to be infringed in so far as they were based on the declarations of April and May,

1909. All the islands not assigned to Italy were also to be neutralized. There was to be included in the territories of Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro the coast beginning at the Gulf of Volosca, near the frontier of Italy, as far as the northern frontier of Dalmatia, including the whole coast then in the possession of Hungary; the coast of Croatia, the port of Fiume, the small ports of Nevi and Carlopago and certain islands; the coast from Cape Planka to the river Drin with the ports of Spalato, Ragusa, Cattaro, Antivari, Dulcigno and S. Giovanni di Medua and certain islands. The port of Durazzo could be assigned to the independent Mohammedan state of Albania. Italy would not oppose the partition of the northern and the southern districts of Albania between Montenegro, Serbia and Greece. The southern coast of Albania from the frontier of Valona to Cape Stilos was to be neutralized. Italy was granted the right of conducting the foreign relations of Albania and the Albanian territory was to be at least sufficiently extensive to enable the frontiers to join those of Greece and Serbia to the east of Lake Ohrida. Italy was to obtain in full ownership Valona, the island of Saseno and territory of sufficient extent to assure her against dangers of a military kind, the approximate extent being mentioned. Italy was also to obtain full possession of the Dodecanese then occupied by her. France, Great Britain and Russia recognized as an axiom the fact that Italy was interested in maintaining the political balance of power in the Mediterranean and her right to take over, when Turkey should be broken up, a portion equal to theirs in the Mediterranean, in that part which borders on the province of Adalia, where Italy had already acquired special rights and interests, as laid down in the Anglo-Italian convention. In the event that the other allied powers should occupy, during the war, districts in Asiatic Turkey, the whole district bordering on Adalia was to be reserved to Italy. In Libya, Italy obtained all those rights and prerogatives hitherto

reserved to the Sultan by the Treaty of Lausanne. In the event of the extension of French and of British colonial territories in Africa at the expense of the German colonies, Italy had the right to extend her possessions in Eritrea, Somaliland, Libya and the colonial districts bordering on French and British colonies. France, Great Britain, and Russia undertook to support Italy, in so far as she did not permit the representatives of the Holy See to take diplomatic action with regard to the conclusion of peace and the regulation of questions connected with the war.²

On August 21, 1917, the agreement of St. Jean de Maurienne was concluded between Great Britain, France and Italy. It provided that, if Russia should consent, Italy should have Smyrna and Adalia. Some months later, Great Britain denounced this treaty on the ground that it could not be legally ratified by Bolshevist Russia. This treaty has been given very little publicity.

² "The New Europe," Vol. VI, pp. 24-27.

CHAPTER IV

THE JUGOSLAV IDEA BEFORE 1914

BUT Italy and Austria are not the only countries which feel that they have vital interests in the Adriatic. During the last century, the Southern Slavs have slowly been working towards a united Yugoslav state; and, for this state, complete control of the Adriatic by another power would mean almost political and economic death.

The original home of the Southern Slavs is supposed to be north of the Carpathians between the Vistula and the Dnieper. They entered the Balkan Peninsula towards the end of the sixth century and settled in three great groups. One group retained the general name Slovene, which was equivalent to Slav; the two other groups during the ninth century acquired the names of Croats and Serbs. The Croats trace their descent from one of the Slavonic tribes which followed in the rear of the Lombards and the Avars. They were invited by the Emperor Heraclius to free Illyria from the Avars and, after performing the task, remained in the country. The tribes that later became known as the Serbs were encouraged to settle farther in the East. The Slovenes, who settled to the northwest, were the first to succeed in founding an independent state and, coming under the sway of Charlemagne, were also the first to lose their independence. The Serb and the Croat states were founded in the ninth century. The Croats and the Slovenes came under the influence of Rome, were Christianized by Roman missionaries and have remained Roman Catholic. In the maritime towns of Dalmatia, Roman institutions survived until the rise of Venice as a sea power; the culture on parts of the

coast has been Latin and the religion that of Rome, while, in the interior, the Serbs have developed a Slavonic culture and have taken their religion from Byzantium.

These small states were not long able to maintain their independence. The Slovenes were incorporated with Austria in the tenth century. In 1102, when the native dynasty became extinct, the Croats elected the King of Hungary to be their king and were under the Holy Crown of St. Stephen for eight centuries. Serbia developed in more distinctly Slavonic lines, reaching the zenith of her power under Tsar Dušan, 1331-55; but, at the battle of Kossovo, in 1389, was completely defeated by the Turks. Her existence as a sovereign state ended in 1459, when Serbia became the Turkish pashalik of Belgrade. The Kingdom of Bosnia was won by the Turks four years later. Since that time, the Serbs have been divided into those who stayed in their old homes and those who migrated into Southern Hungary. The history of the Serbs is one of almost ceaseless struggle against the Turks. Those who went to Hungary enjoyed for about two centuries some measure of self-government under their Despots. They had been invited by the Emperors to migrate and were used as a defense against the Turks. But, as the Turkish menace grew less, one by one, Serbian privileges were taken away.¹ By the fifteenth century, almost all Southern Slav political development, cultural achievement, architectural and artistic aspirations in the home land had been stamped out by Turkish rule and it is really only in the last half century that these oppressed peoples have been picking up the threads of their development dropped in the fourteenth century. Completely isolated from the coast, impoverished by centuries of Turkish rule and extortion, with only occasional help from Russia, Serbia had really a noteworthy achievement in her renaissance.

The whole Yugoslav history has been a constant struggle against the Turks, Magyars and Germans, which has left

¹ Seton-Watson, R. W., "The Balkans, Italy and the Adriatic," p. 7.

the people little time or energy for the work of unification. Vague ideas of Yugoslav unity can be traced to individual writers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The little republic of Dubrovnik (Ragusa) was a center of Slavonic culture through all the period of foreign rule. It fell before Napoleon in 1808 but had never been under the rule of Venice. Montenegro was never fully conquered by the Turks, so the spirit of independence lived on in these two small states. The French Revolution awakened the spirit of nationality. Napoleon united Dalmatia, Istria with Trieste, Carinthia, Carniola, Gorizia, Gradisca and part of Croatia into an administrative unit under the name of the Illyrian Province, and this arrangement was in force from 1807 to 1815. In this purely Southern Slav state of Illyria all three branches of the race,—Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes,—were united under one administration. The French officials introduced the native language into the schools and into the public life of the country. This enforced unification had great influence on the later movements for unity, especially on the literary movement of the thirties known as Illyrism, which resulted in reforms of the spoken and written language adopted by the Serbs and the Croats.

It was the French Revolution, too, that gave the impulse to the insurrection in Serbia against the Turks in 1804. This rising started as a movement to restore the legitimate authority of the Sultan and to punish the Janissaries who had set themselves against him. The leader was George Petrović or Karageorge (Crin Gjorgje). The scope of the uprising extended and the Serbs aimed at autonomy under the suzerainty of the Sultan. In the peace of Bucharest, however, Russia, threatened by France, left Serbia at the mercy of the Turk. The country was invaded and, in 1813, Karageorge fled to Austria. The leadership was taken over by Miloš Obrenović, who succeeded in obtaining internal autonomy for Serbia in 1815. During this struggle, Austria was devoting her entire energy to the Napoleonic wars and

subsequently to the suppression of the liberal movements in Europe and so was little interested in the creation of a new Serbian state, whose formation was greatly aided by Serbs living within Austria and Hungary. In 1817, Karageorge returned and was murdered by order of Obrenović. This was the beginning of the feud between the two families, both of peasant origin. Miloš was proclaimed Prince and was recognized by the Porte in 1830. In 1867, Turkey withdrew the garrisons from Serbia, and, though still recognizing the nominal overlordship of the Sultan, Serbia became, in reality, an independent state, its complete independence being recognized later by the Congress of Berlin. As a result of Russia's favoring Bulgaria in the Treaty of St. Stefano and at the Congress, Prince Milan turned to Austria. He was a weak ruler and became simply a tool of Austria. Austrian influence led to the war with Bulgaria in 1884, which resulted in the defeat of the Serbs. Milan abdicated in 1889. His son, Alexander, added to the family scandals and was murdered with his wife by army officers in 1903, when Peter I, a Karageorge, was made king and the Obrenović dynasty came to an end. The success of Serbia in the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 greatly added to her prestige and gave strength to the idea of a Greater Serbia which would include all the Serbs outside the kingdom.

The Yugoslav lands under the Habsburg monarchy formed one continuous territorial block, but they were divided between Austria and Hungary and subdivided into eleven administrative and fourteen legislative districts. Every province had its Diet for autonomous matters except Fiume, which had a municipal council, and the district in Hungary, which came under the Parliament at Budapest. All provinces belonging to Austria also had to send delegates to the Reichstag at Vienna. Croatia and Slavonia had, for common affairs with Hungary, a Parliament at Budapest.

Up to 1905, the Serbs and the Croats of the Empire were in a continuous conflict, largely fomented by Austria for

her own purposes. The Serbs are Orthodox and use the Cyrillic alphabet. The Croats are Roman Catholic and take their culture and alphabet from the Latins. No opportunity to inflame these differences was lost by the Austrians. From the point of view of Austria, there were two Southern Slav questions: a Croat question which was purely internal and a Serb question which was mainly outside of the Empire. The Croats have always been devoted to the Habsburgs and have quarreled with Budapest. The murdered Archduke, Franz Ferdinand, thought to settle the Southern Slav question on a purely Catholic Croat basis and this brought him into conflict with the Serb element.

In 1848, during the Hungarian rebellion, the Southern Slavs of the Empire threw in their lot with the Habsburg monarchy, trusting that they would be delivered from Budapest, and hoping for union under the Emperor. As usual, promises made them when the Empire needed their fighting strength did not last beyond the emergency. In 1850, special privileges for Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia were abolished. In 1867, the Southern Slav lands were divided, Dalmatia and the Slovene land going to Austria and the rest to Hungary. The Serbs were left entirely at the mercy of the Magyars. Croatia and Slavonia received what looked like Home-rule in the Compromise of 1868 but it was not until after 1906 that the spirit of the agreement was enforced, even in part. The Magyars have systematically exploited the Croats. They have governed the Fiume railroad exclusively for Hungary's economic advantage and have obstructed railway extension which would have aided the economic development of the Croats. Freight rates were so arranged that it was cheaper to transport goods from Budapest to Fiume (Rijeka) than from Croatian towns to the same port. Austria has not improved her provinces. Illiteracy was prevalent and the economic conditions backward. In Bosnia, for political reasons, the government favored the Bosniaks, the Moslem land owners, and, for their

sake, the agrarian reforms so badly needed have been postponed to the detriment of the country.

The Southern Slavs are divided into three main groups, the Serbs, eight million in number, of whom five millions are in Serbia and Montenegro, and three millions in Austria-Hungary; the Croats, three and a half million; and the Slovenes, one and a half million. The Croats and the Slovenes are entirely in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The three branches of one race form a homogeneous population with practically a single language.

The Slovenes form the bulk of the inhabitants in Styria, Carniola, Carinthia, Gorizia-Gradisca, Istria and Trieste. They belong to the Western civilization and form a link between the East and the West. Their native aristocracy has long been extinct. The Austrians have given titles but this titled class is regarded by the people as being German. The true leaders of the Slovenes are the intellectuals, the professional class, recently derived from the peasant class. They are thoroughly democratic in spirit. The Slovenes, owing to their geographic position, between the Germans and the Adriatic, were the first of the Southern Slavs to feel the pressure of the German Imperialism. The events of 1848 showed that the people were without political skill. The Illyrism, which proclaimed the unity of the Slovenes, the Croats, and the Serbs, was regarded by the Habsburgs as a counterbalance to the Hungarian agitation. In 1850, the government at Vienna appointed a commission to establish a legal unified Yugoslav nomenclature. In the eighties and nineties, the Austrian statesmen were prepared to develop the idea of a state of Nationalities and the consequences of the Dualist system were not yet so apparent. But, towards the beginning of the present century, a vein of non-compromise was apparent at Vienna. An energetic system of Germanization was inaugurated. Pan-German Imperialism had the upper hand; the Slovenes were granted a few privileges to offset the Italian population, but, on the whole, the

effort of the Germans in the attempt to reach Trieste was directed to effacing the Slovenes.²

In 1848, the Croats were in advance of the rest of the Slavs in the Empire. The primitive organism of the Serbs had scarcely developed the full character of a state. The Croats possessed both an aristocracy and a middle class and could look back upon an uninterrupted administrative history of many centuries. Agrarian reforms, introduced in 1848, removed the landed gentry, broke the political prestige of the aristocracy, and led to a democratization of politics. Croatia became a democratic peasant state and thus a step was taken towards Southern Slav unity in making Croatia more like the peasant states of the Slovenes and the Serbs.

For a time in the nineteenth century, the ideal of Pan-Slavism belittled the importance of Yugoslav unity. Under Peter the Great, Pan-Slavism began to shape itself, and the racial and religious affinity between Russia and the Christians of the Balkans first became noticeable in the field of international politics. There was a good deal of the mystical and religious element in it. Its political side was emphasized in the last half of the nineteenth century. The first Slav Congress was held at Prague in 1848, another in Moscow in 1867.

Jugoslav unity is not a new idea arising out of the present war. In 1848, the Croatian Diet proclaimed their union with the Serbs and, at the same time, the Sabor demanded the reunion of Croatia and Dalmatia, Istria, Gorizia, Carniola, Carinthia and Southern Styria. Again in 1869, they unanimously proclaimed the political identity and equality of the Serbs and the Croats and passed a resolution whereby the Serbo-Croat language was in the future to be officially styled the Yugoslav language. In the same year, a Congress of the most notable Croatian, Serbian, and Slovene patriots proclaimed in Laibach (Ljubljana), the capital of the Slo-

² Vosnjak, B., "A Bulwark Against Germany," Ch. X.

vene land, the unity of all the Yugoslavs. There has been, for the last forty years, a constant struggle on the part of the Austrian authorities against the Yugoslav movement. Since 1905, this movement had gone forward rapidly. In the Autumn of that year, a conference of Croat deputies from the Croat Diet and from the Austrian Reichsrat was held at Fiume. It passed resolutions demanding that the Compromise of 1868 should be observed in spirit as well as in form and that Croatia and Dalmatia be united under the "Crown of St. Stephen." Less than a fortnight after, a Serb congress met at Zara, endorsed the resolutions of Fiume and proclaimed the need for political cooperation between the Croat and the Serb elements in the Dual Monarchy. In the Spring of 1906, they sent to the Diet at Agram a formidable block representing the new coalition, and at Budapest, by a temporary alliance with the Hungarian opposition, were able to obtain certain guarantees of better government for Croatia. The leaders of this Serbo-Croat Coalition were the victims in the scandalous Agram High Treason Trial of 1909, which did so much to estrange the Southern Slavs from the monarchy though previously they would have welcomed an honorable compromise with Vienna.

The Inter-Balkan Socialist Congress, January, 1910, laid down the union of all Yugoslavs in a single state as the foremost claim of the proletariat.³ "The Socialist interest more than any other interest demands that the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes who inhabit Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Istria, Carniola, Carinthia, Styria, the Mur district, Baranya, Bačka, the Banat, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, should be united in a single Yugoslav state, including all the territories in which they live in compact masses. . . . In order to prevent sanguinary struggles in the future, we demand in the Adriatic free access for all nations, and, in the same way, in accordance with the prin-

³ "New Europe," Vol. V, p. 282.

ciple, 'the Balkans for the Balkan people,' we demand liberty for the Albanians."

Now let us look for a moment at the situation of the Serbs in the Kingdom of Serbia. Having lost her Italian provinces and been ejected from Germany in 1866, Austria adopted a new policy based upon the conciliation of the Magyars. The *Ausgleich* was adopted, dividing the Empire into a dual monarchy and leaving the Southern Slavs within the Empire at the mercy of the Magyars and the Germans. The Slavs outside the Empire were also affected by the war of 1866. Bismarck suggested that Austria could find in the Balkan peninsula compensation for her losses in Germany. Austria, of course, had always taken an interest in the Balkans but her chief interest had centered in Central Europe. From 1866, the Balkans became her special field.

In 1875, an insurrection broke out in Herzegovina and, in a few weeks, spread through Bosnia. The leaders issued a manifesto protesting against the abuses of the Turkish administration. Their object was to secure the autonomy of the two provinces, which would then be united to Serbia and Montenegro. The Great Powers undertook to settle the question. But public opinion in Serbia and Montenegro forced both those countries to declare war against Turkey in 1876 in order to free their kinsmen in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Russia became involved with Turkey in 1877. The whole question was discussed at the Congress of Berlin. Serbia gained the recognition of her complete independence, but Herzegovina and Bosnia were to be occupied and administered by Austria. Austria was looking towards an open way to Salonica and the prevention of the union of Serbia and Montenegro. This was a severe blow to the hope of Serbian unity but it was the price that had to be paid for Austria's support of Serbian independence.

At this period, the conflict of the Serbians in Hungary against the Magyars reached its height. The Serbs of Serbia were thoroughly in sympathy with their kinsmen and,

as in 1848, gave as individuals what aid they could. Since then, in spite of many internal changes in parties and of much misgovernment on the part of the Serbian rulers, there has developed the idea of a Greater Serbia which would include all the Serb people. Active work was started in Macedonia and Bosnia. Demonstrations against the Serbians at Agram in 1895 proved that the idea of Serbo-Croat unity had not developed far at that date, but the rapprochement with Montenegro was a national success. In Dalmatia and among the younger element in Croatia, there appeared the beginnings of a movement which later resulted in the Serbo-Croat coalition described above. Since the beginning of the present century, the national Serbian movement has been the object of constant repression on the part of Austria. Proceedings were begun against the Serbs of the Empire and every pretext was used to involve Serbia in a quarrel with Austria. The annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908 invoked a crisis which is too well known to need to be described here. The racial and regional association of these provinces with free Serbia and Montenegro had made the fiction of Ottoman sovereignty a useful pretext for denying the self-governing institutions which would infallibly have become instruments for a Serb national movement. After the entrance of the Young Turks, this pretext was no longer good. The only way out was to regularize the Austrian occupation and to give the provinces autonomy such as would not impair the Austrian autocracy.⁴ Serbian national aspirations were somewhat appeased by the withdrawal of Austrian garrisons from the Sanjak, the strategic strip separating Serbia from Montenegro. But, after the crisis, relations between Austria and Serbia almost amounted to a suppressed war. The Bosnian episode showed that Serbia was ready to fight for her kinsmen outside the kingdom and that she could fairly rely on the sympathy of all

⁴ Young, George, "Nationalism and War in the Near East," pp. 152, 154.

the Southern Slavs. Vienna considered Serbia the cause of all the trouble with the Southern Slavs of the Empire and was determined to exterminate the country. Serbia, too, lay across the road to the East, for Austrian military authorities had given up the idea of a road through Novi Bazar and had decided that they must have the valleys of the Morava and the Vardar. In view of these plans, Austria had watched with dismay the development of Serbia. Independent Serbia blocked the way of Austria and of her mistress, Germany, to Salonica, to the *Ægean*, to Constantinople, and to Asia Minor. The Balkan League was a heavy blow to Austrian and German influence in the Balkans and the Teutonic Allies did not rest until they had alienated Bulgaria from the League. The Balkan wars were a disappointment to Austria. She had expected to see Serbia come out exhausted; but, instead, particularly after the war with Bulgaria, Serbia came out aggrandized and with prestige enhanced in the eyes of the world, and especially of the Southern Slavs. "As Signor Giolitti announced in October, 1914, Austria asked Italy to join her in a war against Serbia in 1913, but Italy refused and the attack upon Serbia was delayed.

The territorial juxtaposition of Serbia and Montenegro as a result of the Balkan Wars was, before the Great War, leading rapidly to a union of their military and political forces. Many felt that a federation of the two states would be beneficial to both and would serve as the nucleus of a future South Slav State. The Balkan Wars converted the Serbian state from a peasant community to the political leader of the South Slavs.⁵

⁵ Young, George, "Nationality and War in the Near East," p. 347.

CHAPTER V

THE STRUGGLE FOR JUGOSLAV UNITY

A GENERAL election was in progress in Serbia when the Austrian ultimatum arrived. A coalition government including all parties was formed and Mr. Pašić, as Premier, associated himself formally with the program of Yugoslav unity and independence. This coalition government lasted from November, 1914, to June, 1917. During this period, Serbia was completely overrun by the enemy and the Government was removed to Corfu, after the surrender of Belgrade and of Nish late in the Autumn of 1915. But we do not need to relate here the well-known story of Serbia's part in the war.

The Southern Slavs within the Empire have suffered during the war as much as the free Serbs, though in a less dramatic manner.

The repression of these people by Austria and Hungary has been more thorough and relentless than the Austro-Hungarian treatment of the Czechs. The ultimatum to Serbia was not to be made public in Dalmatia until twelve hours after the time limit had expired.¹ The Serbo-Croat leaders in Dalmatia and Bosnia were placed under arrest or under observation as soon as hostilities broke out. The town councils were dissolved with the exception of that of Zara (Zadar), which had an Italian majority. The press and all patriotic societies were suppressed. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, expatriation was reduced, during the war, to a regular system and there have been wholesale treason trials in these provinces, as also among the Slovenes.

¹ "New Europe," Vol. I, p. 359.

In 1918, it was estimated on the basis of published sentences alone that, in Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, for high treason and for crimes against the military power of the state, 35,000 persons had been executed.² In October, 1918, Mr. Trešić Pavišić, a Slav deputy, delivered a long speech in Vienna telling of the treatment received at the hands of the Austrian authorities by the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina and of Istria during the war. He gave exact figures of the number killed and executed and instances of districts in which the whole masculine population had been wiped out.³

The Southern Slavs had no reason to remain loyal to Austria. They had not favoured the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, as he was believed to hold that the Ausgleich had reached the end of its usefulness and to wish to inaugurate Trialism in place of Dualism. This policy would have brought into the Empire a new South Slavic State comprising Croatia, the Banat, Slavonia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Istria, Dalmatia and the Littorale with Carniola, as the third partner in the Empire and would have destroyed all hope of a future independent Yugoslav state or of a Greater Serbia. The Southern Slavs were on the side of the Allies, but the Anti-Slav campaign, the claims on Dalmatia made by certain parties in Italy, and later the knowledge that the secret treaty had promised Italy territory east of the Adriatic, served to raise opposition between the Slavs and Italy and gave Austria just the opportunity she needed. Austria found that Slavonic troops, if sent to Russia, would desert to the enemy, but could safely be sent to the Italian front. There they felt that they were defending their homes against a common enemy. Attempts were made in Italy to show that the Croats were agents of Vienna.

There have been many statements to the effect that there

² Tucic, Srgjan, "Yugoslav Aspirations." *Journal of Race Development*, Vol. IX, p. 31.

³ *Christian Science Monitor*, October 10, 1918.

was a lack of union and of common policy among the different branches of the Southern Slavs, but this is hardly borne out by the facts. The dream of Southern Slav union is certainly traceable as early as the first half of the seventeenth century and before that time it had hung like a mist over the Dalmatian coast in spite of the efforts of foreign rulers. The little republic of Ragusa (Dubrovnik), which resisted successfully all attacks of the Hungarians and Venetians only to fall before Napoleon, had for centuries been a center of Slavic civilization and culture. Gundulić and other nationalistic Ragusan poets sang of ancient Slav aspirations and a contemporary Dalmatian Croat writer, Krizavić, declared, "Non erunt ultra dual gentes, nec dividuntur in duo regna; sed fiet unum ovile et unus pastor." Later poets celebrated together Napoleon and the Yugoslav Kingdom created by him, the first to include all three branches of the Southern Slav race. About 1840-50, Tjudevit Gaz, a political and journalistic genius, while devoting himself to improving the written language of Southern Slavdom, looked forward to complete unification and compared the new Illyria to a great harp stretched from the Julian Alps across the whole Western and Southern Balkans, then broken and discordant from the contentions of the Southern Slavs, but soon to be attuned again to a rich and wonderful harmony. Vuk Karadžić, "the Serbian Grimm," contributed further to this language reform and revival and opened to the Southern Slavs their treasure of ancient folk songs and popular poetry. Mr. Seton-Watson has brought out an English translation of many of these ballads and they challenge comparison with those of Ireland, or of Scotland. The Southern Slavs are a songful people and this song life has preserved their national longings.

In 1848, Jelačić, Ban of Croatia, following the tradition of loyalty to the Habsburgs set by the Croats and Slovenes in their fight for Maria Theresa, supported Francis Joseph

against the great national uprising of the Magyars under Kossuth. The Emperor, after the danger was over, showed the usual Habsburg ingratitude, and the Southern Slavs, by being themselves oppressed and persecuted by both Austrians and Hungarians, have since paid the penalty for helping suppress the struggle of another race for freedom. The hopes of Jelačić and his followers for Yugoslav unity and self-government, as a reward for their loyalty, were doomed to disappointment but the yearning for freedom that stirred the soul of every people in Europe about 1848 strengthened powerfully the Yugoslav idea. Peter Petravić-Njegoš, the Greek Orthodox Prince Bishop of Montenegro, was the poet of this national movement of 1848 and his Miltonic poems, "A Mountain Garland" and "The Light of the Universe," added two classics to the national Yugoslav literature. The great Roman Catholic Bishop Strossmayer was a spiritual father of the movement. In these two Princes of the Eastern and the Western Churches, national and race feeling overcame the natural antagonism of religious differences and gave support to the Slav proverb "brat je mio, kojo vjere bio" (he is my brother, no matter what his faith may be).

Mazzini, Foscolo, Carducci, apostles of Italian nationality, gave inspiration to the Yugoslav movement also and actively encouraged the cause of Italian-Yugoslav understanding. Niccolo Tommaseo, an Italian poet of Dalmatia, sang as often of Dalmatia and of the future of the Southern Slavs as of Italian aspirations.⁴

Until Austria had lost Venetia, she tried to keep her Italian subjects satisfied by encouraging and aiding Italians to get control of the Governments on the Eastern Adriatic coast. From about 1867 to 1900, the Slav majorities in these districts, freed from undue Austrian interference, gained control of most of these Eastern Adriatic

⁴Seton-Watson, R. W., "The Balkans, Italy and the Adriatic," pp. 36-7, 69.

governments. From 1903 to the present day, Austrians, Hungarians, and Germans, have vied with each other in oppressing the Slavs within Austria-Hungary, and in attempting to divide Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.

The victories of Serbia in the Balkan wars in 1912-13 thrilled the Southern Slav world and put Serbia at the head of the Yugoslav movement. The Czecho-Slovaks sent physicians and money to aid the Serbian army and were almost as much inspired by Serbian successes as were their Southern Slav brethren. The Pan-Slav idea had from 1860 taken a strong hold on many intellectual leaders but had never supplanted, in the hearts of the masses of the Southern Slavs, the desire for union of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. The efforts of Germans and Magyars to stir up strife among these three groups have had only temporary and unimportant successes.

In 1913, the young Slovene intellectuals made the following declaration of Yugoslav unity: "As it is a fact that we, Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs, constitute a compact linguistic and ethnical group, with similar economic conditions, and so indissolubly linked by common fate on a common territory that not one of the three can aspire to a separate future, and in consideration of the fact that among the Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs the Yugoslav thought is even today strongly developed, we have extended our national sentiments beyond our frontier to the Croats and Serbs, just as among them also the idea of national reciprocity with the Slovenes is spread abroad. By this we all become members of one united Jugo-slav nation. This is the spirit by which all Jugoslavs must be animated. As regards the Slovenes, we would lay special stress upon the fact that the evolution of their sense of national responsibility towards the creation of the broad foundations of Jugoslavdom, is already to-day greatly strengthening their resistance against denationalization and foreign Imperialism."⁵

⁵ Vosnjak, Bogumil, "A Bulwark against Germany," p. 225.

While Austria was invading Serbia in the Autumn of 1914, the Serbian Skupština met at Nish and, as has been said, formed a coalition government. Through Prime Minister Pašić, that government made, on November 24 (old style, December 7, new style) the following declaration, "The present government has been formed in order to personify the unity of will, forces and purpose of our land. Convinced of the confidence of the national Skupština as long as it places all its forces at the service of the great cause of the Serbian state and the Serbo-Croatian and Slovenian race, the government considers its paramount duty to bow with a boundless respect before the exalted victims who immolated themselves bravely and willingly on the altar of the country . . . convinced of the determination of the entire Serbian people to persevere in the holy struggle for the defense of its hearth and of its liberty, the Government of the Kingdom considers it its prime—and indeed in these fate-shaping moments—its only task to secure a successful end of this great struggle, which, at the moment of its beginning, has developed into a war for the unification of all our unliberated brothers, Serbians, Croats, and Slovenians. The brilliant success which will have to crown this warfare will redeem opulently the bloody sacrifices which the present Serbian generation is enduring."⁶

Various prominent leaders of the Yugoslav movement made their way out of Austria and established Yugoslav committees in Switzerland, Paris, and London. The committee in London was presided over by Dr. Trumbić, the former president of the Croatian National Party in the Diet of Dalmatia, and has been perhaps the most active in advancing the cause of Southern Slav unity. Its aims are clearly stated in the following manifesto, issued at London, May, 1915.⁷ "The Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes

⁶ "The Southern Slav's Appeal," No. 1, Nov., 1916.

⁷ Wallace, William K., "Greater Italy," pp. 234-235. This Committee consisted of 25 members, of whom 15 were Croats, 7 Serbians, and 3 Slovenes. The territorial representation was as follows: from Dal-

pray for the victory of the Triple Entente and confidently await from it the salvation of the Yugoslav nation. The conviction that the Triple Entente is fighting for the triumph of the principle of Nationality, inspired the moral energy and superhuman efforts of Serbia and Montenegro and prevented their kinsmen across the frontier from utterly losing heart.

"For Serbia and Montenegro this war is one of self defense and liberation, not of conquest; they are fighting to emancipate our people from a foreign yoke and to unite them as a single free nation. The military and political overthrow of Austria-Hungary will forever put an end to that system of *Divide et Impera* by which our people has for centuries been governed. The Jugo-Slavs form a single nation, alike by identity of language, by the unanswerable laws of geography, and by national consciousness. Only if united will they possess the resources necessary for an independent existence.

"The Jugo-Slavs (Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes) inhabit the following countries: The Kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro; the Triune Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia-Dalmatia (with Fiume and district); the provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Carniola; considerable portions of the provinces of Istria, Trieste, Gorizia-Gradisca, Carinthia, and Styria; and finally the Yugoslav zone of Hungary proper.

"To perpetuate the disunion of these territories by leaving so many under Austro-Hungarian rule, or to transfer even portions of them to another alien rule, would be a flagrant violation of our ethnographical, geographical, and economic unity, and to this our people would unquestionably oppose an energetic and justifiable resistance.

"The Southern Slav people aspires to unite its territories in a single independent state. The internal arrangements

matia 10, Istria 3, Gorizia 1, Trieste 2, Fiume 1, Croatia 3, Carinthia 1, Bosnia-Herzegovina 3, Southern Hungary 1. See "Southern Slav's Appeal," No. 1, pp. 19, 20, for list of names.

of the new state will be determined by the nation itself, in accordance with its own wishes and needs."

The propaganda of the Yugoslav Committees and the sacrifices of Serbia began by 1917 to bear fruit. The Yugoslavs were at a disadvantage in that there was in England, in certain quarters, a strong sympathy both for Austria and for Bulgaria. For many years all news pertaining to Serbia had come to Western Europe via Vienna. Few people at the outbreak of the war knew anything of Serbia. The general conception was that it was a nation of swineherds and the brutal murder of King Alexander and Queen Draga in 1903 was the part of Serbian history most prominent in the public mind. Serbia has been unlucky in her kings and it took months of propaganda on the part of friends of Serbia to bring before the public the truth about the people of Serbia. The territorial questions between Serbia and Bulgaria in Macedonia were not regarded in the same light by all parties among the Allies and endeavours were made to bring Bulgaria into the war on the side of the Allies, or at least to keep her neutral, through offers of territory occupied by Serbia. The Austrians, at least the nobility, have been well known and liked by the aristocratic classes of Great Britain. Vienna and the many health resorts of Austria have been favorite pleasure spots for them, and, in the earlier stages of the war, many of them felt that Austria was being deceived by Germany and that, in the course of time, things might be settled without actually breaking up the Empire. Italy, in particular, among the Allies, would have been glad early in the war of an Austria, too weak to be a menace to her but still strong enough to counteract Serbia in the Balkans. This general sentiment was not encouraging to the Yugoslav leaders in their struggle for a united Jugoslavia. They saw some hope, however, in the reply of the Allies to President Wilson, January 10, 1917. Section VIII listed among the war aims of the Allies the restoration of Serbia and

Montenegro with the compensation due to them, and "the reorganization of Europe, guaranteed by a stable regime and based at once on respect for nationalities and on the right to full security and liberty of economic development possessed by all peoples, small and great, and, at the same time, upon territorial conventions and international settlements such as to guarantee land and sea frontiers against unjustified attack; the restitution of provinces formerly torn from the Allies by force or against the wish of their inhabitants; the liberation of the Italians, as also the Slavs, Roumanians, and Czecho-Slovaks from foreign domination."

The Yugoslavs had looked to Russia for help, but, with the downfall of the Tsar's government and the practical withdrawal of Russia from the war, they were forced to fall back upon their own efforts. The entrance of the United States into the war was, for them, of course, the bright spot in the events of the war. Here was a democracy which had avowedly entered the war without selfish aims and which was not bound by any of the secret treaties. The time seemed to have arrived for the Yugoslavs to show the world that they were at one in their aims and that they were willing to work together towards a common goal.

At Corfu, July 20, 1917, the new Yugoslav state was proclaimed. The Declaration of Corfu was signed by the Premier of Serbia, M. Nicola Pašić, head of the coalition government, representing all political parties in Serbia, and by Dr. Ante Trumbić, president of the Yugoslav Committee in London, representing all the unredeemed Yugoslavs of Austro-Hungary. This state would have a homogeneous population of some twelve million inhabitants living in the following states and provinces: Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Istria, Carniola, Bačka, and the Banat. The main provisions of this pact are as follows:

"1. The State of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, who are

also known by the name of Southern Slavs or Yugoslavs, will be a free and independent kingdom, with an indivisible territory and unity of power. This State will be a constitutional, democratic and Parliamentary monarchy, with the Karageorgević dynasty, which has always shared the ideals and feelings of the nation in placing above every thing else the national liberty and will, at its head.

2. The name of this State will be the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and the title of the sovereign will be King of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.

3. The State will only have one coat of arms, one flag and one crown.

4. The four different flags of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes will have equal rights and may be hoisted freely on all occasions. The same will obtain for the four different coats of arms.

5. The three national denominations, the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, are equal before the law in all the territory of the kingdom, and each may freely use it on all occasions, in public life and before all authorities.

6. The two Cyrillic and Latin alphabets also have the same rights and everyone may freely use them in all the territory of the kingdom. The royal and local self-government authorities have the right and ought to employ the two alphabets according to the desire of the citizens.

7. All religions are recognized and may be freely and publicly practiced. The Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Mussulman religions which are most professed in our country, will be equal, and will enjoy the same rights in relation to the State. In view of these principles, the legislature will be careful to preserve the religious peace in conformity with the spirit and tradition of our entire nation.

8. The Gregorian calendar will be adopted as soon as possible.

9. The territory of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes will comprise all the territory where our nation lives in com-

pact masses and without discontinuity, and where it could not be mutilated without injuring the vital interests of the community. Our nation does not ask for anything which belongs to others, and only claims that which belongs to it. It desires to free itself and establish its unity. That is why it conscientiously and firmly rejects every partial solution of the problem of its freedom from the Austro-Hungarian domination.

10. The Adriatic Sea, in the interests of liberty and equal rights of all nations, is to be free and open to all and each.

11. All citizens throughout the territory of the kingdom are equal and enjoy the same rights in regard to the State and the law.

12. The election of deputies to the national representation will take place under universal suffrage, which is to be equal, direct and secret. The same will apply to the elections in the communes and other administrative institutions. A vote will be taken in each commune.

13. The Constitution to be established after the conclusion of peace by the Constituent Assembly elected by universal, direct and secret suffrage will serve as a basis for the life of the State. It will be the organ and ultimate end of all powers and all rights by which the whole national life will be regulated. The Constitution will give the people the opportunity of exercising its particular energies in local autonomies, regulated by natural, social, and economic conditions. The Constitution must be adopted in its entirety by a numerical majority of the Constituent Assembly and all other laws passed by the Constituent Assembly will not come into force until they have been sanctioned by the King."

This document has been the basis for all subsequent activity in behalf of a united Yugoslavia.

Meanwhile the Slavs within the Empire had not been idle. The Austrian Reichsrat met May 30, 1917, after having

been suspended for over three years. The Russian Revolution had made it impossible longer to delay summoning the Reichsrat. The Premier's statement of policy when it finally came was so immoderately Centralist that it made the support of the Government by the Czechs, the Yugoslavs and the Ruthenes impossible. Declarations of policy were introduced by all the leading racial groups and, while each contained a reference to the Habsburg dynasty, this was merely inserted as a necessary precaution. The statement read by Father Korošec, in the name of the newly formed Southern Slav Parliament Club, is typical. "The undersigned deputies, united in the Southern Slav Club, declare that they will demand, on the basis of the national principle and of Croatian constitutional law, the union of all territories of the monarchy inhabited by Slovenes, Croats and Serbs in an independent State organism, free from the rule of any foreign nation and resting on a democratic basis under the sceptre of the Habsburg-Lorraine dynasty, and that they will devote all their energies to the realization of this demand of their nation, which forms a single unit."⁸

The Austrian government did all in its power to stem the tide of Yugoslav unity. In June, 1918, Dr. von Seidler, the Austrian Premier, hinted that a Southern Slav state, excluding the Slovenes, might be formed under the Habsburgs. A strong protest arose against any plan which would separate the different branches of the Yugoslavs and this suggestion gave added impetus to the national movement. Again, in September, 1918, Count Tisza, went to Sarajevo to enlist the support of the more moderate Bosnians for a plan involving a new division of the Yugoslav lands. But the Bosnians claimed the right to belong to an independent Yugoslav state. Bosnia holds the central position in the Southern Slav lands and the support of the Bosnians would have been necessary for the success of any

⁸ "New Europe," Vol. III, p. 310.

of the Austrian plans to break the continuity of the Southern Slav territory. The officials of Austria-Hungary had numerous solutions to offer for the Yugoslav problem. The programme of the Hungarian Government was to unite Dalmatia to Croatia-Slavonia under the Hungarian Crown and to make Bosnia-Herzegovina an immediate colony of Hungary. An Austrian plan was to form Croatia-Slavonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Dalmatia into a single unit, connected with Vienna and resting on a Pan-Croat basis. A compromise scheme assigned both Dalmatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina to Croatia, but reserved Slavonia, the port of Fiume and fifteen miles of the Croatian coast to Hungary. Still another scheme, credited to Count Károlyi, gave special autonomy to each Yugoslav province but allowed them no central representation save in the Hungarian Parliament. Of course none of these plans were acceptable to the Yugoslavs. An attempt was also made to win over the Serb exiles. An emissary was dispatched to Geneva in 1917 to offer in the name of Count Czernin, in return for immediate peace between Austria and Serbia, the following concessions: (1) reparation of material damages, (2) the cession of Bosnia-Herzegovina with an outlet to the sea, (3) no opposition to the union of Serbia and Montenegro, (4) Austria's refusal to support the extreme demands of Bulgaria, where no treaty ties her.⁹ While this would have satisfied those who were interested only in a Greater Serbia, it fell far short of the demands of those who were working for a united Jugoslavia and nothing came of the offer.

During the Spring of 1918, evidence of unity among the subject peoples of Austria and of their determination to establish independent states on the basis of nationality, grew more striking. The Congress of Oppressed Nationalities held at Rome April, 1918, proved a success. The Poles broke away from the Germans and this left the government in the minority and caused the closing of the Reichs-

⁹ "New Europe," Vol. VI, p. 53.

rat, by imperial order May 4, 1918. The Poles had not co-operated with the other nationalities. Their interests were hardly in conflict with those of the Germans and the Magyars, and the Polish magnates, who aimed at a re-united Poland, had much in common with the Germans and the Magyars, and much to gain by remaining friends of Vienna. The Yugoslavs are peasants and they and the Czecho-Slovaks had a much more democratic organization than had the Poles. In the beginning, both were willing to remain within the monarchy if they could realize their national and constitutional claims. They worked together, generally with the support of the Ruthenian and of the Italian deputies in the Reichsrat. During the meeting of the Czech Constituent Assembly at Prague, Father Korošec, President of the Southern Slav Parliamentary Club, sent the following telegram: "In its struggle for the rights of self-determination and for its own state, the Czecho-Slovak nation will find allies in the Yugoslavs, who will fight shoulder to shoulder with it."¹⁰ The Slovenes took a popular vote on the question of Yugoslav union early in the Spring of 1918, and, despite the Austrian police, it showed an overwhelming majority in favour of union. The subject peoples were united on the question of forming independent states on the basis of nationality and the fact that they could accomplish this only by means of a definitely anti-Austrian attitude became increasingly clear. The Yugoslavs were here in a particularly difficult position. They knew that any definite steps against Austria would mean the dissolution of the Diets, and of the local administration of Croatia and Slavonia, the placing of the whole country under military regime and the extension of the persecutions and forced migrations. Further there was distrust of Italy. But it was impossible to go farther on the basis of a reorganized Austrian Empire. The agreement between the subject races of Central Europe at the Congress of Rome and the seem-

¹⁰ "New Europe," Vol. VI, p. 284.

ingly changed attitude of Italy, as represented by Orlando, were the death knell of the Empire.¹¹

President Wilson in the ninth, tenth, and eleventh of his "fourteen points" gave some encouragement to the Southern Slavs but did not cover all of their aspirations. The relevant points read as follows:

IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.

X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.

XI. Roumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated, occupied territories restored, Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea and the relations of the several Balkan States to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality, and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan States should be entered into.

This would have given to Italy only the purely Italian border territories of Trentino and Trieste, and would have left all other subject peoples, except the Poles, under the Habsburgs. During the Summer of 1918, the nucleus of a government for Yugoslavia came into being. At the Ljubljana (Ljubljana) Congress on August 16, 1918, the Slovenes organized a national committee, the People's Council, as the first member of a future Southern Slav People's Council. This was soon enlarged by the inclusion of members representing the Croats and the Serbs of Austria-Hungary and Bosnia, and its seat was removed to Agram (Zagreb). It was the beginning of the Yugoslav National Council. The feeling was growing stronger that Austria should not represent the subject nationalities at the peace

¹¹ See Ch. VIII for discussion of the Roman Congress of Oppressed Nationalities.

conference but that they should be given specific representation of their own. In January, 1918, when the Russian Revolutionists were negotiating a peace with Germany and Austria, the Yugoslav Committee had sent forth this idea in the following long telegram to Trotzky:¹² "We deny the right of Austro-Hungarian Delegates to represent in a peace conference the Yugoslav lands, inhabited by Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. The mandatories of Count Czernin are the oppressors of the Yugoslav people. There are no Yugoslavs or Czechs among the Austro-Hungarian delegates, though their inclusion was explicitly demanded by the Yugoslav and Czech deputies in the Vienna Parliament. The Delegates thus represent only the despotic Governments of Vienna and Budapest. The Austrian and Hungarian constitutions, which Czernin invokes, are a delusion. The facts are that, in the Austrian House of Representatives, the Germans hold one half of the seats though the Germans of Austria are less than one third of the population. The Upper House consists only of Archdukes and nominees of the Emperor. In the Hungarian House of Representatives the Magyars, who form only one third of the population of Hungary, have a monopoly of Parliament mandates. The House of Magnates consists solely of aristocracy and of royal nominees. One third of the Croatian Diet at Zagreb (Agram) is composed of foreign nobles and great land-owners who sit without election. The members of the Bosnian Diet at Sarajevo, which was dissolved when war broke out, are chosen according to their religious denominations as if for some ecclesiastical council. Bosnia is utterly unrepresented either in the Parliament of Vienna or in that of Budapest.

"The Southern Slav territory, which covers one hundred sixty thousand square kilometers, is wilfully split up into eleven totally distinct administrations. The people, numbering seven millions, are denied means of education and

¹² "New Europe," Vol. VI, p. 32.

railway communication. Twenty percent of the entire population has been compelled to emigrate to America by the Magyars and German Magnates and the Mussulman Beys of Bosnia, who own the richest lands and forests. Thus shackled, our people is at the mercy of the corrupt terrorism of its alien rulers. This is the Austro-Hungarian constitution under which Count Czernin would have us exercise our right of self-determination.

"Our lands have been denuded of foodstuffs. Our people perish and hunger. Zagreb alone shelters six thousand young children from the starving provinces. Thousands of our men and women have perished on the gallows and in prison. Our whole people has been outlawed, its voice is stifled. Therefore the Yugoslav Committee, which represents it, claims for it by this protest the right to live. We desire once for all to be freed from an atrocious despotism and to be united with our brethren of Serbia and Montenegro in democratic freedom and equality of right.

"Remember this when you seek to negotiate a democratic peace with the Delegates of governments who are the last remaining champions of autocracy, tyranny and militarism—you who until yesterday were yourself outlawed by an autocratic Tsar."

In October, 1918, the Zagreb Council issued a declaration accepting the idea of a general peace based on self-determination. They demanded full independence for Jugoslavia with international guarantees for the recognition of the rights of racial minorities in Jugoslavia to their own linguistic, cultural, economic and social development, and requested permission to send their own representatives to the peace conferences.

The best proof of solidarity in Yugoslav circles and of their determination to win national unity and independence was the proclamation of the Yugoslav leaders in Austria-Hungary, read in the Reichsrat by Father Korošec early in October, 1918. It runs as follows:—

"The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy is not competent to undertake any peace steps on behalf of any other nationality save the German and Magyar. The Yugoslavs demand peace, but this can only be based upon the following principles:—

"1. The Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes are a single indivisible people, wherever they live.

"2. They can only consent to a peace based upon the right of peoples to determine their own fate.

"3. The Yugoslavs must be allowed themselves to decide whether they wish to create their own independent State or to conclude an international union with any other State which already exists or may be constituted.

"4. No section of the Croato-Serbo-Slovene Nation can be subjected to foreign domination; this people must be united within the Yugoslav State.

"5. The Yugoslavs undertake to grant all minorities all rights of a cultural development. The Adriatic ports will be open to all peoples, on the basis of suitable agreements.

"6. The Yugoslavs will not recognise any peace concluded without their participation, and demand admission to the Peace Conference for representatives of the Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes."

This was signed by Dr. Korošec, for the National Slovene Council; the Dalmatian deputy, Dr. Bulat, on behalf of his Dalmatian colleagues; Mr. Pavilić, for the Starčević Party of Croatia; Mr. Radić, for the Croatian Peasant Party; Mr. Krasojević, for the Radical Serb Party; Mr. Bukšeg and Mr. Korać, in the name of the Yugoslav Socialist Party; and the well-known Croatian deputies, Budisavljević and Lorković; and had been endorsed by the Croat and Serb representatives of Bosnia.¹³

That Serbia was working as hard for Yugoslav unity as were the Southern Slavs within the Empire is shown by the declaration of Serbia's war aims made on behalf of the

¹³ "New Europe," Vol. IX, p. 24.

Serbian Minister in London at the Mansion House in August, 1918.¹⁴

"Serbia's first and chief aim is the union of the Jugoslavs (the Serbo-Croats and the Slovenes) who live in compact masses and on the one continuous territory, some within the frontiers of the kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro, some in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy—she wants them united in one free independent, and national state. This is today the wish and the will of all the Jugoslavs wherever they may be, in Serbia, and Montenegro, in Austria-Hungary, and in the allied and neutral countries. . . .

"Secondly, with regard to the question of the Balkans themselves, Serbia holds her old standpoint—"the Balkans for the Balkan peoples" . . . No hegemony and intervention in any form with regard to Balkan internal affairs is Serbia's aim; but support of the free and independent development of the Balkan nations, which would naturally exclude all pretensions for domination of one over others and lead to a league of Balkan states.

"The third of Serbia's chief aims concerns the reconstruction of the devastated countries which are inhabited by Southern Slavs. Serbia hopes that the Allies will see that justice is done and will lend their aid towards this reconstruction immediately the possibility presents itself, on similar lines as they intend to help reconstruct Belgium and Poland.

"In connection with the foregoing, the fourth and last of the chief aims of Serbia, is economical and intellectual intercourse and communications with the allied countries, as they would mean the best support and defense for the future of the nation and recovery from the present conditions.

"A restored Serbia, even enlarged with an outlet to the sea, would, if she remained otherwise in her former condition, and were not completely united with her co-nationalists

¹⁴ *Christian Science Monitor*, Aug. 26, 1918.

into an independent state, go on vegetating, and would necessarily fall back into dependence on the Central Powers. On the other hand, a united Yugoslav state, within its natural frontiers and what belongs to them, would be a strong guardian of peace in the Balkans—the best friend of her neighbors and of her friends today, a home of freedom, justice, and individual rights, and an upholder of the ideas which are at stake in this war.”

By October, 1918, the Austrian Government realized fully that it would have to act quickly and thoroughly if the Empire was to be saved. Count Tisza announced that autonomy, as far as possible, would be granted to the various nationalities living in Hungary, that Austrian territory inhabited by Italians would go to Italy and that parts of Galicia would be annexed to a new Poland. In the same month, the Emperor Charles promised a federal Austria. His manifesto was addressed “to my faithful Austrian peoples.” It read:—¹⁵ “Since I have ascended the throne I have tried to make it my duty to assure to all my peoples the peace so ardently desired and to point the way to the Austrian peoples of a prosperous development unhampered by obstacles which brutal force creates against intellectual and economic prosperity.

“The terrible struggles in the world war have thus far made the work of peace impossible. The heavy sacrifices of the war should assure to us an honorable peace, on the threshold of which, by the help of God, we are today.

“We must, therefore, undertake without delay the reorganization of our country on a natural, and therefore, solid basis. Such a question demands that the desires of the Austrian peoples be harmonized and realized.

“I am decided to accomplish this work with the free collaboration of my peoples in the spirit and principles which our allied monarchs have adopted in their offer of peace.

“Austria must become, in conformity with the will of its

¹⁵ *New York Times*, October 19, 1918.

people, a confederate State in which each nationality shall form on the territory which it occupies its own local autonomy.

"This does not mean that we are already envisaging the union of the Polish territories of Austria with the independent Polish State.

"The City of Trieste with all its surroundings shall, in conformity with the desire of its population, be treated separately."

This manifesto was hailed by the Jugoslavs as a piece of hypocrisy. Dr. Trumbić denounced it as a purely fictitious reform advanced with the intent of deceiving the Allies and the United States in order to save the Habsburgs. "The Serbians, the Croats and the Slovenes, at home and abroad, are inspired by only one thought, namely, that, in the severance of all their ties with the Habsburg monarchy, and their union with their brothers in Serbia and Montenegro, in a completely independent nation lies their future and their salvation."¹⁶ The Yugoslav Committee of London, representative and mandatory of seven million Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes of Austria-Hungary, and of the numerous Southern Slav communities of North and South America and of the British Empire, definitely rejected the Emperor Karl's manifesto. The schemes as proposed in detail would have perpetuated the division of the Southern Slav lands between Austria and Hungary, would have meant the enslavement of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the preclusion of the union of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs of the Empire with the Serbs of Serbia, and the retention of the Roumanians of Hungary under the rule of the Magyars. The Committee declared that their one demand was for a united and independent Jugoslavia. In Austria, the outburst of protest from the nationalities was so great that even the German *Neue Freie Press* attacked the Premier for having sanctioned the issue of the manifesto after the various leaders

¹⁶ *Christian Science Monitor*, Oct. 15, 1918.

of the national parties had pronounced it unacceptable. Austria, as a last resort, declared her willingness to set up a Yugoslavia under the Habsburg, but the offer came too late. There could remain no doubt as to the desire on the part of the Yugoslavs to be entirely free from Austria and to be recognized as a unified and free nation. In a Yugoslavia, under the Habsburg sceptre, there would be no place for the Serbs of Serbia.

The oppressed nationalities were much strengthened in their demands by the tone of President Wilson's reply to the Austrian Peace note of October 7, which proposed a peace based on the Fourteen Points and on the President's address of February 12, 1918. Among the fourteen points, the tenth was particularly to the point. In his reply to the Austrian Note, the President, referring to Point X, wrote: "Since that sentence was written and uttered to the Congress of the United States, the Government of the United States has recognized that a state of belligerency exists between the Czechoslovaks and the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires, and that the Czechoslovak National Council is a de facto belligerent Government, clothed with proper authority to direct the military and political affairs of the Czechoslovaks. It has also recognized in the fullest manner the justice of the nationalistic aspirations of the Yugoslavs for freedom.

"The President is therefore no longer at liberty to accept the mere autonomy of these peoples as a basis of peace, but is obliged to insist that they, and not he, shall be the judges of what action on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Government will satisfy their aspirations and their conception of their rights and destiny as members of the family of nations."

This was practically a recognition of Yugoslavia on the part of the Government of the United States. On July 4, 1918, the Yugoslavs in Washington raised their flag for the first time officially. Early in September, after the recog-

dition of the Czechoslovaks as a belligerent nation, they asked for recognition of their government by the Government of the United States. The Department of State asked for further data and for time to consider the question. On September 8, 1918, the Italian Government recognized the right of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes to constitute a free and independent state when they issued the following statement,—“The Council resolves to inform the Allied governments that the Italian Government regards the movement of the Yugoslav peoples for the conquest of their independence and for their constitution into a free state as corresponding to the principles for which the Entente is fighting and also to the aims of a just and lasting peace.” This was the first official utterance of the Italian Government as a whole regarding the affair. Orlando had received the delegates to the Rome Congress but he had not issued any statement on behalf of the Government. Italy, in common with the other Allied Governments, had recognized as nations the Poles, Finns, Letts and Czechs, but all the Jugoslavs obtained was this declaration.

However, by October it was apparent that the breakup of Austria was not far off. To aid in bringing the oppressed nationalities together and to help them to solve their common problems and disputes, Professor Masaryk organized in America the Democratic Mid-European Union. In this union were representatives of the supreme bodies in America of the Czecho-Slovaks, Jugoslavs, Poles, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Urgo-Russians, Roumanians, Italian Irredentists, Unredeemed Greeks, Albanians, and Zionists and there was hope of co-operation with the Finns, Letts, Esthonians, Carpatho-Russians and Syrians. It was hoped that decisions reached by the common body in America would carry a good deal of moral weight when presented to the people at home. Each point in dispute was treated by a committee of representatives of the people at variance and their agreement approved by the entire body. Masaryk

was careful to insist that all territorial questions should be left to the self-determination of the people immediately concerned and thus one of the most burning problems was removed from the field of discussion. The Union was worth while from the point of view of harmonizing propaganda. On October 26, 1918, a Declaration of Independence was signed at Philadelphia and a replica of the American Liberty Bell was rung at the conclusion of the ceremonies. One of the greatest difficulties at the Conference was the differences between the Yugoslavs and the Italian Irredentist representatives.

CHAPTER VI

THE QUESTION OF MONTENEGRO

MONTENEGRO was a part of the territory taken by the Serb branch of the Southern Slavs from the Byzantine Emperors and was, with Herzegovina, Cattaro, and Scutari organized into the Principality of Zeta. The Zupan, a feudal Prince, resided at Duklea (Roman Dioclea, birthplace of the Emperor Diocletian) and was a vassal of the Grand Zupan, who in turn was nominally a vassal of the Byzantine Emperors. The Nemanja dynasty ruled Zeta as a part of the Serbian Kingdom during the reign of the Serbian Tsar Stephen Dušan but, soon after his death in 1356, was succeeded by the Balsha family, which was said to be of French origin. After the destruction of the nobility, of the dynasty and of the independence of Serbia in the defeat by the Turks at Kossovo (1389), George Balsha and his handful of Serbian subjects retired to their mountain strongholds and defied the Turkish invaders. They would neither emigrate nor submit. "Shut off from outside help, entirely surrounded by Ottoman Turks, many times attacked by apparently resistless armies which they always defeated, scorning even nominal allegiance to the Turk or any other power, from 1389 to 1916 they maintained their savage independence.

"Resistance to the Turk was the dominant motive of their social and political life. Their ruler was a Vladika or Bishop because, as sacrosanct, he would be invulnerable to Moslem attacks or bribes. . . . The Sultan formally recognized their independence in 1799. So did all Europe seventy-nine years later."¹

¹ Grosvenor, "The Races of Europe," *National Geographic Magazine*, Vol. XXXIV, p. 484.

The line of the Balsha ran out in 1421 and Stephen Tzernović, a distant cousin, founded a new dynasty. Stephen and his Albanian kinsman Scanderbeg defeated the Turks in many battles. But a series of Turkish conquests (Serbia in 1459, Bosnia in 1463, Herzegovina in 1476, and Albania in 1478), the death of Scanderbeg in 1468 and the surrender of Scutari, the former capital of Zeta, by the Venetians in 1479, caused Ivan the Black, who had succeeded his father Stephen in 1468 as Voivode or Duke of Zeta, to burn his new capital of Zhabliak in 1484 and to set up his government in the mountain village of Cetinje. Near that village, he established the monastery of Obod, and, in this monastery, he founded, in 1493, a printing press, just sixteen years after Caxton had set up his printing press in Westminster. The Turks destroyed the press in 1566 and it was not re-established until 1832 in the time of the Vladika or Prince Bishop, Peter II. Duke Ivan founded a Bishopric at Cetinje in order to make his capital a spiritual as well as political and cultural centre.

Stanicha, one son of Ivan, joined the Turks and led them against his country. His descendants were for more than three centuries Turkish officers and bitter enemies of Montenegro. George, another son of Ivan, succeeded his father but became disgusted with the hard life and in 1516 went to live a life of ease at Venice. He nominated Babylas, Bishop of Cetinje, as his successor and the Montenegrin chiefs elected the Bishop as their Prince. The title of Prince-Bishop was made hereditary in the Petrović family of Niegosh about 1700 but, on account of the rule of celibacy for the Bishop, it passed always to the eldest nephew. In 1851, Danilo II renounced the spiritual title but accepted the temporal power. Before he could carry out his intention to settle the succession on his male heirs and while he had only a daughter, he was assassinated and his eldest nephew, the present King Nicholas, succeeded him.

Montenegro has had continual wars with the Turks but

has never fully surrendered her independence. Three times Cetinje has been captured by the Turks (1623, 1687, 1714) and at times some of the Montenegrins have paid a *haratch* or poll tax to the Sultan, but the Montenegrin warriors have always held some of their mountain fortresses and the Turks have ultimately found it expedient to retire from a country where "a small army is beaten and a large one dies of hunger." Danilo I (1697-1737) visited Peter the Great of Russia in 1715 and Peter sent a special envoy, Radonitch, to the Montenegrin capital. Danilo's successor, Sava, visited the Empress Catherine in 1739. These two rulers, Danilo and Sava, and their successors defeated the Turks many times. Peter I (the Great) of Montenegro helped Austria and Russia against Turkey, 1782-92, but received only ingratitude for his pains. In 1806, he joined with the Russians in besieging the French in Ragusa (Dubrovnik); in 1813-14, he helped the British to capture Cattaro from the French, but the port was handed over to the Austrians. Peter II (1830-51), defeated a Turkish invading army. He repressed the family feuds, stamped out thefts, established a Senate, revived the national printing press at Obod and collected the Montenegrin ballads or *piesmas*. His death at the early age of thirty-nine was a great loss to Montenegro.

Danilo II (1851-60) was murdered by a banished malcontent and was succeeded by his nephew Nicholas I, son of Mirko, "The Sword of Montenegro." Mirko had crushingly defeated the Turks in 1858 but was considered too much of a firebrand to be selected as Gospodar or Prince. Prince Nicholas was in his nineteenth year. He had been educated in a Slovene family in Trieste and in Paris. He and Mirko, out of sympathy for the Slavs of Herzegovina, then rebelling against the Turks, conducted an unsuccessful war against the Turks in 1862. Nicholas re-armed and re-organized the army, established a system of national education and, in 1868, granted a constitution to Monte-

negro. He refused to join the Serbs of the Boche di Cattaro in their revolt against Austria in 1869 but joined the Bosnians and Herzegovinians against the Turks in 1876. By January of that year, the Montenegrins had captured territories of greater area than their own state and Russia, by the Treaty of San Stefano (March 3, 1878), stipulated for the extension of Montenegro to join Serbia on the east, and to contain an area of 5272 square miles. This was cut down at the Berlin Congress, on Austria's demand for a road to the East, to 3680 square miles, but, even so, the area of Montenegro was doubled and her population increased by the Berlin Treaty from 150,000 to 200,000. Her independence was recognised and she also got thirty miles of her old seaboard on the Adriatic. The Sanjak of Novibazar was, with Bosnia and Herzegovina, put under the protection of Austria-Hungary and thus Russia's effort to connect Serbia and Montenegro by the Sanjak was defeated.

From 1880 to 1910, Montenegro developed in peace and began to become somewhat more of an agricultural country, cultivating tobacco and grapes. In 1883, the Prince visited Sultan Abdul Hamid and thereafter relations with Turkey improved. In 1896, Nicholas attended the coronation of Nicholas II of Russia, celebrated the 50th anniversary of the Petrović-Njegoš dynasty and married his fourth daughter, Princess Elena, to the Crown Prince of Italy, now Victor Emmanuel III. Another daughter was married to King Peter of Serbia while he was only an aspirant for the throne and there was also a family alliance with the rival Serbian house of Obrenović. Certain young Montenegrins educated in Belgrade (Montenegro has no university) tried to bring about union with Serbia in 1907 but were imprisoned by Nicholas. His actions at this time were resented by the Karageorges and since then the relations between the two dynasties have not been as cordial as formerly. In 1910, the Skupština or Montenegrin Parliament asked that the Principality be changed into a kingdom,

and this was done, in August, 1910, with much pomp on the fiftieth anniversary of the succession of Nicholas.

The Balkan League was secretly being organized in 1911 and was completed about May, 1912. On October 8, 1912, Montenegro declared war on Turkey and thus started the First Balkan War. The Montenegrins conducted a brilliantly successful campaign, which culminated in the siege and capture of Scutari. The Entente Powers allowed and encouraged Austria to insist upon a free Albania. Italy and Austria were jealously watching each other in the Adriatic and each preferred an Albania free rather than under the protection of the other. Austria's policy was to keep Serbia as weak as possible, so Montenegro was forced to give up Scutari, while Serbia was driven away from the Adriatic and forced back upon her Macedonian claims, and thus into disagreement with Bulgaria. Radović stated in 1916 that Montenegro could have kept Scutari by giving up Mount Lovtchen to Austria but that such an exchange was refused. Austria planned the treacherous Bulgarian attack on the other Balkan powers after the First Balkan War. Bulgaria was defeated and lost most of her conquests of that War. Serbia and Montenegro received the Sanjak of Novibazar and were thus no longer separated by Austrian or Turkish territory. The Sanjak had been given back to Turkey in 1908, when Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In the crisis of 1914, Montenegro loyally stood by Serbia. On July 24, Mr. Pašić, the Serbian Premier, asked the Montenegrin Government for an opinion on the answer to Austria and received the following answer: "It is difficult to decide what answer must be given to Austria. Our judgment would be to follow the advice of Russia, but, in any case, Montenegro, on this occasion as in the past, shares with Serbia the good or the evil. Serbia's fate is also our fate."² Premier Pašić asked "whether Serbia can rely on the brotherly and unconditional support of Montenegro in

the conflict with Austria-Hungary" and was promptly answered, "Serbia may rely on the brotherly and unconditional support of Montenegro, in the moment, on which depends the fate of the Serbian nation, as well as on any other occasion."² Montenegro was poorly prepared, and Austria had offered, in case of complications with Serbia, to purchase the neutrality of Montenegro by granting territory such as Scutari and its hinterland, Spizza, Boudva, a portion of Bosnia, a ratification of frontiers. Montenegro's answer was to declare war as soon as Austria had declared war against Serbia and to put forty thousand men in the field.

The Austrian General Staff decided early in the War that it was necessary, on account of the strategic importance of Montenegro, to capture the country and thus to deprive the Serbians of an almost impregnable stronghold. But five thousand Montenegrins with only fifty pieces of old artillery defended Mt. Lovtchen for seventeen months and were driven out or captured only after Austria had sent more than fifty thousand troops with 480 guns against them.

The Entente Allies were not without warning of the strategic importance of Montenegro in the plans of the Central Powers. *Le Journal* of October 27, 1915, quoted from the *Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten* the following:

"The events which are to-day occurring in the Balkans have placed Montenegro in the front rank. Whatever may be the issue of the campaign, the Serbian Army will always be able to find a refuge in Montenegrin mountains, where it will be able to continue the war. It is also possible that the Italian Army may take Montenegro as a base of operations.

"It is because of this that the Imperial General Staff has decided to take efficacious measures against Montenegro.

² Devine, Alex., "Montenegro in History, Politics and War," p. 64. This book gives a convenient summary of the history of Montenegro and has been largely used in the preparation of this chapter.

It is, of course, impossible that such a small country should play any part in actual events, but from the strategic point of view the country is important. It possesses two ports on the Adriatic, which will become a base for the revictualing of the Serbs. Montenegro's army comprises all her men, from eighteen to sixty-two years of age, totaling 45,000, and her strength is greatly enhanced by the steep rocks which surround her territory. The fate of Montenegro must absolutely be settled simultaneously with the fate of Serbia."³ Italy did not take Montenegro as a base of operations or help the hard-pressed Montenegrins; Great Britain and France were too busy elsewhere or too blind to realize the importance of holding this natural barrier against the Austrians and Germans.

The Montenegrin towns organized committees to welcome and succor the refugees from Serbia and the Cetinje Committee issued the following proclamation:

"To the Citizens of Cetinje

"The Serbian Nation, for which fate has reserved the cruellest sufferings, is once more sacrificed. Our sister Serbia is invaded by the enemy. Our brothers and sisters, with their tender children, driven out by the invasion of the enemy, have taken refuge with their brothers in Montenegro.

"Montenegro, cradle of Serbian heroes, has taken her heroic brothers to her breast.

"Our brothers and their tender children are undergoing cruel suffering.

"We suffer with them; their sufferings are ours; their grief is ours; their troubles are ours. Although we ourselves are suffering privations, let us share with them what we have. We must not only succor them; we must share with them; they are our brothers—what we have is theirs.

"The time has come not only to shed our common blood

³ Devine, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

with our brothers, but also to share with them our bread. We have already shed our blood; now let us share our bread. Let us prove in this way also that we live and die with our brothers,"⁴

November 12, 1915, King Nicholas, in a proclamation, said,

"The same events which have occurred in Serbia threaten Montenegro. The designs of Providence are not known to us, but let me tell you that Montenegro will always remain faithful, and, following her traditions, will always prefer death to slavery. Among all the riches of the world, that which we hold most dear is Liberty."⁵

January 2, 1916, the Premier read to Parliament, in the name of the Cabinet, this statement:

"Gentlemen,—We have come into power, as you well know, at a grave moment, but with a firm decision to continue the programme which Montenegro entered upon at the beginning of this terrible war. This programme Montenegro has loyally and faithfully adhered to, faithful to her historical traditions, in order to continue the war side by side with her great and powerful Allies, up to the time of that complete victory of which we have never been in doubt. Such a decision is dictated by our honour, our past, and our vital interests.

"Confident in the prompt and regular help of our Allies, we believe that our brave troops, always ready for the greatest sacrifices, will once again brilliantly accomplish their task.

"We count, Gentlemen, on your patriotic support."

Parliament, by unanimous vote, adopted the following answer:

"Entirely convinced of the devotion of our valiant army, the representatives of the Nation accept the declaration of the Royal Government, and look to it to do all that is

⁴ Quoted by Devine, *op. cit.*, p. 75-76.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

necessary in order that our country may once again be worthy of the loftiness of her mission.”⁶

Italy offered no aid to the Montenegrins in their stubborn defence of Mount Lovtchen. Sir Arthur Evans after the capture of this position, wrote a letter to the London *Times* saying, “Except an illusory bombardment round Cattaro and Lissa, nothing has been done to paralyse the action of the Austrian Fleet, which was allowed such liberty that it could come out of Cattaro every time that a transport was leaving the port of Brindisi. Why was the Austrian Fleet given such liberty? It seems a mystery indeed!” The *Times* commented on the letter and said England was entitled to know why Italy had allowed the loss of Mount Lovtchen without turning a hand to oppose the besieging Austrians.⁷ Barzilai, an Italian Minister, stated before the “Pro Patria” Society January 14, 1916, that it would have taken two or three hundred thousand men to save Montenegro and that “Mount Lovtchen, fortified or not, was doomed to fall, together with the other parts of the country.” But *Il Secolo* on January 12, 1916, said:

“Who is responsible for the crushing of Montenegro? The Allies or Italy? . . . The very fact of having left the defence of the base of Cattaro to the obsolete artillery of the Montenegrins very nearly constitutes an act of treason.”⁸

The French supplied the Montenegrins with some war material and a French unit aided in the defence of Mount Lovtchen, but the Italian navy seems to have stood aloof. Part of the Montenegrins were captured, part escaped through Albania and were refitted and reorganized at Corfu with the Serbians, part escaped to the more remote mountains of their country and maintained a stubborn guerilla warfare until December, 1917. And yet the Montenegrins

⁶ Quoted by Devine, *op cit.*, pp. 76, 77.

⁷ Devine, *op. cit.*, pp. 91-92.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 94.

have been accused of giving up the fight too soon. They defended the Sanjak and covered the retreat of the Serbians; they fought long after all hope of successful defence of their country was gone and after they must have realized that their allies could not or would not help them.

The Montenegrin Commander-in-Chief in a *communiqué* dated February 10, 1916, declared that *pourparlers* with the Austrians as to an armistice and as to peace were held only in order to gain time for reinforcements to arrive, and that twelve of the best Montenegrin battalions did arrive and prolong the resistance. He continued, "The King was quite determined never to append his signature to a separate peace with Austria-Hungary. . . . The Royal Family and the Government were obliged to leave hurriedly in order not to fall into the enemy's hands.

"On reaching Italian territory, on January 20, the King, in a telegram to General Yanko Voukotitch, Commander-in-Chief of the Montenegrin armies, recapitulated his formal orders so as to do away with any uncertainty:

"1. To oppose an energetic resistance to the enemy.

"2. To effect a retreat in the direction of the Serbian army, towards Durazzo. Of this the Serbian commanders have been informed.

"3. Not to enter into any *pourparlers* of any kind under any pretext.

"4. The Prince, as well as the Government, is ordered to follow the army in retreat.

"5. The French Government will make the same arrangements for the transport of the Montenegrin army to Corfu as is made for the Serbian army."⁹

The question of the withdrawal of King Nicholas was touched upon by Baron Sonnino in the Chamber on April 17, 1916, when he stated: "The invasion of Montenegro has been the inevitable consequence of the Serbian retreat.

⁹ Devine, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

"It was said that Italy could have, ought to have, sent a military expedition to protect Montenegro.

"But this argument cannot stand the most elementary criticism, if the tactical and strategical position on land and sea is taken into account.

"King Nicholas preferred to withdraw into exile rather than sign a separate peace, convinced as he was that the victorious Allies would restore the independence and the integrity of his country."¹⁰

Nicholas did not tarry in Italy but went on to France and took his Cabinet with him. It was in Paris that the disagreements between him and his different cabinets took place. Naturally he wanted a form of union and of government for Jugoslavia that would enable him to retain the throne he had occupied since 1860.

It is certain that a large majority of the Montenegrins favor union with the other Jugoslavs but there is much difference of opinion as to the form of union. On August 18, 1916, the Premier of Montenegro, Mr. Andreas Radović, presented a memorial to King Nicholas in which he declared that the union of Montenegro and Serbia must be followed by the fusion of the two dynasties and that Nicholas and his son should abdicate in favor of Prince Alexander of Serbia and that thereafter the throne should alternate between the two houses.¹¹ The King returned no definite answer. On January 11, 1917, a second memorandum was presented couched in even more explicit terms than was the first. King Nicholas declined to accept the proposals and the Cabinet resigned. A new Cabinet was formed which owed its position to the King alone, but, when he wished the Cabinet to disown the Montenegrin Committee of National Union founded by Radović and other prominent exiles, the Premier, General Matanović, refused and pointed out the need for a profound entente with Serbia. King Nicholas, then, quite on

¹⁰ Devine, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

¹¹ "New Europe," Vol. IV, p. 68.

his own initiative, sent a telegram to the King of Italy asking for his assistance. The Cabinet interpreted this as a denial on the part of the King of the ideal of Yugoslav unity and resigned in a body. The King formed another Cabinet of practically unknown persons. It has been said that, at the Balkan Conference held at Paris soon after this, the Allies refused to admit personal representatives of Nicholas but this has been denied most positively by friends of the King.¹²

This difference of opinion between King Nicholas and the prominent exiles has continued. The Montenegrin Committee for National Union sitting at Geneva has striven for union with the Serbians and the other Yugoslavs. In a manifesto issued late in 1917, they regretted that Montenegro was not still fighting and declared that, on the day of liberation, Serbia and Montenegro "must constitute a single state, to which must be united besides the other Serbian lands, the Croat and the Slovene countries, according to their common aspirations and desires."¹³ This Committee stated that King Nicholas had disregarded the unanimous resolution of the Montenegrin Parliament to fight to the end and that he had telegraphed to the Emperor and to Baron Burian to try to arrange peace terms. These charges made by Radović and his committee are strongly denied by Mr. Devine,¹⁴ who declares he has talked with Radović and with other Montenegrin ex-ministers and has sifted much evidence. His conclusion is that the stories against Nicholas come from the Montenegrins and Serbians, who wish to show the old King no consideration whatsoever, but to regard the union of Montenegro with the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes under the Karageorge dynasty as an already accomplished fact.

The Montenegrins in Paris, who did not agree with Rado-

¹² Devine, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

¹³ "New Europe," Vol. III, p. 237.

¹⁴ Devine, *op. cit.*, ch. VII.

vić and his committee, on October 1, 1917, issued the following declaration:

“For several months the ex-President of the Montenegrin Government, now President of the Montenegrin Committee for National Union, M. André Radović, has been conducting a campaign against the sovereign rights of Montenegro, and against its representatives. Radović and his colleagues have taken it upon themselves to discredit their country by every means in their power, and particularly by way of publicity, in the eyes of the Allies, in order to create, on the eve of the future Peace Conference, a situation which cannot be satisfactory to any loyal Montenegrin, but which will also be disastrous to the entire Serbian race. This campaign has reached its culminating point in Numbers 10 and 11 of the journal of the Committee, *l'Union* (published in Geneva), which states among other things, *à propos* of the Declaration of Corfu:

“‘The Montenegrin Committee for National Union—believing that in this war Montenegro terminates her rôle as a separate Serb State, and that consequently she can only form part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes—adopts unreservedly the Declaration of the President of the Royal Government of Serbia, M. N. Pašić, and of the President of the Yugoslav Committee, M. A. Trumbić, made on the 7th (20th) July at Corfu (No. 10 of *L'Union*). . . . We already consider Montenegro as a constituent part of our United States, and we do not wish her political individuality to be in any way put forward.’

“The facts are quite clear. Montenegro is attacked; the future and honour of the Montenegrin State are being gambled with. This Committee, consisting of M. Radović and his colleagues, having adopted without reserve the Declaration of Corfu, deliberately hands over its country as a present to Serbia without *consultation or consent*.

“Such a solution of the Montenegrin Question, artificially concocted, cannot satisfy any Montenegrin imbued with

honour and conscience for the following reasons: Montenegro being an independent State, which for centuries has fought its own battles, giving proof of admirable moral force as well as striking military capacity, cannot be dealt with in the manner desired by the 'Montenegrin Committee for National Union' and set forth in the Declaration of Corfu.

"In the present war, in spite of an insufficiency of food and clothing, such as no other country has suffered from, Montenegro has fulfilled her sacred mission towards the Serbian nation, the Slav race, and the Allies. The blotting out of the Montenegrin Dynasty as the first representative of the country, in accordance with the desire of the 'Montenegrin Committee for National Union,' would be an attack on the honour and on the dignity of the sovereign rights of Montenegro. Furthermore, any decision made at this time concerning the future status of Montenegro would not have full value, because the principal factor of the State, the Montenegrin Parliament, cannot participate in the elaboration of this decision, which must emanate from the official representatives, and not from a group of citizens exiled in the Allied countries, whose number is insignificant in comparison with the population of the country.

"By reason of the objections enumerated above, we, the undersigned Montenegrin citizens in Paris, declare:

"That the great cause of the liberation and union of the Jugo-Slavs in an independent State is sacred to all Montenegrins, and that the realisation of this idea, hundreds of years old, is their noble aspiration. The right of choosing the best means of assuring the equality of all, or, in a word, the choice of a social and political régime, belongs exclusively to the people, who ought to do this by means of free consent.

"That in adopting the Declaration of Corfu (*in which our country has taken no part and which was drawn up unknown to its representatives*) M. A. Radović and his col-

leagues have not only committed treason against the rights and interests of Montenegro, but have equally given proof of very poor political experience, and of an extraordinary audacity. In consequence the undersigned condemn with indignation this anti-patriotic deed of the 'Montenegrin Committee for National Union,' a deed which is of evil omen to the widest national interests, the members of the said Committee having taken upon themselves the right to speak in the name of the Montenegrin people, whilst breaking all ties with Montenegro, in spite of the fact that the latter, by means of her present representatives, has given proof of her wish for a fraternal Entente with a view to the solution of her national problem."¹⁵

In reply to the foregoing statement the Montenegrin Government at Paris published on October 25, 1917, the following declaration:

"The Montenegrins in Paris have lately carried a resolution in which they have clearly and forcibly protested against the unworthy campaign undertaken against the sovereign rights of Montenegro and her representatives. They have recalled that Montenegro in her quality of independent State, having done her duty to the Serb cause, cannot be disposed of without her own consent and complete participation in future arrangements. They have clearly shown that the removal of the Montenegrin Dynasty (the supreme representative of the country, and possessing substantial worth in the national cause) would constitute an attack on the honour, the dignity, and the sovereign rights of Montenegro. The subscribers of the Manifesto concluded by saying that every Montenegrin has at heart the wish to collaborate in the great work of the liberation and union of all the Jugo-Slavs in an independent State, in which the right of the people will be rigidly maintained—the right to be their own masters; and to form a constitution on an equitable base that will assure their individual and collective

¹⁵ Quoted by Devine, *op. cit.*, pp. 116-118.

rights. The circumstances which have provoked this resolution are very regrettable. They will leave a dark shadow on these days, unhappy, yet great and glorious for our entire country. They will be judged with severity by the people and by history. Instead of directing the energy of minds and hearts towards those aims that may be profitable to the whole nation, they have thrown all the strength that remained to us in this anxious exile into discord, by outraging our great common name of Serbs.

"This ambiguous and evil action, the work of hot-headed persons, of disordered brains, and of blunted consciences, has caused a reaction, an echo of the pure national conscience personified by the subscribers of this resolution, which has been adopted in other places as well as in Paris.

"This pernicious movement, supported by violence, which seeks to shield itself by slander, has roused the indignation of all true patriots, arming them with a civic courage inspired by a sound comprehension of justice and equality. The resolution of the Montenegrins of Paris is an act of equity and of valiant patriotism.

"It is the true expression of the directive idea of the present hour and of modern tendencies. Fraternity and equality in internal questions; united effort in the external. Thus understood, this resolution, binding names and persons by the modern principles of democracy, repudiates in advance all attempt towards imperialism and forced concessions. It does not draw any distinction between the parties and coteries which dispute with each other the power and the control of the national budget, but on the contrary it enlists all patriotic hearts to work for the people, and for their national union. It does not permit those deserving of merit to be slandered, or the disturbers of sacred union to abide undetected.

"When, as to-day, modern legislation demands that the honour of the poorest citizen shall be defended, how can it hesitate in the same measure to defend the honour of those

whom the will of the people has placed at the head of the country? And all the more so because their work corresponds with the national interests and aspirations, of which the people alone are judges, and not with the aspiration of dubious individuals blinded by selfishness or by revenge.”¹⁶

King Nicholas referred to the dynastic dispute in an address to the Montenegrin refugees in Paris on September 25, 1917. He said in part:

“Perhaps you have heard perplexing remarks made by dissentient persons who try to upset the sound ideas of concord, love, brotherhood, and common faith in our rights.

“Such intrigues will not be profitable to them. They will not succeed in getting the seed of discord to bear fruit harmful to their country. *Montenegro is not the exclusive property of anybody. The question is not limited to my Right but also to my Duty to guard that which was confided to me by the people.* Montenegro belongs to a nation of heroes, who fought with honour for the highest ideals. Her people will not allow anybody to trifle with the country, or to put it on the market.

“Serbian and Jugo-Slav, that is what my country has always been; that is the only tradition which it followed in choosing my person and my family as a guide, well knowing that, like our ancestors, we have always lived in it and for it, and that our feelings, as well as our thoughts and actions, were always dictated by our love for our country. . . .

“During my long reign I have always acted in accordance with the wishes of my people, and for the welfare of the entire Serb nation, and I followed the dictates of my sentiments, acting as the representative of the national will, as indeed I was. . . . Some envious people have said that I have not always accomplished conscientiously my duty as a King, having sometimes ignored the Serb interests. But facts prove the contrary. Was I not always ready, side by side with my people, when the welfare and the happiness

¹⁶ Quoted by Devine, *op. cit.*, pp. 118-120.

of the Serbs were at stake? But on this subject the whole truth cannot be told as yet. . . .

"You must love your Serbian brethren, who have always shared with the Montenegrins good and evil fortune. By their heroism in consecrating their Serbian name, they acquired the admiration of the world. The fact is that they love their Montenegrin brothers.

"We have everything in common: we are one nation, and we have always lived in a complete communion of ideas, aspirations, and work; God grant that we may continue to live like this, in spite of intriguers and renegades. . . .

"He will be the victor who does not fall under the weight of the cross of the just, he who allows himself to be guided by a pure conscience, and a faith that is strong in the future of the Serb, Croatian, and Slovene nation."¹⁷

The statement issued by Mr. Radović as President of the Montenegro Committee for National Union in June, 1918, reviewed the situation.¹⁸ It read as follows: "We Southern Slavs, like all other peoples, must demonstrate to friends and foes that we are completely united, and that we will not desist from the fight until all of us—Serbs, Croats and Southern Slavs (probably an error in transmission for Slovenes)—are united in an independent democratic state. Profoundly convinced that the only road of salvation for Montenegro and the goal of her centuries of struggle is union with the Serbs and other branches of our race, I made a condition of my acceptance of the post of Minister President, when King Nicholas again offered it to me in May, 1916, that the King should place no obstacle in the way of that union. After he had given me a verbal and written assurance to that effect, I considered it my duty to accept that post, which assuredly was no enviable one for a man who knew from personal experience how King Nicholas is wont to reward his conscientious ministers. It is notorious

¹⁷ Quoted by Devine, *op. cit.*, pp. 125-128.

¹⁸ *Christian Science Monitor*, September 3, 1918.

that, in 1913, when Serbia and Montenegro acquired a common frontier, the union of these two lands could undoubtedly have been realized, because the union was already an accomplished fact in the souls of the population of both countries, had no powerful obstacle been placed in the way. In order to remove that obstacle, I made, in August, 1916, my well-known proposal to King Nicholas.

"That proposal was based upon the fusion of the two Serbian dynasties, the last word, however, being reserved to the people. Actually it was nothing new or unexpected, being merely a proposal to carry out the decision of the Montenegrin Prince Danilo II, and the treaty which his nephew, the present King Nicholas, concluded, as Prince, in 1865 with the Serbian Prince Mihailo Obrenović. But our efforts to induce the King to bind himself to fulfil the promises made, remained unsuccessful. In view of the fact that the National Assembly was left behind in the country by the King and fell under enemy domination, it was the sacred duty of those politicians and patriots who escaped abroad to come forward as the interpreters of the unequivocal aspirations and feelings of the nation. . . . We Montenegrins have subscribed to the Declaration of Corfu because it is the expression of the wishes of our people, and acknowledge their right to determine their future themselves through their regular representatives. The constituent assembly and no one else, will have the right to create the constitution, and to determine the foundation for the establishment of a new, united state.

"The Montenegrin Committee for National Union speaks not only in the name of its members, but has a mandate from the flower of our youth, and represents over thirty associations in Europe and America to which many thousands of Montenegrins belong. All these associations have declared their solidarity with the Declaration of Corfu and have recognized the Montenegrin Committee as the representative and interpreter of the aspirations of Montenegro."

Mr. Radović stated clearly that this is not a case of favoring one dynasty for its own sake as against another but it is a question of which will better serve the people under the given circumstances.

Early in November, 1918, King Nicholas issued a declaration to his people favoring a Federal organization for Yugoslavia. This form of government would, of course, make it unnecessary for him to give up his throne. On December 1, the Great National Assembly of Montenegro, elected, under the Constitution of 1905, on the basis of universal suffrage, adopted the following resolution:¹⁹ "Taking into consideration the historical tendencies as well as the political and economic interests of Montenegro, the Great Skupština, elected by the people of Montenegro and assembled at Podgoritza, has decided:

1. To depose the King, Nicholas Petrović Niegosh;
2. To effect the union of Montenegro with Serbia under the Karageorgević dynasty and its entrance into the common fatherland of Serbians, Croats and Slovenes;
3. To elect a national committee specifically charged with the conduct of the affairs of Montenegro united with Serbia;
4. To communicate this decision to former King Nicholas and to the Government of the Kingdom of Serbia, as well as to the governments of the allied and neutral powers."

King Nicholas issued a formal protest denying the power of the Skupština to depose him. Dr. Philippe Dobrečić, delegate at large for the dynasty and member of the Montenegrin Parliament, gives the reasons for the King's point of view in the following manifesto:²⁰

"Montenegro was the first to declare war against Turkey in 1912, and she suffered huge sacrifices for the liberation of her enslaved brothers. In the second Balkan War she sent ten thousand soldiers to help the Serbian Army against the Bulgarians and of these the greater part were killed

¹⁹ *New York Times* "Current History," Vol. IX, pt. 2, p. 307.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 423.

or wounded. As soon as Austria declared war against Serbia, Montenegro did not hesitate one moment to help the Serbian people, although she was quite exhausted and deprived of all supplies after two horrible Balkan wars.

"For one year and a half she fought in this war against the Austro-Germans, and several times she had splendid successes; especially in the Autumn of 1915 she protected the retreat of the Serbian Army through her own land and Albania to the shore of the Adriatic Sea, rendering thereby a great service to Serbia and the Allies. Meanwhile, after the Balkan catastrophe and the invasion of Serbian territory by the enemy, Montenegrin troops remained in a desperate situation, and, finding it impossible to effect a retreat, they were encircled and overwhelmed from all sides by a much stronger force of Austro-Germans. In such circumstances they were captured, when help from the Allies could not reach them.

"As in the old days, when Montenegro had to fight for the liberty of all Serbians and Yugoslavs, so it was for the same high ideals and for the unity of the Yugoslav race that she entered into this great war. Montenegro is not opposed to unity with the Yugoslav countries, as some of the Balkan statesmen wish to prove, but she is against the manner of settling the question which they try to impose upon her with a view to bringing about the annexation of her territory. Montenegro as a free allied country voluntarily came into this struggle; she is entitled to a free hearing and to fair play, and should be directly represented at the Peace Conference.

"From reliable information received from Montenegro I can say that the meeting which was held at Podgoritzza was quite illegal and unjust, for all the deputies elected for that meeting and who participated in it were under the influence of agents and partisans of Montenegro's adversaries, and so were compelled to vote for unity with the Yugoslavs and the deposition of the King. Under the Constitution of

Montenegro it is only through the Parliament elected before the war, or through a new one legally chosen at a new election, that the people can decide their destiny. . . . The form and organization of our future common State will be settled after the Peace Conference, leaving it to the Jugoslav countries to settle the matter by self-determination as to whether they will have a federation of united States, a monarchy, or even a republic."

King Nicholas holds that he was deposed by a "mock parliament." His sympathisers claim that Serbia is besieging Montenegro. The Montenegrin Legation at Washington issued a statement in January, 1919, stating that the occupation of Montenegro by Serbian troops had resulted in a revolt and that the insurgents had sent a message to King Nicholas asking that American troops be sent to Montenegro to preserve order. Some weeks before, the State Department had been informed by the Montenegrin Committee for National Unity that a convention duly chosen by the people had deposed the King and had voted to join the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and that a deputation had gone to Belgrade, where Montenegro had been formally accepted by Prince Alexander as part of the new State.

Various tales of Serbian cruelty have been printed in the daily papers coming from the Montenegrin section favorable to the King or from Rome. Italy seems to have made the most of any dissension among the different branches of the Jugoslavs and has used, with good effect, the quarrel centering about King Nicholas.²¹ Contradicting the reports of disorder in Montenegro, a dispatch of January 13 from Belgrade stated that the Montenegrin National Assembly had passed a resolution demanding the immediate withdrawal of all the Italian troops from Montenegro, "now part of the new State of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes," as, "not dictated by any military necessity, as stable peace reigns in the country."

²¹ "Modern Italy," Vol. II, pp. 79-86.

On one hand we have the statements of Serbian misrule and cruelty in Montenegro. Major Charles Wellington Furlong, acting at the instance of the Peace Commission's intelligence department, visited Montenegro in the Spring of 1919. He reported that the Serbs were acting most arrogantly in Montenegro and were employing methods not at all in conformity with the armistice. He blamed the actions of the Serbs during the elections for the insurrections in Montenegro, stating that the Serbs had announced the election of men who were not known in the towns and who had been rushed in like "carpet-baggers."²²

It is entirely natural and probably true that a part of the Montenegrins, besides the royal officers and the court circle, favor retaining the separate national existence of their country or at least prefer some arrangement for union with Yugoslavia whereby King Nicholas might continue in authority in his own country. It would be strange if all the members of an individualistic, warlike people such as the Montenegrins, with centuries of successful warfare and great traditions behind them, could accept a new government without considerable friction and disturbance. Americans have only to recall the great hostility to the new Federal Constitution of 1787 in order to understand the opposition of individuals in Montenegro to the Yugoslav Government.

Quite a different account of the risings in Montenegro and of their cause has also been given. It is said that King Nicholas counted on an ally on the other side of the Adriatic, that besides the fact that one of his daughters is Queen of Italy there was a political reason for Italian aid to Nicholas. Italy expected, in effect, by the creation of an autonomous Montenegro, to place a dangerous corner in the new Yugoslav State. Plamenatz was sent to Montenegro well supplied with money. He had been minister under the old régime and a great friend of Austria. But the

²² See interview in *New York Times*, June 15, 1919.

revolt miscarried. Plamenatz fled to Scutari and many of his followers succeeded in escaping to Cattaro.²³

An impartial investigation has since proved that the resolution of the Montenegro National Assembly deposing Nicholas was passed in a regular manner and expressed the will of the people. Further reports go to show that the elections were held fairly and without the use of coercion. The Inter-Allied Commission, upon which sat General Franchet d'Esperay (French), General Bridge (British), Lieut.-Col. Vitelli (Italian), and Lieut. Gray (American), reported (1) "that the troops actually in Montenegro were Yugoslav and not exclusively Serbian and that the total number of soldiers did not exceed over 500 in the whole country; (2) that the latter had no influence on the elections nor on the political changes; (3) that the elections were free and that 500 Yugoslav soldiers could not impose their will upon 50,000 armed Montenegrins; (4) that the elections were held much more freely than under the régime of King Nicholas."

The Inter-Allied Commission of Investigation, after going through Montenegro and questioning the prisoners of the revolution of January, 1919, confirmed the view that the uprising was caused by agents of King Nicholas and supported by some Italian emissaries.²⁴

On March 5, the Council of Four heard the protest of King Nicholas against the loss of his throne and the absorption of his country into Yugoslavia. But no decision or action by the Peace Conference has been announced. In April, the National Assembly of Montenegro again voted the union of Montenegro with the new Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and appointed Mr. Pavicović to be their permanent representative at Belgrade.

²³ See Dispatch of T. S. Ryan, special correspondent of the *Chicago Tribune*, quoted by *La Serbie*, April 24, 1919.

²⁴ See "New Europe," Vol. XII, p. 187, 188.

CHAPTER VII

THE ORGANIZATION OF JUGOSLAVIA

THERE is no need to repeat here the well-known record of the victories on the Italian front towards the end of October, 1918, and the complete rout of Austria. On November 3 Austria signed the armistice, which was most certainly one of "unconditional surrender." The Czechoslovaks were quite ready with their new government and proclaimed Czechoslovakia a republic October 31. The National Council of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes had elected a Central Executive Committee, which proclaimed its intention to assume the task of establishing and of governing a Yugoslav state. On October 19 the committee published the following program, which was really a reply to the "autonomy" proclamation of the Emperor Karl:¹

"With a view to the solution of our national problem, the National Council, guided by the great principles of the right of national self-determination and of democracy, with which our entire nation was permeated even before the war and which have now gained the victory in international politics, puts forward the following essential claims:

"1. We demand throughout the whole extent of its ethnographic territory, regardless of the provincial and state frontiers between which it lives today, the union of our whole nation of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs in a unitary and sovereign state established on the lines of a political and economic democracy in which social and economic inequalities and injustices will be abolished.

"2. We demand that at the forthcoming International

¹ *Christian Science Monitor*, March 21, 1919.

Peace Conference our people be represented as a whole, by its own delegates appointed for this purpose.

"3. Consequently the National Council rejects the basis of the solution of our problem contained in the manifesto of the Emperor of Austria, dated the 16th of this month; likewise, every other future scheme aiming at a partial solution of our national question or depriving it of its international character.

"4. The National Council is of opinion that durable peace between peoples united in free states, and consequently the League of Nations and general disarmament likewise, can only be guaranteed by the realization of these claims and these principles.

"5. The National Council declares that in conformity with the general principles of democracy, free development will be assured to all our national minorities in the State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs, and that the pursuit of commerce, traffic and access to the sea shall be facilitated and assured to the neighboring states outside our territory, so long as our territorial integrity and the sovereignty of our State are not prejudiced thereby.

"The National Council calls upon our whole nation of one blood and heart to work for the realization of these claims and principles with the devotion and self-denial demanded by the present critical moment. Let us, therefore, unite in one great and unbreakable national phalanx which has for its aim the one great idea of national unity, liberty, and independence. Thus shall we show ourselves worthy of the great epoch through which we are passing and of the great task that we have accepted.

"Zagreb, Oct. 19, 1918.

"For the National Council of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs. The executive: Dr. Anton Korošec, Dr. Ante Pavelić, Svetozar Pribičević."

On October 29, demonstrations for the declaration of the Yugoslav State took place in several of the larger Croatian

cities. On the same day, the Croatian Diet unanimously adopted the following resolution: "The constitutional relations between the Kingdom of Dalmatia, Slovenia, Fiume, on one hand, and the Kingdom of Hungary on the other, exist no longer. The ties between Croatia and Austria are also abolished. In particular the compromise regulating the relations between Croatia and Hungary is pronounced null and void." A further resolution read: "The people of Croatia, Slovenia, and Serbia wish to have nothing in common with Austria and Hungary. They aspire to a union of all the Jugoslavs within the limits extending from the Isonzo to the Vardar. They desire to constitute a free State, sovereign and independent."² Insurrections broke out in the Yugoslav provinces. The Governor of Fiume having only a small number of troops at his disposal handed over the city to the Croats and dissolved the Municipal Council. On November 1, it was announced that the Austro-Hungarian Navy had been handed over by Vienna to the Yugoslav National Council at Zagreb. The Jugoslavs state that the crews of the navy consisting mostly of Dalmatian Jugoslavs had revolted and turned the navy over to the Council. The Italians declare that the Jugoslavs were in league with Austria and were trying to save the Austrian navy from Italy.

During the first week of November, 1918, representatives of the national organizations of Central Europe residing in Switzerland, the Poles, Czechoslovaks, Italians, Southern Slavs and Roumanians, met at Geneva and, in the name of their countrymen, drew up a special declaration which they handed to the diplomatic representatives of the Allied Governments at Berne. After declaring that the Habsburg system was dead and that none of the subject peoples would consent even to consider the federalization of Austria under the Habsburg dynasty, the signatories of the document demanded complete independence and national unity of their

²"Current History," Vol. IX, pt. 2, p. 306.

peoples. To show that they were in agreement with each other, they stated, "There are no fundamental divergences of a political or economic order which can form a serious obstacle to the understanding between these nations or to their future co-operation. On the contrary, this co-operation is the best guarantee of their mutual safety for the future. It is a source of strength and a stimulant for economic effort and progress of civilization. We can only find a truly solid and natural basis in the right of peoples to dispose of themselves in the manner defined by President Wilson."³

On November 2, the new government of the Jugoslavs took the oath of office in the Cathedral at Zagreb. The governing body was the National Council representative of all Jugoslav lands. Upon it were representatives of Dalmatia, Istria, Trieste, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Carniola, Croatia, Slovenia, Carinthia, Styria, Gorizia, Gradisca and Hungary. The President was Mgr. Korošec, the former President of the Jugoslav Parliamentary Club at Vienna, a Slovene; the Vice-Presidents, Dr. Ante Pavelić, Croat, and Dr. Svetozar Pribičević, Serb; the Secretaries, Dr. Drinković, Dalmatian, Dr. Lorković, Croat and Dr. Budisavljević, Serb. The Mohammedan Jugoslavs of Bosnia gave their unconditional support to the Council, which was recognized by all the Jugoslav provinces. There were local governments at Sarajevo and Laibach (Ljubljana) under the supreme control of the Council.

The results have justified the policy of the Serbo-Croat coalition holding office in Croatia for the last four years. Croatia was open to the Magyars and the leaders decided in 1914 that a passive policy was the only one for them to adopt during the war. In spite of many criticisms of their lack of patriotism, they stuck to this policy and husbanded their resources until they felt that they could strike with success. The Jugoslav representatives in the Reichsrat and

³ "New Europe," Vol. IX, p. 101.

particularly the Slovenes were left to advocate Yugoslav unity on a wide basis, always being careful to avoid hostile references to the Habsburg dynasty. The Yugoslav Committee in London was able to issue for the Southern Slavs in Austria-Hungary the whole program of independence and union with free Serbia and Montenegro in entire agreement with their brethren still in subjection but without bringing upon them further oppression and persecution. During the war, the Serbo-Croat party in Croatia obtained most of the offices and, when the new Yugoslav government was proclaimed, the entire administration passed into the hands of the new régime without having to undergo dangerous changes in personnel. The work of the members in Vienna was recognized in making Father Korošec President of the new Government. He is a Slovene and a Catholic.⁴

The first step of the National Council after taking over control of the troops in Croatia was to communicate with the Yugoslav Committee. Delegates from the Council met Dr. Trumbić, Mr. Pašić and leaders of the Serbian Opposition Parties at Geneva, November 7. They agreed that all the territory inhabited in compact masses by the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes outside of the present kingdom of Serbia, should form, with that country, a single, indivisible state. The delegates from Zagreb asked the Serbian Government and the other Allied Governments to recognize the Council of Zagreb as the supreme power of a state newly organized within the frontiers of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene nation, hitherto being parts of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and as commander-in-chief of the fleet of that state until the final formalities of union with Serbia were carried out. They also asked that the Yugoslav troops should be recognized as a belligerent and friendly force and gave Dr. Trumbić full power to represent the National Council of Zagreb before the Allied Governments until a common organ could be created for diplomatic representation.

⁴ "New Europe," Vol. IX, p. 137.

The delegates at this meeting, representing the whole Yugoslav people, agreed on the following statement, which completes the Declaration of Corfu of July, 1917: ⁵

"The common effort of the Allies and the United States of North America, as well as the strength of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, have, both in the battlefield and on the sea, broken down the brutal barriers which were preventing the union of our people. The representatives of the Royal Government of Serbia and of the parliamentary groups of the Skupština, the representatives of the National Council of Zagreb, and the representatives of the Yugoslav Committee of London who have met at Geneva, the city of liberty, are happy to be able to proclaim, solemnly and unanimously, to the entire world their union in one State, formed of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. The people of Montenegro, to whom we extend our hand in brotherly love, will certainly not hesitate to welcome this act, which realizes their highest ideals. By this act the new State appears and stands from to-day as an indivisible State-unit and as a member of the Society of Free Nations. The former frontiers no longer exist.

"In all manifestations abroad this State unit will be represented by the common Ministry of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, by the intermediary of organs specially created for this end and in the same spirit. The public has already been notified of the formation of this Government. We shall ultimately make known the sphere of action of this Government, for its unanimity on all questions regarding aims and methods has already prepared the way for the general labours of the new State.

"The Government of the Kingdom of Serbia and the National Council of Zagreb will, each one in its sphere of judicial, interior, and territorial matters, continue to direct such administration as exists, until the Great National Assembly of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (the Constituent)

⁵"New Europe," Vol. IX, pp. 137-139.

shall be elected by all citizens by means of direct, secret, universal suffrage and until the Constitution shall have definitely settled the State organization. The life of the entire state will be based on this constitution, which will be the source and refuge of all power and rights and which will have to organize, in a democratic spirit, all functions of State life.

"The frontiers between this state and the neighbouring States will be traced according to the principles of nationality, at the same time respecting the right of free determination of each people. The unchangeable faith and confidence of our people in its right and in the principle of justice, proclaimed by our Allies and accepted by the universal conscience of the civilized world, are sufficient guarantees for this settlement.

"Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes!

"Our secular dream has to-day been realized. We are united in liberty. Let us glorify the great days of national fortune and joy and let us maintain order. Where there is no order, there is no State!

"It is only a strong State which can accomplish at the right time those tasks which ensure the well-being of the citizens, and which can accomplish its social duties and its mission by concerning itself for the general progress of society, the protection of the weak, of wrecked households, and of disabled soldiers.

"Let us respect the memory of all those who fell fighting for the realization of our national and human ideals. Let us do respectful homage to the historic exploits of our army, and transmit to future generations our grateful sentiments towards our noble Allies with whom we shared the victory.

"Jugoslavs!

"May our beloved country live in honour and glory amidst the other peoples!

"The President of the National Council of Zagreb,

Dr. Anton Korošec.

The Prime Minister of Serbia,

Nicholas P. Pašić.

The President of the Yugoslav Committee in London,

Dr. Ante Trumbić."

Acting in the sense of the above document, the accredited representatives of Serbia and the Yugoslavs unanimously drew up the following document, which has since been officially transmitted to the Allied Governments by the Serbian Diplomatic representatives:

"In the name of the Serbian Government, Mr. Pašić, Premier of Serbia, accepts the Note by which Dr. Anton Korošec, President of the Yugoslav National Council in Zagreb, and MM. Čingrija and Žerjav, members of this Council, request:

(a) The recognition of the Yugoslav Council of Zagreb as the supreme authority in the State organized by the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, belonging to the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

(b) The recognition of the Yugoslav military forces on land and sea as belligerent troops and Allies of the Entente.

(c) The recognition of Dr. Trumbić, President of the Yugoslav Committee of London, as official representative of the Yugoslav National Council in Zagreb with the Entente Governments, until the moment when a common organ, including Serbia, shall have been created to represent the new States constituted in Zagreb." ⁶

Mr. Pašić consented to inform the Allied Governments immediately regarding the requests contained in this Note and to support them.

The Conference then unanimously and amid great enthusiasm proclaimed the Constitution of a Common Ministry for the State of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, including Serbia. It proclaimed also that there are no longer any political or customs frontiers within the territory of the new State of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. The governmental organizations and administration, hitherto exist-

ing in various Yugoslav countries, including Serbia, will be maintained for the moment.

The sphere of activity of the Common Ministry of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, or Joint Council, as it is called, extends to (1) foreign policy and the preparations for the Peace Conference; (2) military and naval defense; (3) joint finance; (4) transport, railways, and posts; (5) re-victualing and reconstruction; (6) care of prisoners; and (7) the preparation for an United Constituent Assembly.⁶

Of course, while there has been co-operation between the various sections of the Jugoslavs there have been disagreements as to the details of a united Yugoslavia. In Serbia there has been dissatisfaction with the government of Mr. Pašić and, at the Geneva meeting, all the groups were agreed upon the necessity of excluding him from the Joint Council on account of his reactionary attitude. As has been stated above, a coalition government was formed in Serbia at the outbreak of the war and lasted from November, 1914, to July, 1917. It was under the administration of this coalition government that the Declaration of Corfu was signed. But, after the Serbian Government was established at Corfu, party dissension began to break out. Mr. Pašić fell back into the old personal semi-autocratic régime of pre-war days, which was highly unsatisfactory to the more democratic and progressive parties. The rival cliques in the army and the Salonica trials of army officers accused of conspiracy brought the differences in the Cabinet to a head, and the leaders of the Young Radicals and of the Progressives resigned at the end of June, 1917.

The Serbian Opposition had its hands tied because an appeal to the country was an impossibility and because, at Corfu, the Serbian Parliament deliberated virtually behind closed doors, no reports being allowed to pass from Opposition circles to the outside world. The Opposition blamed Mr. Pašić entirely for the tension which for a time pre-

⁶"New Europe," Vol. IX, p. 139.

vailed between the Serbian Government and the Yugoslav Committee at London,⁷ and this explains the desire to exclude him from the Joint Cabinet. He stood rather with the party in Serbia, who, instead of a united Yugoslavia, would have preferred a smaller state in which the dominant elements of the Kingdom of Serbia could have remained dominant. There was also a group of politicians who wished to force all Bosnians, Croats, and Dalmatians to call themselves Serbs and to bring them directly under the political control of Belgrade. But these were minorities and the most progressive Serbian opinion has been, and is, strongly in favour of a united Yugoslavia in which no pre-eminence is conceded to Serbia. Prince Alexander has lent his influence to this party and has repeatedly declared that it is not his intention "to Serbize Yugoslavia." It was at his personal request that Mr. Pašić nominally gave up his power and that Mr. Protić, who favours a united Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, as against a Greater Serbia, was made President of the Joint Council. The fact that this party was in the ascendancy is shown by the declaration of Mr. Pašić late in October, 1918, to the effect that the Serbian Government was determined to stand by the Declaration of Corfu and did not desire to pursue an imperialistic policy nor to claim a predominant position in the future Yugoslav Kingdom, that Serbia considered it her national duty to liberate the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes of the Monarchy and that they had the right to declare freely whether they wished for union with Serbia on the basis of the Corfu Pact or whether they desired to constitute small states as in the distant past. The fact that the Serbs greatly outnumber the Croats and the Slovenes and that Serbia is better known and enjoys better credit on account of her dramatic sacrifices in the war makes it natural that the Croats and the Slovenes should have some misgivings lest the Serbs should absorb them. These misgivings have,

⁷ "New Europe," Vol. IX, pp. 18-20.

of course, been in part initiated and largely strengthened by the Austrians, the Magyars and the Roman Catholic agencies, which have striven for generations to keep the Yugoslavs divided, and which during the war have been most active.⁸

Then there is the question as to how far the unity of the Yugoslavs should be carried. Are the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes three separate nations with three national feelings? The Serbs and Croats speak the same language but differ in religion and historical tradition. The Croats and Slovenes have the same Roman Catholic religion but differ in language and historical past. Those who make the most of these differences admit that politically, economically and racially they still have much in common and that they ought to unite for the defense of their national independence, at the same time that each group would guard jealously its own individuality and continue to develop in its own peculiar way. The union would be of more or less mechanical character. The more thoughtful leaders of the Yugoslavs feel that such a union would go to pieces as soon as foreign menace was removed and believe, with many of the younger generation, that the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes are only three component parts of a single nation which had been divided by unfavorable conditions and that their future must be a reaction against these forces of division. The aim must be the happiness of the Yugoslav people. They point out that the former Italian states have united under a common name and argue that the names Serb, Croat, and Slovene should be dropped so that some of the danger of one group trying to dominate the others may be avoided. If this view were accepted by all the peoples concerned, the other questions of organization, particularly that of the form of government, could be more easily solved.⁹

⁸ Savić, V. R., *Two Problems of Yugoslavia, The Nation, International Relations Section*, Vol. CVIII, p. 129.

⁹ Savić, V. R., *op. cit.*, pp. 129-130.

The Declaration of Corfu provides that the future form of government shall be a monarchy with the Karageorgević dynasty at its head. But provision is also made for a constituent assembly which is to draw up a constitution and settle all questions of form and principle. Of course, this convention will inevitably have to decide whether the government shall be a monarchy or a republic. Dr. Hinko Hinković, the representative of the Yugoslav Committee of London in the United States, declared last November that all Jugoslavs were in favour of a republic.¹⁰ He stated that the mention of a monarchy in the Declaration of Corfu was merely a suggestion and that Pašić acted as if the form of the state were settled because a monarchy agrees with his idea that the Jugoslavs should enter the Serbian Kingdom. On the basis of President Wilson's reply of October 18 to Austria's peace note, the Yugoslav National Council at Washington formally renounced the Corfu Declaration, feeling that the Wilson note was a stronger guarantee of their national aspirations. A mass meeting of Jugoslavs in New York held in November, 1918, advocated a republic. The Geneva Conference left the form of government to the constituent assembly.

Before the war, no republican movement was perceptible among the Jugoslavs of Austria-Hungary, who, being denied the elementary rights of citizenship, did not even dream of choosing a form of government. The Serbs in Serbia and Montenegro felt that, with the conditions in Europe, a monarchy offered the best guarantee of freedom, and, moreover, the belief was general that Russia would help them in gaining their unity and the republican idea was avoided lest it should eliminate Russian help. Now that Russia is no longer a monarchy, the general current of thought may turn more to the republican form of government. The friendship of America is also having a great influence on the discussion. However, as Mr. Savić says, "a form of

¹⁰ *New York Times*, Nov. 21, 1918.

government which is known to the people might secure them a greater measure of freedom, progress and happiness than a form which, although theoretically better was unfamiliar. Serbia is a monarchy, and, since Serbia has played a decisive part in the realization of Yugoslav liberty, the disposition of its people must be taken into serious account in any future plans for Jugoslavia. To overthrow the Serbian monarchy would mean a new struggle. The Serbian people are well nigh exhausted by the present war, and they can in justice demand that they be spared any new effort unless the advantages to be secured are positive and great."¹¹ If a republic were proclaimed, what form would it take, bourgeois, socialistic, communistic? The people lack political experience and it might prove difficult to find strong leaders and establish stable parties. In the future Yugoslav assembly will be represented some twenty parties which have never before co-operated. The leaders are not well acquainted with one another and the formation and maintenance of a working majority will be a hard task.¹² Meanwhile, as things stand now, the Prince Regent of Serbia has been appointed Regent of the new state.

The question of federalization versus centralization has also come up. In Serbia, there is practical unanimity of opinion in favour of a centralized government. King Nicholas, as will be remembered, favours a federal state, if he is to come into Jugoslavia at all. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, there is a strong minority in favour of federalization. In these provinces, this idea finds its basis in religious differences. The population contains 600,000 Mussulmans, 840,000 Orthodox, 460,000 Catholics and 12,000 Jews.¹³ The Orthodox are now in power and of course hope for a close union with Serbia.

The republican ideal is stronger in Slovenia than in the

¹¹ Savić, *op. cit.*, pp. 130-131.

¹² Savić, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

¹³ *New York Times*. "Current History," Vol. X, pt. 1, p. 305.

other districts but yet the Slovenes have accepted the monarchy as the best form of government for the new State. All the Slovene parties, including the Clericals, have adopted the policy of Centralism under the Karageorgević monarchy. This is interesting in view of the fact that the Slovenes are economically and culturally the most advanced branch of the Yugoslavs and therefore might have much to gain for themselves from a federal form of government.

The stronghold of federalism is in Croatia. But even here, the most important political party, the Serbo-Croat Coalition, which has had for its program, since 1905, the winning of liberty and union, and which counts among its members the most progressive of the younger elements, is for complete centralization. Their leader is Svetozar Pribićević, who is also Minister of the Interior in the Yugoslav Ministry at Belgrade. He believes most firmly in a centralized state with a single legislative body. But, like all the centralists, he sees the need for autonomy for the communes, districts and departments on account of the very varying local conditions. What the Centralists are trying to break up is the old distinctions between Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, and Montenegro, so carefully fostered by Austria.

The Separatists or Federalists in Croatia are perhaps best represented by the Frank Party and the Peasant Party. The Frank Party, the Croatian party of the Right, is third in importance in Croatia and until now has been an instrument of Austrian politics, believing that, through the Habsburgs, it could get union of the Croatian countries. It derives its membership largely from the non-Slav elements, but those of the Croatian Clergy who are opposed to Serbian orthodoxy have also joined it. The leader, Dr. Prebeć, stated that they worked for union inside the empire, having no hope they could ever get it outside. When union came from another source, he saw no need of continuing the party. In an interview, he made the following declarations: "Our dissolution was announced on October 29, 1918. We were

convinced at that time that our Croatian countries were to constitute a republican state within the system of the Yugoslav confederation. . . . In reality those about us were working for the upbuilding of a Great Serbia whose name only was changed.

"Under these circumstances, the party reconstituted itself in order to take up again the defense of Croatian rights. From that day we have been persecuted, and our organ suspended in defiance of law. Our programme is word for word that of the patriot Starčević of 1894, that is, a demand of the thousand-year-old rights of a united Croatia, which does not at all prevent the union of this Croatia with our neighboring brother people. We differ from the Serbians only as to the method of this union. Our party considers it impossible to abolish by mere stroke of the pen the profound differences existing between us. We have in common with the Serbians only the spoken language. The written language, religion, civilization, and history divide us. To aim at unity as an ideal realizable for coming generations so much is good; to choose to consider it as the immediate and indispensable result of our common desire for union is a gross error in the sincere, and megalomania in others. . . .

"Although our party constitutes an appreciable section of Croatian opinion, we have been pushed aside in public affairs under the new state of things. No place has been given us on the National Council of Zagreb. . . . This Coalition party, which represents us as pro-Austrian, was always our opponent, for we always fought those Serbians who supported the Hungarian régime and who, by their opportunist compromises during the last ten years, have prevented the national Croatian parties from forming an opposition majority. Let it be clearly understood that it is these Serbians alone that we are fighting. Serbia otherwise we have never regarded as an enemy, but indeed as a brother in race.

"At the elections for the constituent assembly we allied

ourselves with the Peasant party to support our federalist and republican programme, the only one appropriate to the debut of Yugoslavia.”¹⁴

The Peasant Party is second in importance in the matter of separatist tendencies. Its leader is the former deputy Radić, noted for his courageous speeches in the Reichsrat. He gives the views of the party in these words: “Our history has made us federalists. Our geographical situation, our orientation toward Hungary—a European state—makes us federalists in order not to become dependent upon the Balkans, which are, whatever one may say, an extension of Asia. Our duty is to Europeanize these Balkans and not to Balkanize the Croats and Slovenians. . . . Yugoslavia is a nation only from an external point of view. Internally, it is composed of three nationalities which are profoundly differentiated by laws, constitutions, and degrees of culture. For instance, Slovenians have only 17 per cent. of illiteracy, Croats 46, Bosnians 65, Serbs 80, Montenegrins 95. Moreover, we and the Serbs have different mental constitutions. Serbia has constituted a heroic armed camp; we, who had not even our own army, constituted a workroom. Serbia came to a life of freedom through an insurrection; she has created and maintained herself by uninterrupted wars. We, for our part, have preserved a national life by methodical, cultural labor, by patient intellectual effort. Our papers and books have been our only guns during the century of struggle under foreign domination against Austria and Hungary.” Radić believes that only external affairs and finances should be centralized; otherwise he favours federalism.¹⁵

This difference between the federalists and the centralists explains the dispatches from Zagreb (Agram) giving news of the national assemblies which have been held in various

¹⁴ *Temps*, Paris, Feb. 18, 1919. Quoted in *The Nation* (N. Y.), March 22, 1919.

¹⁵ *Temps*, Paris, Feb. 18, 1919. Quoted by the *Nation* (N. Y.), March 22, 1919.

Croatian localities to protest against the Belgrade Government. A telegram sent to President Wilson and all other delegates at the Peace Conference, dated Agram, February 8, 1919, read as follows: "Many thousand delegates of the Croatian people, among them the municipal councilors, commissaires, trustees and members of the legations of the Croatian Popular Party, assembled in extraordinary meeting, in Agram, the capital of Croatia, on the 3rd February, 1919, send to the delegates of the great Democracies of the West to the Peace Conference in Paris, through President Wilson, the following resolution on the basis of the principles of democracy and auto-determination, and protest against the acts of violence committed by the Serbian Army in mistreatments, in the suspension of autonomous organs and in threats of hanging and shooting of Croatian peasants. All the more as these acts of violence are committed because the Croatian people unanimously manifested its desire that Jugo-Slavia should be organized in three states, independent and united as regards foreign nations, but internally organized, after the example of the states of North America, in a confederate republic. We therefore demand that the Serbian Army be immediately withdrawn from Croatian territory, namely from Croatia, Slavonia, Middle Murje and from Dalmatia, because if the Serbian Army should further remain in these territories the Croatian people would not be free to manifest its will at the election for the constitution and disorders and conflicts and even rebellion would ensue. Referring to the provoking attitude of the Serbian Army and to the violent agitation carried on for Greater Serbia, in the name of the Croatian people, independent with 1300 years of history, we demand the convening of the Croatian Constituent and of the Croatian Legislative Assembly, of the provinces of Croatia, Slavonia, Middle Murje and Dalmatia. We protest against the proclamation of the United Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and the Slovenes, because on the Croatian side only those persons who, up to the last

moment, faithfully served the Hapsburgs, the Germans and the Magyars, adhered to the proclamation, prolonging the errors of the war and the absolute centralization of the ministry in Belgrade. This centralization is nothing else than a copy of the absolutism of the war, and we condemn it all the more sharply as the Jugo-Slavs have hitherto been set one against the other by the Serbian Government. The same Government showed its love for our people by torturing and killing at Odessa thousands and thousands of Croatians for the sole reason that they would not hear of a Serbia of the Karageorgević, but desired instead a Jugo-Slav republic. The Serbian Army even to-day, by its attitude, shows the same intolerance by beating Croatian peasants to death. Responsible for this is the political education, not of the Serbian people, but of its present leaders. It is, therefore, indispensable that every power, at least as far as regards Croatia, be taken from these overbearing anti-democrats. The Croatian people remain quiet in the hope of a favorable decision at the Peace Conference.”¹⁶ It is difficult under the present circumstances to decide what weight should be given to such documents. The reference to Odessa is hard to explain.

Another protest sent to the Peace Conference in March was signed by the leaders of the Peasant Party. It was handed to the French Mission in Zagreb with the request that it should be transmitted to the Peace Conference. The text of the document is given as follows:

“To the French Military Mission in Agram:

“The main committee of the popular peasants’ party, founded in 1904, and representing today four-fifths of the Croatian peoples, and, therefore, the only party entitled to speak in the name of the Croatian people and Government, voted unanimously on March 8th, 1919, the following resolu-

¹⁶ Dispatch from Paris made public by the Italian Information Bureau at New York, Feb. 23, 1919.

tion after considering the situation caused by the proclamation of the S. C. S. Kingdom.

"1. We, Croatian citizens, cannot recognise the so-called kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes under the Kara-georgević dynasty because this State, like the National Croatian Council, was formed without first appealing to the Croatian people and without its authorisation.

"2. We do not recognise the S. C. S. National Council because some of its members have never been elected by the Croatian people and others were elected before the war.

"3. Hence in Croatia we do not acknowledge the Belgrade Government, nor do we accept its authority over Croatia. We refuse to recognise a Government which, without the people's sanction, calls the population to arms, employing barbarous means, such as the imprisonment of wives and relatives, to force the conscripts to give themselves up to the military authorities. This Government without a mandate from the nation collects and spends at its pleasure the revenue from taxes, formulates new laws, and acts in everything on its own initiative.

"4. We particularly refuse to recognise the right of the Minister's Council in Belgrade to dispose of our Croatian woods and estates and to intervene in our agrarian question.

"5. We protest against the appropriation of Croatian territories in Dalmatia by the Italians, and we expect that the great Italian people will appreciate the value of a neutral republic of Croatian peasants and recognise its national territory, thus ensuring neighbourly relations, a policy of sincere friendliness and lasting commercial relations.

"6. We protest energetically against the violence of the Royal Serbian Government at Belgrade, which, contrary to the declarations made by the Croatian Assembly on October 28th, 1918, and to the common will of the Croats, arbitrarily abolishes and destroys our new State and the Croatian fatherland, treads underfoot constitutional and human rights, forbidding the issue of publications it does not ap-

prove of, forbidding public and political meetings, and cudgelling ignominiously in public republican men and women who refuse to acknowledge the S. C. S. Kingdom.

"7. We particularly protest against the veto to publish and circulate the newspaper of our party only, a veto enforced on February 26th, 1919, by the Ban of Croatia and Slavonia, the nominee of the Regent-Prince Alexander, whose authority we do not acknowledge. In order to enforce his veto the Ban had recourse to a war regulation of the late Emperor Francis Joseph, but the Croatian Assembly broke off relations with the Austro-Hungarian monarchy on October 29th, 1918. Moreover, the Ban itself abrogated on October 30th the particular war regulation issued by the late Austro-Hungarian authorities.

"8. Finally, we protest against the fact that the printers of the *Don* newspaper, the Hormic Printing Company, have been forbidden to issue any newspaper or sheet in any way similar to the *Don*, although the sheets which it was attempted to circulate had been passed by the censor and fulfilled all the requirements of the law and of the police authorities.

"9. In view of all this we citizens of the Croatian State demand in the name of international rights that our country and State be recognised and that Croatia be formed into an independent peasants' republic with its Croatian authority before the Peace Conference decides finally the future of the Croatian people."¹⁷

The opponents of Yugoslav unity have laid stress upon the religious differences among them. The Serbs are Greek Orthodox and the Croats and Slovenes are Roman Catholic. The Austrian and Magyar agencies have made good use of these religious differences in their endeavour to divide the Yugoslavs, but, on the whole, we find religious toleration among the Yugoslavs.¹⁸

¹⁷ Published in "Modern Italy," Vol. II, pp. 64, 65.

¹⁸ See "New Europe," Vol. X, p. 61. "Religious Toleration among the Southern Slavs," by T. R. Gjorgjević.

The design of dividing the Southern Slavs into two divisions, the one Catholic and the other Orthodox, is said to have been favoured by the Tsar of Russia when the matter was under discussion just before Italy's entrance into the war. The Croats were never so submerged in their faith that they put the usage of their Church above their nationality. As far back as 1248, after a long and determined struggle, the Croats won the unusual privilege of using their language in the service instead of using Latin. There have been priests and monks of both faiths among the most devoted workers for Yugoslav unity. The great Croatian Bishop, Josip Juraj Strossmayer, spent his life working for the cultural and political unification of the Serbo-Croats. Then more recently Father Biankini has devoted his whole life to the national cause in the Austrian Reichsrat and in the Dalmatian Diet. His arrest since the Italian occupation of Dalmatia has caused widespread indignation in Yugoslav circles. The Catholic Bishop of Laibach and the Prince Bishop of Davant and many of the high Slovene clergy publicly adhered to the Declaration of Corfu.

A most interesting comment on the attitude of the clergy comes from the *Primorske Novine*, of Fiume, the organ of the Franciscans along the coast. "The fact that the high ecclesiastical dignitaries, Bishops Jeglič and Mahnič, as well as Archbishop Bauer, openly uphold the Yugoslav idea, and also adopt Strossmayer's ideas in so far as they concern conciliation between the two churches, cannot be too joyfully welcomed by Yugoslav public opinion. They have their clergy with them, and the clergy have the people, who are in close and continual contact. It is they who, especially in the Slovene districts, have aroused such great enthusiasm among the masses for the Yugoslav idea. . . . Considering the difficult situation due to the war and Mgr. Mahnič's position as an Austrian Bishop, we are driven to admire the open way in which he has declared against German and

Magyar imperialism. . . . His idea of Yugoslav unity, and in particular an accord between Serbs and Croats, has won over everyone. . . . It is clear that the dignitaries of the Church will join the people in their struggle for the realisation of a general union of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs.”¹⁹

Legislation in Serbia has put the Catholics, Orthodox and Mussulmans on an equality. After the enlargement of Serbia through the Balkan Wars, the Skupština, July, 1914, passed legislation to the effect that “the Catholic Apostolic faith is to be freely and publicly exercised in the Kingdom of Serbia.” In June, M. Vesnić, representing the Serbian government, had concluded a Concordat with the Vatican whereby Catholics were given all rights to the free exercise of their creed and national language. And the Pact of Corfu placed Catholics, Orthodox, and Mussulmans on an absolute equality. The minister of Public Worship in the first Yugoslav Cabinet is Mr. Alaupović, a Croat Catholic, from Bosnia. The deputation of clergy from Dalmatia, which arrived in Paris in February, 1919, to plead for Yugoslav unity, including Mgr. Bulić and Father Eterović, a prominent member of the Franciscan order, was authorized to speak not only in the name of the Catholic secular clergy and orders but also of the Orthodox clergy of Dalmatia.²⁰

On November 23, Crown Prince Alexander of Serbia was appointed Regent of the Yugoslav state by the National Council at Zagreb. A State Council composed of all the members of the Zagreb Council, fifty delegates from Serbia and five from Montenegro, was summoned to meet at Sarajevo to appoint a Cabinet for the Yugoslav state. The Prince was empowered to appoint governors at Belgrade, Cettinje, Ljubljana (Laibach), Sarajevo, Novi Sad, Zagreb and Split (Spalato) to carry on the local government. Provisions were made for a Constituent Assembly to be elected as soon as conditions became more settled. This assembly

¹⁹ Quoted in “New Europe,” Vol. VIII, p. 312.

²⁰ “New Europe,” Vol. X, p. 235.

will decide what form the state is to adopt and will draw up a constitution. The resolution was passed by the Council November 23 with only one dissenting voice, that of Mr. Radic, the peasant leader, who favoured a republic. It read as follows:

"The Regency of the United Serbo-Croat-Slovene State is transferred to the Prince Regent of Serbia, who has summoned the State Council to Sarajevo and will appoint the first government.

"The State Council will consist (1) of all the members of the Southern Slav National Council in Zagreb (Agram); (2) of fifty representatives from the Kingdom of Serbia; and (3) of five representatives each from Montenegro and the Voivodina. From among the members of the State Council the Regent will appoint a government, which will consist of much the same Ministers as have existed in Austria-Hungary and other states; a special ministry will be formed to deal with maritime affairs.

"The Regent in addition will appoint five or possibly seven Governors and the same number of Secretaries of State, who will have a voice in the Cabinet and act as intermediaries between the central government and the different provinces."

The following resolution was added in a plenary sitting of the National Council: "The Southern Slav National Council, in accordance with the above decisions and in agreement with the Government of the Kingdom of Serbia, proclaims the union of the Southern Slav State which has been formed from all the Southern Slav territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy with the Kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro, as a single unitary state of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, and appoints a Committee consisting of 28 members who, in conjunction with the Government of the Kingdom of Serbia and representatives of all parties in Serbia and Montenegro, will proceed immediately to the organization of the unitary State on the basis of these de-

cisions. These decisions will be ratified at the first meeting of the State Council, to which, together with the representatives of the Kingdom of Serbia and Montenegro, all members of the present National Council in Zagreb belong, with the addition of the Southern Slav Committee in London.²¹

Twenty-four delegates of the Yugoslav National Council of Zagreb presented an address of Union to the Prince Regent of Serbia on December 1, 1918. They made further provision for government until the Constituent Assembly was convoked. "The National Council desires that a national representation should be established by agreement between the National Council and the popular representatives of the Kingdom of Serbia, and that the Government should be made responsible, according to modern parliamentary principles, to this representation, which would sit *en permanence* until the Constituent. . . . For the same reasons the former administrative and autonomous institutions would remain in vigour. In this period of transition it is in our opinion necessary to create the conditions for a definite organization of one unitary state. With this end in view, the Government should prepare the Constituent, which, according to the proposal of the National Council, would be elected on the basis of secret, universal and proportional suffrage and convoked at latest, six months after the conclusion of peace." Prince Alexander in his reply hailed the "historic decision" of November 24, by which Yugoslav unity was proclaimed at Zagreb. "It is only by this act that we realize finally what was begun by the best sons of our race of three religions and three names on either side of the Danube, Save, and Drina, under the reigns of my grandfather Prince Alexander and of Prince Michael. We thus realize what corresponds to the wishes and desires of my people, and, in the name of King Peter, I proclaim the Unity of Serbia with the provinces of the independent

²¹ "New Europe," Vol. IX, pp. 208-209.

State of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, in the Unitary Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. . . .

"I assure you that I and my Government and all who represent Serbia will always be guided solely by brotherly love towards all that is most sacred in the souls of those whom you represent, and in the sense of the wishes which you have just expressed—wishes which we accept in their entirety—the Government will at once take steps to realize all you have said for the period of transition until the Constituent, and for the elections. Faithful to my father's example, I shall only be King of free citizens of the State of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, and I shall always remain loyal to the great constitutional, parliamentary, and democratic principles resting upon universal law. I shall therefore ask your collaboration in forming the Government which is to represent our united country, and this Government will always be in contact with you all at first, and eventually with the national representation. It will work with it and be responsible to it." ²²

The Yugoslav ministry was formed about Christmas time under the Presidency of Mr. Protić. The Ministers were as follows: Vice Premier, Dr. Anton Korošec, President of the Zagreb Council, a Slovene; Foreign Minister, Dr. Ante Trumbić, formerly President of the Yugoslav Committee in London, a Dalmatian; Minister of the Interior, Svetozar Pribičević, a Croatian; and Minister of National Defense, General Raich, a Serbian. There was thus a new all-Yugoslav Government formed at Belgrade by representatives of all the Yugoslav lands, and the allied and neutral governments were informed by the new State that the Kingdom of Serbia had become the United Serbian-Croatian-Slovene Kingdom. This government was formally recognized by the United States in a note sent by Mr. Lansing to Dr. Trumbić, as "Minister of Foreign Affairs of Serbia," February 7, 1919. Both the party believing in a Greater Serbia and

²² "New Europe," Vol. IX, pp. 236-238.

the party favoring a more comprehensive Jugoslavia interpreted this title in their favor. The note read as follows: "My dear Dr. Trumbić: I have the pleasure to communicate the text of the note which the Government of the United States has decided to publish tomorrow: 'On May 29, 1918, the Government of the United States expressed its sympathy for the national aspirations of the Yugoslav races, and on June 28 it declared that all Slav people ought to be completely liberated from the yoke of Austria-Germany.

" 'After having extracted themselves from foreign oppression, the Jugoslavs, who were formerly under the rule of Austria-Hungary, have, on several occasions, expressed the desire to unite with Serbia. On its side, the Serbian Government has publicly and officially accepted the union of the Serb, Croat, and the Slovene peoples.

" 'Consequently, the Government of the United States favorably accepts this union, but at the same time recognizes the fact that the final settlement of the frontiers must be left to the Peace Conference, in conformity with the wishes of the interested peoples.' " ²³

²³ "Current History," Vol. X, pt. 1, p. 43.

CHAPTER VIII

ITALY AND THE JUGOSLAVS, 1915-1918

AS will be remembered, there have been three different Premiers at the head of the Italian Government during the war. Salandra resigned June 12, 1916, after losing a vote of Confidence in the Chamber, the official Socialists and the Giolittians voting against him because he had led the country into war, and the Interventionists because he was not pushing the war as vigorously as they wished. The Boselli Ministry lasted until October, 1917, when the Giolittians and Clericals caused its fall. Various portfolios in the Orlando Ministry have changed hands, but Orlando retained the Premiership from the fall of Boselli up to June 19, 1919. All through the war, one post was held by the same man,—Sonnino was Minister of Foreign Affairs from September, 1914, to the fall of the Orlando Ministry, and, in many respects, he has been the most important factor in Italy's foreign policy. As a young man, he had served in the Legations at Madrid, Vienna, Berlin and Paris. Returning to Italy in 1871, he devoted himself for the next few years to the study of political and social conditions. In 1880, he was elected deputy, distinguished himself as Minister of Finance in the Crispi Cabinet of 1893, but fell with Crispi after the disaster at Adowa, 1896. Since then he has been active as leader of the constitutional opposition and was Premier for a short time in 1906. He is the founder of *Il Giornale d'Italia*, which he has used to propagate his political ideas. As regards the Jugoslavs, Sonnino has been consistent in his policy of claiming wide powers for Italy in the Adriatic.

The terms of the Secret Treaty show clearly the aims of the Italian Government in 1915. At that time, there was no thought of the breaking up of Austria-Hungary and there was fear that a Greater Serbia on the East coast of the Adriatic would be dominated by Russia and would thus menace Italy. While Italy was willing that Serbia should have an outlet on the Adriatic, she was opposed to one big state on the East coast. This idea may be expressed in the words of the *Secolo*,¹ May 8, 1915: "If the Serbs were to succeed in including the Croats in their frontiers they will then become too powerful, and we must envisage all the possibilities. It is better for us to raise up two other nationalities (the Croats and the Albanians) and thus to divide the imperialist Serb bloc, reducing it to its joint propositions, for it is better to have for neighbors two small states than a single State which includes them. With an Albania, anti-Slav par excellence, on one side, and a Croatia, anti-Serb and Catholic, on the other, we should establish in the Eastern Adriatic an advantageous equilibrium, dividing the Slav forces, which have too great a tendency to increase but little to coalesce."

During 1916, the Nationalists came more and more to the fore. The Croats were proclaimed as agents of Vienna, the propaganda against a united Jugoslavia was actively conducted, and the extreme claims of Italy in the Adriatic set forth. Though the Secret Treaty had not as yet been published, its terms were well known among the Jugoslavs.

But the imperialists were by no means upheld by the whole of public opinion in Italy and the feeling grew, especially after the Spring of 1917, that Italy was making a big mistake in allowing a noisy party to antagonize the Slavs. It was recognized that, if the oppressed nationalities of Austria-Hungary could be won over to the side of

¹ May 8, 1915. Quoted by Taylor, "The Southern Slavs," p. 119. The *Secolo* of Milan is an important Radical paper. It has been pro-Ally and is traditionally pro-French. During the war it has been conciliatory towards the Jugoslavs.

X the Allies, revolution within the Empire would hasten an Allied victory. The Russian Revolution and the entrance of the United States into the war, both had a powerful effect on the war aims of the various Italian parties. Led by some of the more liberal and democratic journals and politicians, public opinion in Italy began to swerve towards the ideas of Mazzini on the question of the Adriatic. In 1871, he had declared that Italy's interests demanded an alliance with the Slavs, that Italy must recognize the necessity of an outlet for the Slavs on the Adriatic and that it would be in the interest of Italy to help the Slavs in their struggle for the realization of their nationality. He said, "Istria is ours. But from Fiume onward down the Eastern coast of the Adriatic to the River Boiano on the borders of Albania there stretches a zone in which, amid the relics of our colonies, the Slav element predominates. This zone of the Adriatic shore includes Cattaro, Dalmatia, and the Montenegrin region. In conquering for the Slavs of Montenegro the outlet which they need at Cattaro, and for the Slavs of Dalmatia the principal towns of the eastern shore, thus assisting the resuscitation of the Illyrian Slavs, Italy would be the first among nations to acquire the right of affection, of inspiration and of economic advantage with the entire Slav family."²

The *Unità*³ urged that Italy keep up the Mazzinian and Garibaldian tradition and proclaim herself the Ally and champion of the Southern Slavs against the Germans and Magyars. It stated, "Uncertainty about Italian intentions has produced in Slavonia and Croatia a third party—that of the politicians, neither resolutely Trialists nor resolutely Irredentists. They merely want no longer to be exploited by Germans and Magyars, but they are afraid that the war

² Quoted by "New Europe," Vol. VI, p. 403.

³ 2 August, 1917. Quoted by "New Europe," Vol. IV, p. 188. The *Unità* of Rome is the organ of Clerical Radicalism. Professor Gaetano Salvemini, who has always favored a compromise with the Jugoslavs, is one of the editors.

may replace Austrian rule in Dalmatia by Italian rule; they then are ready to become Trialists if Austria conquers, provided she guarantees their complete autonomy, or full-blooded Jugoslavs if the Entente conquers, provided they are sure of not being handed over to the Italians. . . . Italy ought to have offered to the more reasonable section of the Slavs a fair compromise in the mixed territories of the Adriatic; she ought to have pledged herself to legal equality and scholastic rights for Slav minorities under Italian rule, exacting similar guarantees for Italians remaining within the boundaries of New Serbia; she ought to have offered the more resolutely her support in creating the new Jugoslavia, in that this support would have justified in the eyes of all sensible men the renunciation by Jugoslavia of all territories East of Gorizia and inside Istria, as well as those military points in the central Adriatic which we demand as necessary to Italy's maritime security."

The Italian Socialist Party, the Socialist Parliamentary Group, and the General Federation of Labor proclaimed in 1917 the "necessity of a peace not only without forcible annexation, but also respectful of autonomy for all, which leaves to each people the selection of its own grouping; which, together with international control of the channels and all other points of confluence of human races, and with the most absolute freedom of the seas, will suppress the most immediate causes of conflict in the future." ⁴

The Italian Reformed Socialist Party was represented at the Inter-Allied Socialist Conference in London, August, 1917. Its officially declared views of the reasons why Italy entered the war are as follows:

"1. To reunite with the mother country their populations of the same race who dwell beyond the old, unjust, and arbitrary political frontiers under the Austrian rule.

"2. To insure within the girdle of nature's boundaries along the chain of the Alps and the Adriatic Sea the safety

⁴ New York *Evening Post*, July 17, 1917.

and tranquillity of the Italian nation—there being no doubt that the Italian state which emerges from this war must embrace the populations of the Trentino and of the Gorizia regions and Istria. The delimitations of the boundaries of the Italian state or the states which will emerge from the breaking up of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy must be conducted in a just and conciliatory spirit and in a manner to arrest all future grievances and discord. And should it happen that in the settlement of frontiers certain groups of the Slav race are comprised in the Italian state while certain groups of the Italian race are comprised in the Slav state, previous mutual guarantees should be given for the free development of individual autonomies and for the maintenance of local autonomy. The Reformed Socialists hold that the new eastern boundary should be traced in obedience to ethnical, political and military considerations and so as to insure the safety of the Italian nation, while avoiding all undue interference with the rights of those free nationalities which shall be constituted in the East.”

In August, 1917, three Italian Ministers resigned because they learned that Italy had proclaimed a protectorate over Albania without the consent of the entire Cabinet. This may have had no direct connection with Yugoslav relations, but indicated general opposition to an imperialistic policy. Perhaps the Treaty of St. Jean de Maurienne was partly the cause of their action. The King came from the front to Rome and persuaded the three to retain their positions pending a reorganization of the Cabinet. All the ministers placed their portfolios at the disposal of Boselli, who put in new Ministers of War and of Navy, and the Chamber of Deputies then gave the Ministry a vote of confidence, 361 to 63. Very little information as to this Cabinet crisis was given out.

As time went on, the necessity for the break-up of Austria-Hungary as an appendix of Germany became more and more recognized among certain elements in the Allied countries.

But President Wilson's apparent acceptance of Austria's peace protestations early in 1918, the activity of the Austrophile section of British public opinion, the meeting of General Smuts with Count Mensdorff and the general talk of a separate peace with Austria, led Italy to fear that the full measure of Austria's guilt and the extent to which she was the cooperating tool of Germany was not fully understood by Great Britain, France and the United States, and that, after the war, the Dual Monarchy would be left intact on the basis of autonomy for the Nationalists. Some persons in Italy even expressed the fear that, not only would Austria be left intact but that she would be allowed to acquire a protectorate over Serbia and Albania to compensate her for the territory which she would have to give up to Italy. This would mean that Italy would be in practically the same position in the Adriatic after the war as she had been before the war. If she had to choose between having Austria or the Jugoslavs on the east coast, the Jugoslavs were to be preferred.

The *Secolo* complained of the British attitude towards Austria in an article headed "British Love for Austria" and gave its opinion in the following words:⁶

"One of the English fads is to believe that Austria is something substantially different from Germany, and that her 'standard' is much nearer to that of the Western democracies; the other illusion is that Austria has long wanted to throw off the yoke of Berlin and aims at winning the good graces of the Entente with a separate peace.

"By whom are these fallacious ideas cultivated? By a small but extremely influential group of ultramontane-Clericals and clericalising Catholics, who are really and truly the only people who know Austria as she really is and not merely as she appears; and they use their knowledge and the ignorance of their compatriots to create a false atmosphere which deceives and turns public opinion adrift.

⁶Quoted in "New Europe," Vol. VI, pp. 379-381.

. . . They know that Austria is the one great State in Europe where the Papacy can still in normal times find a prop for its own temporal and spiritual policy. . . . Austria once destroyed, the prestige and the moral influence of the Vatican would by it (they say) be diminished, and the cause of militant and political Catholicism would lose ground everywhere. Thus to maintain their own prestige and influence in England, by way of the Vatican, they see nothing better than keeping Austria intact, not only in her geographic limits, but also in her present divisions, divisions which, by a diabolical contradiction, give cohesion to her institutions. . . . From the Episcopal Curia of Westminster, Austrophile suggestions have penetrated into the Foreign Office and even into the War Office; from these two Ministries they have spread to certain parts of the press. And who has snapped them up? Who has espoused the cause of Austria with the greatest enthusiasm? The Puritan and Non-conformist Radicalism of papers like the *Daily News* and *Nation* which, in their neo-pacifist fervour and in their profound ignorance, see in the elimination of Austria from the war, a way of getting swiftly into touch with Germany. . . .

"It is unnecessary to say that Austria from afar laughs at so much ingenuousness, but neglects nothing to encourage her old and tried friends, the Ultramontanes; and to dupe her new friends, the Puritans. And it is in this light that the speeches of Czernin inviting Wilson to 'conversations' ought to be read, while the ex-ambassador Mensdorff meets General Smuts at Zurich and tries to temporise with a little light conversation, without realizing that the Boer General is not a fish to be caught in such a net.

"It is to be hoped that after this vain attempt the idea of paying court to Austria, in order to separate her from Germany, will be abandoned by all the Entente Governments, and that they will all be convinced that the one policy possible is war *à outrance* with equal intensity against both Cen-

tral Empires, war until is reached that victory which will make possible the realization of the promises given to the divided and subjected nationalities of complete unity and independence. If the Entente went back on this, its moral undertaking, so loudly proclaimed at the beginning of the war, in order to conclude a premature peace, which, even if satisfying wholly or in part, Italian aims, left Czechs, Jugoslavs, Roumanians and Poles oppressed and divided, it would commit little less than a betrayal of the principles which its war has sanctified."

The favourite manoeuvre of the Austrophiles in Entente countries has been to represent the Slavs of Austria as aiming, not at the disruption of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, but at some kind of reorganization of the Empire on a federal basis. They have also insisted that the Catholic element among the Slavs is for the most part loyal to the Habsburg Dynasty and would prefer to be part of a federal Catholic State rather than to be included within a Slav State in which a large part of the population was Orthodox.

If Italy desired the break-up of Austria in order to obtain a stronger position on the Adriatic, her cue was to side with the Slavs of the Empire and to convince the world that the arguments of the Austrophiles were not true, that the Nationalities within Austria-Hungary would not be satisfied with a reorganization of the old Austria on a federal basis, but that they wished to be entirely free. This point of view caused many Italians to join the more democratic and radical leaders, whose general views on the Yugoslav question have been expressed above.

Italy had been the one great obstacle to a united Jugoslavia, but, from the middle of 1917, there was a growing feeling among Italians that she should take the lead in helping the oppressed Nationalities against Austria. Until the end of 1917, these people had looked to London, Paris and Washington for aid while distrusting Italy and fearing her national aspirations and imperialistic aims. In January

and February, 1918, there was an intensive campaign in Italy for the promotion of an Italo-Jugoslav understanding. Energetic anti-Habsburg agitation was maintained by the Yugoslav Club; declarations of Yugoslav refugees and popular movements in Croatia and Slavonia were given prominence to show that the Jugoslavs were with the Czechs against the Monarchy. The change of feeling was evidenced by the publication of a volume on the Adriatic by Professors Salvemini and Maranelli, which was unfavourable to Italian imperialism. It had been suppressed by the censor in 1916, but was published in 1918. Its main thesis is based upon this extract from Mazzini, written in 1861: "There exists today but one really grave peril for Europe and this peril is Imperialism. For thirty years, so far as my own poor powers have allowed me, I have fought against all authority which is not representative of Justice, Truth, Progress, and does not recognize the consent of the people as its symbol. I have fought against it under whatever name it bore—Pope, Tsar, Bonaparte, or an oppressive nationalism."⁷

The *Corriere della Sera* took an active part in upholding the Jugoslavs and in defending the Corfu Pact. The issue of January 16, 1918, in speaking of the necessity for the break-up of Austria-Hungary, stated: "A grand opportunity is here offered to Italy to prove her genius for politics. It is for her to organize and put herself at the head of this league, to establish an accord between the nationalities concerned in all disputable points concerning their material relations and their future status, to obtain the sanction of the Allies for this agreed scheme of settlement, and with them to force its acceptance on the Central Empires. . . . The Slavs understand what is indispensable for Italy; Italy must see that her future can only be secured if she holds out a generous and helping hand to the nascent neighbor state in the Adriatic. The sacrifices required of

⁷ "An Old Mazzinian," Italy and the Nationalities of Austria," *Contemp. Review*, Vol. CXIII, p. 610.

her do not involve renunciation of legitimate national aspirations or of military security.”⁸

Even before Caporetto, a group of Italians with democratic tendencies and a number of Yugoslav refugees had formed the nucleus of a committee in Switzerland. Some months later a group of politicians in Rome started a movement for an understanding with all the oppressed nationalities. Andrea della Torre went to London and Paris on behalf of this group to establish an understanding with the Slav refugees and, on March 7, 1918, made an agreement with Dr. Ante Trumbić, chairman of the Yugoslav Committee in London. The outcome of this meeting was the Congress of Oppressed Nationalities of Austria-Hungary held at Rome, April 8-10, 1918. Men prominent in Italian public life, representatives of the Czecho-Slovak National Committee, of the Yugoslav Committee, of the Serbian Skupština, of the Poles and of the Roumanians met in this Congress, which was also attended by a number of invited foreigners. The Congress unanimously adopted the general resolutions agreed upon between the various nationalities and the special Italo-Yugoslav convention concluded between Signor Torre and Dr. Trumbić. The resolutions passed were as follows:⁹ “The representatives of the nationalities subjected in whole or in part to the rule of Austria-Hungary—the Italians, Poles, Roumanians, Czechs and Yugoslavs—join in affirming their principles of common action as follows:

“1. Each of these peoples proclaims its right to constitute its own nationality and State unity or to complete it and to attain full political and economic independence.

“2. Each of these peoples recognises in the Austro-Hun-

⁸Quoted in “New Europe,” Vol. VI, p. 92.

The *Corriere della Sera* of Milan is the most widely known Italian paper. It is Constitutional-Liberal and moderate in its views; opposed to Giolitti, and, since the outbreak of the war, anti-German; one of the first papers to advocate agreement with the Yugoslavs; very fair to the Allies.

⁹“New Europe,” Vol. VII, pp. 54-61.

garian Monarchy the instrument of German domination and the fundamental obstacle to the realisation of its aspirations and rights.

"3. The assembly recognises the necessity of a common struggle against the common oppressors, in order that each people may attain complete liberation and national unity within a free State unit.

"The representatives of the Italian people and of the Yugoslav people in particular agree as follows:

"1. In the relations between the Italian nation and the nation of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes—known also under the name of the Yugoslav nation—the representatives of the two peoples recognise that the unity and independence of the Yugoslav nation is a vital interest of Italy, just as the completion of Italian national unity is a vital interest of the Yugoslav nation. And therefore the representatives of the two peoples pledge themselves to employ every effort in order that during the war and at the moment of the peace these decisions (*finalita*) of the two nations may be completely attained.

"2. They declare that the liberation of the Adriatic Sea and its defense against every present and future enemy is a vital interest of the two peoples.

"3. They pledge themselves also in the interest of good and sincere relations between the two peoples in the future, to solve amicably the various territorial controversies, on the basis of the principles of nationality and of the right of peoples to decide their own fate, and in such a way as not to injure the vital interests of the two nations, such as shall be defined at the moment of peace.

"4. To such racial groups (*nuclei*) of one people as it may be found necessary to include within the frontiers of the other there shall be recognised and guaranteed the right to their language, culture, and moral and economic interests." There was a special memorandum dealing with the future of Poland.

The leaders of the Congress were officially received by Premier Orlando, who conveyed to them the hearty greetings of the Government and its keen sympathy with the national movement which, he said, Italy should be able to understand better than any other country. He quoted from his speech made on February 12 in the Chamber in favour of the subject races. He had then said, "It is our common and perhaps decisive interest that the inexplicable and grievous doubt which has arisen regarding our war aims should be dissipated. Here once more, for ourselves and for all, we have loyally declared them to be exclusively directed towards assuring our territorial integrity and national defense against the implacable and secular menace of an enemy State." Addressing the Congress he continued: "Now these neighbouring nationalities are, in their turn, subjected to Austria, and it has only been the traditional astuteness of this State which has unchained the ethnical passions of the oppressed races, inciting one against the other in order more easily to rule them. Hence, it seems natural and necessary to follow the opposite policy from that which has so greatly helped the enemy, and to establish a solidarity born from common suffering. There is no substantial reason for quarrel if we sincerely examine the conditions of mutual existence, the mutual sacrifices of certain ethnical groups in these 'grey zones' which lie along the frontiers of great peoples, and the determination to grant just guarantees to those racial minorities which necessity may assign to one or other of the different State groups."

The great gain of this Conference was the proof that, among themselves, the subject nations were satisfied with the justice of their aspirations. None of them was afraid to associate with the cause of the others. But the results of this Conference were not all that was expected. On May 29, Mr. Lansing declared officially that the proceedings of the Rome Congress had been followed with great interest by the government of the United States and that

the nationalistic aspirations of the Czecho-Slovaks and Jugoslavs for freedom had the earnest sympathy of the American Government. This was something more than President Wilson's statement of January 8, in which he mentioned autonomous government for the subject peoples of Austria-Hungary. Wilson's statement, coming after Mr. Lloyd George's speech to the British Labor Representatives on January 5, had spread dismay among the subject nationalities of Austria-Hungary. They knew the meaning of autonomy or self-government under the Habsburg and did not regard it as synonymous with liberty. The British and French governments by the Spring of 1918, however, realised that victory lay in convincing the Slav element that the Allies were really fighting for Slav freedom and submitted to the Allied Conference at Versailles early in June declarations in regard to the future of the Poles, the Czecho-Slovaks and the Jugoslavs. This official announcement was made July 6: "At a meeting held at Versailles on June 3, the Prime Ministers of the Allied countries, Great Britain, France and Italy, agreed to the following declarations: (1) The creation of a united and independent Polish State with free access to the sea constitutes one of the conditions of a solid and just peace, and of the rule of right in Europe. (2) The Allied Governments have noted with pleasure the declaration made by the Secretary of State of the United States Government and desire to associate themselves in an expression of earnest sympathy for the nationalistic aspirations towards freedom of the Czecho-Slovak and Jugoslav peoples."

Baron Sonnino was responsible for the half-hearted character of the second clause. He was one of the leaders of the group which had not favoured the Rome Congress. Austria-Hungary naturally made the most of the difference in the tone of clause one and clause two in the propaganda against Italy among the Southern Slavs. Mr. Lansing sought to improve matters by a new statement on June 28, but the

Piave offensive had already started and it was too late. He announced that "since the issuance by this Government on May 29 of the statement regarding the nationalistic aspirations for freedom of the Czecho-Slovaks and the Yugoslavs, German and Austrian officials and sympathizers have sought to misinterpret and distort its manifest interpretation. In order that there may be no misunderstanding concerning the meaning of the statement, the Secretary of State has today further announced the position of the United States Government to be that all branches of the Slav race should be completely freed from German and Austrian rule." Mr. Balfour and M. Pichon followed this up early in June by an exchange of telegrams on the occasion of the presentation of colours to the Czecho-Slovak army in France, when M. Pichon also referred publicly to the creation of a Yugoslav state. The British Foreign Minister in a public statement early in July also spoke of "a Yugoslav State" and Mr. Balfour declared, at the Mansion House on July 25, his deep sympathy with the statement of the Serbian-Yugoslav war aims which were quoted above. Great Britain, France and the United States were ready to recognize Jugoslavia, but Italy still held aloof. The subsequent recognition of the Czecho-Slovak National Council and people as an allied and belligerent nation was a further advance. The recognition by the United States of the Czecho-Slovak nation as a belligerent on September 4, 1918, followed the recognition by the Allies, but went further in that it recognized the Czecho-Slovak army and the National Council as the *de facto* government. The recognition of the Czecho-Slovaks as a nation was a direct admission by the Allies and by the United States of the need for the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary.

But Italy was slow in granting recognition to Jugoslavia. As we have seen, in the Spring of 1918, the general opinion became more favourable towards the Slavs and great expectations were aroused by the success of the Congress of Oppressed Nationalities held at Rome. The Russian policy

of "peace without annexation" and the implicit renouncing of the Straits and of Constantinople, of course, made a change in the Dalmatian situation. But the Imperialist party by no means completely disappeared. In August, 1918, however, it was probably at its lowest ebb. Various influential journals published articles showing the weak points in the Imperialist program. The Italian press started a lively discussion centering around the policies of Orlando and of Sonnino. The *Secolo* urged an active propaganda among the Austrian nationalities as the most effective and quickest way of defeating Austria. Italy must convince the Slavs that she is fighting, not to satisfy her imperialistic ambitions, but to give each of the nationalities, Poles, Roumanians, Northern and Southern Slavs, a country. A writer in the *Tribuna* defended the Croats against the charge made against them of fighting in the Austrian army. He pointed to the actions of their deputies in the Reichsrat and to the support which they received from the people as proof of their hostility to the Habsburg.¹⁰ The *Unità* stressed the fact that from a military point of view Austria could be attacked much more easily through the lands of the Southern Slavs than on the Alpine front and that Austrian military writers had realized this danger. The Slavophobe campaign and the claims made on Dalmatia by certain parties in Italy had tended to give Austria exactly what she wanted, the hostility between Italy and the Southern Slavs, and the secret treaty crowned their work. This policy must be reversed and the confidence of the Southern Slavs gained by Italy.¹¹ It was pointed out by the *Secolo*¹² that the war was working a great transformation in the ideals of government and that democracy was the guiding spirit of the day and that there was going on the substitution of the rights of the peoples for the will of the governments and of

¹⁰ *Christian Science Monitor*, August 31, 1918. The *Tribuna* of Rome was one of Giolitti's organs and neutralist until Italy entered the war.

¹¹ *Christian Science Monitor*, August 28, 1918.

¹² *Christian Science Monitor*, August 24, 1918.

nationality for the existing anti-national states. Orlando's policy at the Rome Congress was pointed to as a step in the right direction. He had broken the circle of "sacred egoism" which was stifling her (Italy) and had launched her for the first time into world policy. He had understood that moral conquests might have greater value for a nation than gain of territory. But the article pointed out that Orlando by himself could not go forward on this policy. It ran counter to the traditions of the Consulta (Foreign Office), whose support he should have. As we now know, the Foreign Minister and his policy of imperialism did become more prominent again after the armistice.

In August, 1918, Lord Northcliffe and Mr. H. Wickham Steed led an attempt to induce Baron Sonnino to recognize the claims of the Jugoslavs as belligerent allies. There were many complaints against the Secret Treaty, which had largely lost its meaning now that the Tsaristic régime had disappeared in Russia and that it was certain Austria-Hungary could not exist much longer in its present form. The *Corriere della Sera* conducted a lively discussion in regard to Sonnino's anti-Slav policy.¹³ It declared that Mr. Balfour's statement to Dr. Beneš when he recognized the Czecho-Slovaks as the allies of Britain was a pledge on the part of England to liberate the oppressed nationalities of Austria and was the death knell of the Austrophile tendency in British diplomacy. Italy had signed a similar agreement with the Czechs in May, 1918, but the fact had not been made public. This silence showed how ambiguous was the official attitude of Italy with regard to the question of nationalities. "After the Congress of Rome we have often asked ourselves why the Italian Government never took in hand the unification of the Entente policy towards the nationalities by giving it a uniform diplomatic formula and that unity of political and military action which would certainly have multiplied its effects."

¹³ "New Europe," Vol. VIII, pp. 164-167.

The *Corriere della Sera* applauded the fact that Orlando had signed the military convention with the Czecho-Slovaks, but would have liked it better had Baron Sonnino signed it. It felt that the policy of nationalities should cease to be uncertain and equivocal and summed up the policy represented by the Rome Congress as follows: "At Rome the Italians recognized that when once the dismemberment of the Dual Monarchy was attained, the formation of a united and independent Yugoslavia becomes an Italian interest, while the Yugoslavs recognized that their supreme national interest is to work with all their forces, in perfect union with Italy and the oppressed nationalities, in order that this necessary premise to the creation of Yugoslavia may be attained." The Yugoslav problem, the *Corriere* considered as part of a Policy of Nationalities, a policy which "should find in Italy its pole, the centre from which it radiates and moves. . . . Italy cannot, without contradicting and denying herself, delay for an instant taking note of the radically anti-Austrian resolutions of the Allies. The Yugoslav policy, understood not merely as a problem of territorial and maritime balance of power, but as a factor in the complex problem of ranging forces against Austria-Hungary, is a mere episode in the Policy of Nationalities."

The *Corriere* declared that Orlando had done good service in placing himself at the head of this movement, "but the policy of his government—it is useless to have any illusions—does not coincide with his personal policy. The Consulta conspires daily to rouse the equivocal around what is clearer and more limpid than the sunlight." Why did Baron Sonnino not associate himself with M. Pichon and Mr. Balfour in the recognition of the Czechs? The paper warned its readers that if Austria were allowed to survive, Italy's rôle at the Peace Conference would be an insignificant one and it called upon Orlando to see that this did not happen, and practically suggested the retirement of Sonnino from the office of Foreign Minister as it was impossible

for Italian foreign policy to have two aspects, "that presented by the Premier's personal work and pronouncements and that constituted by the official policy of the Foreign Office." The *Corriere* pointed out that at the Versailles Conference of June 6, "Baron Sonnino did not remain faithful to the spirit of the Pact of Rome, but that he is especially responsible for an action which rendered less decisive the results of the Congress of the Capitol, and which in any case greatly diminished the moral and political advantage which Italy could have derived from it and which led the French and British Governments to secure for themselves full liberty to supplement, by successive unilateral steps, the insufficient declarations of Versailles. Thus Baron Sonnino not only failed in the task naturally reserved to a Minister of Italy, and very early after the Pact of Rome, of uniting and directing the policy of the Entente against Austria-Hungary, but he also worked with his own hands to divide the Entente by leaving his own country in unfavourable conditions as against the Allies and the oppressed nationalities." The *Corriere* inquired why Sonnino had alone raised obstacles to the formation of a Yugoslav Legion and tried to hinder the enrolment of Roumanian volunteers.

The *Giornale d'Italia*, which in May advocated an Austrophile policy but in July was Austrophobe, took up the side of Sonnino against the *Corriere della Sera*. It insisted that there was no conflict or difference of opinion between the Foreign Minister and the Premier. The *Epoca* held the same view. The *Giornale d'Italia*, however, as the controversy continued, began to denounce the policy of nationalities and insisted that the Jugoslavs must recognize the terms of the Treaty of London before Italy could recognize Jugoslavia. The *Messaggero* took the following attitude: "Signor Orlando has placed himself in the van of the Entente movement which aims at the dissolution of Austria and the creation of a free Bohemia and a great Jugoslavia; and this attitude, which culminated in his cordial welcome

to the delegates of the Roman Congress, has won for Italy many sympathies not only among the oppressed peoples who long for redemption, but in all Allied and neutral countries where there had been spread the story of an Imperialistic Italy, hostile to every irredentism save the Italian. Baron Sonnino, by remaining at his post, has shown that at bottom he shares the views of the Premier but he has never given to this policy an explicit and warm adhesion, and has sometimes seemed to tolerate rather than to desire the political course adopted in the Capitol during the memorable meeting of representatives of the oppressed nationalities of Austria. Thus, while from some government offices there have been since then issued propagandists in favour of the Pact of Rome, from others there continued to be sent abroad pamphlets and propagandists not exactly inspired by the principles of the Congress of last April.”¹⁴

This controversy in the Italian press was closely followed in the enemy countries. The *Frankfurter Zeitung* for September 2 made the following comment: “Sonnino’s opponents have reproached him with lack of conciliation towards the Jugoslavs and with thus delaying the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy, which would be bound to fall if the Croats and Slovenes worked as keenly for their independence in a Great Serbian Empire as the Czechs for their separate state. . . . We have learnt that the difference between Sonnino and Orlando goes far deeper than we had hitherto imagined. From the Italian standpoint the justice of the reproaches made to Sonnino could not be mistaken. He it was who concluded the London Treaty, which Bolševik indiscretion has revealed. Its execution, which presupposes a crushing Entente victory, would be bound to replace the existing Austro-Italian conflict by an incurable Italo-Jugoslav en-

¹⁴ The *Giornale d’Italia* of Rome is closely connected with Sonnino, though it claims not to be his organ. It takes a moderate National line. *Epoca* of Rome, founded in 1917, was the pro-war, unofficial organ of Orlando. *Messaggero* is Radical and anti-Clerical, friendly to England and pro-French.

mity. Sonnino therefore acts quite logically in not receiving the leaders of Southern Slav nationalities and refusing to further their aims even by mere polite attentions. *To be quite logical, he must really aim at preserving the Habsburg Monarchy*, which has hitherto protected Italy from Slav greed. The Italian statesman's taciturn nature makes it difficult to estimate whether he realizes this consequence of his policy, which at once shows how untenable the whole programme is."¹⁵

The *Corriere della Sera*, the *Secolo*, and the *Messaggero* may be regarded as representing the overwhelming body of Italian public opinion in the late Summer and Fall of 1918. The only papers giving active support to Sonnino by September were the *Giornale d'Italia*, the *Rosto del Carlino* of Bologna, which is no longer of great political importance, and the *Tempo* of Rome, recently founded by the editor of the *Rosto del Carlino*. The Italian Irredentist Socialists announced a policy of cordial co-operation with the Jugoslavs against Austria and the Executive Committees of the Italian and of the Yugoslav Socialist parties met together in Trieste to discuss possible solutions of the Adriatic problem. It even looked for a time as if Sonnino might be driven from office.

The general feeling of dissatisfaction led to the declaration of the Italian Cabinet on September 9, to the allied governments, recognizing the Yugoslav movement as being in accord with the principles of the Entente. This was the first definite declaration of the whole Cabinet on the Yugoslav question and marked a considerable advance in Italy's position. It was hailed with great delight by the *Corriere della Sera* which declared, "Two of the objects which we had before us in promoting the policy of the nationalities, these being to increase the national opposition within the confines of the monarchy and to cure our allies of their Austrophile illusions may be considered as achieved. We

¹⁵ "New Europe," Vol. VIII, p. 264.

must now add a third object which we have before us and that is to give Italy the leadership of all the anti-Austrian forces operating both within and without the enemy empire. The declaration of the Italian Government in favour of Yugoslavia constitutes the necessary premise for the accomplishment of this object and tells us that it may be accomplished and that it is in our power if we will grasp it." The *Giornale d'Italia*, the organ of Sonnino, stated that the declaration received the almost unanimous approval of the Italian Parliament. It continued that the position of Italy became more delicate as the Entente war policy turned more and more in favour of the oppressed nationalities, for Italy, while aiming resolutely to support the Entente and to forward the movement for freeing these subject peoples of Italy's ancient enemy, was naturally concerned to bring about the complete realization of her war aims and, above all, in no way to compromise the Treaty of London, and to avoid any renunciation which might, as things are, turn out to be an irreparable loss to Italy.¹⁶

Unitá remarked that, if the Government had delayed its recognition three weeks more, it would have come after the defeat of Bulgaria and then the Italian Government could not have claimed the least credit for generosity and liberality. It said the Italian Government had done on September 8, 1918, what a ministry of genius would have done in May, 1915, and what a ministry of good sense would have done at least in April, 1917, after the Russian revolution and the intervention of the United States. The viewpoint of the *Unitá*, which represents Professor Salvemini and his group, has been summarized as follows:¹⁷ "The *Unitá* goes on to express approval of the manner in which the government has framed its declaration. The right to the constitution of a Yugoslav State, it says, is recognized in a positive form under the negative condition that it shall not

¹⁶ *Christian Science Monitor*, Nov. 7, 1918.

¹⁷ *Christian Science Monitor*, Nov. 11, 1918.

form part of an enlarged and transformed Austria-Hungary. Either the new State will be formed through the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary and will be constituted as free and independent, or Italy will be free to oppose its constitution, or in other words, the absorption of Serbia and Montenegro in a greater Austria.

"Interpreted in this way which the *Unità* considers the only legitimate one, the government's action, it states, is both generous and prudent. It opens the way for the future without leaving an opportunity for any surprise, points the way and lays down the limits, and recognizes the national rights of the Jugoslavs on the condition that these rights are not confiscated by the royal house of Austria; that is, that they shall not be falsified by Italy's enemies after having been affirmed by Italy.

"This means, the *Unità* declares, that the action of the Italian government will be without effect, unless the anti-Austrian and separatist movement of the Southern Slavs becomes intensified to the point of bringing about the collapse of Austria, conjointly with the Czech and Polish movements. Thus the duty of the Jugo-Slavs of Austria to conquer their right to unity and national independence by means of uncompromising anti-Austrian action becomes clearer.

"The *Unità* declares that it has never been among those who assert that all the Croats, all the Slovenes, and all the Serbians of Austria, down to the last man, are flinging themselves wholeheartedly into an anti-Austrian struggle before being sure of the anti-Austrian Yugoslav movement. On the other hand it has always combated the claims of those who ignore all the Yugoslav anti-Austrian manifestations, and, by means of the Agenzia Stephani, send to the Italian papers only the news of manifestations which are either favorable to Austria, or 'possibilist' (by which the *Unità* means to describe those people who, in vulgar parlance, are waiting to see which way the cat jumps) or doubt-

ful, and thus make Italy believe that all the Jugoslavs are favorable to Austria. It knows, it declares, that by the same methods, all the irredentist Italians might be made to seem favorable to Austria, ignoring the sufferings of Battisti, Filzi, Sauro, and Rismondo and recording only the homage of Dr. Ziliotto of Zara to Francis Joseph or the speeches of Don Faidutti and Don Bugatto in the Vienna Chamber, or the order of the day voted at Rome by certain very Italian people who invoked war on the Slavs and forgot to ask for the dismemberment of Austria. A nation is not a company of soldiers maneuvering on a drill ground, and the slowness with which Italy has come to see the need for recognizing the right of the Jugoslavs to unity and independence should make them indulgent toward other people's slowness.

"Nevertheless, the *Unità* declares, there is a slowness which at a certain point betokens an incapacity to move, and the Austrian Jugoslavs from now onward, should set themselves to combat this slowness among large sections of their compatriots. A typical case in point may be found in the Diet of Zagabria, where the separatist element in the Serbo-Croatian coalition which forms the majority should be more energetic in opposing the trialist element and should draw to itself the 'possibilist' element.

"The Serbo-Croatian coalition has reached a critical point, the *Unità* declares; it must either cut the bridges between it and the House of Austria, or the anti-German Entente will have the right not to take any account, either in peace or war, of national aspirations which do not make themselves manifest through so considerable a part of the race concerned. Inertia of this kind would show that these aspirations were not the conviction of the race, but only the views of a dreamy minority that played no real part in the actualities.

"No doubt, the *Unità* declares, it is easy for it to talk in all safety about cutting bridges. For the Serbo-Croatian

coalition cutting the bridges means facing the savagery of the Magyars, who would have the right to accuse it of betraying the dynasty and of wishing to bring about the collapse of the State, and they would dissolve the Diet of Zagabria and the local administrations of Croatia and Slovenia, put them under a military régime, take possession of the crops and bring in the same régime of extermination which has been tried in Serbia.

"It seems terrible, the *Unità* declares, that such things should be written by those who run no risk, but the gains of the Jugo-Slav nation will be in proportion to its deserts, and its right to live free and independent will be measured by the extent to which it has shown that it is ready to face the suffering necessary to bring about its constitution. The Jugo-Slavs must feel that the anti-German Entente has done its duty by them when it has recognized their national rights; fighting against Austria for its own reasons, it offers them the opportunity of realizing their rights, for which it is their own concern to make sacrifices. The world is not making war, nor will it continue to do so, merely that Jugo-Slavia may arise, and it must gain this right by the merit of its sons and not through the sacrifices of others. It would not have the right, the *Unità* says, to point out the duty of the Jugo-Slavs to construct their own country, if it did not at the same time declare that it is the duty of the Italian Government not to stand in the way of their doing so, as it would be doing if it stopped halfway in the policy inaugurated by the Rome Conference and the recent declarations. X

"For three years, the *Unità* declares, Italy by her opposition to Jugo-Slav national unity and by her claims to conquer not only Trieste and Istria but also Dalmatia, has sent astray the irredentist anti-Austrian groups in Jugo-Slavia, weakened them in the national opinion and made them dread an Italian victory as the worst disaster which could overtake the Jugo-Slav nation. The Italian Government's ex-

plicit recognition of Jugo-Slav national rights to unity and independence, must have beneficent effects in favor of the anti-Austrian separatist movement, the *Unità* insists, but from this point the rest of the article has been deleted by the censor."

But, even after the Government's declaration of September 8, Sonnino stated in the Chamber in October, 1918, that the Italian Government did not desire the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary, that it repudiated all Imperialistic aspirations, and demanded only what was necessary for security, for the completion of her national unity and for the maintenance of a joint balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean. Of course, without the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary, an independent Jugoslavia was an impossibility. The propaganda against the Croats, as agents of Vienna, did not cease and, in spite of appeals from the Jugoslav Committee, from Serbian headquarters and from the men themselves, Italy never allowed the Jugoslav officers, and men interned in Italy to be released to fight against Austria. Orlando, however, still maintained his friendly attitude. Interviewed on November 6, after the Versailles Conference, Orlando said: "It is not our fault nor was it the fault of the Jugoslavs if we were face to face when they were clad in this straight waistcoat which disguised them as enemies, owing to the brutal subjection to an adverse State. No wonder some misunderstanding happened.

"These are but little things toward the great actual events to which we are assisting and taking part. We must lay on a strong and unshakable bond of friendship between the two nations who are ultimately united by nature and frontiers."¹⁸

But, though outwardly there was a growing feeling in favour of friendship with the Jugoslavs, after the armistice and the break-up of Austria, the Imperialists came more and more to the front. In the Cabinet, there was dissension.

¹⁸ New York Times, Nov. 7, 1918.

It came to a head late in December, when Leonida Bissolati, Minister of Military Aid and War Pensions, resigned because he disagreed with his colleagues, and especially with Sonnino on the Adriatic question. From the beginning, Bissolati has favoured a policy of friendship towards the Yugoslavs. On August 12, 1916, his party, the Reform Socialists, published their war aims program in the *Azione Socialista*. They would claim for Italy, Trentino and, if possible, the Upper Adige; Venetia Julia, at least as far as Cape Franona, political guarantees for the pacific and autonomous development of Italian centres in Dalmatia and the islands; military guarantees for the safety of Italy in the Adriatic, which could be completed by the possession of Valona. They desired the constitution of a Yugoslav kingdom reaching from the Danube to the Adriatic strong enough to be independent of Russia or of Austria-Hungary and linked to Italy by common interests.¹⁹

Bissolati believed that "the foreign policy of Italy should be one of rapprochement with France on the one hand and with the Southern Slavs on the other." Further, he said, "We have a great and definite task to perform on the eastern shore of the Adriatic and part of it will be to throw open the door of commerce to the Yugoslav and place him in connection with the West."²⁰ In discussing his resignation, the Rome correspondent of the *Temps* said: "Signor Bissolati always held the same ideas as President Wilson, even before the President expressed these ideas. Signor Bissolati was frequently in disagreement with a considerable part of the Cabinet, but his disagreement was suppressed for patriotic reasons. It appears, however, that, since the signing of the armistice, this disagreement has become more marked, and now Bissolati feels that his democratic programme is impossible with certain of his colleagues."²¹ The

¹⁹ "New Europe," Vol. I, p. 50.

²⁰ *Christian Science Monitor*, Sept. 28, 1918.

²¹ *Montreal Gazette*, Dec. 30, 1918.

Giornale d'Italia says that Bissolati showed himself opposed to the establishment of the Italian Alpine frontier at Brenner Pass, Southern Tyrol, and that he was willing to leave Dalmatia to the Croats. "The Italian people are not of the same opinion," the *Giornale* continues, "we must not only save northern Dalmatia, but also the whole Italian city of Fiume. Premier Orlando has a road clearly defined before him for arranging with a strong hand a reconstitution of the Cabinet in accordance with the necessities of the present hour."²²

Bissolati gave out a statement giving the reasons for his resignation. "I have failed," he said, "to move Baron Sonnino away from the three clauses of the secret treaty of London; (1) annexation of a large portion of Dalmatia from Lissariki and Trebuije to Cape Planka (Article 5); (2) permanent retention of all the thirteen islands of so-called Dodecanese with their almost exclusively Greek population (Article 8); and inclusion within Italian territory of the German population of the Northern Tyrol, as far as the Brenner (Article 4). Baron Sonnino insists on the absolute inviolability of the Secret Treaty of London; but, on the other hand, that does not include Fiume, which the treaty (Article 5 and Note 2) assigns 'to the territory of Croatia and Montenegro,' whereas I claim that Italian city for Italy, but would give Dalmatia to the Yugoslavs." Bissolati had warned Sonnino that the Yugoslavs would fight if the Italians occupied their country and that the decision of the Dalmatian question would probably depend upon President Wilson and that it was by no means certain the President would support the Italian view, especially as he was not bound by the Treaty of London. He also thought that the other signatories were not very enthusiastic about the Treaty, though they would no doubt honor their signatures. He thought that the wise course for Italy would be immediately to give over Dalmatia to the Yugoslavs on con-

²² *Montreal Gazette*, Dec. 30, 1918.

dition that she could keep Fiume and all of Istria. Fiume should then be made a free port under Italian administration. As for the Dodecanese, he believed them of no value and held it was extremely unwise to irritate Greece over such a small matter. The German population in the Tyrol, he foresaw, would be a continual source of trouble and he would draw the Northern frontier of Italy a little to the north of Bozen, but so as to include the Ladin Valleys because the Ladins were of the Latin race and spoke a dialect akin to Italian.²³

His views were stated fully in his speech at Milan on January 11.²⁴ Bissolati is by no means a non-interventionist though he hopes this will be the last war. He holds the record, unique among allied statesmen, of having volunteered for active service, though past the fighting age, and of having served for many months in the trenches before entering the Orlando Cabinet. The first part of the speech was an eloquent plea for the Society of Nations. (It might be noted here that Bissolati was invited to represent Italy among the speakers at the interallied demonstration in favour of a League of Nations in Paris early in February.) To him, there is no room for imperialism in the peace. "Each people must bring to the Conference a readiness to show moderation and equity towards others, as a sacred offering on the altar of a lasting peace. Each of the anti-German nations must guard itself against any unconscious German element in its own soul, if only in order to have the right to combat any trace in others of the imperialism which has poisoned the outlook of the German people." In discussing the territorial claims of Italy, he feels that there is no room for discussion in Italy's claim to Trentino, Gorizia, Trieste, and Istria. They are within the sacred boundaries of Italy. But other territories listed in the Treaty of London should not be included. "If Italy, mind-

²³ *Montreal Gazette*, Jan. 7, 1919.

²⁴ Full text printed as Supplement to the "New Europe," Jan. 23, 1919.

ful of the Hellenophil proclamations of General Ameglio, were to offer the Dodecanese to the Conference for restitution to Greece, she would transform the present situation, thus winning in the Lower Adriatic and South Albania a sure friend and opening a wide door to her cultural and economic influence in the Balkans and the Mediterranean." He admitted that his views on the German Tyrol were shared by few. "Now I readily admit that the line of the Brenner would be the best defensive line," but "we must ask whether when the good line coincides with ethnography, Italy would do well to secure the perfect topographical line in order to include within her borders the bacillus of German Irredentism. Italy has too much against the Germans to grant them, save for most pressing reasons of defense, the halo that surrounds people whose national feelings are outraged.

"Coming thus to the question of the Eastern Adriatic, let me say that the heart of Italy cannot be indifferent to the fate of even a single Italian living on the coasts and islands south of Istria. The question is wrongly posed when it is said that to oppose the annexation of Dalmatia—even of the part assigned to Italy by the Treaty of London—implies an abandonment of the sureties and guarantees to which our kinsmen are entitled where they are in tiny minorities. No, the question is whether, in the interest of Europe's safety against fresh German menace and of lasting peace, such guarantees should be secured *by means of annexation*. . . . The factors that determined the European war were the attractive force exercised by Serbia upon the Slav elements in Austria-Hungary, and the design of that empire, under German and Magyar influence, to absorb Serbia and open up the main routes to the East. Italy felt that if Serbia had been swallowed up by that monstrous empire—itsself the vassal of the German Empire—her own economic expansion and political independence would have received a mortal blow. And so she was on Serbia's side,

first in neutrality, then in intervention. . . . Those who only see, in the formation of the Yugoslav State, a sympathetic or antipathetic episode of the war, or a subsidiary effect of it, have failed to detect its inner meaning. . . . Italy must do all in her power to bind to her the young state which she has done so much to create. . . . What separates her and Jugoslavia? Difficulties of mixed territory where an exact ethnographic line cannot be drawn. And then Italian extremists demand the annexation of the whole eastern Adriatic coast, while Yugoslav extremists claim the whole coast, including Istria and Trieste. But if Italy renounced the annexation of Dalmatia, she might obtain from Jugoslavia or from the Conference the joy of pressing to her heart the most Italian city of Fiume, which the Treaty of London renounced. She could see the language and culture of all her sons across the Adriatic assured by special grants of autonomy, as at Zara, or by arrangements between the two States, whose real guarantees would reside in the fact that our frontiers would, even without Dalmatia, include many more Jugoslavs than there were Italians in Jugoslavia."

This speech was met by a burst of indignation in virtually the entire Italian press. The denunciation of Gabriele d'Annunzio was most scathing. He demanded the inclusion of all Dalmatia in the Kingdom of Italy. Bissolati's stand on the Brenner line was perhaps the thing that caused the most vehement criticism.

Shortly after Bissolati's resignation, Francesco Nitti, Minister of Finance in the Orlando Cabinet since October, 1917, gave up his portfolio January 13, 1919. In the early part of the war, he had held a middle position, between his former chief Giolitti and the Interventionists. He resigned at this crisis believing that the non-intervention Socialists and Clericals would be strong enough to overthrow the Orlando Government and to enable him to form a new ministry. His popularity had, however, been diminishing since

it had become known that, in December, 1917, he had advised the Government to make a separate peace with Austria unless England and France furnished stronger support to the Italian armies than they had been doing. He had never been classed as pro-German. He was opposed to Sonnino on the Adriatic question and was willing to compromise with the Yugoslavs. His strength lay in the fact that he had had the support of the Vatican and the confidence of the Catholic party, which had been acquiring power during the war because of the dread of Bolshevism and of the fear that the Socialists would be too readily led away by Bolshevik propaganda. He had been generally regarded as the only politician who could hope to replace Orlando as Premier. This Cabinet crisis kept Orlando away from the Peace Conference and was one of the many factors delaying the peace. Besides Bissolati and Nitti, the Ministers of Justice, Agriculture, and Transport handed in their resignations. The new Ministers were appointed from men strongly behind Sonnino in his Adriatic and Yugoslav policy.

Mr. Wilson was in Italy at the height of the Cabinet crisis. His speeches were interpreted by each side in its own favour but the Sonnino faction took greater comfort in the fact that the United States had not recognized Jugoslavia as a nation. This recognition, however, came the next month. Mr. Wilson was received with enthusiasm. In his speech to the Chamber of Deputies he gave Italy the credit for having gone into the war for the same exalted principle of right and justice that moved our own people. He continued: "But we cannot stand in the shadow of this war without knowing there are things which are in some senses more difficult than those we have undertaken, because, while it is easy to speak of right and justice, it is sometimes difficult to work them out in practice, and there will be required a purity of motives and disinterestedness of object which the world had never witnessed before in the councils of the nations.

"It is for that reason that it seems to me you will forgive me if I lay some of the elements of the new situation before you for a moment. The distinguishing fact of this war is that great empires have gone to pieces. And the characteristics of those empires are that they hold different peoples reluctantly together under the coercion of force and the guidance of intrigue.

"The great difficulty among such States as those of the Balkans has been that they were always accessible to secret influence; that they were always being penetrated by intrigue of some sort or another; that north of them lay disturbed populations which were held together not by sympathy and friendship but by the coercive force of a military power. Now the intrigue is checked and the bands are broken, and what we are going to provide is a new cement to hold the people together. They have not been accustomed to being independent. They must now be independent.

"I am sure that you recognize the principle as I do—that it is not our privilege to say what sort of government they should set up. But we are friends of those people, and it is our duty as their friends to see to it that some kind of protection is thrown around them—something supplied that will hold them together. There is only one thing that holds nations together, if you exclude force, and that is friendship, and by the same token the only thing that binds men together is friendship. Therefore our task at Paris is to organize the friendship of the world—to see to it that all the moral forces that make for right and justice and liberty are united and are given a vital organization to which the peoples of the world will readily and gladly respond."

CHAPTER IX

ITALY AND THE JUGOSLAVS SINCE THE ARMISTICE

THE armistice concluded with Austria-Hungary gave Italy the right to occupy territory to a line practically identical with that bounding the territory assigned her by the Secret Treaty. No better means could have been devised to provoke conflict between the Italians and the Jugoslavs. The armistice of Belgrade gave permission to the Serbian army to occupy the Banat, the Bačka, Syrmia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina but no territory lying farther west. This looked very like a revival of the policy of Mr. Pašić and of certain foreign diplomats who wished that Serbia, instead of becoming part of a united Yugoslavia, should annex the mainly Serb districts of Bosnia, Slavonia and southern Hungary to form a Greater Serbia, leaving the Croat and Catholic population to the west to be cared for in other ways. There are still, among the followers of the Habsburgs and among the Roman politicians who have always worked for the survival of Austria, small groups working for a separate Croatian republic. The Banat is claimed by both Serbia and Roumania and it would have been in the interests of peace if the troops of neither country had been allowed to enter this district until after the Peace Conference had come to some decision on the question of its possession.¹

The occupation by Italian troops of erstwhile Austrian territory, now claimed by both Italy and the Jugoslavs, has led to many unpleasant incidents, especially where the military occupation has been followed by an attempt to intro-

¹ "New Europe," Vol. IX, p. 281.

duce Italian civil administration. The Serbian army did not enter as conquerors to annex a limited zone, but entered the whole Yugoslav territory at the urgent and enthusiastic invitation of the population and of the National Government. On November 17, the first Serbian troops entered Fiume and almost at once became involved with the Italian troops who had already occupied Abbazia and Volosca and now landed at Fiume. The Italians claimed that two regiments of Croats were terrorizing Fiume and that they were obliged to land troops to maintain order. On November 18, the Zagreb Council issued an official note of protest against the occupation of Fiume and against the seizure of ships by the Italians. They drew the attention of the Allied Governments to these events and repudiated all responsibility for any consequences that might ensue. On the twentieth, the Council ordered the mobilization of the five classes from 1895 to 1899. The arrival of American troops at Fiume and Trieste allayed the worst dangers. There were also unpleasant incidents at Spalato and other coast towns. Order in these towns has been maintained by allied forces, and wherever Italian troops have been landed an endeavor has been made to have also some other Allied force.

Both Italian and Serbian Bureaus of Information have made the most of these incidents to prove that they are the injured party. Of course, one can realize that such incidents will occur when foreign troops are placed among a strange population and especially when the conditions are such as they are in the Adriatic today. The Yugoslavs see in the occupation by Italian troops the fulfilment of the Secret Treaty. The belligerent attitude of certain leaders on both sides has not helped the situation. On December 14, Premier Orlando stated in the Italian Senate that Italy was not in position to demobilize a single man and that all war material should be kept intact. He declared that the immediate difficulties to be surmounted had not diminished

a bit, but had, on the contrary, increased. The Jugoslavs naturally felt that this was directed against them and on January 4 Dr. M. R. Vesnić, Serbian Minister to France, made the following statement: "Should the treaty secretly signed by England, France, Russia, and Italy in 1915, whereby Italy was to come into possession of the Eastern coast of the Adriatic after the war, be confirmed by the coming Peace Conference, then Serbia would fight again, and fight to the finish. Serbia did not enter this war to become the vassal of any nation. She cannot agree to have Italy control the territory in question."²

In their address to the Prince Regent, December 1, the delegation from the Yugoslav National Council drew attention to the facts of the Italian military occupation. "At this historic moment, when we appear before your Royal Highness as representatives of all the Yugoslav territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, we are profoundly grieved to observe that large portions of our national soil are occupied by the troops of the Kingdom of Italy, which is allied with the Entente Powers, with whom we desire to live in friendly relations. But we cannot recognize any contract, not even that of London (the treaty of April, 1915), by virtue of which, in violation of the principle of nationalities, we should be obliged to surrender part of our nation to other States.

"We draw your Highness's attention to the fact that the Italian occupation far exceeds the limits and regions provided even by the clauses of the armistice, which was concluded with the Commander-in-Chief of the former Austro-Hungarian Army long after these territories had been declared an independent and integral portion of the State of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes."³

On December 13, Washington received the following protest from the Zagreb Council: "On November 17, Italian

² "Current History," Vol. IX, Pt. 2, p. 310.

³ "Current History," Vol. IX, Pt. 2, p. 307-308.

troops arrived and occupied Fiume, although Fiume was not included for occupation in the armistice terms. From the first moment, the behavior of the Italian troops assumed a degree of hostility towards the population usual only in enemy's lands. They seized all the public buildings, dissolved the branch of the National Council, and seized all the warships and merchant ships which happened to be in the harbor, and which did not come under the terms of the armistice. All these acts are contrary to the treaty of armistice and to public law.

"More than this, the Italians closed indefinitely all the Yugoslav schools, and seized the railways and telegraph, declining their use to the Jugoslavs. Starvation is on the threshold because the Italians make imports and distribution of food impossible.

"In Dalmatia, things are, if possible, worse. On November 2 a National Council was established for Dalmatia, being subject to the Central Council at Zagreb. The temporary Italian occupation disregards and violates all terms of public and private right. The Italian Government dissolves schools en masse, the whole merchant marine in Dalmatia harbors was seized and sent to Italy, being declared Italian property on the ground of seizure during a war.

"The exasperation of the Jugoslavs in all parts occupied by Italian troops has reached a stage of acute danger, and if there is no quick interference by the Allies, especially by America, deplorable bloodshed will be the result."

The neutral and Central European press has reported the various incidents more fully than has the allied press. During the second week in November, Italian troops crossed the line laid down in the armistice of October 31 and pressed on as far as the suburbs of Laibach (Ljubljana), the Slovene capital. The Commandant of the Serbian troops there, Colonel Svabić, sent the following note to the Italian commander: "In agreement with the Yugoslav National Council in Zagreb, Serbian troops have occupied the town

of Ljubljana in the name of the Entente. The Serbian troops received orders to prevent the advance of Italian troops on Slav territory. It would be disagreeable to the Commandant of the Serbian troops if he has to resort to arms—a step for which he has received full authority. Should it come to bloodshed, the Serbian troops reject all responsibility. The Italian Commandant is requested to keep back the Allied Italian troops on the watershed between Save and Isonzo until the Serbian Government regulates this matter in agreement with the Italian Government.”⁴

This action and others of a similar nature at Laibach led finally to the closing of the frontier between Italy and Jugoslavia which had been opened by the armistice. Laibach, just outside the armistice frontier, is a railroad centre on the line from Trieste to Vienna. American food had been shipped through Laibach for the interior towns. Italy had maintained a military mission there on the plea that it was necessary to supervise the movement of the food trains, and it was this which the Jugoslavs resented. On February 20 the Serbian commander caused Italian officers to leave Laibach. The closing of the frontier followed the next day, thereby cutting all communication between stations in the territory claimed by Jugoslavia and the ports, and interrupting the shipment of American relief food supplies to Bohemia and other sections of Austria. The Spalato disturbances were also given by the Italian Government as a cause of the embargo against the movement of supplies through Adriatic ports.⁵ The embargo was made the subject of inquiry by the Peace Conference, which lays great stress upon adequate food supplies, many authorities holding that hunger conditions are the prime incentive to Bolshevism and to hostile collisions between Italians and Jugoslavs. Mr. Hoover reports that there is a most alarming

⁴ “New Europe,” Vol. IX, p. 188.

⁵ “Modern Italy,” Vol. I, pp. 212-216; “The Tragedy of Spalato,” by Professor Giotto Danielli.

state of malnutrition among the children of these regions and that there is every need for rapid importation of all food supplies. The official investigators report extreme suffering owing to lack of food and clothing. The American Red Cross and the Hoover organization have been making every effort to better these conditions and, of course, the embargo was fatal to their work. Early in March the American Government warned Italy that she must put an end to the delays in the movement of relief supplies to the newly established Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. The embargo had not been entirely effective but had caused intolerable delays. Since the break-up of Russia and the depredations of the Central Powers in Roumania, Italy herself is dependent upon the United States for food staples, receiving credits through the American Treasury with which to make the purchases.

This policy of Italy has helped to make conditions in Serbia worse than they were during the war. The Serbs were able then to hide from the enemy some of their crop; roads and communications were kept up by occupying powers; German and Magyar supplies imported were scanty but yet included some indispensable industrial articles. The armistice erected a firm barrier between Serbia and Austria-Hungary. Means of communication had been destroyed in the Austrian and Bulgarian retreat and the railroad to Salonica put out of action. The line from Belgrade up the valley of the Save to Fiume was not destroyed and would afford some relief but for the Italian blockade. Under paragraph 5 of the armistice with Austria-Hungary, an inter-Allied commission decides upon the necessary exceptions to the blockade. The decision does not rest in the hands of Italy alone.

It has been generally assumed that the ships belonging to the Jugoslavs in the Austrian merchant marine, some 200 in number, would be assigned for the provisioning of the Yugoslav provinces, but the Yugoslav territory formerly

within the Austrian Empire was not given by the armistice freedom of trade and this has impeded the revictualing of Serbia and the other Yugoslav districts. The commission of four Allied admirals at Fiume decided to allow Italy to requisition all the merchant ships of the former Dual Monarchy in the Adriatic, to hoist the Italian flag on them and to subject them to her laws. No distinction was made between Yugoslav owners and others. Italy is employing this fleet for organizing new trade lines for exporting her products into the territory occupied by her and for strengthening her position in other parts. In point of fact, due to the blockade, only relief supplies can be imported into Jugoslavia and thus little chance is given to improve the rate of exchange or the economic life of the country.⁶

The Italians are said to be trying to transfer the various Austrian shipping concerns to Italian private ownership against the moment when economic questions of the Adriatic come up for discussion at the Peace Conference. The Austro-Americana line is now sailing under the Italian flag, and its manager, Mr. Oscar Kosulich, is said to have become an Italian subject. The Austrian-Lloyd, with the approval of the German-Austrian Government, entered into negotiations with an Italian syndicate to sell its ships and other equipment. These negotiations seem to indicate a spirit of political understanding between Italians and Germans, which has already manifested itself to the detriment of the Jugoslavs. The Italians have arranged that citizens of Trieste leaving Vienna may take with them their money and movable property. The Italians have endeavored to revictual the Czecho-Slovak republic in order to gain popularity in Austria. The negotiations over the Austrian-Lloyd are subject to stipulations that the Italian Government shall have part of the mercantile fleet of Trieste placed at the disposal of the German Austrian State for its trade interest. These transfers mean that the trade policy of the Adriatic

⁶ "New Europe," Vol. X, p. 184-7.

will be in the hands of the Italians, for little other shipping can be expected for the next two years. This would work to the interest of Trieste against the Yugoslav ports. The *Neue Freie Presse*, February 22, states that the negotiations between Vienna and the Italians for the sale to the latter of the Lloyd Steamship Co., the Austro-Americana, and the Navigazione Libera, were concluded at the end of February. Italians have obtained the decisive influence in their management. A syndicate composed of Venice and Trieste capitalists, under the leadership of the Banca Commerciale of Milan (which before the war had close relations with German finance), have a sure majority of the shares. Arrangements have been made regarding tariffs and shipping conditions. Time tables and routes will be combined "so as fully to satisfy the needs of German-Austrian commerce."⁷

As has been stated above, the Italians have claimed that the Croats were the agents of Vienna during the war. The Italian press has made a particular grievance of the acceptance by the Yugoslav Government of the Austro-Hungarian fleet when it was handed over to them by the Vienna Government. Of course, the fleet had been in the hands of the Croats some days before it was formally handed over to them, after the revolution in Prague, Zagreb and Budapest had triumphed and there was practically no Austrian Government left. In going through the form of turning the fleet over to the Jugoslavs, who already held it, the Emperor Charles was evidently trying to continue the Austrian policy of making capital out of the Italian hostility to the Jugoslavs. Italy played into Austria's hand by her action in regard to the fleet. This fleet was turned over to an interallied fleet under Italian command after the armistice. It could have been in the hands of the Allies three weeks earlier if it had not been for the imprisonment in Italy of the Yugoslav and Czecho-Slovak emissaries from the Austro-Hungarian fleet who left Vis (Lissa) in Dalmatia in a sail-

⁷ "New Europe," Vol. X, p. 255.

ing boat and landed in Italy, October 4.⁸ These were the leaders of the revolutionaries in the fleet who came to Italy to make arrangements for the final meeting.

*Fulcieri Paulucci di Calboldi*⁹ claimed that the story of the meeting was manufactured by the Jugoslavs to conceal a gift from the Austrians for service rendered against Italy; that the fleet was transferred to the Entente Allies by the armistice of November 3, 1918, and, therefore, Italy cannot recognize the alleged transfer by the supposedly mutinous crews to the Yugoslav Council any more than England could recognize a gift by the Kaiser to Poland of the German fleet.

The Yugoslav story of the surrender of the Austro-Hungarian fleet is given in some detail in an open letter written to President Wilson by Dr. Ante Tresić-Pavičić, formerly a Croat deputy from Dalmatia.¹⁰ Dr. Pavičić was arrested in July, 1914, by the Austrian authorities and was released only in May, 1917, when the Reichsrat was convoked. He describes the story of the surrender of the fleet in the following words: "I and my friends organized the mutiny of the late Austro-Hungarian Navy, and to me and to my friends as representatives of the Yugoslav Government in Zagreb, this navy had been handed over with all the stores, arsenals and war ports in the Adriatic on the 31st day of October, 1918. At the invitation of MM. Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Colonel House, and Signor Orlando, I, together with two members of the Zagreb National Council, proceeded to Corfu in order to negotiate with Admiral Gauchet on this question.

"The Admiral, acting in the name of the Council of Versailles, showed me the conditions of the armistice imposed on Austria-Hungary, which included the surrender of the fleet. I pointed out to Admiral Gauchet that the fleet had

⁸ "New Europe," Vol. IX, p. 156.

⁹ "La Revue," Vol. CXXX, p. 254; for same view see "Modern Italy," Vol. I, pp. 190-200.

¹⁰ Published by New York *Times*, May 25, 1919.

already passed into our hands, first as a result of the revolution and later by a contract signed by Austrian Admirals on the authority of the Emperor, who had not yet abdicated. In consequence the Austrian General Staff had not had the power to dispose of the fleet, which was no longer Austrian, but our property. Admiral Gauchet then received from Versailles instructions to ask me and my friends to place at the disposal of the Entente our war and commercial fleet and the port of Fiume for the victualing of the Entente armies of occupation on the condition that, after the conclusion of the peace, both fleets, the port of Fiume and other ports would be returned to us in the same condition, and that any damage sustained by them would be compensated for. These conditions were accepted by Admiral Gauchet in the name of the Entente.

"On the 8th of November Admiral Gauchet received a wireless message from Versailles announcing, in connection with our answer, that 'Le fait que les Yougoslavs ont pris possession de la flotte Austro-Hongroise a pour consequence de suspendre l'application des clauses relatives a la livraison des soumarines, quirasses, croiseurs, destroyers et torpilleurs Austro-Hongroise mentionnes aux Clauses II et III ainsi que l'application du dernier alienea de la Clause III.'" (The fact that the Yugoslavs have taken possession of the Austro-Hungarian fleet has as its consequence the suspension of the application of the clauses concerning delivery of the Austro-Hungarian submarines, battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and torpedo boats mentioned in Clauses II and III as well as the application of the last paragraph of Clause III.)

"It is evident, therefore, that MM. Clemenceau, Lloyd George, House, and Orlando acknowledge that the fleet of the late Austro-Hungarian Monarchy is our property, and the requests made by them to us to place our fleet and the ports of the Adriatic at the disposal of the Entente lends additional confirmation. Yet, to my great astonishment,

I read that Italy took possession of and conducted to Venice the following ships: *Teggethof*, *Franz Ferdinand*, *Saida*, *Admiral Spaun*, seven torpedo boats, five destroyers, and four submarines, and that the Italian King held a review of this fleet. All this happened without our authorities having been consulted, against every right and all treaties, and what astonished me most is that it occurred with the knowledge and presumably the consent of the authorities of the United States, in whom all our hope and our faith had been concentrated."

A large section of the Italian press and many officials have taken the attitude, that the Jugoslavs are conquered enemies. They base this on the fact that there were many Slavs in the Austrian armies, especially Croats. Captain Piero Tozzi and Lieutenant Pecorini on a special mission to the United States, stated that the present status of the Slovenes, Croatians, and Bosnians is that of defeated enemies; that Italy believes that a truly repentant Slavonia and Croatia are necessary in order to have peace in the Adriatic. Their statement, in the *New York Times*, January 8, 1919, continued that even not considering historical, cultural, and strategic rights, Italy possessed enough military and naval strength to obtain and maintain for a long time to come the settlement which she considers necessary for her security; that besides this strength she has a treaty which, secret or not, has no more nor less validity than all other similar treaties and understandings between the Allies and constitutes an integral part of a general situation. They state that there is not an imperialist and anti-imperialist party in Italy but that the division is between those people who do not trust the Jugoslavs and those who are willing to take a chance in spite of the fact that the Jugoslavs were in the divisions which fought to the last against the Italians.

This attitude has, of course, been resented by the Jugoslavs and has been considered the great factor in delaying

the recognition of Yugoslavia by the Allies. The Jugoslavs point out the situation which compelled the Jugoslavs and especially the Croats to fight in the armies of Austria and point to the work done by the Serbian troops and to the Jugoslavs who fought in Russia and against Bulgaria. And it must also be remembered that the Jugoslavs knew of the Secret Treaty and feared that they would merely be transferred from Austrian to Italian rule if Italy were victorious. It was after the terms of the Secret Treaty had become known that the Italo-Jugoslav issue developed.

Sir Arthur Evans insists that Sonnino has followed a policy which would insure that the Jugoslavs should appear at the Peace Conference as enemies of the Allies and not as friends. It is for this purpose, he says, that the Italians discouraged desertion to their forces of Jugoslavs from the Austrian army. Deserters were put on the same footing as other prisoners of war. This footing was somewhat modified after Caporetto and the Roman Congress but, after the armistice, Sir Arthur Evans declares, "the Austrian régime is being repeated under the ægis of the Peace Conference."¹¹

Evidence from various other sources corroborates this position. Italy persists in treating the Jugoslavs as defeated enemies. In December, 1918, financial experts sent by the Zagreb Council to Paris were detained as enemies by the authorities at Venice and for some days were not even allowed to communicate with their government in order to establish their case.¹² It is also said that Italy has engaged in wholesale deportations of Jugoslavs from Dalmatia and Istria and that some 700 of them had been interned in Sardinia by March, 1919.¹³ This is denied by the Italian authorities, who say that, up to May, 1919, only 87 persons had been interned from the Jugoslav territory occupied by Italian troops and that those 87 are as much

¹¹ *Christian Science Monitor*, May 15, 21, 1919.

¹² "New Europe," Vol. IX, p. 225.

¹³ "New Europe," Vol. X, p. 295.

enemies of Jugoslavia as of Italy.¹⁴ The editor of *Modern Italy* offers the following explanation of the charge of deportation of Jugoslavs by the Italians: "I now find that there is at least a partial explanation of the discrepancy between the Yugoslav and the Italian figures. Large numbers of people outside the armistice frontier have fled for protection to the Italian authorities. This is evidently what the Jugoslavs call deportation. The Yugoslav rule has been so brutal and tyrannic that the people look to the Italians as their protectors."

¹⁴ "Modern Italy," Vol. II, pp. 67, 103.

CHAPTER X

THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF THE ADRIATIC QUESTION

WE have seen that, before the war, Italy was interested in preventing Austria from becoming more powerful in the Adriatic and in preventing any other power from getting a foothold in Albania. Both the Allies and Austria used Adriatic territory as an inducement to Italy to come into the war and, as we have seen, the Allies, in the Secret Treaty of 1915, promised Italy large territorial gains on the east coast of the Adriatic. When the question of the Adriatic came before the Peace Conference, there was, not only the Secret Treaty, but also the Pact of Rome to be considered, though, of course, the Secret Treaty was the binding document. As has been said, public opinion in Italy, on the question of Jugoslavia, has passed through several phases; by March, 1918, there was a fairly large section who were willing to make a compromise with the Slavs and not to stand by Italian claims as laid down in the Secret Treaty. This liberal element, however, lost ground after the Armistice, and the imperialists have become more and more prominent in the political field. The watchword again became "sacred egoism."

When the Secret Treaties were published by the Bolsheviks in 1917, protests against their imperialistic basis came from the democratic parties, especially in England. The protest in France was less vigorous and that in Italy was weak. At the beginning, the protests were directed, not so much against the fact that the treaties represented the old diplomacy and imperialism, for the abolition of which the Allies were fighting, as against the fact that the com-

pensations promised were unjust, excessive, and imperialistic. Few people at that date realized in full the true function of a league of nations and the air was still full of ideas about safe frontiers and strategic outposts and stations. But, though the harm done by the Secret Treaty became apparent, even in England, up to the end of November, 1918, only the *Manchester Guardian* and the *New Europe* had published the full text of the secret treaties. The idea was still current that there must be no discussion of policy during the actual fighting of the war. However, if the Allies did not discuss the Secret Treaty, the Central Powers did. The people of Germany and Austria-Hungary were well aware of it shortly after it was signed. The full text was printed and hung in every barracks of Austria where there were Yugoslav troops. And it is here that we find an explanation of the fact, so often repeated by Italian propagandists, that the Croats were among the best fighters in the Austrian army. They felt that they were defending their homes against an outside enemy. The government of Austria, they knew, was weakening and they hoped to achieve their unity either inside the Empire or, if it broke up, outside the Empire. But, if Italy were to become mistress of the Adriatic and of the Dalmatian coast, they felt that all hope of a united Yugoslav state would be lost. After the Pact of Rome, aviators flew over the Austrian army and dropped hundreds of pamphlets telling of the Congress and detailing the agreement between Italy and the Yugoslav leaders. This agreement was made the basis of the whole propaganda which the Allies carried on vigorously in the Summer and Fall of 1918 to encourage revolution in Austria as the easiest way of defeating that Power. X

The Secret Treaty was also a great hindrance to the Allies in the Balkans. It was made without the knowledge of Serbia, and, naturally, when it became known, did not help to encourage her. Having given away the coast of the Adriatic, the Allies could not further ask Serbia to

grant all of the demands of Bulgaria in Macedonia. The Germans could, however, and did promise all of Macedonia and, as a result of this bargain and of the German affiliations of Ferdinand, Bulgaria came in on the side of the Central Powers. German propaganda in Greece was naturally helped by the fact that there was an agreement among the Allies whereby Italy was to retain the purely Greek islands of the Dodecanese. Greece also feared for Northern Epirus. With Bulgaria on the side of the Central Powers and Greece rent by civil war, the Allies found it impossible to come to the aid of Roumania and to prevent her collapse in the Autumn of 1916. The Treaty was a flagrant disregard of the principles of nationality and self-determination and the fact of its existence made a restatement of the war aims of the Allies an impossibility in 1917, when they were at their lowest ebb. We have seen that, all during 1918, there were efforts made to revise the treaty and many articles in the *Corriere della Sera*, in the *Secolo*, and in the *Messaggero*, the Rome Congress, the two declarations of the Versailles Council and the grudging recognition of the Jugoslavs by Italy in September, 1918, all show in what direction the wind was blowing. But, as has been shown, after the Armistice the extremists under Sonnino were able to win popular backing and the demands of Italy have become more and more insistent.

In April, 1915, Russia proposed to Italy that two Slav states be formed on the Adriatic. Serbia was to be united with Bosnia and Herzegovina and to have the Dalmatian coast from the Narenta to Montenegro. To the North, there was to be an independent Croatia-Slavonia enlarged by the acquisition of a portion of Carniola and of the greater part of Dalmatia with Zagreb for its capital, and Fiume, Zara and Sebenico for its chief ports. Italy was to receive Trieste with Western Istria, including Pola. Italy objected. She was willing that greater Serbia should have commercial access to the Adriatic, with which Serbia would have

X been satisfied if granted immediately after the first Balkan war, but not now; but she insisted that, strategically, the Adriatic should become what it virtually was in the days of the Venetian Republic—an Italian Lake.¹ Italy also feared this suggestion, thinking that Austria would be replaced by two Slav states under the tutelage of Russia and that she would have exchanged Austria for Russia on the coast facing her.

The Jugoslavs have kept close watch on the course of affairs in Italy and, as Italy has demanded more and more, so the Jugoslavs have become more and more extreme in their demands. The Belgrade *Politika* summed up the situation in 1915 as follows: "Italy has decided to make traffic of her sympathies and sell her warlike co-operation. The cry, 'What am I offered?' alone inspires Italian Policy. . . . The saddest thing in this whole business is that we are to serve as the objects of the bargaining. England and France, who, in the name of the Triple Entente, carried on the negotiations with Italy, consent to concessions at the expense of Serbia and of South Slavism. Serbia asks no aid of Italy. She does not need to. All the more is she not ready to cede an inch of Yugoslav territory. If the Triple Entente is reduced to calling for Italian assistance, let it pay the necessary price out of its own pocket. It possesses territories enough of which it can dispose. Let it not violate others' rights. Savoy, Corsica, Malta, Tunis, Algeria, Asia Minor and Egypt could serve perfectly well as compensation for Italy. We are perfectly convinced that this Italian policy of extortion is not in the least agreeable to the Triple Entente and that the latter would agree only against its will to such compensation extorted by force. We are also persuaded that Italy would one day bitterly regret it. But it is only right and just that he who be-

¹ Marriott, J. A. R., *The Problem of the Adriatic, The Nineteenth Century and After*, Vol. LXXVIII, p. 1326.

lieves that he must grant compensation should take it out of his own property.”²

After the entrance of the United States into the war, the Jugoslavs placed their hopes on the fact that this country was in no way bound by the Treaty. The Croat newspaper, *Hrvatska-Drzava* (The Croatian State) for August 29, 1918, made the following comment: “The controversy between the Italian press and the Italian Foreign Minister, Sonnino, has revealed an interesting fact. In consequence of the policy adopted by its Foreign Minister, Italy has lost the good-will of Wilson and America. . . . Italy, in the circle of her democratic allies, is not considered very reliable owing to her imperialistic tendencies. American democracy objects to Italian imperialism, and looking facts in the face, it is easy to guess who will be master. The force of democracy and the rights of the belligerent peoples will vanquish Italian imperialism also. Sonnino ought to revise his programme or to retire and leave foreign affairs in the hands of capable men, able to adapt themselves to the spirit of the time and to the watchword of Italy’s allies, who are fighting for the liberty of small nations. The force of democracy is irresistible.”³

Southern Slav aspirations for unity call for the union of Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the eastern portion of Istria, the Slovene territory in Carniola, Carinthia and Styria, the Serb section of the Banat, and the present kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro. The territory in dispute between Italy and the Jugoslavs is in the former Austrian provinces of Gorizia-Gradisca, Trieste, Carniola, Istria, Fiume, and Dalmatia. The total number of Italians in Austria-Hungary was, according to the last census (1910), 768,000. Of these, 390,000 live in the Trentino. The remainder of the Italians in the Dual Monarchy were distributed at that date as follows: in Gorizia-

² Quoted by Stoddard, T. L., “Present Day Europe,” pp. 230-231.

³ Quoted by “New Europe,” Vol. IX, p. 48.

Gradisca, 90,119 out of a total population of 299,658 (30 per cent. as against 155,039, or 51 per cent. Slovenes); in Trieste, 118,959, out of a total of 190,803 (62 per cent. as against 59,974, or 31 per cent., Slovenes); in Istria, 145,517 out of a total of 382,652 (37 per cent., as against 224,400 or 58 per cent., Croats and Slovenes); and in Dalmatia, 18,028 out of a population of 663,778 (3 per cent. as against 612,669 or 94 per cent., Croats and Serbs).⁴

The Austrian figures are criticised by the Italians, who claim that it was the policy of Austria to suppress the Italian nationality and that the census figures are not correct, that they favour the Jugoslavs and do not give a correct relation between the number of Italians and the number of Jugoslavs. In Dalmatia, even at the beginning of the eighteenth century, Venetian documents show a conflict between a Slav majority and a numerically insignificant Italian minority. In 1833, when the municipalities were all in the hands of the Italians, the population was reckoned at 360,000 Serbo-Croats, 16,000 Italians, 882 Albanians and 510 Jews. In 1868, Niccolo Tommaseo, the Italian patriot, accepted as correct the estimate of 20,000 Italians as against 400,000 Slavs. It is true that, after the loss of Venetia in 1866, Austria did not have the same reason for encouraging the Italians in Dalmatia, whom she had used as officials in Venetia, but there is no evidence that a policy was adopted of suppressing the Italians for the benefit of the Slavs. Austrian policy has been rather to play one off against the other than to favor either at the expense of the other.⁵ In Dalmatia, all the leading Croat municipalities were dissolved early in the war but, even after Italy's entry into the war, the Italian municipality of Zadar (Zara) remained unsuspended. Professor Salvemini does not accept the Austrian census as entirely correct. On the basis of the votes cast at elections held in Dalmatia, he figures that

⁴ Seton-Watson, R. W., "The Balkans, Italy and the Adriatic," p. 56.

⁵ Seton-Watson, *op. cit.*, pp. 65-67.

there must be some 45,000 Italians in that province, comprising some 8 per cent. of the population, rather than the 3 per cent. given by the census. But he says that even his corrected figures show the Italians in Dalmatia to be but "a weak minority scattered in little groups in the midst of an ocean of Slavs," and, moreover, one-third of the Italians in Dalmatia are concentrated in the town of Zara.⁶ Giotto Danielli, Professor of Geography at the University of Pisa, it is claimed, "has been able to prove by reports and data deducted from the same Austrian census papers, that the Italians in Dalmatia number well above 80,000."⁷ "Adriacus" contends that the Morlachs of Dalmatia are not Slavs but belong to the ancient Illyrian Latinized population and have only during the past two centuries adopted Slav dialects; also that the 100,000 Italian speaking inhabitants of Dalmatian towns are really of the Italian race.⁸ The Jugoslavs point to the fact that Italian is spoken all around the Adriatic and often by people not even claimed by the Italians. The "Encyclopædia Britannica" treats the Morlachs as Slavic in origin.

In the Memorandum on Dalmatia presented to the Peace Conference by the Yugoslav delegation, the following references were made to the question of population. "Already forty years before the present world war, the Jugoslavs, by their own efforts and contrary to the intentions of the Austrian Government, became masters of all the autonomous institutions of the province. Of the 86 municipal councils existing in Dalmatia, 85 are Slav and one only, that of Zara, is Italian. And even that one would have fallen into the hands of the Slavs if the Austrian Government had permitted the adoption of universal suffrage. Of the 41 deputies of the Dalmatian Diet, 6 only were Italian, all elected in the town of Zara on account of the old system of voting,

⁶ Salvemini, G., "Italy and the Southern Slavs," *Quarterly Review* (London), Vol. CCXXIX, p. 192.

⁷ "Adriacus," "From Trieste to Valona," p. 18.

⁸ "Adriacus," *op. cit.*, pp. 20, 21.

while the remaining 35 were Serbo-Croats. All the deputies to the Parliament of Vienna, eleven in number, elected by universal suffrage, were Serbo-Croats. . . .

"In 1851, when the political power was exclusively in the hands of the Italians, the returns gave 378,676 Slavs and 14,645 Italians. In 1857, when the Government was still favorable to the Italians and the latter were in power in Dalmatia, the statistics gave 415,628 Slavs and 16,000 Italians. The population speaking Italian therefore always remains in a proportion of 3 to 4 per cent. That it does not increase in the same proportion as the Jugoslavs is due to the fact that it is exclusively urban, being composed of people belonging to the lower and middle class and not including any inhabitants in the country. . . .

"The ethnical character of the town of Zara itself does not differ in any way from other Dalmatian towns. . . . Today Zara is a little town of functionaries, the last bulwark of an Italian bureaucracy in a purely Slav country. Having been under the Venetian and Austrian dominations the capital of the province, it is the headquarters of the greatest number of Italianized functionaries, who, with their families and their dependents, constitute the majority of the population. But this majority is limited to the urban part of Zara, to the town alone, without the suburbs or environs, for if one considers the entire community of Zara it is found that the Slavs are in a proportion of 3 to 1 Italian, and in the district of Zara this proportion is 7 to 1. . . .

"Dalmatia is the purest Slav country and five centuries of foreign domination could not denationalize it; its conscience of being Slav is a more living force than in any region in the Balkans. The Dalmatian Diet, at the opening of each new session, has never failed to demand, in a special and solemn address, the union of Dalmatia with Croatia. Let Dalmatia be given the possibility of freely expressing its sentiments and it is more than certain that it will af-

firm, by an almost unanimous vote, her desire to be reunited to the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes."

In the Upper Adriatic, the territory to which both Italy and the Jugoslavs present claims includes the region known variously under the names of Küstelband, Küstenland, Julian Veneto, Venezia Giulia and the Littorale, covering the six provinces of Austria-Hungary: 1, the basin of the Isonzo known as the "Principality of Gorizia and Gradisca"; 2, Trieste and its district forming a province; 3, the Istrian peninsula with the Quarnero Islands constituting the "Istrian Margravate"; 4, the greater part of the Inner Carso joined to Carniola; 5, the town of Fiume with the surrounding district; 6, the triangle between Fiume, the Polizza Pass and the Rock of St. Mark governed as part of Croatia.⁹ The Austrian census of 1910 gives the population of this whole region as 437,385 Slavs and 356,495 Italians. It is possible to some extent to separate the two races in this territory. The district of Gorizia-Gradisca included 154,750 Slavs and 90,119 Italians. Within this district, the southwest is compactly Italian both in the towns and in the rural sections. The right bank of the river Isonzo is purely Italian, as is also a strip on the left bank as far as Monfalcone. The northeast districts, with the exception of the town of Gorizia, are Slav. The town of Gorizia contains 14,000 Italians and 11,000 Slavs and is Italian in character but eastward from the suburbs the population is Slovene without even an Italian minority of any size. If the town is included in Italian territory, the Slovenes to the northeast will be deprived of their commercial and administrative centre, while if it is incorporated in the new Yugoslav State, the Italian population to the southwest will be deprived of their centre.

The city of Trieste has been under the Habsburgs since 1386 but has retained its Italian character. In addition to having 62 per cent. of its permanent population Italian,

⁹"Italian Claims on the Alps and in the Adriatic," pp. 7, 8.

there are Italian immigrants coming into Trieste. Inside the municipality, there is a strong minority of Slavs, making up some 25 to 30 per cent. of the population, and just outside the suburbs one enters purely Slovene territory. The census taken in 1910 by the Italian municipal authorities of Trieste found the Italian population to be 74 per cent. of the whole rather than 63 per cent. as in the Austrian census.¹⁰ This census gave the Slavs 60,074 but Vosnjak claims that, on the basis of election returns, there must be 66,000 Slavs in Trieste.¹¹

Istria presents a less difficult problem than some of the other districts. It is not impossible to draw a line through Istria in such a way that only small minorities will be left on the wrong side.^{11a} In the whole of Istria, there are 223,000 Slavs (168,000 Serbo-Croats and 55,000 Slovenes) and 147,000 Italians. The eastern side of Istria beyond the Vena Mountains and Monte Maggiore, and including the district of Volosca, is overwhelmingly Slav, there being 135,290 Croats and Slovenes and 6,686 Italians. In the district of Volosca itself, there are 47,700 Slavs and 955 Italians. In Western Istria Italians and Slavs are more intermingled, though the Italians are rather concentrated in the towns while the Slavs form the bulk of the rural population. In this western district, there are 129,903 Italians and 58,373 Croats and Slovenes. The towns of Western Istria are predominantly Italian. On the eastern coast, the Slavs predominate in Abbazia, in Pazin and in a few other towns. The rural districts of the interior are Slav. The ancient boundary of Italy under Augustus, running from the estuary of the Arsa northward through Istria, practically follows the racial division. Of the islands, Lussin alone has an Italian majority, there being 7,588 Italians on the island and

¹⁰ Salvemini, G., *op. cit.*, p. 181.

¹¹ Vosnjak, B., "A Bulwark Against Germany," p. 140.

^{11a} Seton-Watson, "The Balkans and the Adriatic," pp. 58, 59.

4,380 Croats. This island is a necessary protection to Pola, which is an Italian town.

The Jugoslavs claim that the elections of 1911 and 1914, under the universal suffrage law of 1907, have contradicted the figures of the Austrian census of 1910 both for Pola and for the whole of Istria. Further, as to Pola (29,000 Italians and 13,000 Slavs by the census of 1910), it is said that the population has been increased from 1076 in 1841 to its present size largely by the artificial stimulation of its being an Austrian naval base and that, with the removal of this activity, Pola will lose its transient population and become as unimportant commercially as the other towns of Western Istria. The first elections held under the universal suffrage law of 1907 gave the Slav candidates majorities in all of Eastern and Central Istria. In the district of Parenzo-Rovigno-Montona, the Italian candidate was elected by only 620 majority (6424 to 5804 for the Slav candidate); in the Pola district, the vote was 3,332 for the Italian candidate and 3,190 for the Slav candidate.¹²

The town proper of Fiume contains 24,212 Italians and 15,687 Slavs. If we include the suburb of Susak across the narrow river, the population is made up of 25,781 Italians, 26,602 Slavs and some 10,000 Magyars, Germans and foreigners. The surrounding country is purely Croat. The question of Fiume will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.

While the extremists among the Jugoslavs have claimed Trieste and Istria, it has seemed certain that Trieste and a large part of Istria would be assigned to Italy by the Peace Treaty. A number of Slavs will necessarily be included in Italian territory but Italy will have a satisfactory line of military defence, which will relieve a certain section of public opinion in Italy, and, if there are guarantees for the Slavs of cultural liberty and equality before the law and the right to commercial transit free from custom duties

¹² *La Serbie*, April 24, 1919.

through the port of Trieste for the inhabitants of the back country, there should be no great difficulty in Italy's taking over this territory.

The Italians claim that Julian Venetia is essentially an economic and geographic entity; that the most important centres, Gorizia, Trieste, Pola and Fiume, as well as the towns and minor boroughs and extensive rural districts connected therewith, are overwhelmingly and incontestably Italian and lead the moral and material life of this whole region; therefore, "Italy's claim to the possession of the whole region must be recognized, not only for the higher reason of her eastern defence, and for those of history and civilization, but also and more especially by reason of the economic laws of the country and the well-being of its population, without distinction of nationality. . . . The natural outlets of the Slavified mountain zones (which moreover are not densely populated) are the Venetian Friulian plain, and the Italian ports of Julian Venetia, from Trieste to Fiume. These zones, which are now mainly inhabited by Slavs, were to belong to a state other than ours, they would become centres of anti-Italian agitation, they would inevitably press towards the sea and, supported also by the Slovene and Croatian hinterland, might exercise a vigorous and threatening pressure on our frontier territories, keeping them in a state of continuous agitation and the two bordering States in a condition of perpetual tension." By wise treatment of those Slavs within Italian limits, Italy feels that she can and will avoid creating a Slav irredentism.

In view of the economic and geographic indivisibility of Julian Venetia, and of Italy's need for the Julian Alps as a defensive boundary, the argument continues, "the strength of Italy's claims cannot be prejudiced by the number of inhabitants of other language who are to be found either scattered as a minority among the Italian population in some parts, or even actually in the majority in certain outlying corners of the territory." Whatever the actual population,

the Italians dominate the political life of Julian Venetia, as is shown by the fact that an Italian population of 44 per cent. in the provinces of Trieste, Gorizia-Gradisca and Istria control the local administrations in communes aggregating 70 per cent. of the population of all Julian Venetia, though there are 32 per cent. Slovenes and 20 per cent. Croats in these provinces. And the Italian statement adds that this is true in spite of Austrian discrimination against Italians and in favor of Slavs.¹³

Dr. Trumbić, in his statement to the Peace Conference in February, contended that the mountainous part of the province of Gorizia-Gradisca, east and north of the Cormons-Gradisca-Monfalcone line, contained 148,500 Slovenes and 17,000 Italians, of whom 14,000 live in the town of Gorizia, where they form half the population. Trieste he recognized as having a population two-thirds Italian but he demanded it for Yugoslavia, because it is surrounded by a great Slovene hinterland furnishing a third of its commerce and is separated from Italy by 20 kilometers of Slav coast. On account of the population of 223,318 Jugoslavs to 147,417 Italians in Istria, of the territorial connection of the Istrian peninsula with Carniola and Croatia, and of its separation from Italy by the Adriatic, he claims Istria for Yugoslavia.¹⁴ From the economic point of view, the Jugoslavs state, "No economic interest binds Istria to Italy. Istria is a poor country. Wine is the only export product worthy of mention. Italy, with its own wine production, would render impossible the sale of Istrian wine and would thus lead to the economic ruin of the country" (if Istria were included within Italian territory).¹⁵

In the case of Dalmatia, the Italians rest their claim largely on the ground that the culture of Dalmatia is Italian and that it was under Venetian rule. It is true that

¹³ "The Italian Claims on the Alps and in the Adriatic," pp. 9, 10.

¹⁴ *Christian Science Monitor*, May 31, 1919.

¹⁵ *La Serbie*, April 24, 1919.

Rome and Venice had much influence in developing the culture of Dalmatia but, for a thousand years, Dalmatia has been Slav. The ancient Slavonic liturgy known as the Glagolitic rite has been sung uninterruptedly for ten centuries in many of the islands and in parts of the mainland of Northern Dalmatia. Slavonic philologists today go to Krk (Veglia), Cherso, and Istria for early Slav in its purest linguistic form. The coast was hotly contested between Venice and Hungary before Venice became mistress of the Adriatic. Venice confined herself to maintaining outposts for the fleet in Dalmatia, to safeguard the trade against the Turks and the pirates. She never regarded the land in any other light but that of a colony to be exploited. The bare hills of the country today stand witness to the deforestation carried on under the Venetian régime. There were compensations for the rule of Venice, however, in the cultural advance made under her administration but it must be remembered that the churches and other art relics in Dalmatia were the work of Slav artists, even if they owed their inspiration to Venetian masters, and that these relics show the influence of Byzantium as well as of Venice.¹⁶ The cultural influence of Italy was really international during the Middle Ages and Italy would be entitled to half of Europe on this ground. The same is true of Roman influence. It was as strong in Spain as in Dalmatia or stronger. The truth is that there is not much weight to be placed on remote historical facts that have left such slight and shadowy effects on the present inhabitants of the disputed lands. It is the people of today who must be thought of and consulted.

Though the towns in Dalmatia came more and more under Italian influence, the peasants were always Slav. Tommaseo, a native of Sibenik (Sebenico), wrote in 1855, "Dalmatia, while loving Italian rule and Italian culture, was not forgetful of its duties to itself; it retained its own spirit,

¹⁶ Seton-Watson, *op. cit.*, pp. 61, 62.

its own customs, costume, language; it preserved its Slav character better than Italy its Italian.”¹⁷ Mazzini, Foscolo, Carducci, have always been models for the leaders in Dalmatia but these same leaders have realized that Dalmatia cannot exist without its hinterland. Mr. Ziliotti, leader of the Italian party, made a public declaration to this effect in the Diet of Zadar (Zara) in 1896. “We, cut off from Italy by the entire Adriatic, we few thousands scattered within territorial continuity among a population, not of hundreds of thousands, but of millions of Slavs, how could we think of an union with Italy?”¹⁸ The genesis of the so-called Autonomist party, which was the germ of the modern Italian party in the Diet, was due on the one hand, to a movement of the established burghers and patricians of the towns against the demands of the peasants for a share in political life, and, on the other hand, to a movement against Yugoslav unity, the families in power fearing lest they should lose their power and oligarchic privileges if Dalmatia should be united with Croatia. After 1903, this feeling of provincialism began to yield to a sense of unity and kinship with the Slavs of the other districts and provinces and, from that time, Austrian authorities have been active in deliberately playing off Italian and Slav.¹⁹

Professor Salvemini sums up the present situation in Dalmatia in these words: ²⁰ “The Slav population in Dalmatia has its own ruling class, which is three times more numerous than the Italian ruling class; it has its own schools, its own newspapers, its own political and economic organizations; it administered, before the war, the provincial Diet and all the communes of the region, except that of Zara; its high culture, in comparison with the Slav populations of Bosnia-Herzegovina—and it is a superiority due to Italian influence—has strongly accentuated its national sentiment,

¹⁷ Quoted by “New Europe,” Vol. IX, p. 67.

¹⁸ Quoted by Seton-Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

²⁰ Salvemini, *op. cit.*, p. 193.

and, even admitting that the Austrian Government may have in the past helped to arouse this sentiment and to exasperate it against the Italians, there cannot exist to-day in Italy a single reasonable person, acquainted with the real state of things, who can believe that Italy would be able to denationalise this region and bring back the good old times when it was regarded as a colony of the Venetian Republic.

"The only fair and equitable solution of the Dalmatian problem is that Italy should recognise the right of the enormous Slav majority in this region to join itself to the Southern-Slav nation. In admitting this, Italy would do no more and no less than remain faithful to the traditions of her own national *Risorgimento*." Professor Salvemini insists that, under these conditions, the rights of the Italian minority must be guaranteed and that Zara, with its Italian majority, might have an autonomous constitution.

The Italians argue against placing the districts of Istria and Dalmatia and the city of Trieste under different nations because "a considerable share of the traffic of Trieste comes from Istria and Dalmatia. In 1913, the tonnage that entered the port of Trieste on board merchant ships was 5,480,074, of which 2,014,200 came from Istria and Dalmatia; that which cleared it (Trieste) 5,775,445, of which 2,015,200 bound for Istria and Dalmatia."²¹ As to the volume of this traffic, it is said, "At first sight, one might be inclined to think the break-up of the Central Empires, and the political barriers that will intervene between Trieste and its hinterland, would bring about a falling-off in the stream of traffic up the Adriatic. We shall show that this could only happen in case of an unwise custom-house policy on the part of Italy."²² It is pointed out that economically Dalmatia would gain through union with Italy. "We

²¹ Alberti, Mario, "Trieste e la sua fisiologia economica," p. 9. Quoted by Adriacus, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

²² "Adriacus," *op. cit.*, p. 50.

have already seen how this province (Dalmatia) depends economically from Trieste and Fiume, and how these two harbors would greatly lose their importance if a Custom-house barrier was to cut them off from Dalmatia. Neither is it likely that this eminently maritime country might become economically dependent from the remnant Balkania. . . . As a country bound to live on importation, she will always be dependent from the sea, and it is thus obvious what damage would befall her if she were not united to the nation in possession of Trieste and Fiume, while she would greatly improve on her ante-bellum condition, were she united to Italy together with the aforesaid harbors, thus abolishing the custom-house barrier, which greatly weighed on her relations with Bari, Ancona and Venice.”²³ The declaration is made that the possession of Dalmatia would not be a great economic advantage for Yugoslavia. The possession of Dalmatia, instead of close trade relations with Italy (“whose produce she needs and where she could have exported timber, cement, coal, etc.”), would not represent for Yugoslavia the great benefit she pretends. This coastal region could give her nothing she does not already possess, except perhaps cement. Owing to the difficult communications, her natural harbours on the Adriatic must be in the North those situated on the Morlacca Canal, in the South, the mouth of the Narenta and Ragusa, Cattaro, Antivari, Dulcigno and at the farthest Durazzo. In no case Sebenico, Spalato and Zara.

“As a Custom-house barrier will have to exist between Jugo-Slavia and Italy, it is of no consequence whether it is established on the coast or on the Dinaric watershed.”²⁴

The Yugoslavs deny that Dalmatia’s natural economic connection is with Italy. In the Memorandum on Dalmatia presented to the Peace Conference, they elaborated this point as follows: “The annexation of Dalmatia by a foreign

²³ “Adriacus,” *op. cit.*, pp. 59-60.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

State would certainly entail for it an economic decadence and would create an incurable wound in the organization of our State. The eastern coast, rocky and poor, does not possess the conditions for an independent economic life. Its natural function is to be the outlet of the rich plains of the valleys of the Danube, the Save, the Bosna and the Morava to the sea, and it is from these countries that it ought to live. Separated from the rest of our country Dalmatia could not lead a normal life, as is demonstrated by the five centuries of her history under the Venetian and Austrian dominations. Dalmatia, if within Italian boundaries, could not trade on equal terms with Italy because her principal export products of oil and wine could not compete with Italian oil and wine. On the contrary, in our State, Dalmatia would sell her produce at advantageous prices and would buy foodstuffs of prime necessity cheaper than elsewhere, the importations and exportations being naturally and justly balanced.

“Under foreign domination the ports of Dalmatia could not pretend to become ports of transit for the commerce with the hinterland. On the contrary, if they belonged to our State, they would undergo a great development as ports of exportation for the natural riches of the adjacent Jugoslav countries.”

In entering the war, Italy had the desire, not only to complete her national unity, but to insure a safe strategic frontier in the Alps and real security in the Adriatic. The Treaty of London had this object in view. Since it was signed, the Revolution has changed the foreign policy of Russia; Austria has disappeared as a great power; and further, the submarine has revolutionized naval warfare. Naval bases are less important than they were in 1914. Pola has proven of small value to Austria in this war on account of the superiority of the Allied fleet in the Adriatic and in the Mediterranean. Instead of a powerful empire of 52 million facing her, Italy now has for a neighbour a

state of some 12 million; and, whereas Austria had a fleet, Yugoslavia has none and can be prevented from developing one. Professor Salvemini, a leader of the party believing in Italo-Yugoslav friendships, wrote, when Italy was still a neutral: "We cannot prevent Austria from having a fleet, because she already possesses one. But the Serbia of tomorrow we must prevent from having one, both in her own interest and in ours; and we can take advantage of this moment, which will never recur in history, to exclude from the Adriatic Austria, which has a fleet, and to substitute for her a new state which has no fleet, and which we can prevent from creating one."²⁵

In presenting their claims to the Peace Conference, the Italians summed up the strategic argument in these words: "On the Eastern Coast of the Adriatic a magnificent advance barrier of rocks and islands protects the mainland and with it the coastal line of communication. On the Western coast is a low-lying beach, undefended and exposed to aggression of all kinds.

"On the east side there is the possibility of sheltered navigation, no matter from what direction the wind may blow; on our side there is a complete lack of every kind of refuge, and risky sailing whenever the weather is bad. On the eastern coast, wide recesses and the possibility of casting anchor anywhere; on the west, a lack of anchorages and difficulty of call and refuge.

"On the Dalmatian coast high ground offers excellent observation posts which command the wide surrounding horizon; on the Italian coast, on the other hand, low-lying ground and (with the exception of the Gargano and the Concro) no possibility of observing the waters from a height.

"It is clear that a power having exclusive sway over the central tract of the Dalmatian coast from Zara to Spalato,

²⁵ Quoted by "New Europe," Vol. IX, p. 272.

with the military port of Sebenico and the Islands, would be free to come out at any moment and give battle.

"The Italian fleet, speeding up partly from Venice and partly from Brindisi, would infallibly find itself exposed to fight with only half of its forces against the entire enemy fleet, and to the possibility of being beaten separately before having a chance to join up its forces.

"Dalmatia if all in the hands of one Power represents a danger to Italy; a portion of Dalmatia in possession of Italy, especially within the modest limits to which Italian aspirations are confined, represents a danger to no one.

"The present war has proved this. . . . In order to avoid remaining in a state of permanent and absolute inferiority, Italy is, therefore, entitled to ask that, in accordance with what has been set forth above, the coast and islands of the Adriatic which will be allotted to others, shall be neutralised; that all fortifications, either on land or sea, should be forbidden and all existing ones dismantled.

"As to the zone comprised between Zara and Sebenico, its configuration is such that no form of neutralisation could possibly prevent its being transformed in a few hours into a first rate naval base by the sudden resort to the latest means of warfare such as mines, submarines, etc., which would make that coast impregnable. Only by having it in her possession could Italy guarantee her safety."²⁶

It has been pointed out often that Italy does not need the whole or even part of the mainland of Dalmatia to secure her safety in the Adriatic. It is true that the Italian coast is flat, with few good harbors and none of strategic value, and that the railway from Rimini to Termoli is exposed to bombardment from the sea and cannot be moved inland on account of the Apennines, while the opposite shore of the Adriatic is a series of splendid harbors, with a fringe of islands affording a safe inside passage and a roadstead, where a whole fleet could lie hidden in safety.

²⁶ "The Italian Claims on the Alps and in the Adriatic," pp. 13, 14.

One suggestion has been that the whole eastern coast of the Adriatic should be neutralised from Trieste to Bojana. This, if carried out under the guarantee of the League of Nations, would relieve Italy of all anxiety of a strategic nature. There is not much opposition to granting Italy the five keys to the Adriatic. With Trieste and Pola, Lussinpiccola, which covers the back of Pola and commands the entrance to the Quarnero and to the port of Fiume, Lissa, and Valona which controls the Straits of Otranto, Italy would be in a position to control the Adriatic. Certain sections of Italian public opinion hold that Italy needs these bases, even if Jugoslavia has no navy, because there are other fleets which might enter the Adriatic and Italy must be in a position to protect herself. If Italy held Valona, she would control the entrance to the Adriatic and would not need other bases for this purpose of keeping out enemy fleets. We already have one good example of an inland sea bordering upon two countries upon which there are no vessels of war nor fortifications. For the last hundred years, ever since the agreement between Great Britain and the United States made after the War of 1812, the only armed ships on the Great Lakes have been revenue cutters.

The Jugoslavs consider "as strategic bridgeheads" any points or islands on the eastern coast of the Adriatic occupied by any other power. Such positions would really be, not defensive, but offensive fortresses from their point of view. In their Memorandum to the Peace Conference, they point out that determination to dominate the Balkans actuated Roman and later Venetian occupation of the eastern coast of the Adriatic; and "it is still what those desire to realize who today claim for Italy a part of the eastern littorale and invoke the necessity of protecting the Italian coast." The strategic advantages that will result to them from the possession of what they regard as their own coast and islands, they say, is necessary to balance the economic preponderance of Italy in men and natural resources and

thus to prevent the Adriatic from becoming an Italian lake.

The boundary line laid down by the Secret Treaty was not that advised by the Italian military and naval experts but was put through by the Imperialists. Many feel that Italy, by occupying Dalmatia, would be weakening rather than strengthening herself. For example, Professor Ferrero writes:²⁷ "The Italians must reduce annexation on the eastern coast to the minimum amount required by strategic considerations; the Slavs must give such pledges as will leave no opening for treachery and respect as far as possible the national rights of those Italians living in parts of the Adriatic coast not annexed to Italy;" but he considers that it would be "a disadvantage for Italy to have to defend a long line of frontier a few dozen kilometres from the coast, behind a vast hinterland seething with discontent at being cut off from the sea." Professor Salvemini points to Roman occupation of Dalmatia and to the lesson Italy might draw from it.²⁸ "Rome having occupied the Dalmatian Coast to safeguard Adriatic commerce against the pirates, had, under Augustus, to occupy the hinterland as far as the Danube, to safeguard Dalmatia. When the Slavs occupied the basin of the Save, Dalmatia also was lost for the Empire. The Venetians, who occupied the coast, were long troubled in their possession by Slavs, Magyars and Turks. And Austria, when mistress of Dalmatia, had, in her turn, to occupy Bosnia. Does Italy wish to submit to the same necessity?" Harbors alone do not give command of the sea. There must be a producing population and industry back of the harbors and, above all, good will.

The future of Trieste and of Fiume raises the whole question of the economic access of landlocked territories to the sea and of the establishment of a special international status for certain harbors and railways. These two ports are the sole outlets to the south for a large part of Central Eu-

²⁷ Ferrero, G., *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. CXX, p. 65.

²⁸ "La Questione dell' Adriatico," p. 167.

rope. Some of the Yugoslav leaders claim that Italy wants Trieste in order to tax the commerce of German-Austria and of Czecho-Slovakia, and that she wants Fiume simply to kill it as a port, so that there may be no competition with Trieste.²⁹ Italy remembers how Austria-Hungary used the better position of Trieste and Fiume to divert trade from Venice. Austria, after ceding Venetia to Italy, developed Trieste to a great extent and made it second to no Mediterranean port except Genoa and Marseilles. Fiume was founded for Hungary. Germany used Trieste in her *Drang nach Osten*. Thus Trieste and Fiume had powerful backing and most favorable location, "so that, with the attraction of an immense hinterland, these two ports absorbed the bulk of the Levantine trade to the exclusion of Italy, powerless to compete with such formidable rivals."³⁰ Germany had capital; Italy was dependent upon Germany and upon other nations for the development of her own internal resources and certainly could not successfully oppose Germany and Austria-Hungary in the eastern Mediterranean. "So Italy, who at one time owned the absolute monopoly of Levantine trade, so much so that her language and dialects echoed along all the shores of the Eastern Mediterranean, now found herself completely shut out from these ports and obliged to turn her energies towards western traffic, where the field was already occupied by more advanced and more powerful nations than herself, without being able to overcome their redoubtable competition."³¹

The annexation of Trieste by Italy has not been questioned by the Peace Conference and the majority of Yugoslavs have not opposed it at all vigorously. However, some feel that it should be a free city in order to guard the economic interests of the hinterland and of Trieste itself.

²⁹ Savić, V. R., *Montreal Gazette*, Feb. 15, 1919.

³⁰ "Adriacus," *op. cit.*, p. 43.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

Others would go further and make Trieste and that part of Istria which cannot be detached from it an independent entity. The claim is made that not all the people in Trieste want union with Italy, that Italian sympathies are mostly found among the intellectuals, who see a sentimental value in annexation to Italy. But "Trieste is a commercial town and its pillars are business men and workers. For them, economic values have a great importance, and they know that the annexation to Italy, pure and simple, means the economic ruin of the town. The arbiter of the destinies of a harbor is its commercial hinterland. And this hinterland, as for Trieste is not Italy. . . . The only possible solution is, therefore, the constitution of Trieste and Istria, which cannot be detached from Trieste, as an independent State. This is not only my opinion but it is the opinion of the majority of Italians of Trieste who have at heart the destiny of the city. Proof thereof is that the Chamber of Commerce of Trieste, whose overwhelming majority are Triestins of Italian sentiments, has recently sent a memorandum to Rome in favor of the constitution of such an independent State. The Italian Government and its agents in America did not care to give publicity to this important document."³² However, as things now stand, it seems certain that Trieste will be included in Italy and that the inhabitants of Trieste are not opposed to this action.

What economic gains would accrue to Italy from the possession of the Adriatic coasts? Before 1915, there was a decidedly friendly feeling between Italy and Serbia, especially after the economic war between Serbia and Austria. Serbia looked upon Italy as a nation which had recently won its unity and therefore had much in common with the Jugoslavs. Even today the leaders in Jugoslavia are anxious for the friendship of Italy and recognize its great value to them. This is expressed in an interview with Pribičević, Vice President of the Zagreb Council, published by the

³² Letter from F. Giovanelli, *New York Times*, March 16, 1919.

Secolo, December 3, 1918.³³ "We ardently desire to live in the best of friendships with the Italians, whose culture we admire. But we cannot forget that Dalmatia is Slav, that Fiume is the lung of Jugoslavia, and that by ethnographical, geographical and historical right, Dalmatia and Fiume fall to Jugoslavia. We shall have the greatest respect for the Italian minorities who must inevitably find themselves included in our territory. Zara and Fiume will enjoy all liberty of culture and municipal autonomy. And we are convinced that an equal treatment will be accorded to the Slav minorities which will inevitably be included in your territory. We understand and perfectly recognise your right to Trieste and to Pola, and we would that in Italy our right to Dalmatia and to Fiume were recognised with the same justice. Among us, there are a few Imperialists who would like Trieste and Pola, but the Yugoslav National Council will not let itself be turned aside by Imperialistic infatuations. For us, Trieste and Pola belong *de facto* and *de jure* to Italy, and we are sure that Italy will accord all liberties to the Slav populations which will find themselves included in the territory, just as we shall accord the greatest liberties to the Italian populations which will find themselves in the territory of Jugoslavia."

The fullest economic development of the Jugoslavs is possible only if their whole territory becomes an economic and political entity. The various provinces are economically interdependent. During the Middle Ages, before the different districts fell under distinct political systems, there was a fairly active commercial life. The coast, especially Dalmatia, was highly developed. There were regular trade routes connecting the coast and the interior. Venice was the chief centre of this trade. Raw materials such as grain, cattle, timber, were exported and salt, arms, textiles and manufactured goods imported. The western Yugoslav countries and the Morava district maintained a trade connec-

³³ Quoted by "New Europe," Vol. IX, p. 285.

tion with Italy through Ragusa until the end of the eighteenth century. But, under foreign rule, this trade dwindled away. Austria and Hungary have paid no heed to advancing the economic development of the country and the railroads have been built to benefit the Magyars or the Germans. Lines of local interest have been very little developed. All imported manufactured goods had to come from Austria or Hungary. Fiume, alone of the Adriatic ports, has direct railway connection with the Southern Slav countries and then, of course, only with the northern districts. There are no standard gauge lines connecting the ports of Dalmatia with the interior.

The existing railways connect Fiume, Zagreb, Belgrade; and Belgrade, Nish, Salonica. There are practicable routes across the mountains between the interior and Dalmatia. Already Dubrovnik (Ragusa) is connected with the interior by a narrow gauge running up the Narenta Valley to Sarajevo and thence connected with the Fiume-Belgrade line. The gap between Uzice and Visegrad, which represents a difficult engineering feat, prevents a connection with the Belgrade-Nish line and eastern Serbia. There are also short lines from Split (Spalato) to Šibenik (Sebenico) and from Split to Knin (Tenin) and a little beyond, at a smaller gauge, but these, of course, do not create a connection with the main Balkan railway line. This connection could be made, by the valley of the Una and by the Arzano pass and Bugojno, with the Bosnian railways in the interior. And, in time, a connection could be made further by the Danube-Adriatic line with Roumania and Russia. Magyar hostility has prevented the development of these routes in spite of the demands of the Dalmatian Diet. If Italy were to succeed in establishing her claims on the east coast of the Adriatic, railroads joining Croatia and Dalmatia would have to pass through Italian territory, with the danger of measures being taken which would shift the trade to an Italian Dalmatian port and away from the Yugoslav ports.

A great problem for the Southern Slavs is north and south communication along the coast. This can be effected only by sea. For this reason, if Italy were given the islands granted her in the Secret Treaty, she would have practically complete control over communication between the Yugoslav towns on the coast. It is so difficult to find practicable routes over the mountains because practically the whole of the territory inhabited by the Serbs and a large part of that inhabited by the Croats is watered by streams running from the mountains north, then east and eventually falling into the Danube. The Vardar is an exception, flowing into the *Ægean*, and this is what gives it such great strategic importance. The Croatians have a less mountainous country than the Serbs and have more easy access to the sea. These communication problems give Fiume its importance in the demands of the Yugoslavs. The Dalmatian ports have a potential value, but, until adequate railway facilities can be provided, Fiume must remain the outlet for the whole of Yugoslavia. The Croats, of course, could build a port at Buccari and, in the course of a decade, the whole problem could be changed. When the railways are completed, Spalato will probably become the chief port of Yugoslavia, but today Fiume is the only port with a broad gauge railway connection to the interior and it must always remain the chief Adriatic port for Zagreb, Budapest, Southern Hungary and Bohemia.

Railway building will be an important part of reconstruction in this region. Already lines extending over a thousand miles are being planned. The development of a cheap water route to Salonica would hasten the development of the mineral resources of the country. Such a route along the line Smederevo-Nish-Salonica by way of the Morava and the Vardar rivers is considered an early possibility. The opening of such a waterway would tend to lessen the importance of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus.³⁴

³⁴ Savić, V. R., "South-Eastern Europe," p. 229.

The foreign trade of Serbia and of the Austrian Jugoslav provinces was determined by the needs of Austria. By control and manipulation of railroad rates, Austria dictated the export trade. Practically only those raw materials could be exported of which Austria had need and only those parts of the country with good railroad connection with Austria, that is, the Slovene districts and parts of Croatia, could carry on even this export trade. Provinces like the southern part of Dalmatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, which lay away from the main lines of communication, experienced difficulty in exporting their raw materials. Serbia, too, has been economically dependent upon Austria. Cut off from the sea, her exports had to find a market in Austria, if at all. After the Balkan War, Austria prevented Serbia from getting an outlet on the Adriatic but the agreement with Greece allowed Serbia to use Salonica, and Serbia began to build up an export trade through that port. Italian merchants came to Serbia to buy grain and cattle and Italian manufactured goods were beginning to be imported in considerable quantities before the war. Austria had also prevented Serbia from finding an outlet via Bulgaria. In 1905, Serbia and Bulgaria concluded an economic agreement which was almost equivalent to a customs union. Austria refused to allow this agreement to go through. She closed her frontiers to imports from Serbia and, by diplomatic pressure, prevented the ratification of the agreement although it had already been voted by the Bulgarian Parliament. Before the war, Serbia and Roumania were also coming to an economic understanding, which seemed to promise well for both countries. There were also negotiations going on with Montenegro for a single army, a single foreign office and a customs union. In 1906, Austria and Germany discovered and checked a scheme between Russian and Italian interests for the construction from the Danube to the Adriatic of a railroad which would open the Balkans to commercial penetration from the north and east

and to the Italian trade through some Adriatic port.³⁵ There was a current of trade across the Adriatic from Ravenna, Ancona, Bari and Venice to the Slav ports but the lack of east and west railroads prevented Italian trade from penetrating far from the coast. Germany and Austria-Hungary, pursuing their settled purpose to drain for themselves all the resources of their neighbours and to connect by their own railroads with Turkey and Asia Minor and thus with the enormous resources of Asia and Africa, built in the Balkans only north and south lines to serve as joints in the feed pipe by which the Central Powers were to draw to themselves the economic strength of the East, links in the political chain by which the East was to be bound to Germany. German influence in Russia was exerted in favor of this longitudinal system.³⁶

Besides the question of communication, the new state of Jugoslavia will have many difficult economic problems to solve. The methods of holding land vary in the different provinces. In Bosnia, some 10,000 families own the land cultivated by some 112,000 families. These landowners, or begs, are chiefly Moslems, the old Bosnian nobility, who accepted the religion of the Turk. This land system has never been remodeled by Austria because she favoured the Moslem begs against the peasants. The natural resources of Bosnia have been exploited by Hungarian concessionaires and there have been many franchise scandals. Croatia and the Banat have a system of small peasant proprietors with a few large estates owned by the Magyars and the Catholic Church. Slavonia and Serbia both have systems of small peasant proprietors. But, in all cases, it will take capital to start agriculture anew. The stock has been requisitioned and driven off, and much of the farm machinery has been taken away. Better and more modern methods will have to be introduced.

³⁵ Ferrero, G., "Italy and the Adriatic," *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. CXX, p. 65.

³⁶ "Adriacus," *op. cit.*, pp. 45, 46, 47.

The natural resources of Jugoslavia are great and as yet undeveloped. They should furnish the basis for foreign trade and, once the country has achieved a settled government, foreign capital will be attracted. There is a fairly wide range of climate with resulting diversity in the agricultural products. Gorizia-Gradisca is a hilly country, supporting vineyards, orchards and mulberry plantations. In Istria, the coast district produces articles much like those of Italy, wine, olives, figs and melons, while, in the interior, cereals are the staple crops and there is also some cattle raising. Croatia and Slavonia are divided into sharply distinguished geographical regions. On the coast, fruits, olives and wine grapes are grown; back of this strip are the Karst Mountains, which are far from fertile, and, in the extreme east, a flat plain with considerable swamp. Many kinds of cereals, hemp, flax and potatoes are grown in the interior and horse-breeding is carried on to a considerable extent in Slavonia. Pigs also are raised in large numbers and there is dairy farming. In Styria, cattle raising and dairying are the chief occupations, good horses are produced and there are also considerable poultry and bee raising. In Carniola, only some 15 per cent. of the land is under cultivation and the crops do not suffice for the needs of the province. Large quantities of flax are grown and silk worms flourish in the warmer regions. Cattle breeding is well developed in Carinthia, whose horses have a good reputation. Here again only some 14 per cent. of the land is under cultivation. In Serbia, there is great possibility for the development of agriculture. Indian corn forms the principal crop. Pigs are raised in great numbers and also cattle. Flax and hemp are good crops. The cultivation of the sugar beet was introduced some twenty years ago and is proving a successful venture. There are great plum orchards, prunes being one of the principal exports. The plums are used also to distill a mild spirit. Bees are kept, the honey being consumed at home and the

wax exported. Silk worms are cultivated in some regions. The tobacco of Serbia, of the Banat, of Herzegovina and of Macedonia is considered especially good for cigarettes. Agriculture in Yugoslavia will be helped by the numerous cooperative societies, which get rid of the disadvantages of small holdings, enable the peasants to obtain credit and to work together. In 1910 there were 1,207 such societies among the Slovenes alone, 952 of them being purely Slovene.³⁷

The fertility of Dalmatia has been decreased by the deforestation of the mountains, which was carried on under the Venetian régime, but the olive, vine and the other fruit crops are still of value. Potatoes and beets are also grown in quantity. The cherries of Dalmatia form the basis of the famous Maraschino cordial. The fisheries and coral and sponge beds are the riches of Dalmatia.

The forests of Yugoslavia should prove a valuable asset. In Serbia, the oak and beech forests support great herds of swine. There are fine forests in Styria, Slavonia, Bosnia and Carniola. Dalmatia and the Banat lack forests. Much of this forest wealth has been wantonly and systematically destroyed by the Germans and Austrians.

The mineral wealth of the country has been very little developed. In Roman times and again under the merchant princes of Ragusa, silver, lead and iron were mined in Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Turkish occupation caused the mines to shut down and it was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that they were again worked. There were in operation before the war lead, zinc, gold and silver, antimony, copper and iron mines. The nickel, mercury, manganese, graphite, marble and sulphur deposits are practically undeveloped. In Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Banat, there are numerous mineral springs, which, when exploited, should rival the famous baths of Austria-Hungary. The richest coal and lignite deposits in Serbia are

³⁷ Vosnjak, B., *op. cit.*, p. 206.

found along the Morava and near the Danube. There is a valuable salt deposit at Dolnja Tuzla and, in the southern part of Herzegovina, asphalt and lignite are found. Croatia is poor in minerals and the richest deposits in Carniola, except the large mercury mine at Idria, are outside of the Yugoslav belt. Slavonia has rich coal beds. By Serbian law, the minerals belong to the state and there should be no question of their now being developed, not in the interests of a few concessionaires, but for the benefit of the state as a whole.

The Slovenes are more advanced economically than the other branches of the Jugoslavs. They have developed a middle class, who take an active part in business and have become an important factor in Trieste. There is also a class of small industrial owners and of industrial workers. The inexhaustible water power offers every chance for the development of manufactures. Lack of industrial enterprises has, however, caused the Slovenes to emigrate in large numbers, some going to Upper Styria to work in the mines and others going overseas. The large industries are almost all in foreign hands, only the smaller factories belonging to the Slovenes. Two great Czech banks have branches in Trieste and the Slav banks play an important rôle in the business there. The Ljubljanska Kreditna Banka and the Jadranska Banka in Trieste are both purely Slovene. There is not one great Italian bank in that city.³⁸ The so-called Slavization of Trieste is due to the economic development of the whole of southern Croatia and principally to the new Alpine railway, by which Trieste is more closely united with the hinterland than in times past.

Before the war, most of the capital invested in Trieste was German. Trieste has always played an important rôle in the *Drang nach Osten* and Germany has made every endeavour, and with increasing success, to gain an economic hold on Trieste. The Germans have developed the metal-

³⁸ Vosnjak, B., *op. cit.*, p. 154.

lurgic industries in Carinthia and iron and steel products, machinery and small arms, lead articles, wire cables and rails are manufactured in that district. A few of the manufacturing centres are in the Slovene country. In Carniola, industry is not so well developed, most of it still being, like the linen and lace industries, in the household stage of development. Croatia also has very few factories. There is little manufacturing in Serbia and the Serb does not seem to take as kindly to the factory as does the Slovene. Montenegro is almost without a factory. There is so little call for male labour that the problem of emigration had, before the war, become a serious one. The soil is largely unsuitable for cultivation with the present facilities and cattle raising is the only feasible occupation. The Montenegrins have been fighters by tradition and this spirit has been fostered by the Court so that commerce and trade in Montenegro is carried on by Serbs from Serbia. In recent years, efforts have been made to increase the cultivated areas with the hope of checking emigration. There is no native artisan class in Serbia. A large proportion of the artisans found there are Austro-Hungarians or gipsies. The chief industries are concerned with making up the native raw materials, meat packing, flour-milling, brewing, tanning, weaving and spinning of hemp, flax and wool. There are a few iron foundries, potteries, sugar refineries and tobacco factories. In 1910, there were not over sixty large establishments employing altogether not more than five thousand workmen.³⁹ The industry of Bosnia is insignificant, there being only a few sugar refineries.

Italy would gain little in an economic sense by the occupation of Dalmatia. Rather, she would sustain a loss. Dalmatia at present is not a prosperous country. The vineyards and olives are able to afford a scanty livelihood to the population as long as they are favored over Italian imports. But, if Dalmatia were drawn into the Italian

³⁹ "Encyclopædia Britannica," Servia.

tariff system, the process of depopulation through emigration, which was increasing before the war, would be accelerated and the country would become poorer. Given good connection with the interior, Dalmatian ports will become flourishing commercial centres but, if these ports are under Italian administration, the traffic from the interior will be diverted to Salonica and elsewhere. Instead of gaining trade, Italy will lose it. Italy lacks coal, certain minerals and cheap food. All these could be obtained readily and conveniently from a friendly Yugoslavia in return for manufactured goods. The Secret Treaty gives Italy two groups of islands and part of the mainland in such situations as to cut the coast of Yugoslavia into three parts. Further, the railway connecting Spalato with Knin would, according to the Treaty, run for a short distance through Italian territory, a situation fraught with the possibilities of much friction. Dalmatia has suffered enough from isolation under the Austrian régime but it would be still worse if it were divided from its hinterland by a tariff wall.

The economic expectations of Italy in the Balkans have been summed up as follows:⁴⁰ "The stream of traffic up the Adriatic will therefore continue to be what it was before the European conflict. It will even increase. . . .

"Commercial relations across the Adriatic, between Italy and Balkania must . . . awake to new and exuberant life. Apart from the trade always kept up between Dalmatia and Italian ports, stands the fact that the Balkan peoples, having only now reached the threshold of modern civilization, exhausted by long and bloody wars, will need everything: capital, all kinds of products, manufactured goods, skilled and other labour; with directing personnel for large industrial concerns; in a word they will be dependent on more advanced and financially more solid Nations. In the North, instead of powerful Teutonic organization and Russian help, they will find no other concrete centre of economic and

⁴⁰ "Adriacus," *op. cit.*, pp. 53-57.

cultural expansion, and they will be in contact only with defeated people and with the States arising from the ruins of the Tsar's Empire. . . .

"So Italy will, once more, be offered the opportunity and the possibility of developing Balkania economically and industrially, pouring into it the overflow of her production, of her labour, of her capital . . . at the same time refurnishing herself of those raw materials she lacks. She must therefore start at once her penetration by rail, on the transversal scheme. . . . As a start, two branches would suffice. A first from Valona to Durazzo, touching the Monastir-Salonika line at Elbassan; a second from Antivari to Pristina by Cettigne (or better Scutari), and then on by Novibazar to Nish, where it would join the main down line: Belgrade-Sofia-Adrianople-Constantinople. And finally the completion of the railway system heading at Fiume by the transformation to normal gauge of the branch lines of the Fiume-Serajevo railway which are still of a small gauge.

"Nor is this all. When the Po will have been made navigable, it will be easily connected with a great Balkan river-system formed by the Save and Danube, through the ports of Venice and Trieste, or Fiume, by a short railway line from Trieste to Karlstadt on the Kulpa, or even to Sussek on the Save. By these means the industrial centre of Italy would be united to Balkania and the Black Sea, by the least expensive mode of transport, which fact would enable us to win any competition. . . .

"But to make all this feasible, it is necessary for Italy to fully control the eastern shore of the Adriatic, so as to insure peace, and also for irreducible economical reasons.

"Firstly, the new Balkan nation could not dispose, at least in the beginning, of sufficient means to carry on the necessary harbour works and the building of transversal railways. Neither could they ask for help from other Nations, who would not find it convenient. It can be foreseen

that some of them would oppose, in their own interest, any like attempt. Further, to avoid any possible loss of energy it would be necessary that all the transversal railway lines of penetration in the Balkans were in the hands of the same Nation, which undoubtedly must be the one in possession of Trieste. Otherwise dangerous competition would arise between harbour and harbour, and the transversal railways would not always follow the shortest and most economical route."

CHAPTER XI

THE ADRIATIC QUESTION AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE

JUGOSLAVIA, as such, was assigned no representatives at the Peace Conference. Serbia was first granted two representatives. Later, to allay dissatisfaction, that number was raised to three. Montenegro was given one representative but, on account of the political state of the country, conditions for the naming of that representative were not set. Serbia was represented by Nickola Pašić, long premier of that country, Dr. Ante Trumbić, the Foreign Minister of the new State of Jugo-slavia and the chairman of the Yugoslav Committee of London, and Dr. Vesnić, the official representative of the new State in Paris. Italy at first was represented by the Premier, Orlando; by Salvatore Barzilai, a native of Trieste, who has been identified with the irredentist movement, but who was a member of the Italian Parliamentary Committee that organized the Rome Congress of Oppressed Austro-Hungarian Nationalities; by General Count Mario di Robilant, the Italian member of the Supreme War Council at Versailles; by the Foreign Minister, Baron Sidney Sonnino; by Marquis Salvago-Raggi, who has served as secretary in various embassies and was Minister to China during the Boxer troubles; and by ex-Premier Salandra. In May, Marquis Imperiali, the Italian Ambassador to London and Dr. Silvio Crespi, the Italian Food Minister, replaced Salandra and Salvago-Raggi.

From the beginning, there has been the feeling that the questions in dispute between the Italians and the Jugoslavs at the Conference would be decided largely by President Wil-

son. Italy had accepted the Fourteen Points as the basis for a peace and so had Jugoslavia. Wilson was the representative of the only Great Power which was not tied by the Secret Treaty. In January, the reports from the Conference suggested that Mr. Wilson favored only a partial endorsement of Italy's claims. The Jugoslavs ceased to mention Trieste with the same insistence as previously and Orlando seemed to be willing to give up all Dalmatia except Zara and a few islands, provided that Fiume were given to Italy. It might have been possible, at this date, to arrive at some agreement if there had been direct action between the two parties. When this consultation was suggested in April, both sides had become excited and it was too late to introduce such a method.

After the first week in February, the situation became more difficult. The Jugoslavs suggested that the territorial differences should be left to the arbitration of President Wilson. On February 18, Italy formally declined to accept this solution stating that, while she believed arbitration useful when two nations fail to agree as to the interpretation of a treaty, the fixation of a boundary or such a matter, this dispute was not suitable for arbitration. Here, there was only one nation and an oppressed people that had to be fitted into a national shell and given a legitimate frontier by the Great Powers, of which Italy was one; this was not only a matter of measuring but of weighing the world's peace; five premiers were likely to possess more knowledge than one; and this was not a territorial dispute but a universal question and as such must come before the Peace Conference. The Jugoslavs, in reply to this rebuff, advanced their most extreme claims and asked the Conference that the Isonzo River be made the boundary line, thus including in Jugoslavia the whole of Istria, Trieste and Fiume and all the Dalmatian islands except Pelagosa. The Yugoslav leaders further suggested that their differences with Italy and Roumania should be left to be settled on the basis of

plebiscites conducted under the ægis of a friendly and impartial power. This plan was not acceptable to Italy.

The claims of Italy were outlined by Orlando in the Italian Chamber March 1. Much enthusiasm was aroused at the mention of Fiume and her aspirations for union with Italy. Orlando said, "We remain faithful to the spirit of conciliation which inspired the treaty upon which Italy entered the war, but that does not mean that Italy can remain insensible to the appeal reaching her from the Italian town on the Gulf of Quarnero which for centuries has defended its national character and which is now exposed to the loss of both its nationality and its independence."

On March 21, Orlando communicated to the Powers the decision of the Italian delegates to leave the Conference unless Fiume were assigned to Italy contemporaneously with the conclusion of peace. The Italians wished peace to be made simultaneously with all the enemy powers and objected to peace being signed with Germany before it was signed with Austria. For, if the Italian delegates signed the treaty with Germany before Italy's claims were settled, they would be guaranteeing the frontiers of France without knowing what their own were to be. These demands came at the same time as the news that Hungary was allying itself with the Bolsheviki. The decision to deal with all four enemy powers at the same time was arrived at by the Conference.

On April 3, the Big Four took up the question of the Adriatic territory. Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau listened to the case of the Jugoslavs as presented by Dr. Trumbić. Orlando retired when the discussion began and refused to listen to Trumbić, characterising him as the representative of an enemy people. This was in effect the abandonment on his part of the whole basis of the Pact of Rome. Dr. Trumbić set forth the claims of the Jugoslavs in these words:¹

¹ *New York Times*, "Current History," Vol. X, pt. I, p. 413.

"Our principal demands are, as the world knows, for the port of Fiume and for the eastern coast of the Adriatic Sea. Despite all that has been said, I would insist that Fiume is the only possible port that can serve our kingdom. Those taking a different view have suggested that our needs can be met by another port. As Spalato has been mentioned, I would point out that it is hopeless for our purposes. The port itself would have to be created. Fiume took the Hungarians fifteen years to make, and Spalato has no proper port. Railways would have to be built, which would involve the cutting of tunnels as difficult as those running through the St. Gothard. In other words, unless Fiume is given to our kingdom our outlet to the sea cannot really exist, and we start our national life with our commerce strangled.

"On all grounds Fiume belongs to us. Ethnographically it is ours. Take the official Austro-Hungarian statistics for 1910, which in themselves are hostile to us. It is there stated that there were in the city 24,212 Italians and 15,687 Jugoslavs. What is ignored is that Fiume is really joined up with the town of Sušak, and a tourist would not know when he was passing from one to the other. The population of Sušak consists of 658 Italians and 11,706 Jugoslavs. Fiume and Susak together, therefore, number 24,870 Italians and 27,393 Jugoslavs. It is unnecessary perhaps to do more than mention that historically Fiume is Croatian. In 1848 its inhabitants were 691 Italians and 11,581 Jugoslavs. The city has never entered Italian history, the closest approach to this being its seizure by the Venetians in 1509. It was then, however, held only for a very short time.

"I can only put forward similar claims as regards the eastern shores of the Adriatic. All along the coast the population is predominantly Yugoslav, Italians being in a majority only in the town of Zara, while all the Dalmatian towns and islands and the whole hinterland are admittedly

Jugoslav. The one obstacle to our claims is the existence of the secret agreement of 1915. Now we were no party to that agreement, and by the nature of things it cannot be regarded as binding. It was concluded at a time when it was partly expected that Russia would be granted Constantinople. For that reason it was natural—with the emergence of Russia as a Mediterranean power—that Italy should wish to be strengthened to meet any possible danger. By the nature of things it is for the Peace Conference to decide these territorial questions from the actual present-day standpoint, and if this is done I feel confident that our claims will be recognized as just.”

These claims were expounded further in a statement by Yovan Yovanović, Serbian Minister to Great Britain, published on April 27:²

“Fiume is a point to which the routes from Zagreb (Agram) and Belgrade converge and gravitate. It is in a sense the natural sea outlet for all Croatia, Bosnia, Hungary, Serbia, Bačka, the Banat, Roumania, Bohemia (Czechoslovakia), Poland and Austria.

“To quote the official statistics of 1910, the town of Fiume has 24,212 Italians, 6,493 Hungarians, 2,315 Germans, and 15,687 Serbo-Croat inhabitants. These statistics were prepared by the Fiume Municipal Council, a body which was composed of Hungarians and Italians, and was controlled by the Hungarian authorities.

“Thus, after fifty years, the Hungarians were still trying to establish their hegemony in the town. By the actual number of their own inhabitants they were incapable of reaching their object, nor have they succeeded up to the present by means of emigration or concessions to other races.

“The suburbs of Fiume are Slavic. Sušak, the most important of them, is populated by 11,706 Slavs as against 685 Italians. The more outlying districts, including the

² *New York Times*, “Current History,” Vol. X, pt. I, pp. 413-414.

Island of Veglia, are inhabited by Slavs only. The Hungarians and Italians form a wedge in the town proper.

"Before the world war, all the powers, Italy included, were in agreement about according Serbia access to the Adriatic. Now, after the termination of the war, this access to the sea has become more necessary than ever to the United Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, who number 12,000,000 and occupy a territory of 10,000 square miles. Not one Dalmatian or Croatian port—neither Split (Spalato) nor Šibenik (Sebenico) nor Dubrovnik (Ragusa) nor Kotore (Cattaro) nor Bari (Antivari)—possesses the same geographical advantage as Fiume. Above all, the port is linked to the various Yugoslav countries by railway. It also connects with the tributaries of the Danube and the Save.

"Fiume in the hands of Italy, which has already on the Adriatic the harbors of Ancona, Venice, Bari, and Brindisi, might, at a given moment, produce an intolerable effect in the economic independence of the Triune Yugoslav Kingdom.

"The Allies are making every effort as well as every combination imaginable to assure to inland States free access to the sea. Would it, in any circumstances, be just to take from the United Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes their natural outlet on the Adriatic?"

In February, Dr. Trumbić had laid the following statement before the Peace Conference:³

"I shall confine myself, in the name of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, to setting forth briefly our claims, and to indicate the ground we take up in maintaining them.

"The area in question consists of those territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, situated on the Adriatic or that gravitate toward it, and which are inhabited by the Yugoslav Nation.

"As repeatedly declared in public manifestoes by official

³ *Christian Science Monitor*, May 30 and 31, 1919.

representatives of our Nation, we base our territorial claims on the principle of nationality and on the right of peoples to dispose freely of themselves. It is on this basis that we claim for our State territories where the population is of Yugoslav nationality, and populations which desire to enter our State.

"In a general way it should be noted, first of all, that so far as the language spoken and national sentiment are concerned, the whole Adriatic coast of former Austro-Hungary, from Monfalcone to Spizza, is inhabited in compact and unbroken mass, by Yugoslavs. The whole countryside and the whole hinterland of this coast are Yugoslav, with the single exception of five Italian villages to the north of Pola. In the majority of the towns the Slav element predominates, except in a few isolated towns where the Italian element is in the ascendent, as at Gorizia, Trieste, the cities of the western shore of Istria, Lussin, Fiume, and Zara. The Italian element, therefore, forms in this area but enclaves or oases in a Slav setting, and is in no way adjacent to the Italian peninsula.

"The Yugoslav majority has always been oppressed. Such was the state of things during the four centuries and more of Venetian domination. The Slav element, deprived of all national rights, was able, under that domination, to obtain no school in its own tongue, either in the towns or in the country. And yet the Venetian domination did not succeed in Italianizing any area, and left behind it, throughout the whole length of the Adriatic coast, but a handful of families and some few vestiges of the Venetian dialect, just as was the case in the Ionian and Ægean Islands governed by the Venetian Republic.

"Austria continued in the provinces the application of the system which she found there. The Austrian régime was anti-democratic. It was based upon the division of classes and of nationalities as much from the point of view of civil, as from that of civic rights. It also always oppressed and

systematically neglected the Yugoslav element, whereas the Italian element in the towns was privileged. When in 1907 universal suffrage was introduced into the Austrian territories the first election showed that the Yugoslav element was much stronger than it seemed.

"The national awakening of the Yugoslav masses had begun with the introduction of the Constitution of 1861. It was then that was born the political struggle between our element and the Italian element. Our populations are democratic; they struggle for the liberty of their tongue, for their political and social rights. Naturally enough, in this struggle they gained victories every day, and made progress in the claiming of their rights, gaining new positions.

"Passing to the application of the principle of nationality and of the right of peoples to dispose freely of their destiny, I wish to enumerate regions with which we are concerned. In order to render the question more comprehensible, I shall speak first of the region situated on the Adriatic coast from Cape Promontore, and then along the eastern coast of Istria, past Fiume, and along the rest of the Croatian and Dalmatian coast as far as Spizza (the southern frontier of Dalmatia), and of all the islands of the Quarnero and of Dalmatia, which, from every point of view, form an integral part of the coast. The coastline which I have just indicated is peopled almost exclusively by Yugoslavs to as great an extent in the villages and townships as in the greater part of the cities. The Italian-speaking population lives but sporadically in certain cities, and is so scarce that this factor can have no influence on the national character of this coastline and of these islands.

"The Yugoslav population, which constitutes the vast majority of the population, is possessed of a lofty consciousness of its national unity and is animated by the firm desire to remain in the State we have already constituted. Hence, in the name of the principle of nationality, we demand the whole of this coastline with its islands be united to our State.

"It must be emphasized that these regions are poor, and can only develop economically in an independent state, of which their hinterland forms a part. It is toward this littoral that there gravitates the whole of the national economic and commercial life of the greater part of the provinces of our State; that is to say, Croatia, Slavonia, the Bačka, the Banat, northern Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dalmatia and Montenegro, the whole of whose (natural) routes and actually existing railways lead to the sea. The islands, for their part, sell all their exported produce in the coast towns. The economic policy of Austria would not assent to the construction of transverse routes of communication, such as would have been in the interest of these regions. On the contrary, longitudinal commercial routes were constructed from north to south with a view to the penetration of the Balkans. The task of our State will be to modify completely this policy, and to construct transverse railway lines, in order to contribute to the development of the commercial relations overseas, and, in the first place, with Italy.

"The only commercial railway is that which leads from Fiume (Rijeka) to Croatia-Slavonia, Serbia, Bosnia, and Hungary. The Hungarian Government constructed this railway with the resources of the common Hungarian-Croatian State at a time when, on the strength of the falsification of the law of 1869, it had wrested Fiume from the Croats. Consequently, the port in question is today the sole commercial outlet to the sea from all these regions. Without Fiume they cannot develop normally. Today, when the Peace Conference is occupied with assuring commercial outlets to the sea even to enclaved peoples having no direct access, it would be incomprehensible were an attempt made to take from our Nation the ports situated on its territories and in its own coast. For these reasons we demand that the whole coast line, including the islands concerned, be recognized as part of our State.

"In the basin of the Upper Adriatic are the provinces of Gorizia-Gradisca, Trieste with its suburbs, and the western part of Istria.

"The Province of Gorizia-Gradisca consists of two parts, which differ from one another both from the ethnical and from the economic point of view. The western part, which extends from the line Cormons-Gradisca-Monfalcone, lives its own life and constitutes an economic unit. On the basis of the language spoken in this region, there are 72,000 Italians and about 6,000 Slovenes; from the geographical point of view it is but the prolongation of the Venetian plain. This territory, called the Frioul, belongs, according to the principle of nationality, to the Italian people, and therefore, we do not claim it. The remainder of this Province, to the east and north of the Cormons-Gradisca-Monfalcone line, and which comprises the mountainous region, is inhabited by 148,500 Slovenes and 17,000 Italians, 14,000 of whom live in the town of Gorizia, where they form half the population. The economic and intellectual centre of this region is situated in the town of Gorizia.

"The Slovenes are a civilized people, very advanced and conscious in the highest degree of their national community with the other Yugoslav peoples. We, therefore, demand that this region be reunited to our State.

"The town of Trieste and its suburb form, geographically, an integral part of territories that are purely Slav. This town has a predominantly Italian population—two-thirds, according to statistics—while a third is Slav. The Slav element plays an important rôle in the commercial and economic life of Trieste. For the rest, were Trieste placed in ethnical contact with Italy, we should recognize, in the name of the principle of nationality, the right of the majority. But the whole hinterland of Trieste is purely Slav and separates Trieste from Italian territory by 20 kilometers of Slav coast line. However, the importance of Trieste should be considered in the first place by examining it from

the point of view of its commercial and maritime value. Trieste is a port of world commerce. As such it is the expression of its hinterland, which extends as far as Bohemia, and in the first place of its Slovene hinterland, which forms a third of the total commerce of Trieste. Trieste depends on its hinterland as its hinterland depends on Trieste. Were Trieste to fall under the sovereignty of Italy, the town would find itself separated politically from its commercial hinterland. This separation would necessarily prejudice its commerce. Austria having crumbled away as a State, the natural solution of the problem of Trieste is its reunion to our State, and it is precisely this that we demand.

"Istria is inhabited by Slavs and Italians. According to the latest statistics, there are 233,318 Jugoslavs and 147,417 Italians. The Slavs inhabit, in a compact mass, central and eastern Istria. There are Italians in sporadic groups in certain little towns. To judge from the vast majority of the population, central and eastern Istria is Slav.

"The Italian population is more numerous on the western coast of Istria, especially in the towns, and only in five villages to the north of Pola. These are the only Italian speaking villages along the whole Adriatic coast from Monfalcone to Spizza. Slavs people the towns of the seashore and all the other villages. For these reasons, and also because the Istrian peninsula is linked territorially to Carniola and Croatia, while it is separated from Italy by the Adriatic, it ought to be concluded that this peninsula should be recognized as forming part of our State. It is this that we demand.

"Generally speaking, it should be pointed out that the whole region of the Adriatic littoral (from Monfalcone to Spizza) has no vital common interests with the Italian peninsula. It has such interests, on the other hand, exclusively with our regions, with which it is geographically

united. This main point should be taken into consideration when solving the present problem.

"With reference to Austrian statistics it should be pointed out that, in accordance with Austrian law, they were compiled by the communes. In the towns in which Jugoslavs live side by side with Italians, such as Gorizia, Trieste, Pola, Fiume, Zara, the communes are in the hands of the Italians. It is, therefore, the Italians themselves who have taken the census and who, consequently, cannot be suspected of having compiled it to the detriment of the Italians."

The subject of the Adriatic was under discussion by the Conference all during April. Sonnino presented Italy's case on the 19th. It was regarded as significant that he, rather than Orlando, was the person to do this because he had shown himself so much less conciliatory, had never been a party to the Pact of Rome, and, of the four foreign ministers who framed the Secret Treaty, he alone was left in that position.

On April 20, Orlando received a telegram from the heads of the Italian army telling him that he had the entire army behind him in his claims for Fiume and the Adriatic territory. Some critics interpreted this as a threat that Orlando was expected to gain the Italian demands or retire. The opening of the Italian Parliament was announced for April 23. It seemed necessary for the Ministers to have something definite to tell the people by that date. Mr. Wilson did not attend the discussion on April 21. The day before, he had consulted the American delegates as to the advisability of his making public a statement on the Adriatic. Orlando that day announced that the opening of the Italian Parliament was postponed until May 6. He declined to come to the Council meeting of April 22 but he had a private interview with Lloyd George, where, it is reported, he refused to consider the recognition of the Italian claims to Fiume in return for the complete renunciation of Dalmatia on the part of Italy.

The Italian claims were fully set out in a long memorandum read to the Peace Conference by Signor Barzilai. The official résumé of this memorandum was issued in this form: ⁴

"The memorandum begins by explaining that the Italian claims are based on justice and moderation and fit into the framework of President Wilson's fourteen points, which were the basis of the armistice. If a certain part of Italian public opinion would like to see them to some slight extent reduced, another part demands that they be considerably increased. Thus the claims accepted by the Italian delegates represent a compromise based on necessity and equity. True, the Italian claims imply adding to the Italian State a certain number of citizens of non-Italian language and origin, but this phenomenon is to be observed on a much larger scale in States already constituted and in others which are now forming. The explanation of this fact is that in all previous settlements the principle of nationality was held in contempt and the infiltration of foreign races beyond their natural frontiers was thereby encouraged.

"Such past wrongs cannot now be turned into the rights of the States which perpetrated them. On this point, the memorandum quotes President Poincaré for the statement that the soul of a people cannot be destroyed and that of all the claims put forward by the Entente European States Italy claims the smallest percentage of foreign blood: 3 per cent. as against France's 4 per cent., Roumania's more than 17 per cent; Czechoslovakia's 30 per cent.; and Poland's 40 per cent. Dangerous irredentism has, it proceeds to argue, only been created by injustice and persecution, and the precedents of Italian history show that nothing of this kind has happened with regard to the French, Slav and German population already included in the Italian Kingdom.

"After these prefatory remarks, the memorandum proceeds to state exactly what Italy does want. Italy went

⁴ *New York Times*, April 26, 1919.

to war with two aims: the liberation of her oppressed sons, and the attainment of safe frontiers by land and sea. Victory has cost her much more than she expected, and she is, therefore, all the less likely to repudiate the principles which determined her intervention. The concrete application of these principles might be summed up as the Alpine frontier, which includes the Upper Adige, the Trentino and Julian Venetia, and an improvement of her Adriatic position which, without prejudicing the legitimate aspirations of the new State, will allow Italy to escape from the position of absolute inferiority and danger in which she finds herself.

"Italy has no need to defend her purely ethnic claims. Her other claims aim at giving her future safety on exactly the same basis as the other allied States, i.e., future safety independently of the present or future attitude of neighboring States.

"The foundation of the League of Nations will be the more solid if the single nations are guaranteed against all external danger or oppression. What Italy claims in this connection threatens no one, but only aims at parrying the threats of others. Only in this way can Italy devote herself to realizing a reduction of armaments.

"After explaining that the Alpine frontier is the only boundary which provides a really adequate mountain barrier, the memorandum declares that Italy must stretch as far as Bressanone in order to prevent the Germans from again becoming masters of the Italian slopes. This reason is so strong that the inclusion by Italy of 180,000 German inhabitants ceases to be of any importance. The memorandum then explains the cultural links existing between the upper Adige region and Italy. Moreover the Trentino and upper Adige taken together have a 70 per cent. Italian population.

"The memorandum then proceeds to claim the watershed of the Julian Alps as far the Quarnero. Here again

geographers of lands and ages have indicated that this was the natural Italian frontier. The evidence of Roman and Venetian culture are everywhere, and, despite foreign infiltration, the population is mainly Italian in spirit and customs. After relating the story of Austrian persecutions and Italian resistance in this region the memorandum continues:

"Italian Irredentism was born on the day on which the peace of '66 expiated only a part of the great political violation which was first perpetrated at Campoformio and then consecrated at the Congress of Vienna. In order to insure European peace and Adriatic equilibrium it is necessary to complete work interrupted by '66 by carrying the Italian frontier to the watershed of the Julian Alps, thereby closing Italy's eastern gate on the 'habitual route of the barbarians.' Thus the principle proposed with regard to the Brenner frontier can also be applied to the Julian frontier.

"Gorizia, Trieste, Fiume, Pola, the chief centres, are, the document continues, Italian, not only by their past but by the great majority of their present population, as set forth in Austro-Hungarian statistics. The smaller towns are also Italian, as are the big rural centres, whose economic and cultural existence is completely bound up with that of the towns. These centres in the interior and on the coast dominate the moral and material life of the whole region. Thus the whole region ought to fall to Italy, not only for cultural reasons, but because of economic laws and for the benefit of the whole population without regard to nationality.

"Even if questions of military safety and of necessary geographical compactness are left on one side, a compromise frontier, a frontier not based on clear topography, could not settle the race conflicts completely or have any economic stability. The natural outlets of the (for that matter sparsely populated) Slavified mountain zones are the

Venetian Friulian Plain and the Italian ports of Julian Venetia from Trieste to Fiume. If these zones, now inhabited by a majority of Slavs, belonged to any other State than Italy, they would become centres of an exasperated anti-Italian nationalism. They would inevitably push towards the sea, and, helped by the Slav hinterland, exercise an increasing pressure on the Italian frontier zones, thus keeping up a continual agitation and tension between the two neighbor States.

"The inclusion of the whole Cisalpine territory, together with its Slavs, far from creating a danger of Slav Irredentism, is the one way of avoiding or of rendering harmless and therefore of neutralising at the outset, all Slav Irredentism, which the irrational frontier would inflame under pressure of economic necessities. Given the indivisibility of these regions and the need for them to form with the Alpine frontier the eastern bulwark of Italy, the number of non-Italian inhabitants does not prejudice Italy's claims.

"In any case Julian Venetia forms a single whole with Venetia proper and the two together have a population of 3,600,000, of which hardly more than 400,000 is Slav; while in Julian Venetia alone there are 482,000 Italians as against 411,000 Slavs. At this point, however, the memorandum proceeds to deny the value of Austrian statistics. It then declares that in communes representing 70 per cent. of the population local government is in the hands of the Italians.

"The memorandum then turns to the Adriatic problem. The frontier of the Julian Alps, including Istria, from Pola to Fiume in the kingdom, reduces but does not eliminate Italian Adriatic inferiority. This can only be eliminated by restoring to Italy an adequate part of Dalmatia. Conditions have changed, and Italy can now limit herself to demanding not the absolute possession but the freedom of that sea, that is to say, she will not exclude a new Yugoslav State from possessing a part of the Adriatic Coast, claiming for herself not more, but not less, than she needs to

insure her peace of mind and eliminate foreign menaces.

"The Treaty of London gives to Italy 6,085 square kilometers, and 44 per cent. of the population of Dalmatia, while of the whole coast from Fiume to Boyana Italy will have only one-sixth. That is to say, that the Yugoslav State will have six times as much of the coast as Italy and will have more than half of the population and half of the total area of Dalmatia and its islands.

"At this point the document attempts to destroy the Austrian statistics, according to which Dalmatia contains only 15,000 Italians against 250,000 Slavs. This time the electoral results mean nothing. Moreover, even if historical right and national reality were otherwise, Italy could not for reasons of safety in the future renounce having a part of Dalmatia. Italy would be threatened from Dalmatia if the whole of it fell to another State, whereas Italy's claim to a part of Dalmatia threatens no one.

"The memorandum then claims the neutralization of the part of the coast and of the islands assigned to other powers, including those stretches of the coast not neutralized by the Treaty of London, together with an absolute veto of all armaments on land and on sea.

"The memorandum then turns to the special question of Fiume. Russia's defection imposed on Italy a much greater burden than that stipulated in the Treaty of London. American intervention did nothing to relieve the pressure on Italy whereas on the western front it more than compensated for Russian defection. Not only Trieste, but Fiume, must cease to function in favor of indirect German domination of the Adriatic. Leaving on one side the damage to Trieste which would result from the competition of Yugoslav Fiume, or of a Fiume not under Italian sovereignty, and to the economy of the hinterland, resulting upon the inevitable attempt to deflect all of its trade to a non-Italian Fiume, it is necessary to insist on the anti-German part which Italy alone can play at Fiume, a part which can be

played in such a way as to benefit the Croatian and Hungarian hinterland.

"At this point the memorandum insists on the natural aptitudes and the technical resources of a seafaring nation like Italy, which, by placing both Fiume and Trieste at the entire disposal of the hinterland, would conciliate in the best possible fashion her own interests with those of the commercial clientele of the two ports. After detailing the concessions which Italy is ready to make in order to guarantee the trade interests of the hinterland at Fiume and Trieste, the memorandum emphasizes the fact that these two ports have got to serve Germany, Austria, Bohemia, the Yugoslav countries, and Hungary, and that they will only be able to accomplish this difficult mission if intrusted to the one power which is outside and above the political and economic competitions of all these States.

"It is not true, the memorandum proceeds to argue, that Croatia needs Fiume. Croatian trade in the port represents only 7 per cent., the remainder coming from other regions and especially from Hungary. The total trade of Slovenia, Croatia, Dalmatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina hardly reaches 13 per cent.; the remainder went toward the ports of Lower Dalmatia. The carrying trade of the port, now that it is no longer subsidized by Hungary, could not be carried on by a small new State which sent such a small part of its trade into Fiume. Here, again, Italy is the one power capable of undertaking this mission—at first probably at a loss. Moreover, Trieste and Fiume will be able to work together, supplementing each other's services and rendering them more economically. Trieste could carry on without Fiume, but Fiume would be ruined if deprived of Italy's support. Freights from Fiume would be much lower if Fiume and Trieste worked together. The economic interests of the hinterland are then obvious.

"The memorandum then proceeds to explain why Fiume was given to Croatia in the Treaty of London. At that

time the fall of the Habsburg monarchy was not foreseen. It was therefore natural that to a population of 50,000,000 inhabitants one independent Adriatic port should be left, but Italy's decisive victory of 1918 has effectively destroyed this argument. Only by falsifying an *etat de fait*, which corresponds to an *etat d'ame* could Fiume be given to the new Yugoslav State. Besides Buccari and Segna, Croatia—another fact unforeseen in the Treaty of London—has at her disposal other outlets in the lower Adriatic which it was thought would be reserved for Montenegro and Serbia.

"The memorandum then once again emphasizes Italy's efforts and her sacrifices, and asserts that those who oppose her demands do not do so for any objective and intrinsic reasons, but only as a result of paying too much attention to the claims of the South Slavs. At this point the Peace Conference is reminded that the same South Slavs fought to the very last against Italy and up to the very last were ready to form their Yugoslav State within the orbit of the Habsburgs. However, Italy foresaw the possibility of opposition on the part of the comrades in arms to the execution of the agreements made, and for this reason proposed, with a moderation which was at that time much appreciated, a fair transaction (i.e., a compromise) with regard to the points in dispute. The Italian Government, therefore, as it then stated in writing, put forward a minimum of claims in the Treaty of London, at the same time calling the attention of the new allies to the possibility of an opposition which has now taken such grave forms.

"Italy, the document concludes, has the right to expect that her moderate demands, which correspond to her rights and to her needs and which are to such a great extent supported by the will of the great interested populations, should be fully satisfied."

Many compromises had been urged during the discussion. Besides the exchange of Dalmatia for Fiume, others to the effect that Fiume should be divided and that the Yugoslav

suburb of Sušak should be left to Yugoslavia together with that part of the port on the left bank of the river Recina; that Fiume should be internationalized; that the question be left to be settled by a plebiscite were offered. Fiume was not given to Italy in the Secret Treaty and the claim to it was advanced by Italy only after the defeat of Austria. But Italy's original claims in negotiating the Secret Treaty included Fiume and eight Dalmatian ports and all the islands off the Dalmatian coast. The ports originally demanded were Segna, Carolopaga, Zara (Zadar), Sebenico (Sibenik), Spalato (Split), Metković, Gravosa and Ragusa (Dubrovnik). There were also certain provisions for the neutralization of the Montenegrin coast. It was Russia who insisted that only Zara and Sebenico be promised Italy.

Mr. Gayda, delegate of the Italian Adriatic Committee in London and representing the group of the Idea Nazionale, claims that, from the first day of the European war, Serbia placed its cause in the hands of Russia, and that Russia was Serbia's representative when the Secret Treaty was being negotiated.⁵ Premier Pašić has, however, repeatedly declared in the Skupština before November, 1916, that Serbia knew nothing officially of Italy's demands and could not recognize them.⁶

President Wilson has never been in favor of compromise on the basis of the Secret Treaty. As the discussion in the Peace Conference seemed to be leading nowhere, on April 23, he threw down the gauntlet in the shape of a public statement on the Adriatic question. Many persons had regarded the declaration that Wilson would not yield as merely a part of the political game, even though, when the Austrian armistice was signed, Colonel House had made a reservation that the boundary lines laid down should not be construed as an acceptance of the Treaty of London.

⁵ *Christian Science Monitor*, May 20, 1919, also "Modern Italy," Vol. II, p. 257.

⁶ "The Southern Slav's Appeal," No. 1, p. 29.

The Wilson statement of April 23 read as follows:⁷

"In view of the capital importance of the questions affected, and in order to throw all possible light upon what is involved in their settlement, I hope that the following statement will contribute to the final formation of opinion and to a satisfactory solution:

"When Italy entered the war she entered upon the basis of a definite private understanding with Great Britain and France, now known as the Pact of London. Since that time the whole face of circumstances has been altered. Many other powers, great and small, have entered the struggle, with no knowledge of that private understanding.

"The Austro-Hungarian Empire, then the enemy of Europe, and at whose expense the Pact of London was to be kept in the event of victory, has gone to pieces and no longer exists. Not only that, but the several parts of that empire, it is agreed now by Italy and all her associates, are to be erected into independent States and associated in a League of Nations, not only with those who were recently our enemies, but with Italy herself and the powers that stood with Italy in the great war for liberty.

"We are to establish their liberty as well as our own. They are to be among the smaller States whose interests are henceforth to be safeguarded as scrupulously as the interests of the most powerful States.

"The war was ended, moreover, by proposing to Germany an armistice and peace which should be founded on certain clearly defined principles which set up a new order of right and justice. Upon those principles the peace with Germany has been conceived, not only, but formulated. Upon those principles it will be executed.

"We cannot ask the great body of powers to propose and effect peace with Austria and establish a new basis of independence and right in the States which originally constituted the Austro-Hungarian Empire and in the States of the

⁷ *Associated Press Dispatch*, Paris, April 23, 1919.

Balkan group on principles of another kind. We must apply the same principles to the settlement of Europe in those quarters that we have applied in the peace with Germany. It was upon the explicit avowal of those principles that the initiative for peace was taken. It is upon them that the whole structure of peace must rest.

"If those principles are to be adhered to, Fiume must serve as the outlet of the commerce, not of Italy, but of the land to the north and northeast of that port, Hungary, Bohemia, Roumania, and the States of the new Yugoslav group. To assign Fiume to Italy would be to create the feeling that we have deliberately put the port upon which all those countries chiefly depend for their access to the Mediterranean in the hands of a power of which it does not form an integral part and whose sovereignty, if set up there, must inevitably seem foreign, not domestic or identified with the commercial and industrial life of the regions which the port must serve. It is for that reason, no doubt, that Fiume was not included in the Pact of London, but there definitely assigned to the Croatsians.

"And the reason why the line of the Pact of London swept about many of the islands of the eastern coast of the Adriatic and around the portion of the Dalmatian coast which lies most open to that sea was not only that there on those islands, and here and there on that coast, there are bodies of people of Italian blood and connection, but also, and no doubt chiefly, because it was felt that it was necessary for Italy to have a foothold amidst the channels of the Eastern Adriatic in order that she might make her own coasts safe against the naval aggression of Austria-Hungary.

"But Austria-Hungary no longer exists. It is proposed that the fortifications which the Austrian Government constructed there shall be razed and permanently destroyed.

"It is part also of the new plan of European order which centres in the League of Nations that the new States erected

there shall accept a limitation of armaments which puts aggression out of the question. There can be no fear of the unfair treatment of groups of Italian people there, because adequate guarantees will be given, under international sanction, of the equal and equitable treatment of all racial or national minorities.

"In brief, every question associated with this settlement wears a new aspect—a new aspect given it by the very victory for right for which Italy has made the supreme sacrifice of blood and treasure. Italy, along with the four other powers, has become one of the chief trustees of the new order which she has played so honourable a part in establishing.

"And on the north and northeast her natural frontiers are completely restored, along the whole sweep of the Alps from northwest to southeast to the very end of the Istrian Peninsula, including all the great watershed within which Trieste and Pola lie, and all the fair regions whose face nature has turned toward the great peninsula upon which the historic life of the Latin people has been worked out through centuries of famous story ever since Rome was first set upon her seven hills.

"Her ancient unity is restored. Her lines are extended to the great walls which are her natural defences. It is within her choice to be surrounded by friends; to exhibit to the newly liberated peoples across the Adriatic that noble quality of greatness, magnanimity, friendly generosity, the preference of justice over interest.

"The nations associated with her, the nations that know nothing of the Pact of London or of any other special understanding that lies at the beginning of this great struggle, and who have made their supreme sacrifice also in the interest, not of national advantage or defence, but of the settled peace of the world, are now united with her older associates in urging her to assume a leadership which cannot be mistaken in the new order of Europe.

"America is Italy's friend. Her people are drawn, millions strong, from Italy's own fair countrysides. She is linked in blood, as well as in affection, with the Italian people. Such ties can never be broken. And America was privileged, by the generous commission of her associates in the war, to initiate the peace we are about to consummate—to initiate it upon terms which she had herself formulated and in which I was her spokesman.

"The compulsion is upon her to square every decision she takes a part in to these principles. She can do nothing else. She trusts Italy, and in her trust believes that Italy will ask nothing of her that cannot be made unmistakably consistent with those sacred obligations.

"The interests are not now in question, but the rights of peoples, of States new and old, of liberated peoples and peoples whose rulers have never accounted them worthy of a right; above all, the right of the world to peace and to such settlements of interest as shall make peace secure.

"These and these only, are the principles for which America has fought. These, and these only, are the principles upon which she can consent to make peace. Only upon these principles, she hopes and believes, will the people of Italy ask her to make peace."

President Wilson's statement came out in the afternoon papers and, at Italian headquarters, it was said that this was the first that the Italians had known of it. Orlando immediately addressed an official communication to Clemenceau, as President of the Peace Conference, stating that, because of Mr. Wilson's action, the Italian delegation had decided to leave Paris at two o'clock the next afternoon. He also made public the following statement:—"We have withdrawn, . . . all further initiative must come from the other side. If we learn that an adverse decision is reached by them, we shall go home immediately. In any case, unless we receive full satisfaction, the day of the arrival of the German delegation will be the limit of our stay. If we go,

it will not mean a rupture of diplomatic relations, but an expression of the lack of solidarity between Italy and the other members of the Conference."

The next day, April 24, Premier Orlando issued a long reply to President Wilson. After referring to the publication of the statement, he continued:—"The practice of addressing nations directly constitutes surely an innovation in international relations. I do not wish to complain, but I wish to record it as a precedent, so that at my own time I may follow it, inasmuch as this new custom doubtless constitutes the granting to nations of larger participation in international questions, and, personally, I have always been of the opinion that such participation was a harbinger of a new order of things.

"Nevertheless, if these appeals are to be considered as addressed to nations outside of the Governments which represent them (I might say even against the Governments), I should feel deep regret in recalling that this process, heretofore applied to enemy Governments, is today applied for the first time to a Government which has been and intends to remain a loyal ally of the great American Republic, namely, to the Italian Government. . . . Above all I should have the right to complain if the declarations of the Presidential message have the purpose to oppose the Italian people to the Italian Government, because it would misconstrue and deny the high degree of civilization which the Italian people has attained and its democratic and liberal régime and I should be forced to protest strongly against suppositions unjustly offensive to my country."

Orlando admitted that the Treaty of London did not give Fiume to Italy but declared, however, that the Italian claim to that city conformed with the Fourteen Points of President Wilson. In speaking of Wilson's reference to the Alps as the natural frontier of Italy he said, "This recognition is of great importance, provided that the eastern flank of this wall does not remain open and that the right of Italy

should be interpreted to include the line of Monte Nevoso (north and west of Fiume) which separates the waters running toward the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. . . . I contend further that he who is entitled to the honor of proclaiming to the world the right of the free determination of peoples should recognise this right for Fiume, an ancient Italian city which proclaimed its Italian nature before the Italian ships arrived—an admirable example of national conscience perpetuated through centuries.

“To deny this right only because of the small number concerned would mean the admission that the criterion of justice toward peoples varies according to their territorial extent.”⁸

Lloyd George arranged an interview between the Italian delegates, on the one hand, and Wilson, Clemenceau and himself on the other. But no definite result was arrived at although all displayed the strongest desire to reach a satisfactory solution and expressed to Orlando their hope that the Italian Parliament would assist in arriving at such a settlement. That same afternoon (April 24) Orlando, General Diaz and Signor Barzilai left Paris for Rome. Sonnino left two days later. On April 26, it was disclosed that Lloyd George and Clemenceau had given Orlando a statement prepared by Mr. Balfour which, generally speaking, sustained Wilson and pointed out that France and Great Britain intended to stand by their treaty obligations if Italy adhered to hers but that it was inconsistent for Italy to get Fiume and all the rest. It was rumoured that the Allies had offered Italy increased economic aid if she abandoned her claims to Fiume but this was denied.

The break was not as absolute as the public at first feared. Only the Italian plenipotentiaries left Paris. The other members of the Italian delegation remaining in Paris continued to act in collaboration in the work of the Inter-Allied Commission, not directly pertaining to the main ac-

⁸ *New York Times*, “Current History,” Vol. X, pt. I, pp. 407-408.

tivities of the Peace Conference. Orlando's letters to Clemenceau and to Lloyd George of April 23 did not announce a complete rupture, but asked the two Premiers whether, in view of the circumstances, they considered further Italian participation in the Conference useful.

Orlando was given an enthusiastic greeting upon his arrival at Rome. He was received by all the Cabinet Ministers in Rome, high state officials, prefects, senators and deputies, and by the Mayor of Rome, Prince Colonna. Public feeling was running high in Italy. There were demonstrations in the cities and a great display of the flags of Dalmatia and of Fiume. Political disputes between parties were dropped, even in Milan where the Socialists had been causing disturbances. In Trieste, there were parades and demonstrations though, from the beginning, Trieste had been assured to Italy. Wilson's statement was construed as an appeal to the Italian people over the heads of their Government and as such was taken as an insult to a Great Power. The idea was current in the press, as a whole, that Italy could get nothing from the Conference for which she did not fight. This idea is expressed by Signor Federzoni:⁹

"France wanted a peace which gave her Alsace-Lorraine. England took up arms for the independence of Belgium lost through German aggression. America joined the conflict to create a peace based on justice and to found a permanent Society of Nations. The war won, France exacts and obtains, besides the provinces lost in 1871, the Saar basin, extending her boundaries to the Rhine. She occupies a large part of the German colonies and keeps them, and occupies Syria, which she firmly intends to retain. But this is not French imperialism.

"England makes Wilson withdraw his demand for the freedom of the seas, realizes her dream of 'Mittelafrika'; takes possession of Mesopotamia, invents an Emir Faisal

⁹ *New York Times*, April 24, 1919.

to consolidate and extend her dominion in the Eastern Mediterranean. But this is not English imperialism.

"Wilson inserts in the covenant of the League of Nations the Monroe Doctrine, which makes America immune from any interference from the League; refuses recognition of the equality of races, as though Japan has a less secure title to civilization than Jugoslavia. But this is not American imperialism. The only imperialism is that of Italy; it is Oriental Istria; it is Fiume; it is Dalmatia; it is the dream which mitigated the sufferings of widows and orphans. Imperialism means those few rocks and mountains with a total population of less than a million inhabitants, which the Italians claim."

Wilson's action was generally condemned by the Italian press.¹⁰ The *Corriere della Sera* (April 25) gave its opinion in these words:

"This impulsive act is contrary to all custom, and all sense of reciprocal respect. It does unquestionable harm to the authority of the Conference and to the discipline of its labours. It offends a friendly and associated nation by holding her up to common disapproval, and is all the more to be blamed in that this impetuous appeal to publicity is in striking contrast with the secret practice followed hitherto, chiefly by the express desire of President Wilson. During the long and bitter debate with Clemenceau the President never once broke the seal of the Council Chamber. The clamours of the piazza were not allowed to interpose between the two men. Towards Italy Wilson adopts a different course, as if he thought that with us he can deal as he cannot with others.

"Impolite in form, Wilson's act is as regards the substance quite empty. He denies our right to Fiume while with his scant knowledge of European geography he consents to our 'unity within our natural frontiers'—as if Fiume were not geographically Italian!

¹⁰ Quoted by "Modern Italy," Vol. I, pp. 358-360.

"The ideas popularly attributed to Wilson were born in Europe; they were the ideas of Garibaldi and Mazzini; they were the ideas of '89 and '48; they were the intimate essence of the war we have fought against all tyrannical oppression. To these ideas we have been and we remain true. We dared hope that Wilson would find the strength and the will to make them a reality. More than once we thought his strength unequal to the task. We waited and hoped as long as it was permissible to hope. But he has not had the necessary strength. What was once known as 'Wilsonism' has been destroyed by Wilson. In the place of dead Austria Wilson gives us the League of Nations, in which political bodies are amputated in accordance with the law of the Procrustes. Danzig is knocked about like a football. By the express will of Wilson the principle of unanimity is being introduced like a needle into the works of a clock and the Monroe Doctrine itself makes it all valueless."

The Socialist *Giornale del Popolo* was in sympathy with the Italian delegates. "Our plenipotentiaries have left Paris. Their action is serious, but nothing else was possible to men who did not intend to betray their country. In '59 it was Napoleon who suddenly ended a victorious war. In '66 it was Bismarck who curtailed Italy's rights. But Italy today is no longer disposed to tolerate violence, and it would go ill with the Italian statesmen who, returning from Paris, were unable to tell us that the Italians hitherto under the yoke of Austria have been liberated. In leaving Paris our plenipotentiaries are doing their duty."

Epoca commented on the unity in Italy. "In this decisive moment of her history Italy is neither depressed nor alone. The whole nation stands in serried ranks behind the Government. The dissensions which divided us during the war are giving way at the moment when the blood poured out for the sake of human liberty must be rewarded with the liberation of our kindred and the safety of our land."

The *Corriere d'Italia* wrote: "Only a few weeks ago there

were in Italy nationalists and 'renunciators.' Today there are only Italians. After giving to others all they wanted, President Wilson denies us everything. He does not question merely our right to Fiume or Dalmatia, he denies us all—Fiume, Dalmatia, and even parts of Istria, in order to give his Jugoslav friends positions on which they can plant their cannon, threatening Trieste and Pola. The moment chosen by President Wilson for startling us with his 'admonishment' and the crack of the whip, was the very moment in which Italian delegates were negotiating not to obtain all that Italy was entitled to, but the necessary minimum to convince the country that the war had not been fought in vain.

"This is the reason why today all are against Wilson—all parties, the whole Press, while the followers of Bissolati join with bitterness in the protest of the others."

On April 27, two days before the Italian Parliament was to meet, a large and enthusiastic meeting in the Augusteum at Rome approved the maximum claims of Italy. Signor Enrico Carradini, a well known Nationalist, denounced President Wilson's action and praised the Italian delegation as representing, at the Peace Conference, Italy's just claims. He demanded the annexation of the Trentino, the Upper Adige, eastern Friuli, Istria, Fiume and Dalmatia, including Zara, Sebenico and Spalato, and aroused great enthusiasm by reading a telegram giving an account of the request by the Italian National Council in Fiume that General Grazioli take over the city in the name of the King of Italy. The meeting adopted an order of the day declaring that the Roman populace approved the course of the Italian delegation at the Peace Conference and demanded the annexation of the Trentino with the Upper Adige as far as the Brenner Pass, Julian Venetia, and the whole of Dalmatia.¹¹

Professor George D. Herron offered an explanation of President Wilson's attitude which has received a great deal

¹¹ *Christian Science Monitor*, June 19, 1919.

of attention from the Italian party. In a communication published in *Epoca*, April 28, he wrote:¹² "There . . . were at least two occasions when an understanding (between Italy and the Jugoslavs) could have been reached were it not for the intervention of intrigues on the part of international financiers who are diplomatically privileged, who are the true cause of the present crisis and who are the cause of all the political and moral failures of the Peace Conference, on the shoulders of which will fall the responsibility of the ruin which threatens the world. The financial group is trying to secure privileges for the development of Fiume and of the Dalmatian ports, to get hold of all the lines of navigation in the Adriatic for the purpose of exploiting the Serbian nation, on the one hand, and on the other to bring complete commercial ruin upon Italy and banish her mercantile flag from the seas.

"Nor would the ruin of her mercantile commerce be the sole damage to be suffered by Italy were she to renounce Fiume. In a very short time, her political and commercial relations with Roumania and the Balkans would be severed. By refusing to cede her eastern port Italy is at present struggling for her own existence as against the international monopolists. She has no mines. She has no resources to offer to these monopolists, while Southeastern Europe is ripe for exploitation. Furthermore, according to the Treaty of London, only a small part of Dalmatia belongs to Italy. Nine ports capable of adequate development will be left to Jugoslavia." He speaks of the gains of Great Britain and of France and continues, "But on account of reasons which are understood only by those who know the secret means which serve the ends of international finance, Italy is denied territories which, if granted to her, would

¹² "Modern Italy," Vol. II, p. 912. Professor Herron was formerly a teacher of economics but for several years has lived in Switzerland. He was one of the founders of the Rand School of Social Science. President Wilson appointed him as one of the two American representatives to attend the proposed Prinkipo Conference.

bring her only three per cent. of a non-Italian population."

A report, circulated in Italy, that a group of financiers had received from the Jugoslavs shipping concessions at Fiume has been denied by the London Italian organ, *Modern Italy* (April 19, 1919).

Gabriele d'Annunzio took his stand at the head of the extreme nationalists, who were ready to take Fiume and Dalmatia by force of arms if necessary. He telegraphed this message to Fiume: "He who is ready to convert a war cry into action needs fear nothing. I promise you victory. I will be amidst you in the supreme moment. Watch and be silent."

The party leaders in Parliament, however, realized that there should be no talk of getting Fiume through annexation without the consent of the Peace Conference and that the delegates had returned to Rome, not because they wished to defy the Peace Conference, but because Mr. Wilson had suggested that they did not have the confidence of the Italian people. The National Council at Fiume voted for annexation to Italy in April, but General Grazioli, the commander of the Italian troops there wisely declined to accept the offer in the name of Italy, declaring that he must wait a mandate from the Conference. That there was no real break with the Allies was testified to by Professor Luigi Luzzatti, a former Premier. On April 28, he received from Clemenceau, to whom he had sent an appeal, a telegram to the effect that engagements between France and Italy would be honored.

Orlando delivered his address to the Chamber of Deputies, April 29, amid great applause. He admitted his knowledge of President Wilson's memorandum of April 14, on Fiume, of which Italian headquarters at Paris had made no mention when it declared that its first knowledge of the statement of April 23 came from the newspapers. Orlando spoke first of the cordial relations between the representatives of the

different powers at the Peace Conference during the framing of the peace terms for Germany. He continued:¹³

"If it was possible to deduce from our conversations the divergences of views between the Governments, and, above all, between the Italians and Americans, there never had been reason to believe these divergences were absolutely irreconcilable, but up to the time of the delivery of the memorandum, on April 14, by President Wilson, setting forth the American view, assurances had been given that the American delegation had not reached a definite decision regarding the Italian question. . . .

"Several times I stated with firmness consistent with courtesy that the program of the Italian territorial claims was based on essential cardinal points of acceptance, which was an absolute condition for the Italian Government.

"This is, synthetically, the history of the activity of the Italian delegation from the middle of March to April 13, when the convocation of the German delegates was agreed upon, with a reserve provision.

"On April 14 I had two long conversations with President Wilson, in which the whole Italian territorial question was profoundly discussed. Mr. Wilson concluded by handing me a memorandum, saying it represented the decision of the American Government on the question and authorizing me to communicate the same to the Italian Parliament. I have distributed it today to all members.

"President Wilson's message prevented us from refusing, as well as accepting, any proposal without first appealing to the Italian people and Parliament, which alone are entitled to pass judgment on the conduct and responsibility of the Italian Government.

"This, therefore, is my duty—to ask before this National Assembly whether the Italian Government and delegation, acting as they did, were faithful interpreters of the thought and will of Parliament and this country.

¹³ *New York Times*, "Current History," Vol. X, pp. 409-410.

"The point of view of England and France can be summed up as follows: They have always recognized with perfect loyalty the pledge of honor contained in the Treaty of Alliance between them and Italy, intending faithfully to respect it, but they have declared that as that treaty does not include, and, indeed, excludes, Fiume from the Italian claims, they do not concur with Italy on this question.

"They would only admit the principle of making Fiume an independent free State, on condition, however, that this would occur as a compromise and not as an addition to the integral execution of the conditions of the treaty.

"It only remains for me to expound further the Italian viewpoint. Italy firmly believes before all, that her aspirations, as I set them forth in my answer to President Wilson's message, are founded on such high and solemn reasons of justice and right that they should be integrally accepted, even putting aside any international treaty or agreement. I need not repeat the reasons of historic right and national solidarity which are engraved on the heart of every Italian so that they become an absolute part of our nature.

"I wish, however, to repeat a simple fact, to wit: That if all Italy's aspirations were accepted in their entirety, Italy would have, in proportion to her population, a number of inhabitants inferior to those assigned to other States as a consequence of the war. Therefore, the accusation of entertaining imperialistic sentiments grieves and offends us.

"This nation, which certainly has given no proofs of cupidity in discussing the billions requested for reparation, and which has shown no excessive signs of emotion one way or another even when vast and rich territories had to be distributed in Africa and Asia among belligerents, and which has demonstrated that she prefers sentiment to utility until her attitude was a fault, has given the highest proof that she was fighting for her sacred rights.

"Regaining in this hour all her energies and will and find-

ing her reserves of enthusiasm and sacrifice inexhaustible, Italy has made it not a question of billions, nor colonies, nor rich territories, but the suffering cry of her own brothers.

“Regarding relations between us and our allies, we esteem and love the generous people of France and England and the Governments which represent them. Perhaps we love and esteem them too much, so that we may not be sure that we will realize our rights, which come from contracts which pledge them and their honor. It must also be considered that in making these relations there is a sentiment which must be maintained between friend and friend, and Italy, perhaps, measured according to her contract the extent of the sacrifices which the war imposed.”

On the conclusion of the Premier's speech, a vote of confidence in the Cabinet was carried, 382 to 40, the dissenting votes being cast by the Socialists. The vote in the Senate was unanimous. Bissolati voted with the majority. The Italian press was enthusiastic about the unity of the support given Orlando and Sonnino. The *Giornale d'Italia* was delighted with the results of the vote. “Rome has spoken. The Italian Parliament has demonstrated its complete accord with the nation and the King. In this way, the Italian Parliament has answered President Wilson as the people had already answered him in the public squares. It is now undeniable that the Government delegation represents the unshakable will of the whole nation. It is up to the Allies to revise their decisions, if they want to. Italy has made hers known.”¹⁴

It should be noted that neither Dalmatia nor Fiume was specifically mentioned when the vote was taken in the Chamber. It was simply a general vote of confidence. Orlando probably knew that he could not get all that Italy claimed but he did not care to assume the personal responsibility for taking less than the people had been led to expect and

¹⁴ New York Times, May 1, 1919.

so he went back for a further mandate from Parliament.

On the night of April 29, an official statement was issued in Paris giving the text of President Wilson's memorandum of April 14. When it had been presented to Orlando, Mr. Wilson had given permission to publish it in Italy but this had not been done until April 30. The memorandum follows:

"There is no question to which I have given more careful or anxious thought than I have given to this, because in common with all my colleagues it is my earnest desire to see the utmost justice done to Italy.

"Throughout my consideration of it, however, I have felt that there was one matter in which I had no choice and could wish to have none. I felt bound to square every conclusion that I should reach as accurately as possible with the fourteen principles of peace which I set forth in my address to the Congress of the United States on the eighth of January, 1918, and in subsequent addresses.

"These fourteen points and the principles laid down in the subsequent addresses were formally adopted with only a single reservation by the Powers associated against Germany, and will constitute the basis of peace with Germany. I do not feel at liberty to suggest one basis for peace with Germany and another for peace with Austria.

"Personally I am quite willing that Italy should be accorded along the whole front of her northern frontier, and wherever she comes into contact with Austrian territory, all that was accorded her in the so-called pact of London, but I am of the clear opinion that the pact of London can no longer apply to the settlement of her eastern boundaries.

"The line drawn in the pact of London was conceived for the purpose of establishing an absolutely adequate frontier of safety for Italy against any possible hostility or aggression on the part of Austria. But Austria-Hungary no longer exists. These eastern frontiers will touch countries stripped of the military and naval power of Austria, settled in independence of Austria, and organized for the pur-

pose of satisfying legitimate national aspirations, and created states not hostile to the new European order, but arising out of it, interested in its maintenance, dependent upon the cultivation of friendships, and bound to a common policy of peace and a convention by the covenant of the League of Nations.

"There would be no justification, in my judgment, in including Fiume, or any part of the coast line to the south of Fiume, within the boundaries of the Italian kingdom. Fiume is by situation and by all the circumstances of its development not an Italian, but an international port serving the countries to the east and north of the Gulf of Fiume.

"Just because it is an international port and cannot with justice be subordinated to any one sovereignty, it is my clear judgment that it should enjoy a very considerable degree of genuine autonomy, and while it should be included no doubt within the customs system of the new Jugoslavic state, it should nevertheless be left free in its own interest and in the interest of the states lying about it, to devote itself to the service of the commerce which naturally and inevitably seeks an outlet or inlet at its port.

"The states which it serves will be new states. They will have complete confidence in the access to an outlet on the sea. The friendship and the connections of the future will largely depend on such an arrangement as I have suggested, and friendship, co-operation and freedom of action must underlie every arrangement of peace if peace is to be lasting.

"I believe that there will be common agreement that the island of Lissa should be ceded to Italy, and that she should retain the port of Volpna. I believe that it will be generally agreed that the fortifications which the Austrian Government established upon the islands near the eastern coast of the Adriatic should be permanently dispensed with under international guarantee, and that the disarmament which is to be arranged under the League of Nations should limit the states on the eastern coast of the Adriatic to only such

minor naval forces as are necessary for policing the waters of the islands and the coast.

"These are conclusions which I am forced to by compulsion of the understandings which underlie the whole initiation of the present peace.

"No other conclusions seem to be acceptable to being rendered concise with these understandings. They were understandings accepted by the whole world and bear with peculiar compulsion upon the United States, because the privilege was accorded her of taking the initiative of bringing about the negotiations for peace and her plans underlie the whole difficult business.

"And certainly Italy obtains under such a settlement the great historic objects which her people have so long had in mind. The historic wrongs inflicted upon her by Austria-Hungary and by a long series of unjust transactions, which I hope will before long sink out of the memory of man, are completely redressed. Nothing is denied her which will complete her national unity.

"It is with these facts in mind that I have approached the Adriatic question. It is commonly agreed, and I very heartily adhere to the agreement, that the ports of Trieste and Pola, and with them the greater part of the Istrian peninsula, should be ceded to Italy, her eastern frontier running along the natural strategical line established by the physical conformation of the country—a line which it has been attempted to draw with some degree of accuracy on the attached map.

"Within this line on the Italian side will lie considerable bodies of non-Italian populations, but their fortunes are so naturally linked by the nature of the country itself with the rest of the Italian people that I think their inclusion is fully justified.

"Here and there upon the islands of the Adriatic and upon the eastern coast of that sea there are settlements containing large Italian elements of population, but the pledges

under which the new states enter the family of nations will abundantly safeguard the liberty, the development and all the just rights of national and racial minorities, and back of these safeguards will always lie the watchful authority of the League of Nations, and at the very outset we shall have avoided the fatal error of making Italy's nearest neighbors on her east her enemies and nursing just such a sense of injustice as has disturbed the peace of Europe for generations together and played no small part in bringing on the terrible conflict through which we have just passed."

There is evidence that, since the armistice, propaganda has been carried on to raise the expectations of the Italian people. In January, the *Corriere della Sera* drew attention to this fact:¹⁵

"No one knows better than the Minister of the Interior, who is also Premier, that on the other coast Italy claims that part of Dalmatia which was assigned to her by the Treaty of London, but not more. In other words, the Italian Government lays no claim whatever to Trau, Spalato, Ragusa, or Cattaro. We shall meet with denials from the usual ill-informed amateurs; but what we say is incontrovertible truth. And so we ask this of Signor Orlando. If the Government does not claim all Dalmatia, or at least its principal ports, in which the Dalmatian Italians live, is it not simply criminal to raise our hopes for the annexation of centres like Trau and Spalato or all Dalmatia? Here it is not a matter of opinions, but of facts, and we ought to see that those who are agitating in good faith for Dalmatia are aware of it. If the Government definitely claims and demands it, the agitation is justified; but if the Government does not demand it, then, we repeat, to favor and not to curb the movement is the worse kind of Defeatism. For it creates among Italians a state of mind tending to transform the sense of a great victory into the sense of a great defeat. This quite apart from the injury to our Dal-

¹⁵ Quoted by "New Europe," Vol. X, p. 118.

matian co-nationals outside the territory claimed, and from the intransigence which this provokes in the Yugoslav camp."

Mr. Charles Selden, the correspondent of the *New York Times*, related the story told him by an American army officer that bears on this question of organized propaganda. This officer declared that in Fiume the Italian government officials recently got the populace together at a great open-air meeting for the distribution of food. After the distribution had been made, those in the crowd who wanted a further distribution were asked to raise their hands. All hands immediately went up. Photographs were taken at that instant and later were widely distributed throughout Italy with a caption to indicate that the picture was of a group of citizens of Fiume voting in favor of annexation to Italy.¹⁶

If Orlando did not satisfy the expectations of the people, Giolitti was ready to take his place on a platform of breach with the Allies. During the Winter, the Giolitti organs had encouraged the Italian demands while hinting that Orlando was too weak to obtain them. Giolitti has been quiet during the war but is much too shrewd a politician to miss a chance to get back to his old game. Nor was Germany slow to take advantage of the situation. Prince von Bülow gave his views on the Fiume situation in the *Giornale d'Italia*.¹⁷ "Undoubtedly Fiume is an Italian town and must go to Italy. All its inhabitants are Italian, except a small minority. . . . Fiume is Italian, as likewise Zara, Sebenico and Spalato." He went on to say that he hoped soon to return to Italy and again to take up his residence in Rome. Congressman La Guardia, in an interview given to the Italian newspapermen in Paris, warned the Italians against German intrigue. He spoke most emphatically of the need for patience on both sides and con-

¹⁶ *New York Times*, April 30, 1919.

¹⁷ Quoted by *Montreal Gazette*, May 6, 1919.

tinued, "If I have made myself clear, it is evident that unless the element of personal pride be allowed to intervene a solution can be found. It is time for the greatest forbearance, both in America and in Italy. Any one who attempts to make political capital out of this trouble has not the interest of world peace at heart.

"Italy considers that it is the fault of the United States that a settlement has not been reached. But it is my duty to remind Italy that, although her ancient foe, Austria, is defeated, the Germans are doing their utmost to spoil a peace with their dirty, underhand work. Germany pretends to be Italy's friend, but surely Italians can realize the meaning and danger of such pretenses. At best, Germany's friendship means that she is willing to exploit Italy as she would exploit a Germany colony. Such declarations as that of Bülow I consider an outrage and an insult to Italian intelligence. No Italian who would attempt to speculate along such lines at the present juncture can be patriotic or acting in the true interests of Italy."¹⁸

While "Down with Wilson" was the cry in the public squares, it was always followed by "Long live America" and the Government saw to it that no unpleasant incidents occurred around the American Embassy. The nationalist press maintained a friendly tone towards America but attacked Wilson, Lloyd George and Great Britain generally. The *Tempo* compared Wilson's attitude toward Italy with his attitude toward Ireland. He had refused to interfere with the Irish question on the ground that it was a purely internal question of the British Empire but he had interfered in the Italian-Jugoslav question. "Our controversy with the Jugoslavs," the *Tempo* wrote, "is an internal question. Jugoslavia is a State, like the Irish Republic, still waiting its recognition in Paris. If Wilson has not wished to assume the just task to help solidify the efforts of self-determination which Ireland so solemnly aspired to, putting

¹⁸ *New York Times*, May 12, 1919.

forward the pretext of the unsuitableness of his intervention in internal questions of the United Kingdom, consistency would require that he abstain from giving any verdict on those which are for us legitimate, natural, and automatic consequences of a pact which ought to have constituted a fact not susceptible of revision." The *Tempo* concluded that the Allies were taking advantage of the coal and food situation in Italy to make that country give in.

The views of the more moderate Italians are perhaps expressed by Signor Marconi.¹⁹ He feels the greatest admiration and sympathy for the President's ideals but suggests that, as it has not been possible to carry them into effect in every phase of the peace settlement, it is, perhaps, regrettable that Mr. Wilson should have thought it possible to do so in the case of Italy. He indicated that this feeling is largely at the root of the attitude of the Italian people. There is a sense of uncertainty as to the future frontiers and as to the influence of the new Germany; the character and policy of the new Yugoslav State is uncertain; and the League of Nations has yet to prove its practical efficiency. Italy feels that she must obtain every security for the future. Of course, it might be remarked, that in this respect, every European country is in the same condition, so that there is nothing exceptional about the position of Italy.

On May 4, Lloyd George and Clemenceau sent a communication to the Italian Government inviting it to resume its place at the Peace Conference. Italy had also been notified of the intention of the Allies to call Austrian and Hungarian delegates to the Conference. On the same day, Clemenceau and Lloyd George received a telegram from Sonnino declaring that Italy would hold her allies to the agreement to make no separate peace and that the treaty could not be signed without Italy's consent. This was construed by the press as an ultimatum and relief was felt the

¹⁹ *Christian Science Monitor*, April 28, 1919.

next day when Clemenceau received a telegram from Orlando stating that the Italians would return to Paris on May 7 and had forwarded credentials for presentation to the German peace delegates. On May 7, Orlando arrived in Paris and resumed his seat in the Council. He and Sonnino left Rome secretly and the news of their departure was suppressed by the censor for twenty-four hours.

After the vote of confidence in the Orlando Government passed by the Italian Parliament, the delegates felt that they could return to Paris with increased authority, having received directly the mandate of the people. In Paris it was noted that neither Fiume nor Dalmatia were specifically included in the wording of the resolution and this was interpreted as a sign of conciliation. While in Rome, the Italian delegates held conferences with the King and the American Ambassador, Thomas Nelson Page, and with Mr. Page, the French Ambassador, Camille Barrère, and Mr. Griffith, formerly Parliamentary Under Secretary to the British Home Office.

It was stated that Italy's return to Paris was hastened by the fact that Crespi, who had remained in Paris, learned that changes were being made in the treaty with Germany—notably in respect to the share of Italy in the indemnity. There is evidence that a copy of the April treaty was actually printed without the slightest reference to Italy. Mr. Wilson took no part in inviting the Italians to return to Paris and, as subsequent events proved, he had not changed his views on Fiume and Dalmatia.

It is undeniable that Italy had accepted the Fourteen Points. When she accepted them, no reservation was made as to the secret treaties. The provision in the league covenant by which members are obliged to abrogate all treaties or understandings made before the League goes into effect which are inconsistent with the covenant seems to bear directly on the Adriatic question. Article XX, the one in question, reads: "The members of the League severally

agree that this covenant is accepted as abrogating all obligations or understandings *inter se* which are inconsistent with the terms thereof, and solemnly undertake that they will not hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent with the terms thereof. In case any member of the League before becoming a member of the League have undertaken any obligations inconsistent with the terms of this covenant it shall be the duty of such member to take immediate steps to procure its release from such obligations." Article XIX, which might also be considered to apply, reads, "The Assembly may, from time to time, advise the reconsideration by members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable, and the consideration of international conditions of which continuance might endanger the peace of the world."

The fact that the delegates had returned made compromise almost certain and a most noteworthy fact was that the credentials of Trumbić, Pašić, and Vesnić, handed to the Germans, were drafted in the name of the Serbian, Croatian and Slovene State. This was the most direct recognition of the new State which had come from the Conference. By the Peace Treaty, Austria is required to recognize the complete independence of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State, a clause in the preamble reading as follows:—"Whereas, The said powers have also recognized the union of certain portions of the said monarchy with the territory of the Kingdom of Serbia as a free, independent and allied State under the name of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State; Austria similarly recognizes the complete independence of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and renounces her rights and titles." A field commission of seven members, five nominated by the Allied and Associated Powers and one each by Austria and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, is to fix the exact boundaries. The question of the basin of Klagenfurt is reserved and its status will be determined by a plebiscite, which is to be held six months after the treaty goes into effect. The Austrian

authorities are to withdraw from this district when the treaty is signed. Protection for religious or linguistic minorities, freedom of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of other nations passing through Jugoslavia is assured.

A dispatch from Rome, June 16, stated that the Italian forces were advancing on the Villach-Sanvito line on the frontier between Italy and Jugoslavia in order to counteract the operation of the Jugoslavs in the Klagenfurt region. The semi-official explanation of the Italian advance declared that the Jugoslavs wished to occupy Klagenfurt in order to influence by force the plebiscite and to control all railway communications between Trieste and the hinterland.

Many compromises of the Fiume question have been suggested. The French papers in May were largely in favor of the plan of making Fiume a free port for a few years and at the same time helping the Jugoslavs in building a new port on Buccari Bay, upon the completion of which Fiume would revert to Italy. Others thought that Italy should be given a rectification of the frontier of Istria, the Dalmatian Islands and a régime for Fiume like that of the Saar Basin, that is Fiume should be an open port for some years under the trusteeship of the League and then a plebiscite should be taken, or it should be an open port administered by Italy as the mandatory of the League until 1923, after which it would pass under Italian sovereignty. Another plan called for the creation of a "buffer state," an independent state under the protection of the League of Nations and governed by a council of five, two Italians, one Yugoslav, one Hungarian and one citizen of Fiume appointed by the Italian, Yugoslav and Hungarian cabinets and the Fiume National Council respectively. Within this state would be included Fiume and Sušak and a strip of coastline south and east, and the islands of Veglia (Krk) and Arbe, and to the north the railway junction of San

Pietro.²⁰ At the same time, Zara and Sebenico, under this scheme, were given to Italy along with the islands of Cherso, Lussin and Lissa, the rest of Dalmatia being renounced by Italy.

An elaborate compromise suggested in the *New Europe* deserves notice. Their plan is expressed as follows:²¹

"The first axiom upon which the Adriatic peace must rest is the assignment of Gorizia, Trieste and Pola to Italy, of Fiume and Dalmatia to Yugoslavia. But when this has once been said, there are many ways of assuring Italy's dignity and just interests:

"1. The strategic security against Germany which the line of the Brenner alone can give (though this involves the grave infringement of the national principles and may sow the seed of further trouble).

"2. The line of the Julian Alps, with certain passes and railway junctions (e.g., Tarvis), not included in the Treaty of London.

"3. The historic frontier line in Istria from the Arsa northward, perhaps even modified to include, for geographical reasons, the Slav heart of the province.

"4. The proclamation of Fiume as a free and autonomous city, with its own jurisdiction and flag, but inside the Yugoslav customs area and subject to Yugoslav sovereignty (in other words an extension under Belgrade of the privileges which it enjoyed under Budapest).

"5. Similar autonomy for the city of Zara, which will in any case entirely lose its importance as the result of the war.

"6. Reciprocal linguistic rights for all minorities, under guarantees of the League of Nations.

"7. The assignment to Italy of the whole Austro-Hungarian navy (while assuring to the Yugoslav owners their full rightful share of the mercantile marine).

²⁰ New York *Times*, June 3, 1919.

²¹ Quoted in *Christian Science Monitor*, June 19, 1919.

"8. The dismantlement of all fortifications from Isonzo to the Bojana, the neutralization of the coast and the imposition by the League of Nations upon Jugoslavia of a pledge not to construct war vessels, save for the minimum of coastal defense.

"9. If absolutely necessary (but only as a *pis aller* to avert actual war) special arrangements for the island of Lussinpiccola, whose possession by Italy would guard the back of Pola and neutralize any possible Slav aggression in the Quarnero, and of Lissa, which is a key position between the northern and southern chains of islands which fringe the Dalmatian coast.

"10. The grant to Italy of a mandate under the League of Nations in Albania—on the assumption (a) that Albania cannot stand alone; (b) that she must not be partitioned; and (c) that for good or bad it is inconceivable that, if a mandate is to be given, Italy's claims to receive it could be passed over in favor of any other power.

"11. A naval base in the Dodecanese which can be conceded without any serious violation of Greek nationality and which Greece is actually prepared to concede voluntarily.

"12. Into the further question of a possible mandate not only in Adalia but throughout Central Anatolia, once more under the League of Nations, we do not propose to enter for the moment. It is open to many obvious objections and might, indeed, under certain circumstances prove a fatal gift to Italy herself. But if Italy insists upon some form of compensation for the commitments criminally undertaken by her western allies at the expense of a third party, it would seem as though Asia Minor offered the most obvious field for such an arrangement.

"13. Any such changes in Italy's favor as could be made in Somaliland and East Africa are already foreshadowed by the Secret Treaty, and therefore could hardly be regarded as 'compensators.' Needless to say, we still regard

the whole idea of 'compensation' as altogether odious and irreconcilable with modern democratic principles; but for the moment the western powers have maneuvered themselves into a position where the last vested interests of the old diplomacy still have to be bought out by the old methods before the ground can be free for clean and honest construction."

The attitude of the European press outside of Italy towards Wilson was, on the whole, favorable, though, of course, his action, in making public such a statement, came in for a good deal of criticism. This was an entirely new method and naturally was rather irritating to diplomats trained in the old school of secrecy. It established a precedent in appealing directly to a nation instead of deviously through the representatives of the government of that nation. The people have to pay the cost of whatever burden a decision may entail, so public opinion should be given all the material possible upon which to make the decision. Most of the papers favorable to Wilson agreed that it might have been better if the statement had been issued last January before the hopes of the Italian people had been raised to such a high point. The press did not lay much emphasis upon the withdrawal of the Italian delegates. It was not regarded as an irreparable break. To many persons it appeared to be part of a clever scheme to divert the attention of the Italian people from internal matters. There had been riots in Milan caused by the Socialists and strike troubles in Turin. There is shortage of food and coal in Italy. On April 1, the country returned to war bread. Coal is so scarce that the government feared many industries might be compelled to shut down and the condition of unemployment might become dangerous. One reason for not demobilizing the army is fear of increasing the unrest by returning so many men to civilian life to join the ranks of the unemployed. The cost of living has increased enormously. A Royal Italian Commission, making its report in

March, stated that the increase in wholesale prices had been more than in any other Allied country. On April 15, the Supreme Economic Council took steps to improve conditions and appointed a committee on coal supply for Italy. And, on April 30, Italy obtained a new loan from the United States, making a total of some \$1,571,500,000. It was officially stated that these economic measures had no connection with the Fiume situation.

The press of Central Europe was, of course, pleased at the prospect of a rift in the Peace Conference. The *Neue Freie Presse*, however, agreed with some of the Allied papers when it stated: "Orlando is bluffing, probably in order to square his position in Italy toward the interventionists. It is impossible for Italy to withdraw, as she is fed by America." ²² In Germany, *Vorwärts* sided with Wilson and upheld his point of view.

The English liberal papers supported Wilson. Some pointed out that the Italian delegates had recognized the necessity for Polish control of Danzig, a German city with a surrounding rural Polish population, and that they should be consistent on Fiume. Further, the loss of Fiume would not cut Italy in two as the loss of Danzig would divide Germany. The *Westminster Gazette* wrote: "This is the first test case of the League of Nations. . . . It is undoubtedly the break with the past, which conventional minds find exceedingly disturbing. Yet, if the new world order to which we are pledged is to be more than a name, we may make up our minds that we shall all, on occasions, have to submit to the process now applied to Italy." ²³

The *New Europe* gave enthusiastic approval to President Wilson's course and saw in it the making of the choice, at the Peace Conference, between the old and the new diplomacy.

Of the French papers, *Vérité* (Socialist) characterized

²² *Associated Press Dispatch* from Vienna, April 24, 1919.

²³ Quoted by *Christian Science Monitor*, April 28, 1919.

the statement as exhibiting "a wisdom and probity based on equity and reason alone." The *Journal des Debats* blamed the Italian Government for having planted false hopes in the Italian people. André Chéradame, in *La Démocratie Nouvelle*, defended Wilson, while the *Matin* and the *Figaro* attacked his course.

On the whole, the American press backed the President. Some condemned his method and many thought that "it was not our affair," but the defenders of Italy were few. James M. Beck expressed the following opinion on the incident: "How many Americans until recent months ever heard of Fiume? What interest had America in the decision of a question whether an obscure city on the Adriatic shall belong to the Yugoslav nation or to Italy? Our representatives do not even leave the difficult work of adjustment to the great neighboring States of Europe, who have a direct interest in the adjustment of the Adriatic problem. On the contrary, we assume the chief responsibility of deciding a question which can only estrange a faithful ally, and, incidentally, sow the seeds of dissension between the different elements in our own population.

"With one hand President Wilson takes Danzig from Poland, and with the other gives Fiume to Jugoslavia, and simultaneously recognizes the English protectorate over Egypt but reserves decision as to its details and encourages the dangerous unrest among its people. When did the American people give its President a mandate to determine these questions in which the United States had no practical interest whatsoever? Never in American history has there been such an assertion of personal absolutism."²⁴

Senators Borah and Johnson, who have not hesitated to criticise the President, agreed that his policy of opposition to the Secret Treaties was to be commended. Borah argued, however, that the controversy over Fiume, together with that regarding the insistence of the Japanese for racial

²⁴ New York Times, April 27, 1919.

equality, would illustrate the perpetual difficulty in which the United States would find itself as a member of the League of Nations.

Senator Lodge, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, took issue with Wilson on Fiume. He set forth his ideas in a telegram sent to Dr. Rocco Brindisi, President of the Dante Alighieri Society, and to other Italian organizations.²⁵ "Italy should have military and naval control of the Adriatic, not only for her own protection, but as an essential barrier against any future attempt of Germany to attack the rest of the world, as she did in the recent war. I have also said repeatedly that the Jugoslavs ought to have access to the Adriatic, which I regard as economically essential to their independence.

"As to Fiume, if Italy is of the opinion that it is necessary to her safety and for her protection that she should hold Fiume, I am clearly of the opinion that it should be hers, especially as the people of Fiume, I understand, have voted to join Italy. Italy regards Fiume as the founders of our republic regarded the mouth of the Mississippi when it was said that any nation holding the mouth of the Mississippi was of necessity an enemy of the United States.

"That which we desire to do for the Slavs is purely commercial and economic. Italy's demand for Fiume rests on the ground of national safety and protection. Italy has fought side by side with France, England and the United States and has helped enormously in repelling the German onset. . . . She has taken possession of Fiume, which was part of the enemy territory, by her victory in the war. I do not see how the United States and the other nations with whom she was allied can properly refuse her request."

On June 6, Lodge read in the Senate a cablegram from Andrea Ossinack, "Fiume plenipotentiary" at the Peace Conference, appealing to the United States Senate against

²⁵ *New York Times*, April 29, 1919.

the stand taken by President Wilson. The message read: ²⁶

"National Council assembled in emergency meeting, after animated debate, unanimously approved following appeal to United States Senate: When Peace Conference is about to decide destinies of world, Fiume, represented by National Council elected by plebiscite and by its Mayor elected years ago by free ballot, appeals to Senate of great American people invoking its aid to prevent perpetration of the greatest injustice known to history. On Oct. 15, before downfall of Austro-Hungarian monarchy, a Deputy of Fiume declared in Hungarian Parliament that Fiume, which had always been Italian and wished to remain Italian, would exercise right of self-determination under its special status of free national Italian commune united as *corpus separatum* to Hungarian Crown.

"Thirtieth of October, when result of battle of Vittorio Veneto not yet known, Fiume abandoned by Hungarian authorities, we acquired complete independence, and despite the presence of Croatian soldiers who occupied city by force, by plebiscite based on right of self-determination, proclaimed its annexation to Italy, to which Fiume always bound not less than Trent and Trieste by common language, customs, feelings. Same time National Council declared it placed decision under protection of America, mother of freedom and universal democracy, awaiting sanction of Peace Conference.

"All Peace Conference had to do was to take cognizance of annexation to Italy proclaimed by Fiume, and all Italy had to do was to say whether she accepted this annexation or not. But Fiume, to its great surprise, sees that its right to self-determination, freely exercised and placed under protection of America, was denied by President Wilson, who in fourteen points proclaimed the fundamental principle and right, refused to very city which offers world unique typical instance of self-determination.

²⁶ *New York Times*, June 7, 1919.

"President Wilson unable to deny historical right of Fiume, free through centuries, or national right, because all expert American, British, French, Swiss and even enemy journalists had to recognize Italian character of the city whose Mayors and deputies have always been Italian, in whose archives and municipal acts not one document can be found not in Italian. Since President could contest neither historical nor national right to self-determination of Fiume, he had recourse to economic arguments, to give Fiume status of free city, thus insuring, in disguised form, preponderance Yugoslav influence.

"President declared Fiume natural port of hinterland west of Yugoslavia, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Roumania, and for this reason wishes to insure Yugoslav influence, so that city may gradually fall into hands of Yugoslavia. President forgets he thus favors only one of hinterland peoples, forgets that only 7 per cent. of total movement of port of Fiume accounted for by trade of Croatia and Slavonia, forgets that competing agricultural countries of Yugoslavia and Hungary can only obtain from Italy, mainly an industrial country, satisfactory guarantees of impartiality in administration of port, in interests of inland traffic, as Italian commercial interests would not be in contact with those of the hinterland.

"President Wilson is silent when reminded that the treaty of London insures Yugoslavia over 1,000 kilometers of coast with twelve ports, and refuses to understand argument which shows needs of traffic do not require political possession of a city and that Fiume can be annexed to Italy without injury to interests of hinterland peoples.

"If Fiume is a free port no hindrance will be placed in the way of trade of hinterland. President Wilson's refusal to respect self-determination Fiume strange. For while he thus solemnly denies principle he himself proclaimed, it also shows open hostile attitude towards aspirations for which Italian people shed so much blood and sustained such heavy

sacrifices, and favors those Croats and Slovenes who fought to last in ranks of Austro-Hungarian army against Entente.

"Citizens of Fiume appeal to the sense of justice of American Senate, hoping it will not permit, in the name of the great people of Abraham Lincoln and George Washington, so gross an injustice to the community.

"Fiume wishes to know if the Senate which represents American people approves of policy which outrages the feelings of a city and is offensive to Italian dignity. Fiume wishes to know if American Senate wishes to share responsibility which Mr. Wilson has assumed before history. Legitimate representatives of Fiume declare to representatives of the American people that Fiume resists this attempt on its liberties. Fiume will face war, or life or death, and will not tolerate that its fate be decided without its consent. It is prepared to defend itself to the utmost."

The *New Republic* saw in the Fiume crisis simply an endeavor to gloss over an internal crisis. On April 14, the Italian Embassy at Washington had issued a statement to the effect that Italy was on the verge of a revolution due to the coal and food shortage. But, the *New Republic* points out, the world has heard nothing of this situation from the Italian Government. Instead, all attention has been directed to the Adriatic. "Faced with an imminent revolution at home, they have actually threatened twice to quit the Conference at Paris because they could not plant their flag on other people's territory. They have wasted sympathy; they have stirred up no end of irritation; they have put Italy in the worst possible light before the world. Who pays? The common people of Italy. The peasants and the workmen. They starve. They are out of work. They are unassisted because the Italian officials, under the influence of special moneyed groups and intoxicated with the notion of being a ruling power, have consistently sabotaged the peace negotiations, raised a hue and cry over the side issues and left unargued the real needs of Italy. . . . Italy is now

paying for the grandiose pretensions of that sacred egoism which Baron Sonnino proclaimed. The leaders have not been willing to share in the common victory and the common purpose. They have preferred to indulge in Oriental maneuvers, to behave like a plaster cast of the Roman Empire, to listen to the intoxication of d'Annunzios instead of the common sense of the Bissolatis. . . . The imminence of revolution in Italy has been one of the persistent ghosts of the Peace Conference. If it comes, some of the blame may perhaps fall upon other nations, but the bulk of it lies squarely on the doorsteps of the present Italian Government, its propagandists, its corrupted press, its devastating censorship, and its meaningless ambitions."²⁷ It is interesting, in this connection, to note the resolution reported to have been passed by the Executive Committee of the Italian Socialist Party. The committee recommended that the party withdraw from the International Socialist Bureau and affiliate with the "Third International" recently founded by the Russian communists and revolutionary groups of other countries. A chief reason for this action was that the Allied Socialists in the old International are too lenient towards the nationalistic and imperialistic programs of their governments.²⁸

The growing coolness between France and Italy should be noted. From the beginning, Clemenceau has believed in the old balance of power and has insisted upon special guarantees of safety for France as against Germany in what was practically an alliance between France, Britain and the United States. Italy felt that she was left outside of this arrangement. The *Idea Nazionale* has made a special grievance of this agreement. "America, England and France have contracted an alliance while Italy was absent, and did it not only as though she was absent from the Peace Conference, but as though she did not exist."

²⁷ "New Republic," April 19, 1919, p. 363.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, May 3, 1919, p. 2.

Many Italian publicists see a menace to Italy in the attitude of France towards the new Jugoslavia. Virginio Gayda indignantly repudiates the charge that Italy is imperialistic.²⁹ He sees France encouraging the new states in order to neutralize Germany by reducing and confining it. The reconstruction of Russia as a great territorial unit minus Poland and Finland would mean pressure on Germany from the east. Gayda claims that Alsace-Lorraine has more German than French population and that the solution of that question is "more of an historic than a national question." "It is clear, therefore," he writes, "that in the territorial aspiration of every country, we find ourselves still face to face with that old realistic principle of equilibrium, of strategic and economic safeguards and of preventive defense, which is founded on the possession of natural cardinal points, and which in the past has ruled the policy of every sane country. Therefore, if France, Great Britain and Australia, without renouncing the new internationalistic formula of the League of Nations, appropriate to themselves the rights of counting on possible future aggressions, and of providing, each in its own way, for defense against them, why do they deny the right to Italy, who applies it only in very small measure when she concerns herself with the defense of the Adriatic and of securing that liberty of breathing and moving which the domination of Austria has denied her for a century? In the case of France and Italy, are not the problems identical, and ought they not to have an identical solution?"

In fact, Mr. Gayda thinks the situation of Italy is more acute than that of France. The Jugoslavs are as much enemies of Italy as the Germans are of France; the Croats formed the gendarmerie and soldiery of Austria which oppressed the Italians and, in the Great War, the Croats fought to the last. For the enemies of Italy, Mr. Gayda

²⁹ Gayda, V., "The Adriatic Problem and the Peace Conference," *Fortnightly Review*, March, 1919, pp. 478-91.

sees the political value of Yugoslavia. In the Adriatic, he thinks that it will take over the mission of Austria, and perpetuate the military threat against Italy from the sea and block her economic penetration into the Balkans. Yugoslavia has no capital and Gayda realizes that Italy cannot finance her, but foresees that the capitalists and governments who do, will demand concessions and railway and port favors and in that way will definitely eliminate Italy from the Balkans. The great threat he sees in too kindly relations between France and Yugoslavia. "If, therefore, France should accept the invitation, so insistently urged on her by the Yugoslavs, to become the economic and therefore the political protector of the new Serbia, Italy would find herself completely enclosed—east, west, and south—by a chain of French possessions and zones of influence. She would find herself barred from the Adriatic and besieged in the Mediterranean, which would be a French sea." His feelings towards France may be summed up in his warning, "and we must remember that it was after the French occupation of Tunis that Italy accepted the hard yoke of the Alliance with Austria and Germany." He recognizes that ports are necessary for the Croats and Serbs, but "the possession of the whole of Dalmatia is, therefore, not an essential necessity, not a matter of life or death for Serbia. Some concession might be made on Serbia's part. Italy is certainly not hostile to the Serbian national movement for unification. But she does not forget that in the war against Austria, in 1859, which gained only Lombardy, the small kingdom of Piedmont gave over two entire provinces, Nice and Savoy, in order to gain the help of France. And, finally, none of the new nations liberated from the Austrian yoke should forget the fact that it was Italy who destroyed Austria and gave them their freedom."

Gayda is not alone in his attitude toward France. Certain sections of the Italian press have, since the armistice, become more and more dissatisfied with France. There has

been prevalent a feeling that the French have not praised the part Italy played in the war to a sufficient extent and that they are helping Jugoslavia simply to hinder Italy from expanding. Then there is the strategic question of the balance of power in the Mediterranean. Former neutralists are more or less Germanophile and still have something to gain if they can get up a case to show that Italy intervened on the wrong side. The Nationalists want to see Italy the great Mediterranean power, to extend Tripoli in the interior to Lake Tschad and Darfour, to link Eritrea with Somaliland by acquiring Djbouti, to gain a foothold in Alexandria and to keep Syria as small as possible, and to gain Smyrna, Adalia and a hold in Abyssinia.

Mr. Goffredo Bellonci has given in the *Rosto del Carlino* full details of the program of France alleged by him and other Italians to be designed for the express purpose of advancing the expansion and development of France at the expense of Italy. He writes: ³⁰

"Italy comes out of the Paris Conference stripped and impoverished, for the frontiers, pushed up to the Brenner, and the acquisition of Trent, Trieste, and Pola, which would have represented a real gain for Italy in the balance of power system of 1914, assure her no political or economic advantages today. France, with the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, with the possession of the Saar basin, with the control of Syria and the extension of her already vast colonial dominions, is acquiring outlets, markets, and raw materials that put her in the front rank of industrial powers. But this it not enough for France. She is bent on depriving Germany and Italy of markets and outlets. All those who have followed French policy in Poland, Bohemia, and Austria know how France is encircling Germany. But a few words are necessary to show how she is stifling us. In the West, France is consolidating her frontiers, from Savoy, which is to lose its neutrality, to the Pyrenees, where

³⁰ Quoted by A. Livingston, *The Nation* (N. Y.), June 28, 1919, p. 1007.

the French are taking Catalonia under their protection. In the East, France is creating a Danubian and Baltic league, strengthening Serbia and Greece in order to prevent our expansion in the Adriatic and Mediterranean. The principle of nationality is being used to deprive us of the Dodecanese and to give Smyrna to Greece. The principle of economic freedom is sufficient to contest our claim to Fiume, which is the outlet of the new Central European Confederation into the Adriatic. She denies us the mining regions of Heraclea, but asks for herself the protectorate over the Turkish triangle comprising Broussa, Angora, and Kostamouni. With Fiume we lose the trade route of the East and with Smyrna a terminal for lines out of Trieste. We are granted a caravan route in Lybia through Daibat, Ghadames, and Ghat, since France is to hold the railroad of the Kamerum, which gives her control of Tschad. But we fail to get Djbouti, which is indispensable to our colonization in East Africa. When we have been deceived in the matter of Asia, Africa, the Adriatic, and the Mediterranean, why should we try to hide the evidences of our complete diplomatic defeat?"

Some of the French periodicals and journals favor Italy's claims. *La Revue* has published a series of articles expounding the claims of Italy. Other sections of the press suggested as early as last December that Italy had charged too great a price and that the promises of the treaty were only made under duress.

After the armistice, the Italians early announced their intention of holding France and Great Britain to the Pact of London and increased their claims to include Fiume. The main arguments advanced for the inclusion of Fiume were that the territory promised was far less than what Italy asked for at the time of the making of the Secret Treaty; that Italian possession of that city is necessary for the future protection of Italy, and, therefore, for the future peace of Europe; and that, when the Treaty was made,

Italy agreed to fight with the co-operation of Russia, but that Russia collapsed leaving Italy to do the work alone. The general feeling was that the victory was more complete than had been hoped for and the reward of Italy should be greater in proportion. A statement made by an Italian army officer expressed this sentiment: "We have won a great victory and insist upon all the fruits of it. We have crushed Austria more completely than we had dared to hope. So, as our victory is greater than we or our allies expected, we want more than we first asked when we entered the war. It is a natural human feeling to expect an added reward when achievement exceeds expectations."³¹

The statement to the Peace Conference on the Italian claims emphasizes this argument as follows: "When Italy joined the Allied Powers her undertaking, according to the military convention then agreed to, was limited by the obligation of Russia to employ against Austria-Hungary a certain minimum force, to prevent Austria-Hungary from concentrating all her efforts against Italy if Russia should desire to turn her attention in particular against Germany.

"The internal political events in Russia which led to a separate peace had the following double consequence: That Austria-Hungary, freed from any possibility of further pressure, was able to concentrate all her forces against Italy and that Germany, also freed from her Eastern enemy, was in a position to lend Austria-Hungary that efficacious assistance which at one period had such serious repercussion to Italy's detriment.

"In fact, while the unexpected event of Russia's disappearance from among the Entente belligerents was largely compensated to our Allies by the intervention of the American forces, no assistance of this sort came to the Italian front to relieve the effort of the Italian army, as President Wilson himself so sympathetically acknowledged and regretted.

³¹ *New York Times*, Dec. 24, 1918.

"The double consequence of Russia's falling out, from which Italy was the principal sufferer, both as regards military effort and sacrifice on the part of the population, would justify Italy in requesting an all-round increase of the compensations which were agreed upon in anticipation of much smaller efforts and sacrifices." ³²

Italy asks for Fiume as this extra compensation not only as a reward but because that city is racially Italian and having exercised its right of self-determination "of its own accord proclaimed its desire to be united to Italy."

Italy has been worried also about her high emigration rate. At the Colonial Conference held in Rome early in March, Signor Tittoni referred to this problem. He felt that this emigration must stop. Italy must have her own land, to which her people might go instead of having them creating wealth for other nations. He discussed Italy's wish for a colonial settlement corresponding to her needs and disclaimed any imperialistic feeling, declaring that it was a matter of necessity and therefore of justice. He felt that no peace could be satisfactory which did not afford Italy the possibility of just commercial treaties, assure to her supplies of raw material, safeguard emigration, secure her position in the Adriatic and in the Mediterranean, and make her colonial development possible.

Fiume formed part of the Kingdom of Croatia until the 12th century, when, with Istria, it fell under German influence. In 1467, the city became, through inheritance, the property of the Habsburgs and was governed directly by their representatives until 1776, when Maria Theresa incorporated it with Croatia. Internal autonomy was granted to the port, which was made a separate possession of the "Crown of Hungary" (to which Croatia also belonged). On April 23, 1779, Maria Theresa conferred municipal autonomy on Fiume. The Italians claim that by this act Fiume was definitely detached from the territory of Croatia

³² "Italian Claims in the Alps and on the Adriatic," pp. 15, 16.

and united directly with Hungary. The Jugoslavs, on the other hand, state that these special privileges were given to Fiume in order that it might enjoy the same advantages as Trieste and that the proposals came from the Croatian government itself. The crown of Hungary or "Holy Crown of St. Stephen" represented a federation of nations rather than the Magyar state of Hungary as we understand the term today. Croatia also was united with the Crown of St. Stephen. In 1806, Fiume obtained a seat in the Diet of Croatia and, in 1807, a seat in the common Parliament of Pressburg. After 1830, when the relations between the Croats and Magyars became strained on account of the attempt to Magyarize the Croats, the Magyars claimed certain counties of Slavonia and the coast from Segna to Fiume as part of Hungary proper. They claimed that, under the act of Maria Theresa, Fiume belonged to Hungarian territory. In 1848, Fiume took the Magyar side in the revolt against the Habsburgs. It will be remembered that the Croats upheld the Emperor. Fiume was occupied by Ban Jelačić and Francis Joseph placed the city under the direct authority of the Ban of Croatia. After 1860, when the Emperor re-established the Constitution of Croatia and Hungary, the Magyars again laid claim to Fiume and were upheld by the citizens of that town. In 1868, a settlement was arrived at upon all matters in dispute between Croats and Magyars except this question of Fiume. In this compromise, section 66 of the Croat text refers to Fiume, "regarding which an agreement could not be reached." In the Magyar text, the town is clearly defined as "a special body connected with the Hungarian crown." Both these documents were submitted to the Emperor for his signature and then a thin strip of paper bearing the Croat translation of the Magyar version of section 66 was pasted over the corresponding portion of the Croat text. Since 1868, Fiume has been held as an autonomous city directly attached to Hungary, although its status as such has never been

sanctioned by the Diet of Croatia.³³ This quarrel between Croat and Magyar has been revived in the Italo-Jugoslav dispute. The Italians claim that Fiume is an autonomous city and has the right of self-determination. The Jugoslavs hold that Fiume is rightfully still a part of Croatia and cannot break away from that state. In discussing this question the Jugoslav Memorandum to the Peace Conference reads as follows:

"When, then, toward the end of 1918, the municipality of Fiume (in majority Italian) and the Italian National Council improvised in the town, thought it their right to proclaim their 'annexation' to Italy and to send delegates to Rome with this end in view, they seem to have made a confusion between their municipal right (which is in the expression of an autonomy embracing only local affairs) and the rights of a State, which raises very much more important questions of sovereignty and territorial limits. And even though the Latin text, borrowed from the rescript of Maria Theresa and often invoked, which defines Fiume a 'separatum sacrae Regni Hungaricae Coronae adnexum corpus,' might lend itself to an interesting controversy regarding juridical exegesis, nothing useful can be extracted from it today from the point of view of the devolution of Fiume on the basis of modern jurisprudence. The legal subtlety which, a century and a half ago, made of Fiume a body, at once separate and associate (*separatum et adnexum*), may, strictly speaking, be explained by complications familiar in the ancient public law of the countries under the Monarchy of the Hapsburgs. It cannot today create the slightest right for a municipality, elected simply to occupy itself with communal affairs, and which should have nothing to do with any of the branches of the administration of the State, to invoke, in October, 1918, the principles of self-determination to decide the destinies of Fiume.

³³ Seton-Watson, R. W., "German, Slav and Magyar," pp. 89-90. Also Dr. Sišić, "The Fraud of Fiume."

"When President Wilson formulated the principle of self-determination, he took the precaution to add the words 'of peoples' and his idea did not certainly extend to small communities. Besides, the inhabitants of Fiume, who, as we have seen, are divided into Italians, Slavs, Magyars, and even Germans, could not pretend to form a people by themselves, neither from the ethnical nor juridical point of view, nor from the political point of view. Even if they were in accord on this pretension (and such is certainly not the case) it would be already untenable, for its admission would run the risk of leading the Peace Conference to break into fragments and to complicate its work of reconstruction on the basis of nationality, in view of the fact that similar pretensions might repeat themselves elsewhere."

The Italian proportion of Fiume has increased since 1848. Hungarian statistics for Fiume show the following results at the given dates:

	Croats	Italians
1848.....	11,581	691
1880.....	10,227	9,237
1890.....	13,478	13,012
1900.....	16,197	17,354
1910.....	15,692	24,212

Soon after the occupation of Fiume by the Italian troops in November, 1918, a census of the population was made by the Italian authorities. They found that the total population was 46,264, of whom 28,911 (62.5 per cent.) were Italians, 9,092 (19.6 per cent.) Croats, 1,674 (3.6 per cent.) Slovenes, 161 (0.4 per cent.) Serbs (making the total Slav population only 10,927 or 23.6 per cent.), 4,431 (9.6 per cent.) Hungarians, 616 (3.5 per cent.) Germans, and 379 (0.8 per cent.) other nationalities.³⁴

Professor Salvemini gives the population of Fiume as consisting of 6,000 Magyars, 3,000 foreigners, 24,000 Italians

³⁴ "Modern Italy," Vol. I, p. 344.

and 15,000 Jugoslavs in the town of Fiume, and 11,000 Serbo-Croats and 1,500 Italians in Sušak.³⁵ The Jugoslavs, in the Memorandum on Fiume presented to the Peace Conference, claim 11,705 Slavs in Sušak and only 658 Italians. Salvemini comes to this conclusion on Fiume: "This urban nucleus, isolated from its own suburb and from all the territory behind it, the commercial centre of a gulf whose shores are inhabited by Serbo-Croatians, opening directly upon a sea on whose eastern coast dwell some 3,500,000 Serbo-Croatians, is undeniably a centre two-thirds of whose inhabitants are Italian; and these Italians are without doubt the richest and most cultivated portion of the community, and form the political and administrative personnel Fiume, the 1,500 Italians of Sušak, and that other thousand or so of Italians who are scattered through the district of Volosca, would mean also incorporating the 50,000 Slavs of Eastern Istria, the 15,000 Slavs of Fiume and the 11,000 Slavs of Sušak, besides an uncertain number of thousand Slavs to the north and east of Fiume.

"If the ancient autonomous constitution were re-established, adapted to the new times, and defended against the encroachment of Croatian Nationalism, and Italy became the guarantor of the constitution of Fiume, this solution would conciliate all the ethnical and national claims. As guarantor of Fiume's autonomy, Italy would have the right to intervene to protect her compatriots, if ever its autonomy were infringed by the Croatsians."³⁶

The Jugoslavs declare that the "Italianity" of Fiume (confined in addition to the town itself) is the double product of immigration and diverse forms of denationalisation, either imposed or accepted. "The decisive proof that this is the case is that, outside the town, everywhere where these two factors have not found a terrain favorable to their influence, the population has remained purely Slav, to such

³⁵ Salvemini, G., *Quarterly Review* (London), Vol. CCXXIX, p. 187.

³⁶ Salvemini, *op. cit.*, p. 189.

a point that even the statistics drawn up by the Hungarian Government itself have had to make a complete admission of the fact.”³⁷

The economic motive is one of the strongest in the claims of both the Italians and the Jugoslavs to Fiume. The Italians fear that the city may fall under the indirect control of Germany and may become a “southern terminal of a line of domination of which Hamburg and Bremen are the terminals on the North Sea.

“Having freed the one terminal, Trieste, from indirect German domination, we must prevent the other, Fiume, from carrying on her German functions under Jugo-Slav attire, even against the desire and intention of the new Slav State, which would be powerless and unprepared to eliminate the old influences and to counteract the German efforts which will be concentrated, especially after the loss of Trieste, on the one possible point of penetration.”³⁸ Only Italy, they argue, can successfully meet the financial trickery of Germany and block the renewed *Drang nach Osten*. Italy has the natural maritime aptitude to do this and to make Trieste and Fiume serve fully their natural hinterland. “She would but reconcile, by means of the best technical and most advantageous economical methods, her own interests with those of her natural customers, avoiding the effects of any political influence or dependence, contrary to the common line of general interest.

“To these States Italy could guarantee specific advantages such as bonded warehouses and bonded zones, reserved portions of the general storehouses, special landing places, preferential tariffs for harbour dues, special markets, agreements for cumulative railway and maritime tariffs, agreements for the emigration traffic, etc.”³⁸

According to the Italian claims, the Croatian traffic through Fiume, was before the war, seven per cent. of the

³⁷ “Jugoslav Memorandum on Fiume to the Peace Conference.”

³⁸ “Italy’s Claims in the Alps and on the Adriatic,” p. 16, 17.

total imports and exports of that port and "only thirteen per cent. of the entire trade of Croatia, Slavonia, Bosnia, Dalmatia, and Herzegovina passed through Fiume, the rest going towards the ports of Lower Dalmatia." Yugoslavia, the argument continues, with so little trade through Fiume and with no preparation for such work, could not conduct the maritime service of this port as could "a great maritime sea power such as Italy with the necessary traditions, means, connections, and experience."

The fear that Fiume, in Yugoslav control, might draw away commerce from Trieste comes out in the following paragraphs of the Italian Statement to the Peace Conference:

"Trieste and Fiume in Italian hands could have combined maritime services of wider range, and more economical and perfect in organisation, without giving rise to any conflict of interests and to the mutual advantage of their respective hinterlands.

"Maritime services run separately for Trieste and Fiume would be neither rational nor economical. Trieste, supported by an important power like Italy, might have them, while Fiume has not, to her own detriment as well as to the detriment of her hinterland, which would necessarily pay higher rates for such lines than they would require to pay if Fiume were Italian and could make use of the cumulative services which Italy would maintain for both her ports in the Northern Adriatic."³⁹

Salvemini, too, has dealt with the natural rivalry of Trieste and Fiume, but, instead of fearing for Fiume as the Italian delegates say they do, he thinks it probable that Trieste would suffer from the competition. He pointed out that the campaign for the political annexation of Fiume and of eastern Istria is carried on, "not only by the group of Irredentists at Fiume, but also by the Italians at Trieste, in the interest of the commerce of their town. Trieste and

³⁹ "Italy's Claims in the Alps and on the Adriatic," pp. 17, 18.

Fiume are almost equal distances respectively from Vienna and from Budapest. Hitherto, between Trieste and Fiume, that is to say between the Austrian Government which rules in Trieste, and the Hungarian Government which rules in Fiume, there has been arranged a series of port and railway agreements by which Fiume has served chiefly Hungary and Croatia, and Trieste the Austrian countries proper, not, however, without depriving Fiume of a part of the Hungarian trade, thanks to the better position of the port of Trieste in relation to the countries behind, and thanks also to the advantages possessed by the Trieste-Budapest railway over the line from Fiume to Budapest.

"The people of Trieste fear that these agreements will be cancelled, to the damage of Trieste, by the new Serbo-Croatian State if it should get possession of Fiume. And in fact the Jugo-Slavs, if they become the political rulers not only of the port of Fiume but of all the territory immediately behind the port of Trieste, could easily create a system of railway tariffs which would concentrate in the port of Fiume not the commerce of Hungary and Croatia alone but also that of Slovenia and Austria-Bohemia, thus ruining the port of Trieste."

Salvemini, however, points out that this situation would not be helped by placing Fiume under Italian rule, as the Jugoslavs would always be in possession of the railways which unite the interior to the ports and so could always juggle the rates in favor of their own ports, and, even if Italy held the whole of the Dalmatian coast as well as Fiume, the Jugoslavs could direct their commerce through Salonica.

"There is, however," he continues, "a solution which would conciliate the legitimate interests of both Trieste and Fiume—namely a railway and customs agreement annexed to the Peace Treaty, according to which the railway lines which connect Trieste and Fiume with their respective back countries be put under a joint control and the railways and

customs tariffs arranged on the basis of excluding any artificial rivalry between the two towns, distributing the lands behind them between these two centres of traffic according to the natural zone of influence of each.”⁴⁰

Another writer recognizes the same danger and discloses the prospect which is most feared by Trieste commercial circles. He thinks that the trade of Trieste with its hinterland and with the Levantine will increase under wise management, “unless indeed the worst of mishaps were to overtake Trieste: that Fiume should be handed over to a Nation other than Italy. Whether that other Nation were Hungary with Croatia annexed to it, or Croatia aggregated to Greater Serbia, it would be very difficult, not to say impossible, for her new owner to protect Fiume against Austro-Hungarian and German influence. No effort would then be spared, by finance and railway construction, to make Fiume an Austro-German port, thus withdrawing from Trieste a fair amount of her traffic.”⁴¹

Salvemini sees in the creation of a Jugoslav State the best possible protection against German penetration to the Adriatic. He writes, “From the point of view of Italy’s advantage, the new Slav State, with its northwest corner projecting between the Italian territory of the Julian Veneto and the Archduchy of Austria, would become a permanent obstacle to every fresh German attempt to reach the Adriatic. The Germans would not be able to conquer Trieste against Italy without at the same time cutting off Slovenia from the Slavs of the South. The new State would be, in short, a natural ally of Italy against Germany. . . .

“Only when German access to the Ægean Sea is interrupted by a ‘block’ of some twelve million Slavs, allied to Roumania and Italy, will England be sure of the eastern Mediterranean. . . . The formation of a Serbo-Sloveno-

⁴⁰ Salvemini, *op. cit.*, p. 189.

⁴¹ “Adriacus,” *op. cit.*, pp. 51, 52.

Croatian State would, in and by itself, represent the failure of the whole Oriental policy of Austria and Germany.”⁴²

Italy also claims that she must hold Fiume and Dalmatia in order to check Bolshevism which Italian reports state is spreading in Yugoslav lands, caused by the overpowering spirit of imperialism displayed by the Yugoslav leaders. As one Italian review explains it, “The people have never been consulted as to their destiny and the Government suppresses practically every attempt at popular expression. The result is that a large section of the people feels that it must take the law into its own hands. And when a people with no political tradition takes the law into its own hands you are bound to have Bolshevism as the result.”⁴³

From the Yugoslav point of view, we have already seen the importance of Fiume as the one port having railway connection with the interior. The Ogulin-Zagreb-Belgrade railroad, running to Fiume, reaches the whole valley of the Save River and thus serves Croatia, Northern Bosnia, Hungary, Northern Serbia, the Banat and the Bačka. Shall the outlet for this territory, the Jugoslavs ask, the port of Fiume, be under the same government as most of its hinterland or is it “more just to make it a sort of commercial bridgehead or point of approach toward the Slav countries and the Balkan Peninsula at the disposal of a foreign power?” No Dalmatian port has the geographical conditions, the harbor arrangements or the railway connection necessary to serve this wide and deep hinterland as does Fiume. “Italy,” continues the Yugoslav Memorandum, “would evidently make use of it to impose her exports on the Slav countries to the detriment of the laws of competition, which protect the interests of third parties, and would subordinate their importations to conditions chosen by her.” In short, they fear that Italy would employ for her own benefit the same sort of economic coercion that Austria used

⁴² “Salvemini,” *op. cit.*, pp. 177, 179.

⁴³ “Modern Italy,” Vol. I, p. 201.

against the Slavs and especially against Serbia, and that they would be merely exchanging Austrian exploitation for Italian exploitation. When the Italians point to the small percentage of the total trade of Fiume which was derived from the Yugoslav countries, it should be remembered that Austria did not encourage her Yugoslav provinces to export overseas, but used their products for her own advantage and that she regulated railway construction and tariffs with this object in view.

The Yugoslav delegates promised "that guarantees would be given to assure liberty to international commerce in transit by Fiume, notably in the interests of the Czecho-Slovak State, Poland, and even Hungary, of which this port is naturally the exit." They pledged "to the Italian-speaking inhabitants (of Fiume) the free use and development of their language and their Italian culture." They deny that Italy could give to Fiume more attention and better service than they could. To Italy, Fiume would be one of many ports, while to the Yugoslavs it would be their most important outlet and they would have every reason to interest themselves in its development.

The Yugoslavs, as we have seen, have offered to allow the question of the territory in dispute to be settled by arbitration by President Wilson or to leave it to be settled by a plebiscite under the supervision of a friendly power. The present kingdom of Italy was united on the voluntary wish of the people of each province expressed by popular vote so that this method of plebiscite would be quite in accord with Italian precedent. But, of course, it would be more complicated than were the plebiscites taken in the different Italian states between 1848 and 1870.

During the Winter, in most of Dalmatia, there was a plebiscite taken on the question of union with the Yugoslav State and every commune voting decided for the union. In some of the districts occupied by Italian troops, the plebiscite was not allowed to be taken. All inhabitants over 18

years of age were allowed to vote in the districts taking the plebiscite. In the town of Zara, there was a majority against the union, but only by 3 per cent., and the commune of Zara, taken as a whole, voted in favor of union.

The Jugoslavs insist that, as Fiume was not included in the Secret Treaty, as the population of the suburb of Sušak and of the surrounding country is completely Croat and as these Slav elements far exceed the Italian majority of Fiume proper, Italy has no right to it. It is true that there are other ports left to the Jugoslavs, such as Buccari, Cirquenizza, Segna, Cattaro, Ragusa, but, as has already been said, the matter of railway connection is quite as important as that of a port. It would be impossible for Italy to annex the Italians of Fiume without annexing many more Slavs than Italians. Last Fall *Unità* stated that, if Fiume and its district were added to Istria, the Slavs of Venezia Giulia would be increased by 100,000 and the Italians by only 26,000. "That is, the Slavs would become the majority in Venezia Giulia, and all hope of a fair government and the peaceful absorption of the Slav element would disappear. The elections would have to be faked, and every form of oppression and corruption practiced in order to give political preponderance to the Italians." 44

This was written at a time when the more moderate party was gaining a foothold in Italy, and when the Pact of Rome, made in April, at the height of the German offensive, was still regarded as the basis for a possible settlement and also as the hope for the defeat of Austria through revolutionary propaganda among the oppressed nationalities of the Empire. But Sonnino, as we have seen, has never favored any plan of compromise and, since the armistice, he has allowed propaganda to be directed by the most extreme of the anti-Slav elements. It would have been quite impossible for the Dalmatian letter of d'Annunzio, written in January, 1919, to have passed the censor during the previous Summer.

"Quoted by New York *Times*, April 27, 1919.

This letter contained a vigorous attack on France and Great Britain, a violent outburst against the Croats and insulting references to President Wilson. Its publication must have suited the plans of Sonnino.⁴⁵

Wilson had pledged himself to a peace following certain principles and, while these principles may not conform to the "practical" political ideas of the immediate past, that alone is not enough to condemn them. Wilson has had to fight against great odds to get these principles truly incorporated in the peace. Not only has he been the spokesman of the Allies, but he is himself the author of these principles. In accepting the Italian claims to Venetia Giulia, he had already strained the principle of nationality as far as it could go. Italy received the district of Gorizia as an integral part of the territory granted her; though this particular district contains a Slovene majority, the surroundings of Gorizia, on the whole, give it an Italian character. In applying the same principles to Fiume, President Wilson found that it had a Slav character.

After the Italian delegates had returned to Paris, the Conference was busy with the German delegates and day by day passed without any definite news as to the settlement of the Fiume question. Rumors came from Paris that there was hope of merging the Fiume question in the larger question of Asia Minor and that Italy might be given in the latter district mandatories which would satisfy her claims. It was felt to be certain at least that Italy would not actually go to war to gain Fiume and that President Wilson would not alter his decision and concede Fiume to the Italians. When the question of mandatories first came up, Italy was offered the Turkish strip on the Mediterranean beginning at the Gulf of Kos and running east to Dana, including the Adalia region. Italy demanded, in place of this, Smyrna and the valley of the Meander, but later seemed willing to accept the original offer plus the region to the

⁴⁵ Full text of letter in *La Revue*, Vol. CXXXI, pp. 47-59.

north as far as the Black Sea including the cities of Brusa, Konia, Kutabia, and Bendregli. In August, 1917, Great Britain and France had agreed in the secret treaty of St. Jean de Maurienne entered into with Italy, that Italy should have Smyrna, provided Russia would ratify the treaty. In the Fall, Great Britain denounced the treaty on the ground that Bolshevik Russia could not ratify it. The report is that, meanwhile, Great Britain had promised Smyrna to Greece in return for aid promised by Venizelos to the Salonica expedition, and proposed that Italy accept Anatolia, but that Sonnino refused to negotiate a new settlement.⁴⁶

Late in May, 1919, public attention was called to the fact that the Italians had, while Orlando and Sonnino were absent from the Conference, landed forces at Adalia, and at Makri in the vilayet of Smyrna, making the landing without notice to the Allies. The Allies sent a note asking for an explanation and, on May 22, the matter came up in the Council of Four. Orlando refused to discuss the matter until Venizelos had withdrawn. The Greek Premier had been invited because the Council was discussing Smyrna, in which Greece had an interest. The Conference had authorized Greece to land troops in Asia Minor in February in order to maintain order there. No information was given out as to the result of the discussion in the Council, but, on May 27, it was reported in the press that the Italian troops had re-embarked. On May 17, Italy had relinquished her claims to the Dodecanese in favor of Greece.

On June 19, the Orlando Government was defeated in the Chamber of Deputies by a vote of 259 to 70. In his speech he used the phrase, "Remain faithful to our duties toward the Allies"; this seemed to be the immediate occasion for an outburst of the discontent which had been growing against Orlando all Spring. Several deputies shouted across the Chamber at the Premier, "The Allies have never been faithful to us. Why should we be faithful to them?" A ma-

⁴⁶ *London Times*, June 21, 1919.

majority of the deputies wanted a discussion of the Government's foreign policy and Orlando proposed a secret session for that purpose. He insisted that the session be secret, pointing out that no Parliament of any of the victorious nations had yet discussed its international policy publicly, and he asked for a vote on his proposition on the ground that it was not only a question of confidence but of dignity. Nitti tried in vain to make a compromise, to begin the discussion in public and to transfer it to a secret session if Orlando thought necessary and if the Chamber approved.

In his speech, Orlando outlined under three heads the policy that the Italian delegation had followed at the Peace Conference:

"1. Maintain with firmness all essential points of the Italian claims, without which Italy is convinced peace will be neither just nor adequate to the immense sacrifices suffered.

"2. Remain faithful to your duties toward the Allies.

"3. Avoid any blind form of obstinate intransigence. Indeed, facilitate conciliatory suggestions capable of producing accord in the Conference over the problems concerning Italian frontiers."

Summing up the situation he said: "The deep unrest throughout the world leads to pessimism such as was never experienced during the war. Immediately after the armistice was signed, the peoples in general, Italy in particular, never went through such dark days as now. Nevertheless, I am not discouraged, believing as I do that the situation gradually will improve." Dealing with the political, economic and financial situation in Italy in regard to the peace with Germany, he continued, "These have been solved in a manner such as we can on the whole feel satisfied with. Besides, we obtained the determination of our northern frontier formed by the magnificent barrier which Nature placed as Italy's bulwark.

"Regarding the eastern Adriatic frontiers, Italy has not refused to discuss such solutions as are capable of insuring

an agreement of all great Powers, but in failing which Italy remains firm in demanding those territories granted her by solemn pledge, the validity of which was acknowledged by our allies, who declared that these same territories were to be assigned to Italy as a reward for her entering the great struggle."

In the vote which followed, Giolitti, Nitti, and Bissolati voted against Orlando. The fall of his ministry was due to the fact that the deputies were tired of the delays at the Conference, that the internal situation of Italy was bad and that the leading men in the Government were away in Paris wrangling over foreign relations instead of formulating real remedies for the widespread distress in Italy. Many explanations of the adverse vote are offered. Ex-Minister Gallenga said immediately after the vote, "The deputies and the people are tired of the situation. The delay and the uncertainty are affecting Italian prestige. Therefore, has arisen the necessity for having new men in power better adapted to organization for facing the grave problems with which Italy is confronted." Others pointed out that discontent with the internal policy, or lack of policy, of the Orlando Government had existed since the armistice, and that the vote of confidence of April 29 had been intended to strengthen the hands of the delegation at Paris and not to mean approval of the domestic policy.⁴⁷

Orlando urged the deputies to discuss internal affairs and foreign affairs separately. He attributed the unsatisfactory economic and social conditions chiefly to the high cost of living. These internal difficulties were temporary, he said, and conditions would soon return to normal. The government would take measures to prevent profiteering and, having complete control of bread, rice, cereals, sugar and petroleum, would sell these at low prices. Also it would import meat and sell it at cost.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ *New York Times*, June 21, 1919.

⁴⁸ *Christian Science Monitor*, June 21, 1919.

The gravity of Italy's domestic and foreign problems made this ministerial crisis more serious than any since the crises involved in the unification of the nation. The feeling is very general in Italian political circles that Italy lacks today such leaders as Cavour, Mazzini and their King. Italians were led to expect much from the Peace Conference. They very generally believed that their country was the favorite among the Allied and Associated Powers and thought their claims would find little or no opposition in Paris. Instead, says one of the ex-Ministers, "We met obstinate opposition from America, although no American interest was involved in our Adriatic question, which is insignificant compared to the colossal question of the Far East, wherein Japan had its own way. Even little Greece, which at first refused to fight, even under pressure, and finally entered the war when the fight was practically over, despite any promise, will more than double her area and population, while Italy, with half a million dead, more than one million wounded, and about one hundred million lire of debts, is refused a few square miles of territory which she claims only because of sentiment." ⁴⁹

The London *Chronicle* declared that the Italian Ministerial crisis was due directly to the unjust treatment of Italy at the Conference. Italy has suffered in the war rather more than the other powers. She was not furnished with food and coal enough to keep the people from want and even from starvation, but the people kept up their spirits by thinking that they would receive the fruits of their victory. The *Chronicle* continued, "Is all the great work of Anglo-French-Italian consolidation, which the war has achieved, to be thrown idly away on the war's morrow? We sincerely hope not, but, if we are to escape that disaster, some things must be done differently at Paris. There must be a different spirit from that which projected the new defensive triple alliance between France, Britain, and America,

⁴⁹ New York *Times*, June 23, 1919.

without even troubling to ask Italy whether she cared to adhere to it.”⁵⁰

It seems to be very generally believed that Giolitti and his following pursued their usual tactics in taking advantage of the mistakes of the Orlando Cabinet and overthrowing it. The fact that the man chosen to form a new Cabinet had been a follower of Giolitti supports the belief that Giolitti was responsible for this change. On June 21, the King asked Francesco Saverino Nitti, Professor of Finance at the University of Naples, to form a new Cabinet. Nitti has associated with him Tommaso Tittoni as Foreign Minister and himself holds the portfolio of Minister of the Interior. Nitti was before the war a follower of Giolitti and a Neutralist. He became Minister of the Treasury in the Orlando Cabinet. In December, 1917, after Caporetto and when he had been in the Cabinet only a few weeks, he caused it to be noised abroad that he was willing to form a Ministry and to make a separate peace with Austria-Hungary unless the Allies gave more aid than they had been giving to Italy. This offer was not taken advantage of by the King and the Italian nation, so Nitti remained in the Orlando Cabinet until January, 1919, when he resigned, stating that he was not in agreement with his colleagues on the Adriatic question. As has been mentioned, he had hopes then of forming a cabinet of his own.

Nitti was a member of the Italian Mission to the United States in the Summer of 1917. While here, he stated that his foreign policy was based on the principle that “the friendship of England, France and the United States is the most valuable asset for Italy.” Since then, he has declared that the friendship of these powers is “of more value than acres of grottoes on the Adriatic.”⁵¹

Tittoni was Foreign Minister under Giolitti in 1903-5 and 1906-7, ambassador to London 1905-6 and ambassador

⁵⁰ New York *Times*, June 23, 1919.

⁵¹ New York *Times*, June 22, 1919.

at Paris 1910-16. He has been throughout his career friendly to England and France. He and three Senators, Vittorio Scialoja, Guglielmo Marconi and Maggiorino Ferrais were sent as delegates to the Peace Conference.

We are, then, faced with this curious situation. The Orlando Government failed at Paris to win for Italy her full claims. This cabinet falls. In its place we have a new Government, in which the two leading men are avowedly friends of England and of France and hold much less extreme views on the Adriatic question and other Italian claims than did Orlando and Sonnino. Further, Nitti is thought of as a former Neutralist and a Giolittian and thus belongs to two factions which were discredited when Italy went into the war in 1915. Does this mean that the old financial and commercial influences of Germany are beginning a new campaign of penetration through their old ally, Giolitti? The imperialists, the nationalists, the Socialists, the anti-clericals and anti-Giolitti men are opposed to this brilliant, conservative, Catholic Premier. Probably fewer Italians want Nitti at the head of the Government than wanted Orlando to remain. But Giolitti controls the Prefects of the provinces and the Prefects control the elections, so the deputies do the bidding of Giolitti and his Prefects. The present Chamber of Deputies was elected in 1913, when, as we have seen, Giolitti was Premier and Minister of the Interior, and since that date it has gone against the will of this "big boss," this Mark Hanna of Italy, only once, when it was compelled by popular enthusiasm and clamor to declare war against Austria in 1915. No Minister of the Interior has felt strong enough to attack this Giolitti machine. Many of the deputies are creatures of individual Prefects or of their chief. So Giolitti by actively controlling the Chamber put into power a Government less acceptable to popular will than the one he had just forced to resign. It remains to be seen whether the Italian people wish to and can throw off the dictatorship of

this master politician, who has the support of the solid industrial North and of many elements throughout Italy. What could keep the Nitti Cabinet in power? Would they ask or get more concessions at the Peace Conference than their predecessors? Even if they did satisfy Italy on foreign questions, could they cope with the want and suffering throughout the Italian people?

On June 25, Tittoni, the new Foreign Minister, addressed the Senate and stated that Italy had a less favorable position than at the beginning of the Peace Conference because she had approved all that Great Britain and France had asked in Asia and Africa, while the claims of Italy were still unsettled. A continuation of this condition, Tittoni went on to say, would allow France and Great Britain to demobilize their armies and return to normal peace conditions, while Italy must still keep her troops under arms because she would not be at peace. He hoped Italy's rights would be acknowledged not because she had treaties guaranteeing them but because she had made such sacrifices of blood and wealth in the common cause. From Orlando's explanations, he gave the status of Italy's negotiations:

"The frontier with the Austrian Republic is outlined as we desired.

"Regarding the Adriatic, after President Wilson's message in April, there was the Tardieu compromise, which failed of its object. This was to find a compromise agreeable to our allies as well as President Wilson, meanwhile keeping firm the compact of London, which President Wilson did not recognize, but which our allies admitted in its entirety, including the clause assigning Fiume to Croatia.

"No other decision was reached, but Serbia occupied Northern Albania and Greece Smyrna, which was promised us by the agreement of St. Jean de Maurienne."⁵²

The compensation offered Italy in Africa by Great Britain Tittoni found satisfactory, but he thought France ought

⁵² *New York Times*, June 27, 1919.

to offer more. He declared the anxiety of Parliament and of the country over the uncertainty of Italy's claims while those of her allies were already settled. He asked that Parliament and the country give the new Government united and non-partisan support.

On July 1, when the new Council of Five was organized to assume temporary direction of the Peace Conference, Tittoni announced to his four associates that Italy asked and expected the treaty with Austria to dispose definitely of all territory taken from Austria. This meant that the question of the Adriatic must be settled before the treaty was signed and such a settlement was apt to require a long discussion.

CHAPTER XII

D'ANNUNZIO AND THE FIUME CRISIS

THE Nitti Cabinet seems to have tried honestly to allay the excitement aroused in Italy by the reactionary and shortsighted imperialism of the Orlando-Sonnino ministry and by hot-headed military men. Many proposals were made by this Cabinet to the Peace Conference and were discussed by it. But none met the objections of the American Delegation to Italian possession of Fiume and of Dalmatia until an alternative proposition was offered by the Italians on September 10. One choice provided that Fiume itself should go to Italy, but that the port should be free to all nations; the other provided that Fiume and the surrounding territory should be made into an international state. This offer was immediately cabled to Washington and telegraphed from there to President Wilson, then on his tour for the League of Nations. Strong hopes were entertained that the plan for internationalizing the disputed territory would satisfy the President's objections and solve the problem. But the Italian Government had delayed too long. Other events arose to complicate the settlement.

On September 11, Gabriele d'Annunzio, with a force raised from the Italian regular army and from other veterans of the Great War, seized Fiume, which was occupied by Italian, British and French troops, with a few Serbians attached to the French. The British and French troops and the few American officers in Fiume withdrew to their ships; the Italians took possession of the town and declared it saved to Italy. The National Council of Fiume, which, it will be remembered, had voted the annexation of Fiume to

Italy on October 30, 1918, received D'Annunzio with great acclaim. The commander of the regular Italian troops withdrew with the few of his men who did not desert to D'Annunzio.

It is difficult to say how much knowledge the Italian Government had of D'Annunzio's plot. Reports state that D'Annunzio let Nitti know his plan and that the Government knew who was assisting D'Annunzio and removed several high army officers from their commands on account of their share in the scheme. General Grazioli, who was in command of the interallied forces at Fiume, himself stated that he had allowed the people of Fiume to organize and to prepare to receive D'Annunzio and his volunteers from outside the city. D'Annunzio was allowed to remain in Venice, a favorable point from which to direct operations and preparations for the entry of Fiume. Ostensibly, he was granted permission to remain in Venice that he might examine old manuscripts containing information on air currents that might be of use in his proposed flight to Tokyo. He was granted a sum of money by the Government for this aeronautic enterprise. This money was used for the expedition to Fiume.

The Italian press openly praised the coup but feared the internal results of such a breach of discipline and the international results of thus defying the Peace Conference. However, the feeling was strongly expressed that Fiume should belong to Italy.

The Italian Government prohibited the publication of any news concerning Fiume and appointed a special censor to carry out this order. At Paris, Tittoni notified the American delegation that Italy could not stand by her second proposition, for the internationalization of Fiume, then being considered by President Wilson, as D'Annunzio's action had made the giving up of Fiume impossible without a revolution.

Meanwhile the Italian Government had sent General

Badoglio to handle the Fiume situation and to take over the command of the Italian troops on the armistice demarcation line. General di Robilant, who had been in command, had become very unpopular with the Italians on account of his impartial and independent stand as a member of the Inter-Allied commission which inquired into the murder of French soldiers by Italians in Fiume. About November 17, 1918, the Italians occupied Fiume as a strategic point with 13,000 troops, as they had a perfect right to do under the terms of the Austrian Armistice. The French General Franchet D'Esperey selected the city as a base for the Army of the Orient and General Foch confirmed the selection. Dissension soon arose between the Italians on one side and the French and Serbians of the Army of the Orient on the other. The Fiume National Council supported the Italians, claimed control of the railroad and tried to prevent the sending by the French and by the American Relief Committee of food supplies to the Croats and Serbs. On July 6, 1919, came the killing of nine French soldiers and the wounding of fifty more. This was a clear case of unprovoked mob action participated in by some Italian officers and acquiesced in by others. The rioting was checked and finally stopped by wiser and cooler Italian officers in co-operation with the British and Americans.¹ General di Robilant concurred in the finding of the Inter-Allied Investigating Commission which asked the withdrawal of Italian troops from Fiume, the replacing of the civil guard of Fiume by Maltese policemen and the dissolution of the National Council of Fiume. He had been bitterly denounced by D'Annunzio and there is reason to think that the proposals of this Commission caused the poet to push forward his plans for the seizing of Fiume.

General di Robilant's undeserved unpopularity prevented him from checking, even as much as he might otherwise have done, the rush of soldiers and sailors to join D'Annunzio.

¹New York *Times*, October 3, 1919. Statement by Ernest Parsons, Sec. to General Summerall of the Interallied Commission.

The poet himself, Commander Rizzo and other war heroes engaged in the insurrection fired the popular fancy of the excited Italians and drew to the "Fiume Army" the most adventurous spirits of the nation. The Government made a largely ineffective attempt to offset this influence by appointing the most popular officers in the Army (General Badoglio) and in the navy (Admiral Cagni), respectively, to handle the situation. Admiral Cagni had come into conflict with the Yugoslavs in the matter of the Austrian war-ships and it was not likely that his presence in Fiume or nearby would increase the chances of a peaceful adjustment with the Yugoslavs. The military and naval forces were ordered to blockade but not further to molest the D'Annunzio Army and the official policy of the Ministry seemed to be to wait for lack of food and of money to dissolve the insurgent army. The Supreme Council announced that it considered the revolt Italy's own affair and not a matter for action by the Peace Conference.

Statements from Rome, apparently inspired, were issued in Paris to the effect that a settlement agreeable to Britain, France and even to Yugoslavia had been offered by Italy and was awaiting the decision of President Wilson when D'Annunzio took Fiume. This attempt to cast upon the United States blame for delaying the Adriatic question until it had culminated in an armed insurrection, was promptly refuted by the American delegates, who called attention to the long period of time which had elapsed before the Italians offered any plan not involving Italian possession of Fiume. Though President Wilson had made it plain in April that he would not consent to Italy's taking Fiume, the Italians wasted five months insisting upon this claim and encouraging imperialism in the Italian populace. So the Italian Government can justly blame itself for the D'Annunzio difficulty.

The Italian Government gave D'Annunzio a certain time within which to return to Rome with his troops and extended the time to midnight of September 21. He defied

the ultimatum, commandeered all the foodstuffs in Fiume, began to expel foreigners, imprisoned many leading Jugoslavs and continued to issue his grandiloquent proclamations appealing to all Italians and especially to those of the Adriatic Coast. The blockade was maintained, but in a half-hearted manner, and men and supplies were able to find their way into Fiume.

It was announced in Rome on September 23 that the re-opening of the Italian Parliament had been postponed, probably in order that the Ministry might have time to take counsel and to decide on a more definite policy with reference to Fiume and to the disturbed social and economic condition of the country. Some of the Italian newspapers alleged that the Ministry was waiting to lay before Parliament the answer of President Wilson. Evidently the Ministry had not announced the withdrawal by the Italian Peace Delegation, immediately after the D'Annunzio coup, of the offer to internationalize Fiume.

Nitti's use of the word "deserters" when speaking of D'Annunzio's followers in his first speech after receiving news of the poet's exploit, the order of the Supreme Military Command that all officers and men who had not returned to their regiments within five days would be considered as having passed over to the enemy, and the Ministry's generally hostile attitude towards the insurgents at Fiume alienated many who otherwise might have supported Nitti and his Ministry. The Nationalists and the followers of Orlando and Sonnino attacked Nitti with renewed intensity, and Giolitti followed his usual policy of withdrawing support from, and of attacking, a weakening ministry. This Big Boss of Italy began to say that it would be well to have a new election and to replace the Deputies chosen in 1913, just as if he had not always, or nearly always, been able to control a majority of these Deputies and just as if he had not already been busy laying his plans to control the next Chamber of Deputies by his usual methods. Bissolati and his party, the

Reformed Socialists, continued to support Nitti. All the parties were more or less making use of the Fiume situation for their own ends. The Government maintained a loose blockade of Fiume and made only slight efforts to oust the rebels. The Jugoslavs, who had refrained from direct action, became each day more insistent that the Peace Conference do something about D'Annunzio if Italy did not. The occupation of Trau by sympathisers of D'Annunzio complicated the situation and led to the belief that further attacks would be made upon Dalmatia but, fortunately, before the Jugoslavs had fully decided to drive the Italians out of Trau, the American naval and marine officers were able to persuade the Italians to withdraw.

The newspapers favorable to Nitti urged the gravity of the situation upon the nation and appealed for calmness, discipline and unity. Even though attacked by the Nationalists and others, Nitti seemed at the moment to be the one statesman strong enough to maintain a cabinet. The King had taken the almost unprecedented step of summoning to a Crown Council the Presidents of the Senate and of the Chamber of Deputies, the former Premiers, the chiefs of the various political parties and the heads of the Army and of the Navy. Detailed accounts of the proceedings of this Crown Council were published. The discussions of the Council were carried on for the benefit of the Cabinet, upon which fell the necessity of making the decisions. Foreign Minister Tittoni declared that the Peace Conference would not permit Italy to annex Fiume because such a course would encourage the Czechoslovaks to annex Teschen, the Jugoslavs to occupy Klagenfurt, the Greeks to take Thrace and the Roumanians to annex the Banat. Giolitti emphasized the necessity for a general election in order that the country might pass on pending questions, and on its Government. As has been said in a previous chapter, Giolitti usually attacks a ministry, even one of his own choosing, whenever this ministry refuses to heed his wishes or begins to be un-

popular or has to solve difficult problems which may bring it into conflict with the people. It is easier for the "Dictator" to control the government by setting up and knocking down successive ministries than by sticking to one and helping to shoulder its burdens. This selfish opportunism had long characterized Giolitti's conduct in Italian politics and seems to explain his joining in the attack upon the Nitti Ministry. Nitti had often acted with Giolitti and was apparently, at the time he took the Premiership, acceptable to Giolitti. As Premier, Nitti seems to have tried to take an independent course, though there was no open break between him and Giolitti. Salandra opposed a general election on the ground that the Government was not sure of its control over the Army and thus might be unable to maintain public order. Bissolati put forward his plan, discussed above, for Italy to keep Fiume but to give up all claim to Dalmatia. The majority of this Council declared for immediate annexation of Fiume but the Ministry declared such action was impossible.²

The real question before the Crown Council was not Fiume but the general condition of Italy. D'Annunzio's success showed the lack of discipline in the regular army and navy. The strikes and the general tone of the labor leaders, coupled with the bankrupt condition of the country, the difficulty of the Government in finding ways and means of meeting the interest on the huge public debt, to say nothing of raising the funds needed for reconstruction and for setting in motion the wheels of industry in the country, pointed to revolution unless some scheme could be devised to unite all the stronger forces in the country on the side of law and order. This was the reason for calling the party leaders to the Council. Tittoni argued for absolute harmony at home, the sternest retrenchment in every department of public life, and a cautious policy abroad. Only if this policy was followed did he think that Italy could get through the Winter with-

² *Christian Science Monitor*, September 29, 1919.

out disaster. The labor leaders today think that Italy is committed to a policy of imperialism and they also realize that they are dependent for food and credit upon outside countries and cannot afford to follow a policy which would bring them into conflict with a foreign power. Tittoni seems to have favored the resignation of the Nitti Cabinet in order to eliminate the members in disagreement with the conciliatory policy and also that a union ministry might be formed containing all the party leaders. But at the same time Tittoni felt that Nitti was the man most suited for the Premiership under the present conditions.

On September 27, in a tumultuous session, the Italian Chamber of Deputies gave the Nitti Cabinet a vote of confidence, 208 to 148. Foreign Minister Tittoni went carefully over the proceedings of the Peace Conference and explained that the Italian delegation had to take a compromise attitude because France and Great Britain, while most cordial to Italy, would not go in their support of her to the point of conflict with President Wilson. He was insistent upon the necessity of maintaining a conciliatory policy. "I should be a traitor," he said, "if I did not recommend the avoidance of a course which would put Italy in open opposition to the Peace Conference, which would mean Italy's abandonment of the conference, with the loss of all the advantages coming from the peace treaties, with our complete isolation, with the renunciation of our position as a great power—the committing of a folly of which we would soon repent."³ He reminded the Deputies that, though France and Great Britain acknowledged themselves bound by the Pact of London, the Italian delegation had agreed unreservedly to the decision of January 17, of the necessity of unanimous decisions by the Peace Conference. Therefore the American delegation must be satisfied too, and especially as the United States had an economic supremacy over Europe and as, in order for Europe to get credit from the

³ *New York Times*, September 29, 1919.

United States, it was necessary that the international situation should be settled in a manner that would guarantee a durable peace.

As the basis of the compromise that Italy was obliged to make, Tittoni declared that no territory or town having an Italian majority must be subjected to foreign domination; that the national existence of Italian minorities must be effectively safeguarded; that Italy's economic interests must be guaranteed; and that a valid provision must be made for the security of her frontiers on land and in the Adriatic, not only in the Gulf of Quarnero, but from the Gulf of Quarnero to the Straits of Otranto.

Animated discussion followed the Foreign Minister's statement. Deputy Don Colonna di Cesaro strongly criticized the "submissive attitude of the Italian delegation at Paris," and said that Orlando, in the Council of Four and unable to understand English, resembled another figure "not between two but among three thieves." There was strong protest from among the Deputies against this comparison. Deputy Cesaro, who is a Nationalist, ended with the sentence, "No formula will be acceptable which does not give Fiume to Italy." He was interrupted by the Socialists with cries of "Italy does not want another war," "The soldiers will desert."

Deputy Eugenio Chiesa, just returned from a personal investigation in Fiume, made a fiery appeal for the annexation of that city. He declared that, if D'Annunzio had not seized Fiume, the Jugoslavs would have taken possession very shortly, and that General di Robilant's attitude was largely the cause of the whole incident. His speech caused great excitement and was cheered by the entire Chamber with the exception of the Socialists and the members of the Cabinet.

Premier Nitti reminded the Chamber of the grave responsibility that the Government and the Deputies must assume and begged them to discuss the problem with calmness. He stated that General di Robilant's only instructions were to

take part in the proceedings of the inter-Allied commission with loyalty to the Allies. He repeated his previous declaration that the Government must re-establish discipline in the Army and uphold the authority of the state. The Italian people wanted neither foreign nor civil war and he called on the Opposition to prove their good faith by bringing forward a motion demanding the annexation of Fiume. The Government, he stated, did not favor such a course.⁴

Giolitti, as has been said, favored a general election. The present Chamber was elected in 1913. Its term expired during the war but, as in other countries, its life was prolonged. Giolitti suggested that a general election would divert the public from Fiume and would bring before the people the economic and social problems which they are facing and which are more serious than the question of Fiume. In order to hold a general election within a short time, the Chamber would have to be dissolved without completing the discussion of the German and Austrian treaties. One of Italy's chief desires is for the Brenner Pass and the Austrian treaty gives up to Italy that long-sought gateway. There is natural reluctance to delay accepting it. However, on September 29, the Italian Parliament was dissolved and a general election ordered for November 16, the new Parliament to meet December 1.

The leader of the official Socialists, Turati, expressed his desire for a general election in the Chamber, September 28. He denounced the party attacking the United States and asked which American bank would lend Italy money to make war upon Yugoslavia. He argued that only the power of the proletariat could save Italy from choosing militarism or Bolshevism as alternatives of the present situation. And he was certain that even the mildest Socialists would choose Bolshevism. The people, not the Parliament, could solve

⁴ *Christian Science Monitor*, October 1, 1919.

the present difficulties and pass on the Peace Treaties and they could be heard through a general election.⁵

The Jugoslavs have not changed their attitude of acquiescence to the decision of the Peace Conference as regards Fiume. D'Annunzio announced on September 29 that he considered himself in a state of war with Jugoslavia and that measures had been taken to meet any Yugoslav attack. The Yugoslav Government, through the Press Bureau in Paris, denied that it had prepared to enter Fiume in force on September 10 as D'Annunzio had charged. The Yugoslav Government closed its frontiers as a protective measure. This action led the chief of staff of the 26th Italian Regular Army Corps at Abbazia to hold a consultation with D'Annunzio's chief of staff, at which defensive measures against the Jugoslavs were discussed. As a result of this conference, some of D'Annunzio's volunteers were sent to hold the armistice line. This was one of many incidents showing the cordial relations between the Italian regulars and D'Annunzio.

The Socialist Deputies have issued a manifesto condemning the outcome of the war "which has left behind it a threatening preponderance of professional militarism." The manifesto declared that sedition appeared in the Army when the Nitti Cabinet tried for reasons of economy to demobilize it. They saw here the hand of the Nationalists and militarists and appealed to the workmen in soldiers' uniforms not to acquiesce and be used as tools in any attempt of the reactionaries to bring about a coup d'etat.

In a characteristic manner, the Italian public turned from the question of Fiume to the discussion of the general election as soon as it was announced that one would be held. The Catholics broke their tradition and prepared to put candidates into the field. They formed the Italian Popular Party and relied upon the peasants for support. The Socialists, of course, still drew their strength from the indus-

⁵ *New York Times*, September 30, 1919.

trial workers of the North. Outside of these two, the Republican Party alone came forward with a definite program. There were many small groups around individual leaders. But, more and more, a general division became clear between those for and those against the Nitti Ministry, or, what is practically the same, of those for and against the annexation of Fiume. Many people realized where D'Annunzio's action and the talk of the noisy Nationalists might lead Italy.

Meanwhile D'Annunzio had been left in Fiume. The blockade permitted mail and food supplies to be sent into Fiume, excluding only persons, either soldiers or civilians. Both Great Britain and the United States denied having taken any action in regard to Fiume apart from the Peace Conference. D'Annunzio, following the example of the Nationalists who had not recognized the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, issued a proclamation to the Croats, in their own language, in which he charged that the League of Nations was really a league of Jewish bankers who had planned to rule the port of Fiume in furtherance of their own speculations and against the interests of the people of the world. The Croats and the Italians should co-operate and protect their own interests. While Italy was bound to maintain her annexation of Fiume and to make the Adriatic an Italian lake, D'Annunzio promised the Croats ample guarantees of free transit and facilities for commercial traffic through the port of Fiume.

As will be remembered, not all parties in Fiume were anxious for annexation to Italy. Zanella, the leader of the Italian party in Fiume which favored a Fiumian republic under an Italian protectorate, had been opposed to D'Annunzio and had come to an open disagreement with the poet since his occupation of Fiume.

An election was held in Fiume October 26, but only the "Unione Nazionale" or Annexationist Party was allowed to put candidates into the field, to put up posters or to dis-

tribute literature. The polls were guarded by D'Annunzio's gendarmes and soldiers and almost every military conveyance was used to get out the annexationist vote. Only the annexationist candidates had their names printed on the ticket and those wishing to vote for others had to write in the names of their candidates. It is not strange that the Zanella Party received only 186 votes. Thus was the boasted self-determination principle of D'Annunzio used by him and his followers.

One of the suggestions most generally made on the Italian side was that Italian regulars replace the D'Annunzio volunteers in Fiume. The Jugoslavs felt that such a step would make the situation worse and suggested a plebiscite of the buffer state to decide which country should have a mandate under the League of Nations. The Yugoslav Press Bureau complained of the inactivity of the Supreme Council, asking how small nations could get justice if the Council of the League of Nations should be as slow. The statement went on to declare that Jugoslavs were fleeing from Fiume in fear of the Italians, that all the Yugoslav churches and schools had been closed by D'Annunzio and that thousands of Jugoslavs were offering their services to the Government in case of war with Italy over the possession of Fiume.

As matters stood at the middle of October, Tittoni had announced a new basis for settlement and had gone back to Paris. His plan would give Italy the district of Volosca between Fiume and Trieste in order to connect Italy by land with the buffer state of Fiume. This would prevent the state of Fiume from being surrounded by Jugoslavia, would avoid a boundary line between Italy and Jugoslavia and would make the Italian people more ready to accept the creation of a buffer state in Fiume and its hinterland. His plan also added the island of Lagosta to the Dalmatian Islands assigned to Italy and made Italy the diplomatic representative of the free city of Zara (Zadar). While Tittoni realized that this would not at all satisfy the party de-

manding the annexation of Fiume, he felt that the Nitti Ministry could secure acceptance of the plan, as the country was anxious for a solution of the Adriatic question in order to allow consideration of problems of reorganization and reconstruction. He hoped that the United States would meet these concessions in a conciliatory spirit and would realize "the enormous responsibility resting on Washington if refusal should cause complications compromising the peace of Italy and perhaps of Europe."⁶

Jugoslavia has other difficulties besides those with Italy. The secret treaty made by the Allies with Roumania in 1916, without the knowledge of Serbia, promised Roumania the Banat. There are large Serb districts in this region. The Roumanians and the Jugoslavs have never been active enemies and some agreement will be reached through arbitration by the Peace Conference or by a plebiscite. The political leaders have been rather more conciliatory on this question than have the Serbian military authorities. The commander of the Allied troops in the Balkans made a mistake when he encouraged Serbian troops to enter the Banat instead of policing that district with troops from other countries. There is also the frontier with Hungary to be settled in the Bačka and the Baranya. The Slovenes have a common frontier with German Austria and some of the extremists have gone rather too far in their claims here, but again the matter is likely to be settled peaceably under the Peace Conference. The Bulgarian frontier was in dispute before the war and will have to be settled. Relations between Serbia and Bulgaria have been embittered largely through the action of outside powers, especially of Austria and Germany, and it is probable that, without interference, they may be able to reach a settlement whereby they may live peaceably side by side. And this object will be attained rather by disarmament than by changes in territory.

Greece has been on good terms with Jugoslavia. Under

⁶ *New York Times*, October 15, 1919.

Venizelos, it was the first State to recognize the new Government. Poland also has been friendly. On February 7 General Pilsudski, as chief of the Polish State, sent this telegram to the Prince Regent:⁷ "I am certain that I have laid the foundations for the Government and Army of the Polish Republic at a moment when the brilliant victories of the Allies have decided the final triumph of the ideals of justice and freedom. I take the liberty of expressing the firm conviction that my eager desire for the restoration of diplomatic relations between the United Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes and Poland, now restored to its independence and sovereignty, will be met with hearty sympathy from your Royal Highness. The Polish nation has always had brotherly feelings for the Serbian nation, and has been conscious of their common Slav origin. It has followed with the greatest admiration the heroic struggle of the Southern Slavs for their independence and national unity. The deeds of prowess and splendid victories of the Army of your Royal Highness have contributed largely to the triumph of the common cause of the Allies. It is thus my positive duty to bind more closely the ties of friendship which link the Poles with the United Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The Polish people and I pray God to take you in His holy and powerful protection."

The Balkan League of 1912 is credited chiefly to Mr. Venizelos. The League of Nations does not forbid alliances between groups of its members provided all treaties are published and have no provisions in conflict with the terms of the Covenant. It has been suggested by the more optimistic that Greece, Jugoslavia, Roumania and Czechoslovakia form an alliance for mutual protection against Bulgaria, Hungary and Bolshevik Russia. Another suggestion is that Bohemia, Hungary and Jugoslavia should form an economic agreement with German Austria. The Magyars form a wedge between the Czechoslovaks and the Jugoslavs and the

⁷ "New Europe," Vol. X, p. 239.

friendship of these two peoples would be invaluable to the Magyars. If Magyar democracy is sincere, they should be able to develop such a friendship. Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, Hungary and Roumania together would form a complete economic unit, with coal, minerals, oil, wheat, fruits, pigs and cattle, navigable rivers and good ports. United by economic bonds into a Danubian Confederation, these countries would form a much better field for foreign investment than would any one separated from the others. There has been talk of a navigable waterway from the Baltic to the Ægean, using the Vistula, the March, the Danube and canals through the valley of the Vardar, and thus uniting the Balkan countries and the countries of the Danube into one great economic system.⁸

⁸ Savić, V. R., "The Passing of the Balkans," *Yale Review*, April, 1919.

APPENDIX I

THE PACT OF LONDON (THE SECRET TREATY WITH ITALY)

26 APRIL, 1915

(The following is the text of the Secret Treaty with Italy, which is included in the Russian Secret Documents series):¹

THE Italian Ambassador in London, Marchese Imperiali, on instructions from his Government, has the honour to communicate to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey, to the French Ambassador, M. Cambon, and to the Russian Ambassador, Count Benckendorff, the following Memorandum:

I. The Great Powers of France, Great Britain, Russia, and Italy shall, without delay, draw up a military convention, by which are to be determined the minimum forces which Russia will be bound to place against Austria-Hungary in the event of the latter throwing all her forces against Italy. This military convention will also regulate the problems relating to a possible armistice, in so far as these do not by their very nature fall within the competence of the Supreme Command.

II. Italy on her part undertakes to conduct the war with all means at her disposal, in agreement with France, Great Britain, and Russia, and against the states which are at war with them.

III. The naval forces of France and Great Britain will lend Italy their active co-operation until such time as the Austrian fleet shall be destroyed, or till the conclusion of

¹ "New Europe," Vol. VI, pp. 24-27.

peace. France, Great Britain, and Italy shall in this connection conclude without delay a naval convention.

IV. By the future treaty of peace Italy shall receive: the Trentino; the whole of Southern Tyrol, as far as its natural and geographical frontier, the Brenner; the city of Trieste and its surroundings; the country of Gorizia and Grandisca; the whole of Istria as far as the Quarnero, including Volosca; and the Istrian Islands, Cherso and Lussin, as also the lesser islands of Plavnik, Unia, Candidoli, Palazzuola, S. Pietro, Nerovio, Asinello and Gruica, with their neighboring islets.

NOTE 1.—In carrying out what is said in Article IV. the frontier line shall be drawn along the following points: From the summit of Umbrile northwards to the Stelvio, then along the watershed of the Rhaetian Alps as far as the sources of the rivers Adige and Sisach, then across the Mounts Reschen and Brenner and the Etz and Ziller peaks. The frontier then turns southwards, touching Mount Toblach, in order to reach the present frontier of Carniola, which is near the Alps. Along this frontier the line will reach Mount Tarvis and will follow the watershed of the Julian Alps beyond the crests of Predil, Nangart, and Tricorno, and the passes of Podberdo, Podlansko, and Idria. From here the line will turn in a southeast direction towards the Schneeberg, in such a way as not to include the basin of the Save and its tributaries in Italian territory. From the Schneeberg the frontier will descend towards the sea coast, including Castua, Matuglia, and Volosca as Italian districts.

V. In the same way Italy shall receive the province of Dalmatia in its present extent, including further to the north Lissarika and Trebinje (i. e., two small places in S. W. Croatia) and to the south all places as far as a line starting from the sea close to Cape Planka (between Trau and Sebenico) and following the watershed eastward in such a way as to place in Italian hands all the valleys whose rivers

enter the sea near Sebenico—namely, the Cikola, Krka and Butišnjica, with their tributaries. To Italy also will belong all the islands north and west of the Dalmatian coast, beginning with Premuda, Selve, Ulbo, Skerda, Maon, Pago and Puntadura, and further north, and reaching to Meleda southwards, with the addition of the islands of S. Andrea, Busi, Lissa, Lesina, Tercola, Curzola, Cazza, and Lagosta and all the surrounding islets and rocks, and hence Pelagosa also, but without the islands of Grande and Piccola Zirona, Buje, Solta, and Brazza.

The following shall be neutralized: (1) the whole coast from Cape Planka on the north to the southern point of the peninsula of Sabbioncello on the south, this peninsula being included on the neutral zone. (2) Part of the coast from a point 10 kilometres south of Ragusavecchia as far as the river Vojussa on the south, so as to include in the neutralized zone the whole gulf of Cattaro with its ports, Antivari, Dulcigno, S. Giovanni di Medua, and Durazzo; with the reservation that Montenegro's rights are not to be infringed, in so far as they are based on the declarations exchanged between the contracting parties in April and May, 1909. These rights being recognised solely for Montenegro's present possessions, they shall not be extended to such regions and ports as may in the future be assigned to Montenegro. Hence no part of the coast which to-day belongs to Montenegro shall be subject to neutralisation in future. But all legal restrictions regarding the port of Antivari—to which Montenegro herself gave her adhesion in 1909—remain in vigour. (3) All the islands not assigned to Italy.

NOTE 2.—The following districts on the Adriatic shall by the work of the Entente Powers be included in the territory of Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro: To the north of the Adriatic the whole coast beginning at the Gulf of Volosca, near the frontier of Italy, as far as the northern frontier of Dalmatia, including the whole coast to-day belonging to Hungary; the whole coast of Croatia, the port of Fiume,

and the small ports of Nevi and Carlopago, and in the same way the islands of Veglia, Pervicio, Gregoria, Kali and Arbe: to the south of the Adriatic, where Serbia and Montenegro are interested, the whole coast from Cape Planka to the river Drin, with the very important ports of Spalato, Ragusa, Cattaro, Antivari, Dulcigno and S. Giovanni di Medua, as also the islands of Grande and Piccola Zirona, Buja, Solta, Brazza, Cikljan and Calamotta.

The port of Durazzo can be assigned to the independent Mohammedan state of Albania.

VI. Italy shall obtain in full ownership Valona, the island of Saseno and territory of sufficient extent to assure her against dangers of a military kind—approximately between the River Vojussa to the north and east, and the district of Shimar to the south.

VII. Having obtained Trentino and Istria by Article IV., Dalmatia and the Adriatic islands by Article V., and also the Gulf of Valona, Italy undertakes, in the event of a small autonomous and neutralised state being formed in Albania, not to oppose the possible desire of Great Britain, France and Russia to partition the northern and southern districts of Albania between Montenegro, Serbia, and Greece. The southern coast of Albania, from the frontier of the Italian territory of Valona to Cape Stilos, is to be neutralised.

To Italy will be conceded the right of conducting the foreign relations of Albania; in any case Italy will be bound to secure for Albania a territory sufficiently extensive to enable its frontiers to join those of Greece and Serbia to the east of the Lake of Ohrida.

VIII. Italy shall obtain full possession of all the islands of the Dodecanese, at present occupied by her.

IX. France, Great Britain, and Russia recognise as an axiom the fact that Italy is interested in maintaining the political balance of power in the Mediterranean, and her right to take over, when Turkey is broken up, a portion equal to theirs in the Mediterranean—namely, in that part

which borders on the province of Adalia, where Italy had already acquired special rights and interests, laid down in the Italo-British convention. The zone to be assigned to Italy will, in due course, be fixed in accordance with the vital interests of France and Great Britain. In the same way regard must be had for the interests of Italy, even in the event of the Powers maintaining for a further period of time the inviolability of Asiatic Turkey, and merely proceeding to map out spheres of interest among themselves. In the event of France, Great Britain, and Russia occupying during the present war districts of Asiatic Turkey, the whole district bordering on Adalia and defined above in greater detail, shall be reserved to Italy, who reserves the right to occupy it.

X. In Libya Italy obtains recognition of all those rights and prerogatives hitherto reserved to the Sultan by the Treaty of Lausanne.

XI. Italy shall receive a military contribution corresponding to her strength and sacrifices.

XII. Italy associates herself with the Declaration made by France, Great Britain, and Russia, by which the Mohammedan holy places are to be left in the possession of an independent Mohammedan state.

XIII. In the event of an extension of the French and British colonial possessions in Africa at the expense of Germany, France and Great Britain recognise to Italy in principle the right of demanding for herself certain compensations, in the form of an extension of her possessions in Eritrea, Somaliland, Libya, and the colonial districts bordering on French and British colonies.

XIV. Great Britain undertakes to facilitate for Italy without delay and on favourable conditions the conclusion of a loan in the London market, amounting to not less than £50,000,000.

XV. France, Great Britain, and Russia undertake to support Italy, in so far as she does not permit the repre-

sentatives of the Holy See to take diplomatic action with regard to the conclusion of peace and the regulation of questions connected with the war.

XVI. The present treaty is to be kept secret. As regards Italy's adherence to the declaration of 5 September, 1914, this shall only be published after the declaration of war by and upon Italy.

The representatives of France, Great Britain, and Russia, having taken cognisance of this memorandum, and being furnished with powers for this purpose, agreed as follows with the representative of Italy, who was also authorised by his Government for this purpose:

France, Great Britain, and Russia declare their full agreement with the present memorandum presented to them by the Italian Government. With regard to points I., II., and III. (relating to the co-ordination of the military and naval operations of all four Powers), Italy declares that she will enter the war actively as soon as possible, and in any case not later than one month after the signature of the present document on behalf of the contracting parties.

(Signed in four copies, 26 April, 1915)

EDWARD GREY,
JULES CAMBON,
IMPERIALI,
BENCKENDORFF.

APPENDIX II

THE RUSSIAN SECRET DOCUMENTS ¹

I. *Mr. Trotski's Reasons for Publication*

IN proceeding to publish the secret diplomatic documents dealing with the foreign policy of the Tsarist and Bourgeois Coalition Governments during the first seven months of the revolution, we are fulfilling the obligation which we took upon ourselves when our party was in opposition. Secret diplomacy is a necessary weapon in the hands of a propertied minority, which is compelled to deceive the majority in order to make the latter obey its interests. Imperialism, with its world-wide plans of annexation and its rapacious alliances and arrangements, has developed to the highest extent the system of secret diplomacy. The struggle against imperialism, which has ruined and drained of their blood the peoples of Europe, means at the same time the struggle against capitalist diplomacy, which has good reason to fear the light of day. The Russian people, as well as the peoples of Europe and of the whole world, must know the documentary truth about those plots which were hatched in secret by financiers and industrialists, together with their parliamentary and diplomatic agents. The peoples of Europe have earned the right to know the truth about these things, owing to their innumerable sacrifices and the universal economic ruin.

"To abolish secret diplomacy is the first condition of an honorable, popular, and really democratic foreign policy. The Soviet Government makes the introduction of such a policy its object. For this reason, while openly offering to all the belligerent peoples and their governments an im-

¹ "New Europe," Vol. V, supp. 20 and 27, Dec., 1917.

mediate armistice, we publish simultaneously those treaties and agreements which have lost all their obligatory force for the Russian workmen, soldiers, and peasants who have taken the government into their hands. . . .

"Bourgeois politicians and journalists of Germany and Austria-Hungary may endeavour to profit by the published documents in order to represent in a favourable light the diplomacy of the Central Empires. But every effort in this direction would be doomed to failure for two reasons. In the first place, we intend shortly to put before the public secret documents which will show up quite clearly the diplomacy of the Central Empires. In the second place—and this is the chief point—the methods of secret diplomacy are just as international as imperialist rapacity. When the German proletariat by revolutionary means gets access to the secrets of its Government chancelleries, it will produce from them documents of just the same nature as those which we are now publishing. It is to be hoped that this will happen as soon as possible.

"The government of workmen and peasants abolishes secret diplomacy, with its intrigues, figures, and lies. We have nothing to conceal. Our programme formulates the passionate wishes of millions of workmen, soldiers, and peasants. We desire a speedy peace so that the peoples may honourably live and work together. We desire a speedy deposition of the supremacy of capital. In revealing before the whole world the work of the governing classes as it is expressed in the secret documents of diplomacy, we turn to the workers with that appeal which will always form the basis of our foreign policy: 'Proletariats of all countries, unite!'—L. Trotski, People's Commissioner for Foreign Affairs.

II. *Constantinople and the Straits*

(This document, first published in the *Pravda*, appears to be a summary of various secret negotiations, presumably drawn up for the information of some minister.)

"On 19 February, 4 March, 1915, the Minister of Foreign Affairs handed to the French and British Ambassadors a memorandum which set forth the desire to add the following territories to Russia as a result of the present war; the town of Constantinople, the western coast of the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmora, and the Dardanelles; Southern Thrace, as far as the Enos-Midia line; the coast of Asia Minor between the Bosphorus and the river Sakaria, and a point on the Gulf of Ismid to be defined later; the islands in the Sea of Marmora and the islands of Imbros and Tenedos. The special rights of France and England in the above territories were to remain inviolate.

"Both the French and British governments express their readiness to agree to our wishes, provided the war is won and provided a number of claims made by France and England, both in the Ottoman Empire and in other places, are satisfied.

"As far as Turkey is concerned, these claims are as follows:

"Constantinople is to be recognised as a free port for the transit of goods coming from Russia and not going to Russia, and a free passage is to be given through the Straits to merchant ships.

"The rights of England and France in Asiatic Turkey, to be defined by a special agreement between France, England and Russia, are recognised. The sacred Mohammedan places are to be protected and Arabia is to be under an independent Mohammedan sovereign.

"The neutral zone in Persia established by the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 is to be included in the English sphere of influence. While recognising these demands in general as satisfactory, the Russian Government made several reservations.

"In view of the formulation of our wishes with regard to the sacred Mohammedan places, it must now be made clear whether these localities are to remain under the sov-

ereignty of Turkey with the Sultan keeping the title of Khalif, or whether it is proposed to create new independent States. In our opinion it would be undesirable to separate the Khalifate from Turkey. In any case freedom of pilgrimage must be guaranteed.

"While agreeing to the inclusion of the neutral zone of Persia within the sphere of English influence, the Russian Government considers it right to declare that the districts round the towns of Ispahan and Yezd formerly were fortified by Russia, and also that part of the neutral zone which cuts a wedge between the Russian and Afghan frontiers and goes as far as the Russian frontier at Zulfagar, was included in the Russian sphere of influence.

"The Russian Government considers it desirable that the question of the frontiers between Russia and Northern Afghanistan should simultaneously be solved according to the wishes expressed at the time of the negotiations of 1914.

"After the entrance of Italy into the war our wishes were communicated to the Italian Government also, and the latter expressed its agreement, provided the war ended in the successful realisation of Italian claims in general, and in the East in particular, and in the recognition by us for Italy within the territories ceded to us of the same rights as those enjoyed by France and England."

III. *Exchange of Annexations*

(Secret telegram of the Ambassador in Paris, 11 March, 1917. No. 168)

My answer to telegram No. 167.

No. 2.—The Government of the French Republic, wishing to emphasize the meaning and importance of the treaties concluded with the Russian Government in 1915 with the object of regulating at the end of the present war the question of Constantinople and the Straits according to the aspirations of Russia, and wishing also to assure to her Ally

in military and industrial respects all the guarantees desirable for the safety and economic development of the Empire, recognises for Russia full freedom in the arrangement of her western frontiers.

(Signed) *Izvol'ski*.

V. *The Rhine Frontier*

(Secret telegram from the Russian Foreign Minister—Mr. Sazonov's second successor—to the Russian Ambassador in Paris, 30 January, 12 February, 1917. Apparently reproduced only from a copy of the original.)

At an Imperial audience Mr. Doumergue (French Ambassador in Petrograd) informed His Majesty the Emperor of France's wish to assure herself of the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine after the conclusion of the war, and also of a special position in the Saar valley, and to bring about the detachment from Germany of the territories west of the Rhine and their reorganization in such a way that in future the Rhine may form a permanent strategic obstacle to any German advance. Doumergue expresses the hope that His Majesty will not refuse his sanction to this proposal. His Majesty was graciously pleased to express his approval in principle. I therefore request that Doumergue, after getting into touch with his Government, should communicate to me a proposal for an agreement, which could be concluded on the basis of an exchange of Notes between the French Ambassador and myself.

While we thus endeavoured to meet the wishes of our Ally, I wish at the same time to make clear a point of view which the Imperial Government laid down in its telegram of 24 February, 1916 (No. 948), according to which, in the event of our recognising the unrestricted right of France and England to fix Germany's western frontiers, we reckon upon the Allies on their side recognising to us a corresponding right to fix our frontiers with Germany and Austria-

Hungary. The impending exchange of Notes in the question raised by Doumergue gives us the opportunity for requesting the French Government to assure us of its readiness to receive freedom of action in fixing its future frontier on the west (*sic*). We shall in due course communicate more exact details in this question to the Paris Cabinet. Further, we regard as assured the consent of the French Government to the restriction as to the Aland Islands ² being removed at the end of the war. Please put before Briand the views here set forth and wire the result.

(Signed) POKROVSKI.

XIV. *Russia's Readiness to Publish the Treaties*

(Secret Telegram from the Russian Foreign Minister to the *Charge d'Affaires* in Paris, communicated also to London and Rome, 24 September, 1917, No. 4,225.)

With reference to your Nos. 947 and 952. The assurances made to you by Ribot ³ on the occasion of his declaration in the Chamber regarding the eastern frontiers of France, are unfortunately not altogether straightforward. The question of linking this agreement with the agreement regarding Constantinople and the Straits was raised neither in the exchange of Notes with Paleologue ⁴ nor in my verbal declaration to Noulens.⁵ Noulens proposed to me the publication of the treaties concluded before the war—that is really the Russian military conventions. To this I remarked that such a publication of a treaty which is generally known would be completely misunderstood by public opinion and would only give rise to demands for the publication of the agreements which had been concluded during the war. The publication of these, and especially of the Roumanian and Italian treaties, is regarded by our Allies as undesir-

² *I.e.*, the veto in their fortification.

³ Then French Foreign Minister.

⁴ Then French Ambassador in Petrograd.

⁵ The present Ambassador.

able. In any case we have no intention of putting difficulties in the way of France or of placing Ribot in a still more painful position. In order, then, to avoid in the future such misunderstandings as have already twice arisen owing to his statements in the Chamber, I request you to intimate officially to the French Government that on the part of Russia no obstacles will be placed in the way of publishing all agreements published before or during the war, in the event of the other Allies who are parties to them consenting. Regarding the question of Asia Minor agreements I will communicate to you my views in a special supplementary telegram.

(Signed) TEREŠČENKO.

XV. *Offers to Greece*

(Confidential Memorandum, exact source not indicated)

Offer of South Albania.—On 22 November, 1914, the Ministers of Russia, England, and France declared to the Greek Government in Athens that Greece would receive the southern portion of Albania, with the exception of Valona, in the event of her immediate entry in aid of Serbia. For immediate entry Venizelos demanded a sure guarantee from Roumania against an attack of Bulgaria upon Greece. This guarantee was not given by Roumania. Consequently Greece gave no help to Serbia and the offer lapsed.

Offer of Territory in Asia Minor.—On 12 January, 1915, the British Minister in Athens, on instruction from his Government, informed Venizelos that if Greece at the moment of a fresh attack upon Serbia came to the latter's aid, the Entente Powers would recognise to Greece important territorial acquisitions on the coast of Asia Minor. On 15 January, 1915, the Greek Ministers in Petrograd, Paris and London handed in the answer of the Greek Government to the English proposal, containing a whole series of conditions. The negotiations begun on 20 January regarding

Greek wishes in respect of Asia Minor were held up by negotiations regarding Bulgaria's entry, and were interrupted by the resignation of Venizelos on 21 February, 1915. On 9 March, 1915, the Greek Foreign Minister, Zographos, handed to the Ministers at Athens a Note in which the Cabinet expressed the wish to resume the negotiations interrupted by the departure of Venizelos. On 30 March, in answer to this, the Entente Ministers expressed the readiness of the Russian, British and French Governments to guarantee the vilayet of Adnin to Greece in the event of her entering against Turkey. They resumed the negotiations, adding verbally that the offer would lapse unless Greece without delay declared her readiness to intervene. In the reply Note the Gounaris Cabinet on 1 April declared its willingness to enter at once if the Entente Powers would be ready to commence military operations against Turkey jointly with the Greek troops. Intervention was made dependent on a formal guarantee of Greece's territorial integrity, with the inclusion of North Epirus and the islands, during the whole war and for a definite period after it. The territorial acquisitions of Greece in Asia Minor and elsewhere were to be the subject of subsequent deliberation. The negotiations were not renewed during that month, and on 1 May the Foreign Minister declared that the Entente Powers obviously did not wish to guarantee Greece's integrity and that the Gounaris Cabinet had decided to preserve its neutrality still further.

APPENDIX III

THE ITALIAN CLAIMS ON THE ALPS AND IN THE ADRIATIC

(Presented to the Peace Conference at Paris by the Italian Delegates)

THE following pages contain a statement of Italy's claims on the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. They set forth in their whole the various reasons upon which the Conventions regulating Italy's entrance into the war were based. Quite apart from these conventions the Italian claims show such a spirit of justice, rightfulness and moderation that they come entirely within the principles enunciated by President Wilson and should therefore be recognised and approved by everybody.

Our claims involve the inclusion in Italian territory of a certain number of people of foreign tongue and descent. But similar inclusions have taken place, and on a much larger scale, in the formation of already existing States, and are going to be recognised and legalised in the formation of new States about to be brought into existence. This depends on the fact that the long disregard of natural boundaries by Governments which were the outcome of the policy of equilibrium established by the Treaties of Westphalia, Utrecht, Campoformio and Vienna, and the interest these Governments had in destroying all proofs of nationality in order to crush political aspirations, have favored the infiltration and importation of foreign races within the boundaries assigned by nature to the various countries. But the wrong inflicted upon a people can never under any circumstances become a source of rightful claims on the

part of those who are responsible before history for the wrong committed.

Thus, according to their national aspirations, Poland, with the additions in Galicia, Danzig, Posnania and Eastern Prussia, would include over 40 per cent. of foreign population; Bohemia, with the addition of Slovacchia and Austrian Silesia, about 30 per cent.; Roumania, with the addition of Transylvania, Bessarabia, Bukovina and part of the Banat, over 17 per cent.; Jugo-Slavia over 11 per cent., claiming as they do, outside the Italian frontiers, territories in which the percentage of the Slav populations is insignificant; France over 4 per cent.; Italy, only 3 per cent.

There need be no fear that Italy will create new forms of irredentism, which is always the result of injustice and persecution, since Italy's history gives assurance in this respect. The French-speaking citizens of the Valle d'Aosta, the Slavs of the Natisone, the Germans of the Sette Comuni, have never felt they were living under a foreign government, because Italy has always respected their individuality.

Europe, which has never heard any complaints or protests on the part of these long-standing citizens of the Italian State, will likewise never hear in the future of any injustice inflicted upon Germans and Slavs whom the course of events will now bring within the new Italian boundaries.

Such a conception of the common citizenship of peoples of different tongues does not in our opinion clash with the actual bearing of Mr. Wilson's proposals, in that part in which they ask for a just settlement of long-standing territorial, racial and national questions and for the equality of nations on which to lay the foundations of peace.

Italy's Claims

In entering the war in order to face the aggression of the Central Empires, the special aims of Italy were to free her sons still lingering under foreign oppression and to attain an assurance of safety both on land and sea.

The victory to which she contributed by an effort which compares favorably with the efforts of her allies, entitles Italy to formulate her claims on the basis of the principles underlying her resolution to partake in the great struggle by the side of the Entente and against her former Allies.

By conciliating as far as possible national rights with fundamental conditions of safety, her aims might be attained as to the land by claiming the boundary of the Alps, comprising the Upper Adige, the Trentino and Venezia Giulia, and, as to the sea, by so improving the situation on the Adriatic that, without prejudice to the legitimate aspirations of the new States which will border on it, Italy may no longer, as heretofore, be in a position of absolute inferiority and may be relieved of the dangers to which she was exposed up to now.

Italy's claims, in so far as they rest essentially on the principle of nationality, do not call for special explanation. But also those demands, which, while they depart in some measure from the rigorous application of the ethnical principle, aim at securing Italy's future safety, independently of the present or future attitude of the bordering States, are not in reality less consonant with the principles which guide the Allied and Associated Powers in their actions. It is clear that the foundations of the longed for League of Nations will be solid and enduring in proportion to the security which the single nations which form it are guaranteed against danger and interference from outside, and definitely,—we might almost say, physically—against foreign menace.

Italy's claims in this regard constitute no threat to others, they merely protect her against menace from others. Only by their realization can Italy, without anxiety, put into actual practice the reduction of armaments which should be the greatest benefit mankind will reap as the result of the new world organization.

THE NORTHERN ALPINE BOUNDARY

The new Alpine boundary which Italy requires corresponds practically with the line agreed upon in the Armistice signed on November 3rd, 1918, between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria-Hungary. It starts from Pizzo Umbrail to the North of the Stelvio, follows the ridge of the Rhaetic Alps to the sources of the Adige and Isarco, passes through the Reschen, the Brenner, the Oetz and the Ziller, whence it turns southward and reaches the Dobbiaco (Toblach) mountains and the Julian Alps.

This is the geographical boundary along the Alpine watershed. It is the only boundary which, being formed by an actual mountainous obstacle—the formidable wall which has always been considered Italy's frontier—has any intrinsic value as a necessary and real safeguard. It closes the passes which are crossed by two great highways; it leaves to the population living in the upper valleys their natural intercourse with the plain; and it follows its course from one landmark to another, all clearly and incontestably defined. The natural development of this boundary should of course include the High Tauern system; but Italy, who has no desire beyond what is essential for her defence, willingly renounces her right to carry it any further than the Pizzo dei Tre Signori (Ziller Group), diverging thence to the South towards the Hoch-Gall, thence to the summits of the Kreuz Spitz and Hochhorn Spitz and reaching, after including the whole Sexten Valley with Innichen, the Carnic Alps and the present political boundary of the Kingdom at Coma Vanscuro.

The strategic value of the Upper Adige has always been recognised: in the upper valley of the Adige lies the centre of all the highways for a German invasion of Italy. With it, even if Italy had Trent, the Germans would still hold the gates of Italy in their hands. It is indispensable that Italy should reach beyond Bolzano in order that by owning

the side line joining the two great railways of the Brenner and Toblach, the Germans should not continue to have the actual control also of the Italian side. An Austrian, General Kuhn, wrote: "The Italians must conquer Southern Tyrol as far as the Brenner, if they want to defend Venice."

Any other boundary more to the South would merely be an artificial amputation entailing the upkeep of expensive armaments contrary to the principles by which Peace should be inspired. The boundary chosen by Italy insures equal security also to the peoples living on the northern side of it, because the difficult and impervious nature of the ground makes it practically impossible to carry out military operations of any importance either from the North or from the South. The boundary, which we will call the "Brenner Frontier," is therefore indicated by the very conditions of nature, by the necessities of the people's life and by reasons of peaceful security. It places the two neighbouring countries on a footing of perfect equality in every possible way. By reverting to actual natural conditions and by identifying itself with reality, it acquired all the elements of stability.

Compared to the supreme necessity and practical advantage of such a frontier, the fact that it includes about 200,000 inhabitants of German nationality becomes a matter of no significance. Apart from the former historic relations between this region and Italy, commemorated by so many monuments and indelible memories, which received eloquent military and political sanction by Napoleon the First's annexation of the Upper Adige to the Italian Kingdom; apart from the fact that the present national conformation of the Upper Adige is the result of violent intrusion and foreign invasions in a basin which geographically, historically, and economically belongs to Italy (even at the opening of the nineteenth century the region was predominantly Italian not only South of the Napoleonic frontier, but in the entire Venosta Valley, and partially in the districts of Bressanone and Sterzen, while the Valley of Badia is still Italian at the

present day, a total of not less than 45,000 Italians residing at present in the real and proper Upper Adige), it should be noted that the territory lying between the pre-war frontier and the frontier now claimed, that is, the region of the Trentino and the Upper Adige which form one geographical whole, has a total population of 600,000 inhabitants, of which number even the Austrian statistics admit 380,000 to be Italian, while the correct figures reach 420,000. Even if reasons of national safety and defence did not militate in favour of the inclusion of the Trentino and Upper Adige in the Italian Kingdom, the mere numerical prevalence of the Italian population (about 70 per cent.), in a region which for evident reasons is indivisible, would necessitate its return to its natural, economic, and national unity.

Then the frontier assigned to Italy departs from the present political frontier near Mount Lodin, so as to include the Valley of Tarvia, a cardinal point in the defence of the Tagliamento, a main junction of railway lines of great importance, and the centre of converging roads at the junction of the three ranges, the Julian, Carnic and Caravanch Alps; an open thoroughfare in three directions (wherefrom in all probability its name Terviso is derived), of which Napoleon experienced the defensive importance for the Friuli and for Italy when he united it with the Alto Fella and Weissenfels to his Italian Kingdom. Against these reasons of military security combined with economic considerations—for only in this manner is direct communication between the Alto Fella and the High Isontine Valley rendered possible by a connecting line 17 kilometers instead of 150 kilometers long—no serious national objections exist, as this widening of the frontier would involve the inclusion of barely 5800 inhabitants of mainly German race.

The Eastern Territorial Frontier

In order to remedy iniquity and error which in 1866 assigned to Italy as her eastern frontier with Austria what in

reality was the artificial boundary established by the Government of Vienna between the two administrative regions (Lombardy-Venetia and the Austrian Littoral) belonging to the same state, it is necessary, in Julian Venetia also, to follow the indications of nature and the warnings of history and to carry the new frontier of Italy to the watershed of the Julian Alps, from the Pass of Camporosso to the Quarnero.

Here also we must be guided by the same conception of geographical separation, natural defence, historic tradition and national redemption.

Geographers of all countries and all times have placed the Italian frontier at the Julian Alps. The whole of Julian Venetia has developed historically along lines similar to the rest of the Peninsula, with this difference only, that the movement for the complete national reunion of Italy in a single political organism has hitherto failed to achieve the redemption of this extreme corner of the motherland, just as, previous to 1866, Venetia had remained unredeemed, and as, up till 1859, Lombardy had remained under the foreign yoke. At every step from the sea to the mountains, the tokens of Rome and of St. Mark still fit in with the life of the population, the spirit and habits of which are predominantly Italian, even in those parts where infiltration has in the course of centuries interwoven new elements in their ethnical composition. Documents of the highest eloquence, tenacious sacrifice which did not flinch even from martyrdom, the daily life of the people, which is truly, as Renan puts it, "a daily renewed plebiscite," testify to the spontaneous and harmonious participation of Julian Venetia in the secular movement of ideals and heroic action for the liberation and unification of Italy, and to the aspiration of this people to unite itself, when the longed for hour should arrive, with their brothers who had already been liberated. Austria was compelled, on the very day when a state of war with Italy was proclaimed, to dissolve all Ital-

ian representations in the Communes of Julian Venetia, because she was well aware that in every Italian she possessed an irreconcilable enemy, dangerous to her existence as an oppressing state.

When the course of disintegration of their State organism forced the Governments of Vienna and Budapest to promise the right of self-determination to the people, this was the signal throughout Gorizia and Trieste, and the whole of Istria and Fiume, no less than in the Trentino, for the populations, uncowed by persecution, privations, penalties and the internments, to which even old men, women and children were subjected during the war, to rise and drive out in tumult the representatives of the Austro-Hungarian régime and to proclaim, as with one voice, their annexation to the Italian Kingdom. This occurred in defiance of the armed forces which still held the field, before Italian or Allied troops could ensure protection to the rebels. Thus, Julian Venetia, as President Poincaré said of Alsace, by instinctive impulse, "flung herself weeping with joy into the arms of her recovered Mother."

The Italian irredentist movement came into existence on the very day on which the peace of 1866 redressed only in partial measure the great political violence which was committed at Campoformio and preconfirmed by the Congress of Vienna.

In order to give peace to Central Europe and equilibrium to the Adriatic it is imperative to complete the work interrupted in 1866 and to tear up the last fragment of the Treaty of Vienna, which up to the present day has deprived Italy of some of her children, and undermined the security of her Adriatic frontier by sea and land.

To attain this end it is necessary in the first place to carry the Italian frontier to the watershed of the Julian Alps, which from the Moistrovka (east of Mt. Manhard), the Tricorno, Idria, Nauporto, descending by a series of massive ridges as outlined on the annexed map, and following

the natural boundary marked by the watershed between Quarnero and the Canal of Maltempo (Croatian Coast), plunges into the sea opposite the Island of Veglia at the rock which bears the fateful name of St. Mark.

The description of the frontier does not call for elucidation, even with regard to some slight modifications which do no more than define and interpret the summary outline as drawn also in the Treaty of London. Only this frontier will close "Italy's Eastern Gate."

The territory of Julian Venetia has hitherto been assigned to six provinces of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The basin of the Isonzo constituted the "Principality of Gorizia and Gradisca." Trieste and its territory formed a province by itself "directly dependent from the Empire," the Istrian Peninsula (with the Quarnero Islands) constituted the "Istrian Margraviate"; the greater part of the Inner Carso was joined to the Carniola; the town of Fiume with the surrounding district was assigned to the Hungarian Crown as a "separate entity"; lastly, the triangle formed by Fiume, the Polizza Pass, and the Rock of St. Mark formed part of Croatia.

Nature, on the contrary, created Julian Venetia a single and clearly defined geographic whole. The iniquity of events, especially during the last century, has broken up this whole, and divided its ownership, without any regard to the will and interest of the population, thus spreading the seeds of domestic and foreign strife. Here also it is necessary to give Nature its due, to reconstitute the political unity of the region, and decree its ownership to the Italian State, which claims it by right of nature, history and for economic reasons.

Quite apart from this past history, Gorizia, Trieste, Pola and Fiume, the most important centres in Julian Venetia, are Italian by the overwhelming majority of their present population, as shown even by official Austrian and Hungarian statistics. The towns and minor boroughs are Ital-

ian, and extensive rural districts, of which the economic and civil existence form an indivisible whole with these towns, are Italian also. Even the adversaries of the Italian cause do not also suggest that Julian Venetia should once again be broken up, and that certain of the inland portions should be assigned to a State other than that owning the large centres, which for the most part are situated on the coast. And as these large centres, whether along the coast or in the interior, are all incontestably Italian and lead the moral and material life of the whole region, Italy's claim to the possession of the whole region must be recognised, not only for the higher reasons of her eastern defense, and for those of history and civilisation, but also and more especially by reason of the economic laws of the country and the well-being of its population, without distinction of nationality. Even apart from indispensable reasons of military safety and geographical unity, a frontier of compromise, a frontier not based on clearly defined territorial principles, could neither completely settle the conflicts of nationality, which are apprehended as the result of the inclusion in our frontier of Slav minorities, nor present any economic stability. The natural outlets of the Slavified mountainous zones (which moreover are not densely populated) are the Venetian Friulian plain, and the Italian ports of Julian Venetia, from Trieste to Fiume. If these zones, which are now mainly inhabited by Slavs, were to belong to a State other than ours, they would become centres of anti-Italian agitation, they would inevitably press towards the sea and, supported also by the Slovenes and the Croatian hinterland, might exercise a vigorous and threatening pressure on our frontier territories, keeping them in a state of continuous agitation and the two bordering States in a condition of perpetual tension. The inclusion of the entire Cis-Alpine territory, also of that part which is partially or entirely inhabited by Slavs, far from creating the danger of Slav irredentism,—which Italy knows how to avert by wise treat-

ment of the minority—is the only way to prevent that movement for Slav irredentism which an irrational frontier would foster by the very pressure of the economic necessity which the Cis-Alpine Slavs would, on the contrary, be able to satisfy freely as heretofore in the urban centres and the Italian ports under the common protection of Italian rule.

Given the indivisibility of the region and the necessity that it should form, with its Alpine boundary, the eastern bulwark of Italy, the strength of Italian claims cannot be prejudiced by the number of inhabitants of other languages who are to be found either scattered as a minority among the Italian population in some parts, or even actually in the majority in certain outlying corners of the territory. We have already explained the reasons and the general value of such phenomena—characteristic of the border lands of territories belonging also to other nations which, however, are not regarded on this account as politically reduced or split. In any case, in order to rectify current impressions, it is well to make it clear that Julian Venetia is only a part which has been severed by violence in recent times from the geographically compact region of Venetia which, taken as a whole, includes little over 40,000 Slavs in a total population of 3,600,000 inhabitants. If, again, one looks only to that part of Venetia which has hitherto been separated from the Kingdom of Italy (i.e., Julian Venetia) official statistics give a population of 482,000 Italians (Italian subjects included) as against 411,000 Slavs (including Slovenes and Croats). When it is considered that all the Italian residents (including the majority of Italian subjects) are natives and descendants of natives of the country, while, especially in the towns, the Slavs are mostly of recent immigration, deliberately organized for political aims; when it is considered that official censuses have misrepresented the truth to the disadvantage of Italy, as for instance (not to waste time on examples and details) can be demonstrated by the express statement made by the I. R. Central Statis-

tical Commission, which admitted the artificioesness of the methods followed for some one-sided revisions of the last census, it must be recognised that the proportion of nationalities, which official Austrian statistics have acknowledged to show an Italian majority for the whole of Julian Venetia, may be presumed to be in reality even much more favorable to the Italians, and unquestionably the reality supports their claims, which are based on geography and on civil and economic predominance.

Without enlarging on records of the political life of the country, it will suffice to mention that in the three administrative provinces of Trieste, Gorizia-Gradisca, and Istria, which according to official statistics count an Italian population of 44 per cent., with 32 per cent. Slovenes and 20 per cent. Croats, the local administrations, that is to say, the fundamental and traditional organs of public life, are in Italian hands in a number of Communes, that include in aggregate 70 per cent. of the entire population of Julian Venetia, and this although the electoral system in use is on the widest possible basis. On the contrary, the Communes administered by the Slavs include only 30 per cent. of the total population of the three Julian Provinces. Thus the Provincial Diets—even without counting Trieste, where the Council Diet counts 68 Italians out of a total of 80 members—are for the most part Italian throughout Istria and the Gorizian districts, in spite of electoral regulations which, under pressure of the Government, have been arranged to favour the Slavs. These clear manifestations of the political life of Julian Venetia prove either that the Italians form, contrary to official statistics, the very great majority of the population, or else that a very considerable proportion of the Slavs, notwithstanding hostile pressure and agitations, recognise Italian superiority and the necessity and utility of living in community with Italian elements; that they speak our language and accept our political programme, concerning which Italians have never made a mystery even

in the administrative field. These data acquire special importance when we remember the policy of national persecution carried out by every means, especially during the last fifty years, by the Government of Vienna against the Italian elements, who, regardless of their constitutional rights, have always been deprived of elementary, medium and higher schools while the Slovenes and Croats, in consideration of their unfailing loyalty to the Austrian parliament, and by their military efforts, which continued until October, 1918, always enjoyed a privileged situation, even in the cities which were purely Italian.

The Defence of the Adriatic

The new boundary of the Julian Alps, which included in the Kingdom of Italy the Istrian Coast with Pola and Fiume, reduces, without eliminating it, the state of inferiority in which, greatly to the danger of the nation and of the peace of Europe, Italy has been placed up to the present in the Adriatic. In order to remove this evil and to eliminate all danger and menace, it is imperative to return to Italy a share on the Dalmatian coast and islands.

Ever since the moment when, on the fall of Venice in 1797, Istria and Dalmatia were handed to Austria, and the natural unity of the Adriatic was shattered into military and political divisions, the problem presented itself, as it does today, clear and precise, grave and full of menace: torment to all young Italian democracies called into being by the genius of the revolution—remorse to Napoleon who attempted to rectify at Pressburg the mistake of Campoformio—nightmare of German and Viennese reaction which from the opposite shore knows that it can still rivet the chains of Italy—clear vision to the thinkers and statesmen, to the people and to the armies of our country, whom only misfortunes and mistakes—up to the battle of Lissa and the Congress of Berlin—prevented from ensuring Italy's welfare and the world's peace.

Times and conditions having changed, Italy can revise her case as regards the Adriatic: instead of demanding absolute rule on this sea her request may be limited to that of freedom, which will not exclude the Jugo-Slavs from a share in the possession of the Adriatic coast; Italy claiming for herself no more, but also no less, than will ensure her peaceful security and eliminate foreign menace.

Italy's claim is not antagonistic to the laws of geography and history nor to the principles of nationality and economy. The whole of Dalmatia was united to Italy in the centuries of Rome and Venice, for its own good fortune and the world's peace. Indeed, Austria herself considered it Italian territory, together with Lombardy and Venetia, up to the year 1866, and this even in the geography text-books written for her military schools.

The Treaties stipulated prior to Italy's entry into the war aimed at ensuring to her that part of the islands and of the mainland of Dalmatia which was considered sufficient to eliminate danger and threat. It was a compromise, not including Spalato, the old town, with the most glorious tokens of latinity, and which therefore could and should be added.

Out of a total area of 12,385 square kilometers, she was to receive only 6,325 of Dalmatian territory; out of the Dalmatian population of 645,000 inhabitants, only 287,000, i.e., only 44 per cent.; of the whole coast line, exclusive of the islands, from Fiume to the mouth of the Boiana, Italy was to receive 117 miles against 647 given to the Slavs, that is to say, only one-sixth. The Jugo-Slavs would therefore have on the eastern shore a coast line six times the extent of that given to Italy, would possess more than half of the population, and half of the continental and insular area of Dalmatia. Considering that as late as 1909 a Serbian semi-official writer put forward as sufficient for the independence of Serbia a coast on the Adriatic only five kilometers long between Ragusa and Cattaro, one cannot but appreciate

the moderation of the claims of Italy and her liberality towards her new neighbours, especially when we remember that besides the ports of the Croatian Coast (Buccari, Portoré, Segna, etc.), the most important ports in Dalmatia could also be allotted to this State.

As regards nationalities, the Dalmatian territory ensured to Italy by the Treaty includes about 280,000 inhabitants, among whom the official statistics enumerate only 12,000 Italians. This is the result of the most outrageous violence that the political history of Europe records during the last century. Austria did not recoil before any form of artifice or violence in Dalmatia in order to repress Italian feelings, after 1866 in order to check any movement towards annexation to Italy, and after 1878 and 1882 in order to carry out her Balkan schemes.

Even apart from the Illyric-Roman origin, with its Albanese affinity, altogether distinct from the Slav type, of the so-called Morlacchi, who form almost one-third of the Dalmatian population, impartial observation supported indirectly by scholastic statistics, election results and the various manifestations of social life, show the Dalmatian population who come within the boundaries assured to Italy to be of very different national consistency from what would appear from Viennese statistics. There are no fewer than 50,000 Italians, Italian by name, by fact and by conscience, of whom nearly four-fifths were artificially suppressed in the census; the so-called "Slavs for political opportunism," who can neither understand nor speak the Slav tongue and who at home speak exclusively Italian, number at least 15,000. There are then over 100,000 Slavs who know and speak Italian fluently, and to whom life in common with Italians, which is to-day a necessity, will be quite welcome tomorrow when they will be freed from external agitation.

Lastly, there remains in reality not more than 100,000 Slavs in the country districts, who do not speak Italian and remain unaffected by Italian influence, but, as a matter of

fact, not even these latter under the pressure of the unbridled anti-Italian agitation which has been going on for so many years, show any genuine aversion to recognise the civil and economic superiority of the Italians of the towns and maritime boroughs. So great even now in spite of everything is the vitality of the Italian element on the Dalmatian coast, that the Croats must themselves, in their own papers, openly complain that anybody visiting Dalmatia must receive an impression contrary to their aspirations, that is to say an Italian impression, and they reproach the Dalmatians for their "shameful habit" of speaking Italian. Nor could this be otherwise in a country in which the violence of the Austrian rule may have robbed Italians of a parliamentary representation—which in 1869 consisted of 7 Italians against 2 Slav deputies—and of a majority in the provincial Diet which in the first elections of 1861 had numbered 30 Italian deputies against 13 Slavs, but did not succeed either in impairing the Italian character of Zara, which triumphantly asserts itself in Zara's all-Italian Town Council, nor in preventing, for instance, the Chambers of Commerce of Zara and Sebenico districts from being Italian; nor the constituency of the wealthiest class of the same districts from sending unopposed to the Diet Italian deputies, thus affording clear proof that industrial and trade activity and real estate in the very territory reserved to Italy are still in Italian hands, and supporting also in the economic field the Italian character of historic memories and feelings which, since the Italian occupation following on the Armistice, has revealed itself in such a touching and eloquent manner by the spontaneity and persistence of manifestations and aspirations.

But even if historic right did not support it and if racial reality were not actually so different from what the Austrian State has tried to make out in the Slav interest, Italy should still—for the sake of her future safety—not relinquish her claim to the possession of a minimum of the Dal-

matian coast and islands. It would carry us too far to go into a detailed examination of the strategic problems of the Adriatic. A single glance at the map reveals, however, their essential features already thrown into tragic relief by the recent war.

On the Eastern coast of the Adriatic a magnificent advance barrier of rocks and islands protects the mainland and with it the coastal lines of communication. On the Western coast is a low-lying beach, undefended and exposed to aggression of all kinds.

On the east side there is the possibility of sheltered navigation, no matter from what direction the wind may blow; on our side there is a complete lack of every kind of refuge, and risky sailing whenever the weather is bad. On the eastern coast, wide recesses and the possibility of casting anchor anywhere; on the west, a lack of anchorages and difficulty of call and refuge.

On the Dalmatian coast high ground offers excellent observation posts which command the wide surrounding horizon; while on the Italian coast, on the other hand, low-lying ground and (with the exception of the Gargano and the Conero) no possibility of observing the waters from a height.

It is clear that a power having exclusive sway over the central tract of the Dalmatian coast from Zara to Spalato, with the military port of Sebenico and the Islands, would be free to come out at any moment and give battle.

The Italian fleet, speeding up partly from Venice and partly from Brindisi, would infallibly find itself exposed to fight with only one-half its forces against the entire enemy fleet, and to the possibility of being beaten separately before having a chance to join up its forces.

Dalmatia if all in the hands of one Power represents a danger to Italy; a portion of Dalmatia in possession of Italy, especially within the modest limits to which Italian aspirations are confined, represents a danger to no one.

The present war has proved this. Italy with all her fleet was unable to do anything substantial against the enemy's naval forces lurking in the ports and canals on the other shore, and even the cooperation of considerable French and British forces could achieve nothing. Italy was compelled to suffer her naval energies to be worn away in an enervating effort of defence and unaccepted challenge, notwithstanding several acts of individual valour. Austria-Hungary, on the contrary, was able to attack and bombard undefended towns on the Italian coast, and then take refuge behind her wonderful screen on the eastern coast, before the ever vigilant Italian and Allied Forces were able to overtake her.

In order to avoid remaining in a state of permanent and absolute inferiority, Italy is, therefore, entitled to ask that, in accordance with what has been set forth above, the coast and islands of the Adriatic which will be allotted to others, shall be neutralised; that all fortifications, either on land or sea, should be forbidden and all existing ones dismantled.

As to the zone comprised between Zara and Sebenico, its configurations are such that no form of neutralisation could possibly prevent its being transformed in a few hours into a first rate naval base by the sudden resort to the latest means of warfare such as mines, submarines, etc., which would make that coast absolutely impregnable. Only by having it in her possession could Italy guarantee her safety.

Italian Rights on Fiume

The Treaty with her Allies which preceded Italy's entrance into the war, recognised those rights which, as shown above, are Italy's natural and historic rights and essential to her economic and defensive unity in the mountains and on the sea. Fiume and her district have, however, been excepted, and Italy must now reclaim them not only as an essential part of Julian Venetia, as an indispensable fulfil-

ment of her eastern defensive requirements, but, above all, because Fiume is, after Trieste, Gorizia and Pola, the most important Italian town on the eastern Adriatic. There are in Fiume 33,000 Italians, with whom are intermixed only 10,927 Slavs, and 1,300 Magyars. Both ancient and modern history show Fiume as thoroughly Italian: the very Croatian Ban Jelačić, who in 1848 forcibly occupied the town by order of Austria and as a punishment to Hungary, which had rebelled against the Hapsburgs, had publicly to guarantee to the citizens of Fiume "the use of their Italian tongue."

Jealously guarding her Italian culture and teaching, Fiume rebelled against the tendency towards introducing the teaching of other languages in her schools, "thus sowing in the tender hearts of the children prejudice against the Italian tongue, which is the country's own language, and one of the principal elements to which can be attributed her culture and progress, both commercial and industrial" (1861).

The mayors, all members of the municipal council, the deputies have always been and are Italian and only Italian. Up to quite recently, out of respect to the Italian character of Fiume, the Hungarian Kingdom published the laws in Italian.

Her Italian character and autonomy have always been the fundamental elements of the life of Fiume; especially since the day when by her decree of April 23rd, 1779, Maria Theresa declared Fiume to be a separate body of the Hungarian Kingdom, and a town free from all union or connection with Croatia (*separatum sacrae regni Hungarariae coronæ adnexum corpus . . . neque cum alio Buccarano vel ad regnum Croatiae pertinente ulla ratione commisceatur*). This privilege was confirmed by succeeding fundamental laws and by the "Statute of the FREE CITY of Fiume." After the fall of the Hapsburg dynasty, Fiume claimed her right to self-determination and proclaimed, on

the 29th October, 1918, her adherence to Italy, to whom, according to the tradition of the Italian Risorgimento, she had already been assigned by the program of the Carboneria (1822).

Italy, in asserting her right to accept and ask for recognition of the spontaneous self-dedication of Italian Fiume, knows too that she is thus meeting in the best way the necessity for a rational exploitation of Fiume's economic value in the interest particularly of the hinterland to which she serves as port. At the same time Italy would have in Fiume, according to the spirit of the Treaty with her Allies, one of the compensations to which she has earned a full right by the greater efforts and sacrifices by which she has contributed to the war, considering also the new conditions created by the disruption of Austria-Hungary.

When Italy joined the Allied Powers her undertaking, according to the military convention then agreed to, was limited by the obligation of Russia to employ against Austria-Hungary a certain minimum force, "to prevent Austria-Hungary from concentrating all her efforts against Italy if Russia should desire to turn her attention in particular against Germany."

The internal political events in Russia which led to a separate peace had the following double consequence: that Austria-Hungary, freed from any possibility of further pressure, was able to concentrate all her forces against Italy and that Germany, also freed from her Eastern enemy, was in a position to lend Austria-Hungary that efficacious assistance which at one period had such serious repercussion to Italy's detriment.

In fact, while the unexpected event of Russia's disappearance from among the Entente belligerents was largely compensated to our Allies by the intervention of the American forces, no assistance of this sort came to the Italian Front to relieve the effort of the Italian army, as President Wilson himself so sympathetically acknowledged and regretted.

The double consequence of Russia's falling out, from which Italy was the principal sufferer, both as regards military effort and sacrifice on the part of the population, would justify Italy in requesting an all-round increase of the compensations which were agreed upon in anticipation of much smaller efforts and sacrifices.

Italy wishes to give proof—even in this case—of the greatest moderation, and limits herself to requesting, as has been stated above, the City and District of Fiume, which racially is in its great majority Italian, and which has of its own accord proclaimed its desire to be united to Italy. Moreover, in the defensive system of our land frontier, Fiume rounds off the extreme, and therefore the most critical point. The border would otherwise be reduced to an untenable line consisting of the administrative frontier between Istria and Fiume, up to now in the hands of one State only.

Fiume in Italian hands would complete, too, the anti-German programme of defense in the Adriatic. Only Italy, that is to say only a great sea Power, can dispose of the necessary means for carrying into effect this programme, which meets the requirements of the combined interests of all the Powers who have fought side by side in the war.

Trieste and Fiume—a French writer warns us in 1915, referring to the terms of the future peace—either under Austrian or Hungarian disguise, are but German ports, southern terminals of a line of domination of which Hamburg and Bremen are the terminals on the North Sea.

Having freed the one terminal, Trieste, from indirect German domination, we must prevent the other, Fiume, from carrying on her German functions under Jugo-Slav attire even against the desire and intention of the new Slav State, which would be powerless and unprepared to eliminate the old influences and to counteract the German efforts which will be concentrated, especially after the loss of Trieste, on the one possible point of penetration.

Not even an Anti-German Danube Confederation, even if

it could be constituted, could replace Italy in this mission without serious delays of which the enemy, with the financial trickery of which he is master, would take full advantage.

The natural aptitude and technical means at the disposal of a sea power such as Italy are necessary for this purpose. Italy would place this port, as she will place Trieste, entirely at the service of its natural hinterland. She would but reconcile by means of the best technical and most advantageous economical methods, her own interests with those of her natural customers, avoiding the effects of any political influence or dependence, contrary to the common line of general interest.

To these States Italy could guarantee specific advantages such as bonded warehouses and bonded zones, reserved portions of the general storehouses, special landing places, preferential tariffs for harbour dues, special markets, agreements for cumulative railway and maritime tariffs, agreements for the emigration traffic, etc. She is thus sure of acting also in the interests of her own ports, whose prosperity is intimately connected with that of the hinterland States.

Since Trieste and Fiume must be outlets of German territories (Germany and German Austria), the Czecho-Slovak State, the Jugo-Slav countries (Slovenia and Croatia) and of Hungary, the difficulty,—not to say the impossibility—is perfectly clear, of any Power other than Italy ensuring to their common outlets on the sea that impartial and objective technical management which is an indispensable requisite of the rapid and economical exploitation of these ports and of the railway and maritime lines by which they must be served. Only Italy could fulfil these functions as she is obviously outside and superior to any competition either political or economic which may arise between the above mentioned States.

With regard particularly to Fiume, it must be denied

that this port is essential to the economic needs of Croatia. The Croatian traffic amounts to only 7 per cent. of the total movement (import and export) of the port of Fiume; the remainder belongs to the other countries of the hinterland and especially to Hungary. Only 13 per cent. of the entire trade of Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina passed through Fiume, the rest going towards the ports of Lower Dalmatia. The maritime service of the port of Fiume, run so far by companies subsidised by the Hungarian Government, could certainly not be worked by a new state which would bring to Fiume such a small portion of her traffic, which would have many other urgent demands, and which is in no way prepared for such work. Only a great sea Power, such as Italy, with the necessary traditions, means, connections, and experience could help Fiume to accomplish her mission, although at first some sacrifice would be required which could easily be borne by the Italian treasury in the summing up of the profit and loss which is possible through the cumulative management of so many ports.

Trieste and Fiume in Italian hands could have combined maritime services of wider range, and more economical and perfect in organisation, without giving rise to any conflict of interests and to the mutual advantage of their respective hinterlands.

Maritime services run separately for Trieste and Fiume would be neither rational nor economical, Trieste supported by an important Power like Italy might have them while Fiume has not, to her own detriment as well as to the detriment of her hinterland, which would necessarily pay higher rates for such lines than they would require to pay if Fiume were Italian and could make use of the cumulative services which Italy would maintain for both her ports in the Northern Adriatic.

In other words, and not only in this respect, Italy would, to the advantage of both ports and of the producing and

consuming districts of the hinterland, exercise a regulating and subsidising function. The other States of the hinterland, and especially Croatia and Jugoslavia, would lack for this purpose the requisite means, technical preparation and impartiality.

The problem of Fiume, so closely allied to that of Trieste, besides being one that intimately concerns Italy, involving, as it does, the interests of a city which is so markedly Italian, and which is, moreover, connected with the other problem of the eastern Italian frontier,—is also a European problem in the anti-German sense of the word. Only as an Italian city would the development of Fiume as an emporium be ensured, thus protecting the port itself and its hinterland (especially the Magyar district) from the dangers of the following dilemma: either economic ruin or German help and therefore German hegemony, even if only of an economic character. “Fiume as a Croatian city,” as has been written by a French journalist, “means a Hungarian, Austro-Hungarian or German Fiume, which all amounts to the same thing.”

In conclusion, if it is true that the Treaty of London united Fiume to the Kingdom of Croatia in view of its territorial continuity with that region, it is none the less true that the same Treaty did not foresee the fall of the Hapsburg Monarchy, of which the said Kingdom was an integral part. In that case it appeared reasonable that the political possession of an autonomous port on the Adriatic should not be denied to Transleithania and more especially to a total population of 50 million inhabitants, who were quite able to attend to its maintenance and support; whereas, with the fall of the Empire at Vittorio Veneto after the last determining factor of the Italian Army’s powerful blow, the need for and the claim to political rule over this commercial outlet ceased to exist.

The history of over a century, from the proclamation of Maria Theresa which declares Fiume to be a “separate

body" of the Hungarian State without any "connection whatsoever with Croatia" up to the last decisions of the National Council of Fiume, all goes to prove that only by deforming a material reality in perfect harmony with an inalterable spiritual reality, would it be possible to bind Fiume to the fortunes of a new Slav State.

No one can honestly contest Italy's right to obtain from Peace those fruits which for the most part were assured to her prior to her entry into the war as her due for efforts and for sacrifices infinitely inferior to those which she actually made in the common cause. Whoever disputes or discusses Italy's claims, does not do so from objective or intrinsic reasons, but only from too great a consideration for the pretensions of Southern Slavs.

They are the very claims and objections of those Slavs who up to the last moment contributed in full measure to the war, specially devoting their energies against Italy. Only yesterday the most important Jugo-Slav paper admitted that they had fought *like lions against Italy*—that is to say against the Entente—for what they call *their land*. From the Austro-Hungarian Government, and almost as a reward for the loyalty and dynastic character preserved up to the last by their agitation for a Jugo-Slav State within the orbit of the Hapsburg Monarchy, they received at the last moment, in the handing over of the fleet, a mandate of confidence which cannot but cause some perplexity as to the attitude to be taken by the Allies towards the future of the new State.

However, Italy foresaw, before allying herself to the enemies of the Central Empires, the possibility that rightful claims might be contested after the victory by companions in arms who might in some respects have political interests different from or opposite to hers.

For this reason she proposed and accepted an equitable compromise implying unquestionable renunciations to complete redemption of Italian land and peoples. Italy thus

defined the minimum which, while giving some satisfaction to the legitimate desires of others, would also guarantee that on a favorable conclusion of the war, her hopes would not be rendered vain and illusory as a result of pressure exerted by those very men by whose side Italy had fought.

Having at that time, in order to avoid future misunderstanding, drawn the attention of her new Allies to the possibility of the contestations, which have now arisen in a wholly unjustifiable form, Italy is now entitled to anticipate fully that her moderate requests, corresponding to her rights and necessities and having to such a great extent the full suffrage of the peoples involved, should be accepted in full.

APPENDIX IV

MEMORANDUM ON THE DALMATIAN QUESTION

Presented to the Peace Conference in Paris by the Delegation
of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes

I. *Geographical Arguments*

DALMATIA has no natural frontiers. It is not a geographical unity which has always been contained within the same boundaries, but a creation of history, having had during various epochs different frontiers. Roman Dalmatia, for instance, included Eastern Istria up to the River Arsa, all the islands of the Adriatic, all the present Dalmatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, up to the river Boyana, and Serbia, as far as the Morava.

Dalmatia, with its present frontier, only dates from 1815, while in the Middle Ages she was reduced to four or five maritime towns and some islands. Dalmatia is, on the whole, only the western coast of the Balkan Peninsula, intimately bound up with it not only by its geographical, geological, orographical, and in general its morphological structure, but also by ethnic laws, by its social atmosphere, community of race and political ideal. Istria and Dalmatia, with all its islands of the Adriatic, are nothing but chains of the Dinaric Alps of which the sea has invaded the valleys. In a word, Istria and Dalmatia constitute the Western littoral of the Balkan Peninsula, its right lung.

The Dinaric Alps do not in any way prevent the trade of the western Balkan littoral with its hinterland, as the history of Rome and the history of the Croats and Serbs

prove. There still exist today Roman roads which facilitate commerce between the Balkan continent and the sea, roads well known to Italian merchants, who make use of them to go to Bosnia to purchase cattle. Two railways connect Dalmatia with Bosnia and Herzegovina. It would have had others if Austria had not prevented their construction.

The names of places in Dalmatia prove with absolute certainty that that country belongs to the same geographic and ethnic group as the rest of the Balkans, because it would be difficult to find one per cent. of names of Latin origin, even on the islands furthest removed from the Dalmatian coast. Solely, the names of the principal towns and certain of the islands were Italianized, or are of Illyrian, Greek or Latin origin.

Therefore, Dalmatia and Istria with all the isles and islets of the Eastern Adriatic, form, from every point of view, an indivisible whole, living with and from the Balkan Peninsula. Any attempt to detach the least part, the least fragment would be a veritable mutilation.

II. *Historical Arguments*

Dalmatia, by its fortunate geographical situation, has always awaked the covetous desires of conquerors. The list of all the invasions it has had to suffer during the course of centuries would be a long one. The Romans, under the pretext of punishing pirates, undertook its conquest from the end of the 3rd century before Christ.

They had to carry on long and difficult wars and could only put the country under their yoke, under the command of Tiberius, in the year 12 A.D. Velleius Paterculus states that the Dalmatians rebelled more than two hundred times against the Romans. On the other hand, neither the Illyrians nor their successors, the Jugoslavs, ever undertook any war of conquest against Italy.

After the Jugoslavs occupied the provinces of ancient Il-

lyria and were definitely settled there, the western branch, the Croats, founded a State on the Adriatic littoral of which the centre was the region which constitutes the present day Dalmatia. Before the reign of the Serbian dynasty of the Nemanyitch, during and even after their rule, Southern Dalmatia formed part of the Serbian State. The Croatian State was constituted as a Kingdom and during the twelfth century was attached to Hungary in the form of a personal union. From its foundation it struggled against the Republic of Venice, which pretended to dominate the Dalmatian coast. In the struggle, which lasted eight centuries, Venice played the part of the aggressor and the Jugoslavs never did anything but defend themselves. Our people fought with tenacity for their country and their liberty. They only succumbed to the attacks of Venice when the Turks succeeded in destroying their political independence. A striking example of what this struggle for the defence of their country was may be found in the history of Zara, which, although conquered seventeen times, always shook off the yoke of Venice.

The Venetian domination, which lasted as long as the Turkish domination in Serbia, was an epoch of intellectual and economic decadence for Dalmatia. While the free Ragusa was flourishing and, under the influence of its prosperity, was able to create an admirable civilization, which caused it to be given the title of the "Jugoslav Athens" (the literature of Ragusa at this time is now the patrimony of the Serbo-Croatian literature), the remainder of Dalmatia, dominated by Venice, offered the spectacle of the greatest misery, due to the negligence of the authorities. The French, who occupied it in 1806, did not find there a single public school and not a single mile of road. Under the French domination (1806 to 1815), when the first schools were founded and the first roads constructed, Dalmatia began to revive. But in falling, in 1815, under the domination of Austria, it was again abandoned for a century.

The national and liberal movement in Europe, due to the French Revolution, in the first half of the nineteenth century brought about an awakening of the nation's conscience among the Jugoslavs of Dalmatia, a conscience which had slumbered during five centuries of foreign domination. The struggle for the use of the national language in the administration and in the schools, for power in its communes and in the provincial administration (a struggle directed against the Austrian system) began in the year 1860. In this struggle the Jugoslav national idea was victorious and the Austrian Government was forced to admit the language, which was spoken by nearly the entire population, both in the schools and in the administration. The Italian bureaucracy which lost, in consequence, its predominance on the Jugoslav masses, constituted the nuclei of the present Italian minority in the towns and it is this minority of 3 per cent. of the population which still pretends to dominate the other 97 per cent.

Already forty years before the present world war, the Jugoslavs, by their own efforts and contrary to the intentions of the Austrian Government, became masters of all the autonomous institutions of the province. Of the 86 municipal councils existing in Dalmatia, 85 are Slav and one only, that of Zara, is Italian. And even that one would have fallen into the hands of the Slavs if the Austrian Government had permitted the adoption of universal suffrage. Of the 41 deputies of the Dalmatian Diet 6 only were Italian, all elected in the town of Zara on account of the old system of voting, while the remaining 35 were Serbo-Croats. All the deputies to the parliament of Vienna, eleven in number, elected by universal suffrage, were Serbo-Croats. An enormous Slav majority was elected to the Dalmatian Diet and did not cease to demand union with the sister provinces of Croatia and Slavonia with which, in the Middle Ages, it had formed a powerful state. Austria-Hungary always opposed these legitimate aspirations (and that in complete ac-

cord with the Italian political party of Dalmatia). Austria-Hungary is now dead for good and the Dalmatian people hopes that with the Austria has also died the iniquitous system it represented.

III. *Ethnical, Statistical and Political Arguments*

The strongest argument in modern politics to decide to whom a country should belong is the ethnical one. Now, it would be difficult to find a country ethnically more pure or more homogeneous than Dalmatia. The following are the statistical data:

The official census of 1910 established a percentage of 96.19 of inhabitants of the Serbo-Croat language, 2.84 per cent. of the Italian language and 0.75 per cent. of other nationalities, that is to say 610,669 Serbo-Croats and 18,028 Italians.

In 1851, when the political power was exclusively in the hands of the Italians, the returns gave 378,676 Slavs and 14,645 Italians. In 1857, when the Government was still favorable to the Italians and the latter were in power in Dalmatia, the statistics gave 415,628 Slavs and 16,000 Italians. The population speaking Italian therefore always remain in a proportion of 3 to 4 per cent. That it does not increase in the same proportion as the Jugoslavs is due to the fact that it is exclusively urban, being composed of people belonging to the lower and middle class and not including any inhabitants in the country.

One part of the population is formed of immigrants from Italy and the other of Italianized natives. There does not exist in Dalmatia an autochthonous Italian population. The immigrants are descendants of the Venetian functionaries who remained in Dalmatia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, or of Austrian functionaries (originally from the Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom) who established themselves in the country during the first half of the nineteenth century, and finally small merchants, artisans, sailors or fishermen

who arrived recently from Italy and who have formed new Italian colonies similar to those in Marseilles, Tunis and the Argentine. The remainder is composed of Slavs, Italianized in the schools or adherents of the Italian political party, which quite recently still held power. Nevertheless all these Dalmatians speaking the Italian language have always declared that they were not Italians but Slavs of Italian civilization. Until the end of the nineteenth century, they called themselves "Slavo-Dalmatians," opposing this denomination to the national names of Croats and Serbs. Their only popular political journal was printed exclusively in the Serbo-Croatian language and bore the name of "Pravi Dalmatinac" (which means in Serbo-Croatian, the "true Dalmatian").

The ethnical character of the town of Zara itself does not differ in any way from the other Dalmatian towns. Zara was already Slav in the twelfth century. A chronicle of the year 1177 states that the Pope Alexander III, when he came to the town, was accompanied in procession to the church of St. Anastasia while hymns *in the Slav language* (. . . illorum lingua slavonica . . .) were sung. (Farlati, III, 3.)

In its struggle against Venice it showed more resistance than any of its sister towns. Though its Slav population was more than once exterminated or dispersed by the Venetians, the base nevertheless remained Slav. Today Zara is a little town of functionaries, the last bulwark of an Italian bureaucracy in a purely Slav country. Having been under the Venetian and Austrian domination the capital of the province, it is the headquarters of the greatest number of Italianized functionaries, who, with their families and their dependents, constitute the majority of the population. But this majority is limited to the urban part of Zara, to the town alone, without the suburbs or environs, for if one considers the entire community of Zara it is found that the Slavs are in a proportion of 3 to 1 Italian, and in the district of Zara this population is 7 to 1.

As to the Dalmatian islands the population is purely Slav and possesses highly developed national conscience. These are Slav to such a point that in the island of Lissa, (the one the furthest from the mainland), for instance, out of 10,041 one cannot even find one per cent. Italians.

The Serbo-Croatian literature had its roots principally in the islands which were rivals of Ragusa in the poetic art. The most ancient inscriptions on stone in the Serbo-Croatian language are found at Starigrad (Cittavecchia), a little town situated in the island of Hvar (Lesina). Inscriptions even in glagolite (old Slavonic) characters are found at Suchurai on Lesina.

During a struggle which has lasted a thousand years the Dalmatians have kept the old Slavonic language in the liturgy of the Roman Catholic church where, even at Zara, as in the times of Pope Alexander III, the Slav hymns still are sung.

Dalmatia is the purest Slav country and five centuries of foreign domination could not denationalize it: its conscience of being Slav is a more living force than in any region in the Balkans. The Dalmatian Diet, at the opening of each new session, has never failed to demand, in a special and solemn address, the union of Dalmatia with Croatia. Let Dalmatia be given the possibility of freely expressing its sentiments and it is more than certain that it will affirm, by an almost unanimous vote, its desire to be reunited to the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.

IV. *Strategical Arguments*

The Southern Slavs had not and will never have any desire for conquest. They are a peaceful people who only desire to live in peace with the whole world.

Their geographical position, exposed as it is to covetous desires and to invasion, has forced them to become a warlike people, but only for the defence of their native soil. It is

for this reason that they desire natural and sure frontiers, and they believe that the best and most natural of all frontiers is, without doubt, the sea. Thus they cannot tolerate the installation of any power on the eastern coast of the Adriatic or on the islands which form an integral part of it. They consider such occupation as strategic bridgeheads, made in view of new conquests at the expense of their territory. The islands of the eastern coast of the Adriatic may be regarded as fortresses—but only as defensive fortresses and not as offensive fortresses. These islands, in the hands of a foreign power, would really be fortresses directed against our country. If such a state of things was created, our State would lose all its liberty of action, it would fall, by the very fact, under foreign domination, and would find itself in a perpetual state of insecurity. In the constant danger of being suddenly attacked by an enemy army, it could not devote itself to the task of developing public education and economic prosperity, but would be forced to concentrate all its energies on the creation of defences against the menace of foreign invasion. Its force would be completely paralyzed and its sovereignty illusory.

The assertion, according to which the possession of the eastern coast of the Adriatic, or at least some of the islands, would be necessary for Italy to safeguard her western coast from danger of a pretended aggression on our part, has no basis on fact. History teaches us that, in this region, the movement of conquest has always gone from the western toward the eastern coast (Roman and Venetian invasions) and never in the contrary direction. Italy was attacked and conquered, by sea, by adversaries coming from the South (the Carthaginians and Arabs) or coming from the West (Spaniards), but never from the East. If the eastern littoral of the Adriatic is better provided with ports and gulfs, the western coast is richer in population and natural resources which are the basis of all military and political force. It is for this reason that the eastern coast

has never been able to dominate the western coast, while the latter has, on several occasions, conquered the eastern coast, not with a defensive aim but with the well-determined intention of establishing its domination on the Balkan Peninsula. It was thus that the Romans acted in ancient times, and, in a more recent epoch, the Venetians; it is still what those desire to realize who today claim for Italy a part of the eastern littoral and invoke the necessity of protecting the Italian coast.

The liberty of the Adriatic Sea will only be assured when opposite a rich and populous Italy a State is found on the eastern side capable of establishing equilibrium. And since the predominance in men and natural riches will always be on the side of Italy, mistress of the fertile and populous valley of the Po, the strategic advantage to our state, resulting from the possession of the coast which naturally belongs to it in the basin of the Adriatic, should be all the more assured to us.

So long as these elements of maritime supremacy remain separate, the liberty of navigation will be guaranteed to all nations. But the day when Italy will add the strategic factor to her economic preponderance, by installing herself on the eastern coast, the Adriatic will at once become an Italian lake.

V. *Economic Arguments*

The annexation of Dalmatia by a foreign State would certainly entail for it an economic decadence and would create an incurable wound in the organization of our State. The eastern coast, rocky and poor, does not possess the conditions for an independent economic life. Its natural function is to be the outlet for the rich plains of the valleys of the Danube, the Save, the Bosna and the Morava to the sea, and it is from these countries that it ought to live. Separated from the rest of the country, Dalmatia could not lead a normal life, as is demonstrated by the five centuries of her his-

tory under the Venetian and Austrian dominations.

The principal agricultural products of the eastern coast of the Adriatic are wine and oil, which were exported to Austria, to Hungary and to Bosnia. Foreign competition, which will have no limits, would cause such a depreciation of these products that the Dalmatians would have no means of procuring bread and other foodstuffs of prime necessity. The best proof of this affirmation lies in the terrible consequences resulting from a clause in the Italo-Austrian treaty of commerce which permitted the free importation of the wines of Italy into Austria-Hungary and which brought about the economic ruin of Dalmatia. Already in the Middle Ages the influence of the close relations between Dalmatia and its hinterland made themselves felt. Serbian commerce, at that epoch, was directed in the greater part toward Dalmatia.

On the contrary, in our State, Dalmatia would sell her produce at advantageous prices and would buy foodstuffs of prime necessity cheaper than elsewhere, the importations and exportations being naturally and justly balanced.

Under foreign domination the ports of Dalmatia could not pretend to become ports of transit for the commerce of the hinterland. On the contrary, if they belonged to our State, they would undergo a great development as ports of exportation for the natural riches of the adjacent Jugoslav countries.

VI. *Conclusion*

All these reasons militate in favor of the incorporation of Dalmatia in the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. But the strongest of all is the firm, decided and resolute will of the Dalmatian people to be reunited with its national State and the right which our nation possesses to its territorial integrity. A solution of the Dalmatian question which would be contrary to the will of the population would inevitably plant the germs of new conflicts.

APPENDIX V

MEMORANDUM OF THE KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES REGARDING THE CITY OF RIJEKA (FIUME) PRE- SENTED TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE IN PARIS

THE Delegation of the Serbo-Croato-Slovene Government is under the necessity of laying down briefly the reasons on which its right to Rijeka (generally known under the Italian name of Fiume) is based.

FROM THE ETHNICAL POINT OF VIEW

It has been stated that the last official statistics of 1910 have brought out, in the town of Fiume, the presence of 24,212 Italians, 6,493 Magyars, 2,315 Germans and 15,687 Jugoslavs, which assures the Italians a relative preponderance.

But a judicious and equitable criticism of these statistical data leads first of all to the posing of the question as to who are the authorities who have taken this census and supervised its sincerity. It was made by the municipal bureau of Fiume, composed exclusively of Italians and Magyars, under the control of the Magyar Government. To anyone who knows the procedure in usage in the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, but especially in Hungary, there are already grounds, in this simple fact for suspecting the results of an operation which affected the Italo-Magyar political interests.

The entire situation in Fiume for fifty years past has been dominated by the fact that the Magyars had as their aim the establishing over this town a hegemony as jealous as it was artificial. Powerless to establish themselves there and

to maintain a numerical superiority they arranged at least to paralyze by political alliances or combinations the opposition of the only element they had to fear and the only one with which they had had prolonged and serious conflicts, the autochthonous Croatian element.

As soon as one leaves, not the agglomeration but the town itself of Fiume and passes into the suburbs, that of Sušak, which is itself an important urban centre, shows a population of 11,705 Slavs against 658 Italians. And as soon as one advances into the interior or across the narrow canal which separates the mainland from the island of Krk (Veglia) one finds oneself, except for individual exceptions, in an exclusively Slav country. The suburbs of Fiume, the environs toward the country, the environs toward the sea, that is to say everything that goes to make up the town, all that holds to it by the laws of a natural and indestructible solidarity, all this is purely Slav. It is superfluous to recall that the whole hinterland is in the same case.

On considering, in consequence, this from a collective point of view, and always from the simple ethnical point of view, the Italian and Magyar colonies of Fiume make the impression of an enclave in the midst of a Slav population, and of being, so to say, a foreign body.

Later on it will be stated how the Magyars made their way into Fiume, where, besides, they are only represented by a few functionaries, soldiers, heads of industries, ship-owners and professors. There remains to be explained, in the town itself, the presence of nearly 25,000 individuals—according to the official statistics—who claim Italian nationality.

This phenomenon is explained in the first place by immigration. Fiume is, effectively, an industrial and maritime centre quite near to the Kingdom of Italy, a country with a natality of such importance that it is able to offer labor to its various neighbors, Switzerland, France, Tunis, etc.

A convincing proof of the justness of this explanation

may be drawn from comparison with preceding statistics. Fiume, of which the development is quite recent, counted in 1848 only 12,598 inhabitants, 11,581 Croats and 691 Italians. In 1854, according to Kandler, the number of Italians had already increased but nevertheless did not exceed five or six thousand. It is only natural to associate the continued increase of the Italian colony with the progressive development of the industries of the town, the construction of the railways, the harbor works, etc. But this interesting phenomenon, like many other similar ones, from the demographical and industrial point of view, proves absolutely nothing from the national point of view.

Another fact accounts for the place occupied by the "Italian" element not only among the workmen but among the bourgeoisie and the commercial classes of Fiume. This phenomenon is due to the fact that in past time, a certain number of Slav families have Italianized themselves. At a time when the consciousness of nationality was not developed as it is today, when schools were rare and when, in addition, the influence of Italian literature, manners and customs was naturally exercised from one coast of the Adriatic to the other, many people imagined they distinguished themselves from the common people and gave themselves an air of superior cultivation by adopting the exterior signs of Italian nationality. This is what today explains (numerous examples of it could be cited) why some of the more or less ardent protagonists of the "Italianity" of Fiume show, by the very names they bear, their Slav origin. But this does not prove anything from a national point of view. Such weaknesses only bring out all the more strongly the irresistible character of the *national and democratic current* which has had the result of awakening the immense majority of the Yugoslavs to the consciousness of the fact that they are a homogeneous people and has gained them over to the principles of the Entente.

One must, finally, take into account that the Magyars, in

the course of their struggle to the death against the Croats of Fiume, have tried by all the means in their power to make themselves the allies of the Italian autonomist tendencies, the Italian influence and the Italian tongue, while at the same time they suppressed all the Croat schools and systematically removed the Croats from the local administration.

In a town where there was no place, either in the State or municipal institutions, or in the schools of all categories, for the Croat language, a town in which the Italian and Magyar languages were alone officially recognized, it is not surprising that among the new generation, a certain number of people of Slav origin have learned to speak and even to think in Italian and that a trace of this phenomenon is found in the census of 1910.

What it is important to retain of this rapid exposé is that the pretended "Italianity" of Fiume (confined in addition to the town itself) is the double product of immigration and diverse forms of denationalisation either imposed or accepted. The decisive proof that this is the case is that, outside the town, everywhere where these two factors have not found a terrain favorable to their influence, the population has remained purely Slav, to such a point that even the statistics drawn up by the Hungarian Government itself have had to make a complete admission of the fact.

FROM THE HISTORIC POINT OF VIEW

The town of Fiume, which has played an important part in the history of the Monarchy of the Hapsburgs, and more particularly in that of Croatia and Hungary, has not been mixed up, in any manner whatever, in the history of Italy, with the exception of a very brief period, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, when Venice exercised an ephemeral domination over it.

During the feudal period Fiume and its territory belonged to an ancient family of the Croatian nobility, that

of Frankopan, and was ceded by it, in 1465, to the Emperor Frederic IV. Since that time the town of Fiume formed part of the federation of States owing allegiance to the crown of St. Stephen, up to the day when Maria Theresa, without severing it from that crown, declared nevertheless that it was "immediately" annexed to Croatia (1775).

The sense and the spirit of this innovation, determined perhaps to put in accord the already rival pretensions of Magyars and Croatians, were to assign to Croatia a juridically intermediary rôle (it was already such from the double point of view of geography and economics) between Hungary and this port. Fiume enjoyed in addition a charter which consecrated certain municipal privileges.

Fiume was, during the revolution of 1848 and the following years, the theatre of armed conflicts between the Croatians and the Magyars. The latter, who succeeded in taking a momentary possession of the town, were dislodged by Jellačić on December 2, 1849.

When, in 1867, after the defeat of Sadowa, the Monarchy of the Hapsburgs undertook to reconstitute itself on the basis of dualism, the special situation of Fiume formed the subject of negotiations between the representatives of the Croatian State and those of the Magyar State and an attempt was made to settle it in the text of the compromise (*Nagodba*) destined to regulate the general constitutional relations between Hungary and Croatia. But they only succeeded in postponing the solution of the question in article number 66, which became celebrated by the material alterations which the Magyars had the audacity to carry out on the original of the document already ratified and signed by the Emperor-King. This article, which simply placed on record that no agreement had been possible and that the Hungaro-Croatian negotiations on this point were to be resumed, was covered over with a strip of paper the text written on which declared that Croatia renounced Fiume. The document on which this forgery was committed—a

forgery only discovered some years later—is deposited at Zagreb (Agram) in the State Archives and photographic reproductions of it have been published.

The essential characteristics of the history of Fiume show an obstinate and quite natural struggle between the Magyars who, separated from the Adriatic by Croatia, wanted to create a port to their profit, and the Croatians who resisted this pretension, in the name of their geographical and national rights. Italy, which besides only succeeded in effecting her own national unification during the last phases of this secular conflict, could only look on as a spectator. And even the Italians of Fiume had only occasion to take part in it, more or less, as the allies of the Magyar policy with a view to conserving to their profit certain municipal privileges which had no connection with “irredentism.”

When, then, toward the end of 1918, the municipality of Fiume (in majority Italian) and the Italian National Council improvised in the town, thought it their right to proclaim their “annexation” to Italy and to send delegates to Rome with this end in view, they seem to have made a confusion between their municipal right (which is in the expression of an autonomy embracing only local affairs) and of the rights of a State which raises very much more important questions of sovereignty and territorial limits. And even though the Latin text, borrowed from the rescript of Maria Theresa and often invoked, which defines Fiume as “*separatum sacrae Regni Hungaricae Coronae adnexum corpus*,” might lend itself to an interesting controversy regarding juridical exegesis, nothing useful can be extracted from it today from the point of view of the devolution of Fiume on the basis of modern jurisprudence. The legal subtlety which, a century and a half ago, made of Fiume a body, at once separate and associate (*separatum et adnexum*) may, strictly speaking, be explained by complications familiar in the ancient public law of the countries un-

der the Monarchy of the Hapsburgs. It cannot today create the slightest right for a municipality, elected simply to occupy itself with communal affairs and which should have nothing to do with any of the branches of the administration of the State, to invoke, in October, 1918, the principles of self-determination to decide the destinies of Fiume.

When President Wilson formulated the principle of self-determination, he took the precaution to add the words "of peoples," and his idea did not certainly extend to small communities. Besides, the inhabitants of Fiume, who, as we have seen, are divided into Italians, Slavs, Magyars and even Germans, could not pretend to form a people by themselves, neither from the ethnical nor the juridical point of view, nor from the political point of view. Even if they were in accord on this pretension (and such is certainly not the case) it would be already untenable, for its admission would run the risk of leading the Peace Conference to break into fragments and to complicate its work of reconstruction on the basis of nationality, in view of the fact that similar pretensions might repeat themselves elsewhere.

As to the practical consequences of a dissociation of the town of Fiume alone from the Slav territory on which it is situated, from the Slav islands which surround it and the Slav environs from which it lives and which it helps to live, they may be judged by the following considerations.

FROM THE GEOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC POINT OF VIEW

Fiume, by means of the Ogulin-Zagreb-Belgrade railway and its many branch lines, commands the whole basin of the Save and in consequence the points of access to Croatia, Northern Bosnia, Hungary, Northern Serbia, the Banat and the Bachka, in a word the Slav countries and certain countries bordering on them.

The whole question is whether this very state of affairs does not render it imperative that Fiume should be main

tained within the limits of the territory with which it is incorporated and which it naturally serves, or whether it is more just to make it a sort of commercial bridgehead toward the Slav countries and the Balkan Peninsula at the disposition of a foreign Power.

A Yugoslav Fiume fulfils a function of which it would be necessary to create the organism if it already did not exist, moreover a necessary function, for if, before the war, all the Powers (Italy included) were agreed that access to the Adriatic must be assured to Serbia, such access is more than ever necessary to a Serbia united with the Croatian and Slovene territories, which have together a total of twelve to thirteen million inhabitants. Now, no other Dalmatian port, neither Šibenik (Sebenico) nor Split (Spalato) nor Dubrovnik (Ragusa) nor Kotor (Cattaro) nor Bar (Antivari), fulfils the conditions of geographical situation, harbor arrangements or especially railway connections with the interior which permits them to constitute, from the international point of view, the outlet required for a State of this extent, especially on account of the mountain range which separates Dalmatia, throughout its entire length, from the valley of the Save.

In the hands of Italy, which possesses a mass of harbors and which disposes, notably in the Adriatic, of Venice, Ancona, Bari and Brindisi, Fiume could only fulfil an artificial function. Italy would evidently make use of it to impose her exports on the Slav countries to the detriment of the laws of competition, which protect the interests of third parties, and would subordinate their importations to conditions chosen by her. She would employ, vis-à-vis the State of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes the same means of coercion which Austria formerly employed without scruple vis-à-vis Serbia on the Danube.

Allusion has been made to a system apt to give commercial guarantees to the States of Central Europe deprived of access to the Sea. The Peace Conference has already

appointed a special commission to study this vast and delicate subject. But whatever may be its conclusions one reflection must be made. Out of regard for equity, liberty and the elimination of the causes of conflict between the powers, the modern tendency is to procure maritime outlets to countries shut up in the interior of the continent. But if it is equitable and judicious to procure such outlets by artificial means for people who do not possess them, it is still more necessary to leave their natural outlets to those countries which already possess them. To deprive the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes of Fiume, one of its principal points of access to the sea at the very moment when statutes are being drawn up, in the interests of other non-maritime countries, to assure them access to the sea, would be to fall into a singular contradiction.

In order to separate Fiume politically from its hinterland, it would be necessary to separate the town not only from its rural environs to which it is united by a geographical and economic solidarity, but from its very suburbs. Would the suburb of Sušak, to confine ourselves to this example, be also separated from its hinterland? If it is so, it will be necessary to consult the 15,000 Slav inhabitants who have not abdicated their national rights to the 25,000 Italians or Italianized inhabitants of Fiume. If not, for the simply administrative boundary line which up to today has separated Fiume from Sušak there will be substituted a State frontier line, a customs line between hostile States. In the first case it is the whole Italian claim which is placed in question, or rather which would become more and more fragile, since the statistics of the population of the City of Fiume and its suburb, Sušak, united give a majority to the Slavs. In the second place the result would be the creation of an intolerable situation between a city and its urban continuations which common sense shows were destined to form a whole.

In conclusion the Delegation of the Kingdom of the

Serbs, Croats and Slovenes desire to place on record that guarantees would be given to assure liberty to international commerce *in transitu* by Fiume, notably in the interests of the Czecho-Slovak State, Poland and even Hungary, of which this port is naturally the exit.

It is also ready to accord to the town of Fiume the guarantees necessary to assure to the Italian-speaking inhabitants the free use and development of their language and their Italian culture.

To increase or even simply to maintain the prosperity of this port it must belong to a single power, that is to say the Serbo-Croato-Slovene State, which concentrates on it all its resources and all its efforts. Italy, which disposes of numerous commercial ports, is solicited in various directions by the interests of each of them and she will show her solicitude for them in preference to Fiume. Besides, if Fiume did not belong to our State, the Jugoslavs would have no reason for interesting themselves in this town, in which their influence has hitherto been dominant in the banks, in certain branches of commercial activity, especially in maritime industries. This double neglect might in the end lead to the re-appearance in Fiume of the Magyars or the Germans. Such a possibility, which it is prudent to foresee, is certainly not in conformity with the views and intentions of the conference.

In conclusion, the only solution which seems at the same time equitable and practical, under the guarantees cited above, consists in recognizing that Fiume, already included in the past within the territorial limits of Croatia, shall form an integral part of the State of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.

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